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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
by Francis T. Hoban and William M. Lawbaugh
Systems engineering is not new--it's been
around for quite some time. The ancient
engineers who designed and built the pyra-
mids practiced some form of what we today
call "systems engineering." Modern systems
engineering emerged during and immediate-
ly following World War II as weapons grew
into weapon systems, due to the degree of
complexity in design, development and de-
ployability. The advent of space exploration
further increased the need for and use of sys-
tems engineering processes and practices.
The Apollo Program is perhaps NASA's
best example of the application of systems
engineering. During Apollo, systems engi-
neering processes were in place in NASA
Headquarters and at all field centers. At
some locations the process was formalized; at
others it was a back-of-the-envelope applica-
tion, but it was in place. It was widely prac-
ticed, and it sustained a young and vibrant
organization during the design, development
and operations of the world's greatest engi-
neering feat. NASA systems engineering
capabilities grew out of its NACA heritage,
bolstered by people from the Department of
Defense, industry and academia who joined
the team during the Apollo build-up. It
should be noted that during the Apollo era,
systems engineering was conducted without
Agency-wide guidance, standards or lexicon.
After Apollo, the various NASA centers con-
tinued to implement systems engineering on
complex projects but perhaps with less vigor
and enthusiasm than that displayed during
Apollo.
The discipline again became a priority in
NASA when the study team of the National
Academy of Public Administration, led by
Lt. General Sam C. Phillips, recommended
the strengthening of systems engineering in
NASA.
This group, in its final report to the
NASA administrator on December 30, 1986
also recommended a renewed effort in the
education and training of the NASA pro-
gram and project management workforce.
Unwritten but well understood in this rec-
ommendation was renewed emphasis on sys-
tems engineering training. It was no easy
task to build a knowledge base, create a li-
brary collection and develop courses and
workshops in systems engineering, but the
efforts took shape, as one essential part of
NASA's Program and Project Management
Initiative. This became a continuing educa-
tion process assisted on an Agency-wide
basis by the Systems Engineering Working
Group.
Today most large engineering organiza-
tions, including NASA, have a systems engi-
neering process containing elements both
common and unique to those practiced by
other organizations. To document these
processes NASA is now involved in the prep-
aration of the first Agency-wide systems
engineering manual. The manual addresses
common systems engineering practices and
tools, as well as those unique to NASA and
the aerospace industry. This manual, togeth-
er with those describing the individual Cen-
ters' practices, will fully document systems
engineering at NASA and add to the educa-
tion process.
This present collection was inspired by
seven papers prepared by the NASA Alumni
League, illustrating the members' systems
engineering experience. These papers make
up the heart of this collection. We have sup-
plemented them with papers describing
industry processes and other governmental
practices to illustrate the diversity of sys-
tems engineering as it is formulated and
practiced. This is one discipline that clearly
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benefits from cross-fertilization and infusion
of new ideas.
There is also a wide variety of tools and
techniques described herein, some standard
and some unique. It is not unlike an elite
crew of talented carpenters showing up for a
job, each with some different tools in their re-
spective toolboxes, and each with different
tricks or techniques to save time or money--
to do each one-of-a-kind job better, cheaper,
faster.
If all the authors of Readings in Systems
Engineering were ever to assemble in one
place, there would be some unanimity on ba-
sics and essentials but much debate and
downright disagreement on the particulars.
Nevertheless, the meeting would be lively
and interestingma decent description of the
dynamic process of systems engineering it-
self.
APPROACH
We begin our collection with a now-famous
speech delivered by Bob Frosch to a group of
engineers in New York in 1969, shortly
before his appointment as NASA Adminis-
trator. The speech sets the tone best of all for
this volume: Frosch urges a common sense
approach to systems engineering.
When weapons evolved into weapons sys-
tems, the Department of Defense took the
lead in systems, engineering. Today the DoD
approach is widely recognized, and so we
present the newly revised (1990) description
of the systems engineering process from the
Defense Systems Management College at
Fort Belvoir, Virginia. A senior project engi-
neer formerly with Hughes Aircraft, Paul E.
Lewkowitcz, then discusses requirement
analysis, technology assessment, solution
synthesis and performance verification for
very large systems. Marshall Space Flight
Center does it differently, but one of the best
descriptions of Phase A through C can be
found in Marshall's systems engineering
handbook. To close out this overview section,
excerpts from the forthcoming NASA
Systems Engineering Handbook stress the
engineering aspects of successful manage-
ment of aerospace systems.
In our second section, devoted to specific
applications of systems engineering, we be-
gin with two engineers from the Goddard
Space Flight Center whose presentations are
famous for explaining the process and pro-
ducts of systems engineering in unmanned
spacecraft. Tony Fragomeni and Mike
Ryschkewitsch are associate chief and chief
respectively of Goddard's new Systems Engi-
neering Office. Owen Morris, who was
NASA's Lunar module project manager and
the Space Shuttle Systems and Engineerng
manager, then discusses the history of sys-
tems engineering and integration (SE&I)
management in manned space programs.
Chuck Mathews, past president of the NASA
Alumni League, and NASA's manager of the
Gemini Program, director of the the Skylab
Program and associate administrator for Ap-
plications, then focuses upon the systems en-
gineering role in establishing, verifying and
controlling top-level program requirements.
John D. Hodge, a 25-year veteran of the
Department of Transportation and NASA,
including the Mercury, Gemini, Apollo and
Space Station programs, retiring as an asso-
ciate administrator, explains cost consider-
ations in the systems engineering process,
urging clear definition of requirements, sta-
ble management and strong central control
to allocate funds properly.
John E. Naugle, retired NASA associate
administrator and chief scientist, describes
the dual role of "master" and "servant" for
the systems engineer, from the requirements
phase to preliminary design. Eugene F.
Kranz, director of the Johnson Space Center
Mission Operations Directorate, and
Christopher C. Kraft Jr., former director of
the Johnson Space Center, stress manned
mission operations and SE&I. Robert O.
Aller, recently retired associate administra-
tor for space operations, views operations
support as the infrastructure of people,
procedures, facilities and systems for flight
ii
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success. John Yardley, NASA's associate
administrator for manned space flightdur-
ing the Space Shuttle development, asserts
that the systems engineer should consider 10
different politicaland nontechnical groups.
Associate David Wensley suggests ways of
handling politicaland institutional factors
in the systems engineering process. Loren A.
Lemmerman, formerly of the Lockheed-
Georgia Company, shows how a large air-
craftcompany fitsoptimization into systems
engineering and the totaldesign process.
Next, we present what today can be look-
ed at as case studies in lost systems engi-
neering opportunities. On May 14, 1973, a
minute into flight,Skylab 1 lostits meteor-
oid shield and one oftwo solar array systems.
The NASA Investigation Board determined
that aerodynamic loads were probably not
accounted for in design. Likewise, the Seasat
Mission Failure Investigation Board de-
scribed the uncritical acceptance of "stan-
dard" or "flight proven" equipment that
failedin 1978. But no one wants to end on a
negative, so we reproduce a Johnson Space
Center engineer's attempt to define and ex-
plain "systems engineering" a quarter of a
century ago.
This book is primarily for the next gen-
eration of systems engineers, so we look
ahead. As Bob Aller concludes, "The need for
systems engineering is criticalto NASA in
itspreparations for conducting operations in
the late 1990s and into the next decade."
The editors gratefully acknowledge the
authors for sharing their information with
us. We also wish to thank the NASA Alumni
League for its most important contribution.
We thank the NASA Systems Engineering
Working Group and the entire NASA sys-
tems engineering family for their encourage-
ment and support.
iii

A CLASSIC LOOK AT SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
A CLASSIC LOOK AT SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
by Robert A. Frosch
Editors' Note
Before his term as NASA Administrator,
Bob Frosch was an assistant secretary of
the U.S. Navy in charge of research, devel-
opment, test and evaluation of Navy
programs. In that capacity, he delivered a
controversial and well-remembered speech
to the IEEE Group on Aerospace and
Electronic Systems during IEEE's interna-
tional convention in New York on March
26, 1969. Edited portions of that famous
speech follow in an effort to preserve what
is now considered a classic formulation of
systems engineering as an art rather than a
science.
In this presentation, I really will be discus-
sing the application of systems engineering
todevelopment, and in particular to military
systems development (with which I am most
familiar). However, from reading various
journals and newspapers, I suspect my re-
marks are of more general applicability. I
have said some of these things before, but
some bear repeating and some I hope will
spark new ideas.
I couple systems engineering, systems
analysis and Management (with a capital
"M"), because in practice they seem to be
closely related terms, referring to the same
constellation of systematic practices and
attitudes.
• We badly lack: systems engineering of
systems engineering; systems analysis of
systems analysis.
• And, heaven knows, there is no: manage-
ment ofManagement.
• Therefore, I will now preach against
home, motherhood and apple pie.
To the charge that Iam writing about bad
systems engineering, I can only say that I
am taking a pragmatic view: the thing is
defined by what is done, not what is said; and
if what I am describing is bad systems engi-
neering, I can only say that I seldom see any
other kind.
What I want to do is discuss briefly a
series of antitheses (and perhaps an unbal-
anced question or two) that pit the systems
world against what I believe are some
aspects of the real world.
If I plot a graph versus time of what
appears to be a recent rising tide of costs,
cost overruns, unsatisfactory performance
and unhappiness among engineers, I have
reason to worry. (If this trend continues, we
may have to debate whether the question
"whither engineering?" is spelled with one
"h" or two.) IfI plot on the same graph versus
time the rise in talk, directives, and use of
"systems engineering," "systems analysis"
and "Management," I see high correlation
between the two graphs--trouble versus
time and the use of systems engineering
versus time. This does not prove causation,
but it suggests, at least, that the "new tech-
niques" are proving to be a poor substitute
for real science and engineering; they are, at
the least_, not doing what they are advertised
as doing, if they are indeed actually not
making things worse. It could be that things
would be even worse without these new
techniques, but I would like to ask some
questions and suggest some reasons for
believing that systems engineering, systems
analysis and Management, as practiced, are
likely to be part of the problem, and indeed
causative agents.
I believe that the fundamental difficulty
is that we have all become so entranced with
technique that we think entirely in terms of
procedures, systems, milestone charts, PERT
diagrams, reliability systems, configuration
management, maintainability groups and
the other minor paper tools of the "systems
engineer" and manager. We have forgotten
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that someone must be in control and must
exercise personal management, knowledge
and understanding to create a system. As a
result, we have developments that follow all
of the rules, but fail.
I can best describe the spirit of what I
have in mind by thinking of a music student
who writes a concerto by consulting a check-
list of the characteristics of the concerto
form, being careful to see that all of the can-
ons of the form are observed, but having no
flair for the subject, as opposed to someone
who just knows roughly what a concerto is
like, but has a real feeling for music. The
results become obvious upon hearing them.
The prescription of technique cannot be a
substitute for talent and capability, but that
is precisely how we have tried to use
technique.
PAPER VS. PEOPLE
My first antithesis pits the systems world of
paper and arrangements against the real
world of people and hardware. When paper
appears in the real-world version of a
system, it is generally only as an abstracted
commentary. For example, in a very basic
sense it really is of no consequence whether
the documentation on a weapons system is
good, bad or nonexistent; that is only a
commentary on whether or why the people
and the hardware actually work when called
upon, and a tool to help them work. If the
systems arrangements on paper and the doc-
umentation can help to make the stuff work,
then they are of some use. If they are merely
the formal satisfaction of a requirement,
they are only an interference with engineer-
ing. Systems, even very large systems, are
not developed by the tools of systems engi-
neering, but only by the engineers using the
tools. In looking back at my experiences in
development, including watching a number
of Navy developments over the past few
years, it seems quite clear that in most cases
where a system gets into trouble, a compe-
tent manager knows all about the problem
and is well on the way to fixing it before any
management systems ever indicate that it is
about to happen. This happens if for no other
reason than because the competent manager
is watching what is going on in great detail
and perceives it long before it flows through
the paper system. That is to say, personal
contact is faster than form-filling and the
U.S. mails. A project manager who spends
much time in a Management Information
Center instead of roving through the places
where the work is being done is always
headed for catastrophe. The MIC can assist
the people who are not involved in the project
toward learning of after-the-fact problems,
but that is roughly all that it can do, and its
value even for this purpose is frequently
questionable.
Blaming deficiencies in management
systems for problems that exist in real
unknowns, or in the deficiencies of people, is
mere foolishness. In a poem called "Bagpipe
Music," by Louis MacNeice, the final couplet
is:
"The glass is falling hour by hour,
the glass will fall forever
But if you break the bloody glass,
you won't hold up the weather."
LINEARITY VS. THE REAL WORLD
One of the key misassumptions in modern
systems engineering and systems analysis is
that the total problem can be, and frequently
is, decomposed into subproblems; the
subproblems can be solved more or less
independently, and the total solution can be
synthesized by combination of the subsolu-
tions, treating the interactions of the parts
as "interfaces." The real world is, however,
highlynon-linear, and unless real attention
is paid to this fact, the linear decomposition
treatment will fail catastrophically, because
the interaction terms may be as large as the
subproblems and not reducible to simple
interfaces. The result may well remain
decomposed.
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This criticism is frequently answered by
the comment that problems are unmanage-
able unless sliced up and, therefore, the pro-
cedure is used even though we know it may
be seriously in error. This is the case of the
man who played in a poker game that he
knew to be crooked, because it was the only
game in town; or the drunk who looked for
his ring under the street lamp even though
he had lost it a block away in the dark--the
light was better under the street light. I have
some difficulty seeing that a bad analysis is
really better than an informed judgment,
especially since faith in the analysis (and/or
the decomposed solution to the problem) is
frequently, nay, usually, used as a substitute
for seeking or applying any judgment at all. I
am often faced with a result that seems
absurd, and can even produce a quick analy-
sis that at least makes it obvious that the
solution is absurd, but am then given the
answer, "Well, that's what the analysis
showed."
Such a situation usually indicates room
for deep criticism, either of the way in which
the problem was divided up, or of peculiar-
ities of the assumptions that drive the
problem in curious and unsuspected ways,
particularly through the unsuspected (by the
systems person) nonlinearities of the
problem. It sometimes appears that the only
rational subdivision of the problem is to
fractionize the blame to the point where
approval is sought by default.
I would argue that careful attention to
the parts of the problem that do not seem to
be easily decomposable into semi-
independent parts might be one very good
guide to areas involving high risk, since
these are likely not to be amenable to our
usual rules, procedures and technologies,
and hence probably will have to be
approached empirically.
SERIAL VS. ITERATIVE MODELS
Systems engineering techniques themselves
contribute to disaster because they are all
paper techniques and there are only two in-
stead of N dimensions available. What we
end up displaying are linear sequential mea-
sures of system progress.
The PERT diagram and the milestone
chart are excellent examples. These both
essentially assume that the progress of
development and design consists of doing
step A, then step B, then step C, etc. Anyone
who has ever carried out a development or a
design (as opposed to setting up a manage-
ment system for doing so) is well aware of
the fact that the real world proceeds by a
kind of feedback iterative process that looks
more like a helix than like a line. That is to
say, you do A, then B, then C, then you look
at C and go back and change part of A again,
and that causes you to fiddle with B and
perhaps bring in a B-prime that you bounce
against C, and then go back to A and then
jump to D, so that there has to be continual
adjustment, going back and forth so that the
system is adjusted to itself and to its end
objectives as it changes and as the design or
development proceeds. Because it is difficult
to predict this process or to diagram it, or to
predict its costs precisely without using
competent engineers, the systems engineer-
ing procedures simply ignore the iterative,
feedback nature of the real world because the
process has been degraded to clerical report-
ing. To a large extent, this tends to constrain
project managers from doing work in the real
way toward doing it in a way that fits with
their management tools. This is clearly
nonsense.
As a specific example, doctrine says that
one is to consider the "ilities," that is, main-
tainability, reliability, operability, etc., from
the very beginning of the process. This is a
vast waste of time and effort. I do not mean
that one should not think about these things
at the beginning, but it is certainly ridicu-
lous to have a complete plan for the logistics
of the maintenance of an object that has not
yet been designed. I have seen overruns in
expenditure and unnecessary effort generat-
ed by the fact that the linear sequencing of
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milestones had forced development of a com-
plete maintenance and reliability plan for
what was no longer the design, and had not
been the design for three months. The
machinery forced everyone to grind on and
on because, after all, the maintenance and
reliability milestones could not be missed
without disaster and fear of cancellation of
the project, even though the plan being
worked out had nothing whatever to do with
the hardware being designed.
In fact, the point at which to start serious
work on configuration control, maintainabil-
ity and reliability cannot be very well pre-
planned; it can be roughly preplanned, but it
must be adjusted to be at the point at which
the design means something and is likely to
stay still long enough so that the redesign for
the "ilities" will really make some sense.
Judgment, not tools, is what is required.
PREDICTION VS. PRODUCTION
This brings me to a related antithesis that I
describe as prediction versus production. We
have come to a time when meeting certain
targets seems to have become more impor-
tant than producing a satisfactory system.
The question is not the development of a sys-
tem that performs well and was produced at
a reasonable cost and in a reasonable time,
but rather replacement of this sensible
desire by the question, "Does the system per-
form as predicted, did you produce it for the
cost you predicted, and on the schedule you
predicted, and did you do it in the way you
predicted?" Consequently, looking at what is
actually happening in the development has
been replaced by measuring it against a
simplistic set of predicted milestones. Fulfill-
ment of prediction has been seriously pro-
posed as the criterion for judging system
managers. It is certainly a minor criterion.
Fulfillment of a need when fielded continues
to be our real objective.
I know of a number of cases where the
pressure on prediction has been so great that
the project managers were forced to destroy
the possibility of having a good system
because they were not allowed to adjust what
they were doing to the real world; otherwise,
they would have been so far off prediction in
one or another dimension that the project
would have been canceled. We fell between
two stools. We had a system that was only
approximately what we wanted and the sys-
tem failed to meet the prediction. Similarly,
we have not had the sense to cancel some-
thing that met the predictions, but was no
damn good.:
A QUESTION OF PREDICTABILITY
It is curious that those of us, sophisticated as
systems engineers, and having read history
(in which no one ever seems to anticipate
what really happens), knowing that the pre-
diction time for random noise seen through a
bandpass filter is only about one over the
bandwidth, should yet seek predictability for
the processes with a wide bandwidth of
unknown information. No one can predict
politics or economics; few of us predict what
happens in our own lives. Why then do we
assume the predictability of development of
the unknown?
Should we expect development miles-
tones to be met? Presumably, the prior
probability of meeting the perfectly chosen
milestone on time is distributed randomly
and symmetrically about the predicted time.
If the accomplishment is relatively simple,
the distribution is narrow and this is called
"low risk;" if the accomplishment is difficult,
the distribution is wide and this is called
"high risk." However, all development
schedules assume success of each process. If
we put trouble contingency time allowances
into every task, the total contingency allow-
ance would be unacceptably large and the de-
velopment unacceptably long. This tends to
bias the true risk distribution in such a way
as to move the peak to the late side. Thus,
there is a tendency for the "risk distribution"
to peak after the milestone. The contingency
allowance should be provided in an unpopu-
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lar program element, "allowance for stupid-
ity and the unforeseen." Even so, it probably
would be eliminated by the efficient review
process.
All I am saying is that we only assess the
risk of the predictable problems and that
there is always a family of unpredictable
problems that make things take longer;
there are few ("oh, happy few!") cases of luck
" that make things take less time. We should
i not expect milestones to be reached, and they
"-- never (or hardly ever) are, although miles-
tones are needed to assure adequate program
i pressure.
_-, This question and my trial answer sug-
gest a signal-to-noise ratio approach to risk
_= and error assessment in development
models. I have not tried to carry this further;
it is left as an exercise for the developer.
SYSTEMS IN SPACE VS.
SYSTEMS IN SPACE-TIME
My next antithesis I would label "systems in
space" versus "systems in space-time." We
talk about system design and system choice
in terms of ten-year life-cycle costs, but the
assumption we tend to make is that the sys-
tem we are costing is a static object once it is
designed and produced. In a way, this is
forced upon us by the accountant's formalism
of dividing costs into investment and recur-
ring costs. Any system managers who say
that they are designing their system in
space-time, and that they propose to design
it so as to facilitate their ability to change it
during the course of the ten-year life cycle,
will promptly have their project removed
from under them because the doctrine says,
"This is terribly uneconomicali" further-
more, it says that it is bad system design. I
would simply like to note here that real-
world history tells us that all systems are
changed frequently during their lifetime, if
for no other reason than that the real
requirements and environments and tech-
nologies for them change, often in ways that
make it stupid to leave them alone. In fact, it
__ w
is almost true that no military system is ever
used for the precise purpose for which it is
designed Consequently, it makes sense to
think about the system as something that
will have a history in time and that is likely
to require change, and to include some
thought of this in the design. Change,
strangely, is the only truly predictable attri-
bute of the system. Perhaps I am merely go-
ing to be enshrined in the next generation of
systems engineering doctrine with a special
group in every project organization called
"changeabiIity management." I hope not.
The question is not whether there will be
changes or not, but whether the change
process will be under conscious control. Do
the developers know "what" and "why" when
they allow Or make a change? Pretending
that no changes are allowable or desirable is
merely a way of losing control of the change
process.
An example of the consequences of what I
mean follows. It is systems engineering
doctrine that the system should be matched
throughout; that is to say, it is regarded as
poor practice to have, for example, high-
reliability components matched with low-
reliability components since system reliabil-
ity will really be set by the low-reliability
components whereas system cost is likely to
be set by the high-reliability components.
This ignores the fact that since the system
will have to change in time it may be very
sensible to build in high-reliability compo-
nents in some parts of the system, even
though the technology does not provide them
for other parts of the system. During the
course of the lifetime of the system, there
may be a high probability of bringing the
low-reliability parts up to an equivalent reli-
ability with the higher-reliability parts for a
reasonable cost. Thus the system could be
designed for great improvement in reliabil-
ity from the very beginning, whereas if
everything is matched to the lower reliabil-
ity, the cost of improvement becomes gigan-
tic, because the changes are extensive. In
fact, the rule of thumb may not be good
5
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engineering at all if the system is designed
considering change with time. We should de-
sign for growth and a process of technological
leapfrogging in the system.
OPTIMIZATION VS. UNCERTAINTY
One of the fundamental tenets of systems
engineering is that the system should be
optimized to its purpose. This is dandy if the
purpose is very specifically definable and if it
is very independent of scenario and enemy
behavior. If these requirements are not true,
and they almost never are for any military
system of any great sophistication, then opti-
mization may merely be the definition of
which catastrophe you want to undergo. My
analogy is the matching of a narrow-band
filter to a specific signal. This is an elegant
engineering procedure, provided you can de-
pend on the signal to stay put. If the enemy,
for example, has a slight adjustment in their
frequency, then optimization in the normal
sense rapidly becomes nonsense. There is no
sense in optimizing the system beyond the
accuracy of the definition of requirements,
and I never, or almost never, see a definition
of requirements with estimated error limits.
This particular kind of catastrophe is
most often generated by the portion of sys-
tems engineering that the economists like to
call systems analysis. That is to say, having
chosen some scenario or problem defined in a
very specific way, the system prescription
follows optimization of this problem to the
bitter and ridiculous end. There is a vast
reluctance to look at the difficulties and the
risks involved in assuming that the chosen
problem is the correct problem. I will feel
much better about the use of scenarios and
prediction of warfare ten years ahead for
system choice and optimization if ever I meet
a person who can really predict a chess game,
or what will happen in the stock market
tomorrow. This is not to say the game should
be ruled out just because the results cannot
be predicted, but rather to reinforce the fact
that it is a game and cannot be taken
literally.
There is a procedure called sensitivity
analysis, but I have rarely seen it applied to
the right parameters and variations. It is
usually too difficult to do so. One rarely ever
considers an error analysis, even when some-
thing is known about the error distributions
of the input parameters.
A problem related to this is posed by the
analysis of multipurpose objects. A tremen-
dous difficulty is generated by the fact that
the costs and characteristics must be allocat-
ed to the appearance of the system in several
different scenarios. Consequently, these
systems must be single solutions to several
systems engineering requirements. Our usu-
al way of dealing with this problem is to bow
three times in its direction and then ignore
it, because it is just too hard to solve. Solving
it requires solving the systems problems for
all the situations in which the multipurpose
system appears, then doing all the (non-
linear) interaction cases.
In addition, the cost allocation to the var-
ious uses must be attacked. There is simply
no methodology available for really trying
this and hence the problem is generally
ignored. This makes many of the analyses
useless, but that is generally ignored too.
There is no sense in pretending to solve
problems by refusing to address them realis-
tically because they are too difficult, but we
go on playing that game.
OBJECTS VS. OBJECTIVES
Finally, we do not distinguish sufficiently
between objects and objectives. The working
tools and most of the life of systems
engineering are spent trying to reach an
objective, the objective finally becoming an
object. It is important to keep this distinction
in mind. The trouble in procurement of a
development is that procurement procedures
are designed to buy objects, whereas in
development there is no object until the end,
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only an objective, and the two are not the
same thing.
For example, what is a specification? A
specification is an abstract set intended to
describe what is to be produced, but of course
it is only a portion of a total description. It is
a subset of points selected from a continuous
portion of an infinite multidimensional
space. The object itself and its total future
history is the only complete specification.
Consequently, the idea of a "complete" speci-
fication is an absurdity; we can only produce
a partial subset. In fact, it is possible (and we
have all seen it happen) for an object that
meets the subset of specification points to
badly miss being a sensible solution to the
problem, because it departs from the
required reality between the specification
subset points. I hasten to add that sometimes
even the object itself, without regard to its
future history, is not a sufficient specifica-
tion, because it does not contain the details
of the techniques used to produce it. Let the
specifier beware!
Having complained about all of this
throughout this article, what do I propose?
The only thing I know that works is to obtain
a competent person and assistants, and
make sure they understand the problemn
not the specifications of the problem, not the
particular written scenario, but what is real-
ly in the minds of those who have a
requirement to be solved. Then give them
funds, a good choice of managerial and
systems engineering tools, and let them
work at the problem after reasonably
frequent conferences with those who have
the requirement.
In this way, the end object may become
the best that both parts of the system can
produce and not merely the solution to a
paper problem, said solution having the best
paper properties to match the previous set of
paper. (Some paper is water soluble.)
It might do well to bear in mind the
following closing thoughts:
As we are now behaving, we are using up
our best people in filling out documenta-
tion for their superiors to read, and most
of the time no one is running the store.
We have lost sight of the fact that engi-
neering is an art, not a technique; a tech-
nique is a tool. From time to time I am
briefed on the results of a systems analy-
sis or systems engineering job in a way
that prompts me to ask the questions:
"That's fine, but is it a good system? Do
you like it? Is it harmonious? Is it an
elegant solution to a real problem?" For
an answer I usually get a blank stare and
a facial expression that suggests I have
just said something really obscene.
We must bring the sense of art and
excitement back into engineering. Talent,
competence, and enthusiasm are qualities of
people who can use tools; the lack of these
characteristics usually results in people who
cannot even be helped by techniques and
tools. We can all do better.
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(FROM THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT GUIDE [1990])
Defense Systems Management College
The past several decades have seen the rise
of large, highly interactive systems that are
on the forward edge of technology. As a re-
sult of this growth and the increased usage of
digital systems (computers and software),
the concept of systems engineering has
gained increasing attention. Some of this at-
tention is no doubt due to large program fail-
ures which possibly could have been avoided,
or at least mitigated, through the use of sys-
tems engineering principles. The complexity
of modern day weapon systems requires con-
scious application of systems engineering
concepts to ensure producible, operable and
supportable systems that satisfy mission
requirements.
Although many authors have traced the
roots of systems engineering to earlier dates,
the initial formalization of the systems engi-
neering process for military development
began to surface in the mid-1950s on the bal-
listic missile programs. These early ballistic
missile development programs marked the
emergence of engineering discipline "special-
ists" which has since continued to grow.
Each of these specialties not only has a need
to take data from the overall development
process, but also to supply data, in the form
of requirements and analysis results, to the
process.
A number of technical instructions, mili-
tary standards and specifications, and man-
uals were developed as a result of these
development programs. In particular, MIL-
STD-499 was issued in 1969 to assist both
government and contractor personnel in
defining the systems engineering effort in
support of defense acquisition programs.
This standard was updated to MIL-STD-
499A in 1974, and formed the foundation for
current application of systems engineering
principles to military development pro-
grams.
In its simplest terms, systems engineer-
ing is both a technical process and a manage-
ment process. To successfully complete the
development of a system, both aspects must
be applied throughout the system life cycle.
From a government's program management
point of view, the Defense Systems Manage-
ment College favors the management ap-
proach and defines systems engineering as
follows:
Systems engineering is the manage-
ment function which controls the total
system development effort for the pur-
pose of achieving an optimum balance
of all system elements. It is a process
which transforms an operational need
into a description of system parameters
and integrates those parameters to op-
timize the overall system effectiveness.
A system life cycle begins with the user's
needs, expressed as constraints, and the
capability requirements needed to satisfy
mission objectives. Systems engineering is
essential in the earliest planning period, in
conceiving the system concept and defining
system requirements.
As the detailed design is being done, sys-
tems engineers: 1) assure balanced influence
of all required design specialties, 2) resolve
interface problems, 3) conduct design re-
views, 4) perform trade-off analyses, and
5) assist in verifying system performance.
During the production phase, systems en-
gineering is concerned with: 1) verifying sys-
tem capability, 2)maintaining the system
baseline, and 3)forming an analytical
framework for producibility analysis.
During the operation and support (O/S)
phase, systems engineering: 1) evaluates
proposed changes to the systems, 2) estab-
lishes their effectiveness, and 3) facilitates
the effective incorporation of changes, modi-
fications and updates.
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THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS
Although programs differ in underlying
requirements, there is a consistent, logical
process for best accomplishing system design
tasks. Figure 1 illustrates the activities of
the basic systems engineering process.
The systems engineering process is itera-
tively applied. It consists primarily of four
activities: functional analysis, synthesis,
evaluation and decision, and a description of
systems elements. The product element
descriptions become more detailed with each
application and support the subsequent
systems engineering design cycle. The final
product is production-ready documentation
of all system elements.
Since the requirement to implement a
systems engineering process may cause
major budgetary commitments and impact
upfront development schedules, it is impor-
tant to understand the inherent objectives:
• Ensure that system definition and design
reflect requirements for all system ele-
ments: equipment, software, personnel,
facilities and data.
• Integrate technical efforts of the design
team specialists to produce an optimally
balanced design.
• Provide a comprehensive indentured
framework of system requirements for
use as performance, design, interface,
support, production and test criteria.
• Provide source data for development of
technical plans and contract work state-
ments.
• Provide a systems framework for logistic
analysis, integrated logistic support
(ILS), trade studies and logistic documen-
tation.
• Provide a systems framework for produc-
tion engineering analysis, producibility
trade studies, and production and manu-
facturing documentation.
• Ensure that life cycle cost considerations
and requirements are fully considered in
all phases of the design process.
Successful application of systems engi-
neering requires mutual understanding and
support between the milita_ and contractor
program managersl Ti_ey must be willing to
make the systems engineering process the
backbone of the overall development
program. They must understand the need to
define and communicate among the
engineering specialty programs. They must
recognize the role of formal technical reviews
and audits, including the value, objectives
and uniqueness of each formal review and
audit. They must also know the objectives of
the program and possess a thorough inter-
pretation of the user's requirements.
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The output of the systems engineering
process is documentation. This is the means
by which it controls the evolutionary devel-
opment of the system. Systems engineering
prepares a number of technical management
and engineering specialty plans that define
how each phase of the acquisition cycle will
be conducted. Draft plans are usually sub-
mitted with the proposal and final plans are
delivered in accordance with the Contract
Data Requirements List (CDRL). These
plans are used by the government to ensure
compliance with the contract and used by the
contractor to develop detailed schedules and
allocation of resources. Specifications are
submitted that form the basis for the design
and development effort. Top-level specifica-
tions are incorporated into the statement of
work (SOW) and provided to the developer.
The developer will allocate these top-level
requirements to lower level system compo-
nents (hardware and software) and submit
the associated specifications and design doc-
uments to the government for approval. The
status of system development progress is
tracked and documented in the form of tech-
nical review data packages, technical perfor-
mance measurement (TPM) reports, analysis
and simulation reports and other technical
documentation pertinent _o the program. In
summary, this documentation may include:
• Systems Engineering Management Plan
(SEMP)
• Specifications (system, segment, develop-
ment, product, process, material)
• Design Documentation
• Interface Control Documents (ICDs)
• Risk Analysis Management Plan
• Survivability/Vulnerability (S/V) Hard-
ness Plan
• Mission Analysis Report
• Reliability Plan
• Maintainability Plan
• Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP)
• Software Development Plan(SDP)
• Test and Evaluation Master Plan
(TEMP)
, Producibility Plan
• Functional Flow Block Diagrams (FFBD)
• Requirements Allocation Sheets (RAS)
• Audit Reports
• EMI/EMC Control Plan
• Human Engineering Plan
• Trade Study Reports
The systems engineering process is an
iterative process applied throughout the ac-
quisition life cycle. The process itself leads to
a well defined, completely documented and
optimally balanced system. It does not pro-
duce the actual system itself, but rather, it
produces the complete set of documentation,
tailored to the needs of a specific program,
which fully describes the system to be devel-
oped and produced. Each program's systems
engineering process, developed through
tailoring and/or adding supplemental re-
quirements, must meet certain general crite-
ria. Although not complete, the following
guidelines should be considered in approach-
ing the basic process:
• System and subsystem (configuration
item) requirements shall be consistent,
correlatable, and traceable both within
data produced as basic documentation
(e.g., Functional Flow Block Diagram,
Requirements Allocation Sheet, and
Time Line Sheet) and as related docu-
mentation (e.g., work breakdown struc-
ture and Logistic Support Analysis
Record).
• The concept of minimum documentation
shall be evident.
• Acquisition and ownership cost shall be
an integral part of the evaluation and de-
cision process.
• Baselines shall be established progres-
sively as an integral part of the systems
engineering process.
• The systems engineering process shall
result in a design that is complete, at a
given level of detail, from a total system
element viewpoint.
]l
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• The process shall provide for the timely
and appropriate integration of main-
stream engineering with engineering
specialties such as reliability, maintain-
ability, human factors engineering,
safety, integrated logistic support, envi-
ronmental assessments and producibility
to ensure their influence on system
design.
• The process shall provide for continuing
prediction and demonstration of the an-
ticipated or actual achievement of the
primary technical objectives of the sys-
tem. Problems and risk areas shall be
identified in a timely manner.
• Formal technical reviews and audits
shall be an integral part of the systems
engineering process.
• The systems engineering process shall be
responsive to change. The impact of
changes to system and/or program re-
quirements must be traceable to the low-
est level of related documentation in a
timely manner.
Significant engineering decisions shall be
traceable to the systems engineering ac-
tivities and associated documentation
upon which they were based.
Figure 2 is an overview of the four basic
steps of the systems engineering process.
FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
Every engineering effort must begin with a
statement of a perceived need. At the
beginning of a DOD acquisition effort, this
statement will be in the form of a system
requirement document, usually developed
through a Mission Area Analysis of antici-
pated threats.
Once the purpose of the system is known,
the functional analysis activity identifies
what essential functions the system must
perform. In order to accomplish this, func-
tional analysis is composed of two primary
process segments: functional identification
and requirements identification and
Input Requirements
• Mission Objectives
• Mission Environments
• Mission Constraints
• Measurements of
Effectiveness
Technology Selection Factors
• Hardware
• Software
• Reliability
• Maintainability
• Personnel/Human Factors
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Figure 2 The Systems Engineering Process
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allocation (functional performance require-
ments analysis). It answers the "what" and
"why" questions relative to system design.
The basic analytical tool for functional
identification is the Functional Flow Block
Diagram (FFBD), showing logical sequences
and relationships of operational and support
functions at the system level. Specific func-
tions will vary from system to system and
will be traceable to mission requirements
and objectives. Maintenance flow diagrams
depicting general maintenance and support
concepts will lead to analysis of require-
ments on an end item/equipment basis. At
this level, since functions are more standard-
ized, functional identification is often accom-
plished using the End Item Maintenance
Sheet (EIMS) or Logistic Support Analysis
Record (LSAR). Similarly, detailed test
requirements are identified using the Test
Requirements Sheet (TRS), and productivity
requirements are identified using the
Production Sheet (PS).
It should be kept in mind that the sys-
tems engineering process is always iterative.
Each acquisition phase will involve function-
al analysis to progressively more detail. For
example, during the Concept Explora-
tion/Definition (C/E) phase, analysis of
support functions will concentrate on Main-
tenance FFBDs, which will support the
establishment of gross maintenance con-
cepts. During Full Scale Development (FSD),
emphasis will shift to detailed analysis of the
maintenance requirements of specific equip-
ment using the EIMS or LSAR.
The Requirements Allocation Sheet
(RAS) is used as the primary analytical tool
for requirements identification and alloca-
tion, or functional performance require-
ments analysis as it often is referred to, in
conjunction with FFBDs and special purpose
documents such as EIMSs, TRSs, and PSs.
The RAS serves three purposes in document-
ing the systems engineering process: 1) ini-
tially, it is used to record the performance
requirements established for each function;
2) during synthesis, it is used to show the
allocation of the functional performance
requirements to individual system elements
or a combination of elements; and 3) follow-
ing evaluation and decision, the RAS
provides the functionally oriented data re-
quired in the description of the system
elements.
The Time Line Sheet (TLS) is used to
perform and record the analysis of time-
critical functions and functional sequence_
In performing time requirements analysis
for complex functional sequences, additional
tools, such as mathematical models or
computer simulations, may be needed. Time
requirements analysis is performed in any or
all of the functional cycles of the process to
determine whether time is a critical factor.
The TLS complements the FFBD in its
ability to show a lower level of detail, as well
as to illustrate the impact of concurrent
functions within a given sequence. TLSs are
used to support the development of design
requirements for the operation, test and
maintenance functions. They identify time-
critical functions and depict the concurrency,
overlap and sequential relationship of
functions and related tasks. Time-critical
functions are those that affect reaction time,
downtime or availability.
SYNTHESIS
Synthesis supplies the "how" answers to the
"what" outputs of functional analysis.
Two documentation tools accomplish and
record the synthesis of design approaches or
alternative approaches. The Concept
Description Sheet (CDS) is used to collect the
performance requirements and constraints,
as delineated by functional analysis, that
apply to an individual subsystem or end
item. The CDS also describes at the gross
level a design approach for meeting the
requirements. The Schematic Block Dia-
gram (SBD) is used to develop and portray
the conceptual schematic arrangement of
system elements to meet system and/or
subsystem requirements. The CDS and SBD
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are both applicable to all acquisition phases
and provide the basis for development of the
descriptions of system elements.
EVALUATION AND DECISION
Since program risk and cost are dependent
on practical trade-offs between stated oper-
ating requirements and engineering design,
continual evaluations and decisions must be
made not only at the beginning of the
program but throughout the design and
development activity.
The Trade Study Report (TSR) is used to
summarize and correlate characteristics of
alternative solutions to the requirements
and constraints that establish the selection
criteria for a specific trade study area. The
report also documents the rationale used in
the decision process and should present risk
assessment and risk avoidance consider-
ations. Other tools, such as analytical or
mathematical models or computer simula-
tions, may be needed and used in accomplish-
ing the evaluation and decision process.
DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM ELEMENTS
All systems can be defined by a set of inter-
acting system elements which fall into five
categories: equipment (hardware), software,
facilities, personnel, and procedural data.
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Figure 3 Basic and Special Purpose Documentation for Systems Engineering
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Two documentation forms are used to
describe these system elements: the Design
Sheet (DS) and the Facility Interface Sheet
(FIS). The DS is used to establish and
describe the performance, design and test
requirements for equipment end items, criti-
cal components and computer software
programs. The FIS is used to identify the
environmental requirements and interface
design requirements imposed upon facilities
by the functional and design characteristics
of equipment end items. The DS and FIS
provide the basis for the formal identifica-
tion required for configuration management.
The systems engineering process pro-
duces the basic and special purpose docu-
mentation that controls the evolutionary
development of the system. Figure 3
correlates the particular documentation
associated with each step of the systems
engineering process.
The systems engineering process itself
does not actually produce the system, but
produces the documentation necessary to de-
fine, design, develop and test the system. As
such, a variety of engineering and planning
documentation is required throughout the
acquisition cycle, and systems engineering is
the vehicle used to produce that documenta-
tion.
Numerous plans are prepared to define
which technical activities will be conducted.
They address the integration of engineering
specialties requirements, "design-for" re-
quirements and organizational resource
requirements, and discuss how progress
toward system-level goals will be measured.
The Systems Engineering Management Plan
is the key planning document that reflects
these requirements. Contractor compliance
with these plans is monitored by government
organizations to ensure that standard poli-
cies and procedures in the area of systems
engineering are employed. Additionally,
specifications are prepared as part of the-
systems engineering process to form the
basis for the design and development effort.
The top-level specification (system or seg-
ment) is normally approved and draft lower
level specifications (configuration items) are
developed reflecting allocated system re-
quirements to lower level components or sub-
systems, which designers and subcontractors
translate into hardware and software pro-
duction plans.
In order to provide a continuing assess-
ment of the system's capability to meet
performance requirements, the systems
engineering organization prepares technical
review data packages, technical performance
measurement (TPM) reports, analysis and
simulation reports, and other documenta-
tion.
The systems engineering process is one
approach to providing disciplined engineer-
ing during all acquisition phases. Although
current application of the process has focused
on C/E, D/V, and FSD, systems engineering
process techniques and principles are equal-
ly applicable to the analysis and definition of
production requirements.
The systems engineering process also pro-
vides the logic and timing for a disciplined
approach, with certain internal assurances
of technical integrity such as traceability.
Technical integrity ensures that the design
requirements for the system elements reflect
the functional performance requirements,
that all functional performance require-
ments are satisfied by the combined system
elements, and that such requirements are
optimized with respect to system perfor-
mance requirements and constraints.
The DSMC Systems Engineering Man-
agement Guide may be purchased from the
U.S. Government Printing Office (1991-306-
417-QL 3).
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Very large integrated systems have always
posed special problems for engineers. Wheth-
er they are power generation systems, com-
puter networks or space vehicles, whenever
there are multiple interfaces, complex tech-
nologies or just demanding customers, the
challenges are unique. "Systems engineer-
ing" has evolved as a discipline in order to
meet these challenges by providing a struc-
tured, top-down design and development
methodology for the engineer. This paper
attempts to define the general class of
problems requiring the complete systems
engineering treatment and to show how
systems engineering can be utilized to
improve customer satisfaction and profit-
ability. Specifically, this work will focus on a
design methodology for the largest of
systems, not necessarily in terms of physical
size, but in terms of complexity and intercon-
nectivity.
The literature has generally defined
"systems engineering" as in this quote from
W.P. Chase in Management of System
Engineering:
[Systems Engineering is] the process of
selecting and synthesizing the applica-
tion of... knowledge in order to trans-
late system requirements into a system
design and.., to demonstrate that [it]
can be effectively employed as a coher-
ent whole to achieve some stated goal
or purpose.
This definition points out, in the most
general terms, that systems engineering is a
process for ensuring that the customer
requirements are satisfied. What it also
implies is that this satisfaction must be
achieved on time and for the agreed-upon
price. It is this implicit requirement that is
most often unfulfilled in complex engineer-
ing projects.
o 1988 IEEE. Reprinted with permission of the author, from [EEE
Aerospace Application Conference, Park City, Utah, Februa_ I988
Recent efforts at Hughes Aircraft
Company's Space & Communications Group
have focused on sharpening the definition of
systems engineering and defining standards
for improving the implementation of the full
systems engineering methodology on large
spacecraft programs. Since these programs
typically cost in the $100 million range, the
pressure to deliver specified performance on
time and on budget is enormous. A casual re-
view of programs within the author's exper-
ience has shown that the classical approach
to systems engineering has been followed
throughout, but with varying uniformity
and overall success. The question to answer,
in the context of even more advanced, more
demanding projects, is: "How can it be done
better?"
The "classical" method of systems
engineering alluded to above consists of
requirements definition, technology assess-
ment, solution synthesis and performance
verification: four successive steps in the
design of the mission solution. Typically,
this is an iterative process, since require-
ments and technology rarely remain static.
The customer's mission can be altered by
events or even by a better understanding of
the technology, risks or costs involved.
Synthesized solutions, too, depend on the
technology available, as well as the question
asked. Often, the proposed technology does
not live up to expectations, resulting in a
"new" solution and reverification: an embar-
rassing situation at best, an extremely costly
one at worst.
When the verification (or testing) phase
of the systems engineering process uncovers
a fault, the cause can often be traced to in-
complete or improperly stated requirements.
An example of this fact is a problem uncov-
ered on one particular series of satellites; an
on-orbit failure resulted in the loss of some
16 channels of telemetry data. The failure
analysis, performed by the program's
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systems engineering staff, identified the
cause as an open circuit in a particular unit.
This fault produced an abnormally high
telemetry output signal on one channel,
which in turn resulted in the degradation of
all 16 inputs to the telemetry multiplexer.
Had systems engineering levied a require-
ment to protect against failure-induced over-
voltages (via a simple circuit redundancy
technique at the unit), only the failed tele-
metry channel would have been lost, instead
of that of 15 other units as well.
The point here is that it is a knowledge of
the needs of the whole system that is re-
quired, instead of only the needs of the parts.
This knowledge exemplifies the principle of
"engineering leverage" whereby a few engi-
neers, representing a broad experience base,
performing the logical, methodical systems
design work, can save money over trial and
error or crisis-oriented engineering. It is the
concentration of systems knowledge, the "big
picture" view, that allows for efficient
designs all through the system.
A common question is: "How much sys-
tems engineering is required for a given pro-
ject?" This can usually be interpreted as
"How much will this cost?" Clearly a design
team with unlimited funds can perform com-
plete requirements analysis, all manner of
failure analysis and simulations, and exten-
sive part and unit environmental testing to
fully optimize the design of some particular
product. But if that product is, say, a ball-
point pen, have they really made it better
from the manufacturer's standpoint? Or
have they succeeded in making the most
expensive writing instrument the world has
ever known? The application of systems
engineering techniques to a project is a
matter of appropriate degree; how much
engineering is required to ensure the cus-
tomer's satisfaction becomes the first ques-
tion any organization must ask before they
can set up a systems engineering program.
This example emphasizes the fact that
systems engineering costs are a direct charge
to the effort, so the total cost of the engineer-
ing must be distributed over the entire
production run. Even if the run is large, as in
the ballpoint pen case, when the product nor-
mally sells for 39 cents, if the engineering
costs run into the millions, then the manu-
facturer could be in serious trouble. For
smaller production runs, like a satellite or
submarine contract, systems engineering
costs can still drive the final sale price, but
systems engineering can also reduce the
price by preventing errors and rework.
THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
METHODOLOGY
The procedure followed in systems engineer-
ing consists of four distinct phases, described
here in the simplest terms: requirements
definition, technology assessment, solution
synthesis and performance verification.
These sobriquets are intended to be mne-
monic; the details of what they really signify
are presented below.
Requirements Analysis. The initial step
consists of defining the problem to be solved
and the constraints on the solution set. This
is perhaps the single most critical phase of
the systems engineering process in that a
misunderstanding of the problem to be
solved, either in characterizing it or defining
the context of the solution, can result in an
erroneous conclusion. As in the satellite
telemetry example, the customer can be
somewhat less than satisfied when a partial
solution is delivered.
In large systems, the problem definition
is usually described by the contractual docu-
ments. The request for proposal (RFP) or the
statement of work typically contains direc-
tives as to the overall mission of the system,
but these are not always completely specific;
some interpretation of what the customer
really meant is often required.
Another aspect of requirements analysis
often underappreciated is that of constrain-
ing the solution. The RFP for a program may
state that only a certain rocket booster or
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parts of a specific grade can be used, but the
implications of such statements, and espe-
cially the implications of the "unstated" or
"implied" requirements, can have serious
consequences in the final design. These
requirements, sometimes called derived or
secondary requirements, determine the lim-
its of the parametric trades that can be made
in characterizing the problem's solution.
Technology Assessment. Once the basic
requirements, both primary and secondary,
are in place and understood by the design
team, the technology available to solve the
problem can be examined for suitability.
This step is intuitively obvious for small
systems, but when complexity is high,
making the appropriate choice is not always
easy. Typical activities in this phase include
comparative tradeoffs between different
processes and materials, architectures and
performance. The technology assessment
phase may also consider the design and docu-
mentation methods and the management
organization to be employed on a specific
project. Overall, this phase is concerned with
selecting the best tools for performing the
system design.
Solution Synthesis. This is usually the
most time-consuming step in engineering a
system to perform complex tasks and meet
stringent requirements simply because of
the number of choices available. If the re-
quirements are well understood and the
available hardware and software appro-
priate to the task are known, then trade
studies can be carried out (on paper) that re-
sult in myriad viable combinations. During
this phase, compromises are often required
in order to satisfy conflicting requirements.
For example, in a communications system
design, a large antenna may be desired to
provide high gain, but this will reduce its
coverage capability by reducing the beam-
width. Out of this sea of alternatives must
come a single "best fit" solution, meeting all
of the original and derived requirements, es-
pecially such items pertaining to cost and
producibility. If it can't be built or bought,
then it's not the right answer.
Performance Verification. Last, but defi-
nitely not least, is the performance verifica-
tion or testing phase. The task here is to
prove, with all the rigor possible, that the
suggested solution does in fact meet all of the
system requirements in a clearly docu-
mented way. A standard approach is to
utilize specification trees and a verification
matrix to show where each requirement from
the original customer's source documents is
captured in lower level specifications. Addi-
tionally, the verification matrix shows how
compliance with the requirement is proven,
either by inspection, test, demonstration or
analysis. In general, the specification system
is designed to show a clear, unambiguous
flowdown of all system requirements into
individual component designs. The verifica-
tion phase is the test of this flowdown as well
as a measure of system performance.
REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESSFUL
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
The foregoing text has all been a precursor to
this: exactly what does an organization have
to do to apply a full-scale systems engineer-
ing approach to their work? And, perhaps
more importantly, what does it cost that
organization? As expected, in systems engi-
neering, as in life, there are no free lunches.
This section details the inputs to the process,
or what is required by a systems engineering
organization in order to function properly.
Formality. First and foremost, a formal,
planned approach to the systems engineer-
ing process must be in place. Not only must
the "generic" methodology for systems engi-
neering be understood by all involved, the
detailed program plans for the specific appli-
cation of systems engineering must reflect
this commitment. The major components in
the formal system are review procedures,
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specification generation and maintenance
(or "configuration control") procedures, and
planning.
As can be deduced from the discussion of
the phases of the systems engineering pro-
cess, some degree of review and checking is
inherent to all operations. The establish-
ment of specification and design review
teams to examine the documents (e.g., speci-
fications, trade study reports, etc.) and help
polish them into complete and correct inputs
to the final design cannot be avoided. With-
out concrete review milestones, the design
will often wander and become unfocused
with respect to its objectives, which results
in inefficient time and money management.
Since the specifications define the prob-
lem to be solved and its constraints, it is
clear that they must be reliable and well doc-
umented. The configuration control function
is to provide a routine for the introduction,
validation and documentation of new re-
quirements and the updating of old ones
within the system. This is an important step
in the review process, as well as the design
process, in that all parties (customer and
contractor alike) need a stable, well-defined
basis of judgment for the validation of the
system.
Planning is mentioned last in this case
only for emphasis: without complete plan-
ning for the entire system design effort, from
requirements definition through systems en-
gineering, production, and final deployment,
the project is doomed to failure. Every man-
agement textbook in the world expounds this
fact in detail, yet weak planning is still a
major cause of cost overruns and poor perfor-
mance in all types of industry.
Information Exchange. While formality
and procedure allow tight control of the
requirements, informality and open commu-
nications are the key to efficient design and
problem resolution. Not only must the con-
tractor communicate effectively with the
customer, but the various elements of the
contractor's organization (management, sys-
tem engineers, unit designers, etc.) must all
talk to each other in order to completely
understand the requirements. In every pro-
gram there are stated goals and hidden
goals, real requirements and perceived
requirements; it all depends on where the
observer is looking from. Communications
and open channels between all participants,
regardless of title or rank, are absolutely
essential to all phases of the job.
Technology Base. "Technology" in this
context means more than the hardware and
software that can be employed in a design
solution; it encompasses the organizations
and information architectures as well. As a
system becomes larger and more complex, so
too does the technology or "knowledge base"
required to fully define the implementation
of system requirements. Such a base might
include other contractors, national resources
(e.g., the Space Transportation System), spe-
cialized electronic devices, etc. In short, prac-
tically any conceivable problems, and even a
few inconceivable ones, can come up in sys-
tems design. To deal effectively with them,
the systems engineering team must have the
knowledge and experience to recognize solu-
tions from a wide selection of possibilities.
Dedication and Staffing. Finally, the one
factor that takes system engineering from an
abstract concept to a practical reality is the
dedication of the people involved. In order to
even begin a design for a complex system, a
design team is required. Not a single guru
and a few part-time acolytes, but a team of
committed managers and engineers with ex-
perience in real-world problem solving, tech-
nical breadth and clearly defined roles in the
systems engineering process. Without this
core team, the continuity and rigor required
by the process to ensure a coherent, effective
solution cannot possibly exist.
Just as planning is the key to a successful
project, leadership is the key to a successful
team. The complexity of the designs under
discussion are such that (typically) a wide
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range of talents are needed to arrive at a
solution. This diversity can be dangerous
without direction, because diversity is just a
polite name for chaos waiting to happen. A
group with a broad technical background,
when presented a problem without leader-
ship, will always seek to maximize its
entropy. The project staff must be directed
and focused at all times in order to move
through the systems engineering process.
After all, efficiency and minimal engineer-
ing costs concern the entire group. The depth
necessary to perform the detailed designs
need not come from the systems staff,
however; this is often not possible given the
generalist nature required of them. Most
companies employ a unit engineering staff to
design the components of the complete
solution, which simply reflects the top-down
design approach of breaking each require-
ment down into smaller and smaller
functional blocks.
An important factor to consider is time. It
may take several months or even years to
complete the design of a complex system, so
continuity becomes a factor in the staffing of
the design team. The deleterious effects of
change on an organization are well known,
and so are those of miscommunication. The
training of systems engineers, whether
through formal schooling or on-the-job edu-
cation, is the first step toward building a
self-perpetuating, self-replicating design
methodology. Experienced staff members are
able to produce more and overcome obstacles
better than those less experienced; reinven-
ting the wheel is avoided. Additionally,
experienced people add synergy to the team
by virtue of shared experiences. Synergism
in the design process is how the engineering
leverage of systems engineering is released,
by the magnification of individual efforts. A
fringe benefit of this magnification is growth
in the individuals involved. The less
experienced become more experienced and
leadership skills are developed and honed.
Not only does the design process (and
product) continue to improve but, through
continuity and growth, the staff benefits
personally as well.
What about the individual roles of the
staff members? The need for a broad know-
ledge base, for generalists, is clear, but what
do they do? As in any team-building
situation, all members need clearly commu-
nicated job descriptions and management
expectations; this applies to all members of
the project team from the most senior man-
ager to the last clerk. Once the work has
started, they need tangible feedback on what
is going correctly, according to expectations,
and what is not. The immediate benefit to
the organization is clear. Job satisfaction in-
creases, and with it, a concomitant rise in
overall productivity. Again, the process,
when properly managed, feeds upon itself to
work more efficiently.
COST VS. BENEFITS OF FULL-SCALE
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
The requirements levied upon systems de-
sign for very large projects are simple: pro-
vide full customer satisfaction on time and
on budget for a set of diverse and complex
functional specifications and interconnec-
tions. Likewise, the technology appropriate
to this task is (hopefully) equally clear:
employ a formal, full-scale systems engi-
neering approach to meeting this challenge.
Costs:
- Management must be willing to allow
group synergy to make decisions; the
"group think" approach is mandatory.
- Personnel must be dedicated and im-
mersed in the systems engineering of a
single system. Teamwork and continuity
must be fostered and preserved.
- The systems engineering organization
can exhibit all the negative aspects of a
bureaucracy if not managed precisely.
- Careful, rigorous planning is required for
all aspects of the program up-front, before
the work begins, which often means extra
bidding expense.
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Benefits:
+ Customer satisfaction is enhanced
through demonstrated performance and
the opportunity for full customer involve-
ment in the design process.
+ Manageability is improved by accurate,
more complete planning and a well-
defined staff structure.
+ Contingencies are worked out in advance,
resulting in fewer surprises during the
design, test and production phases.
+ Better cost performance is achieved due
to reduced redesigns, reworks and "patch-
es."
After an analysis of the costs and benefits
of implementing a systems engineering
solution to a complex design problem, it
becomes apparent that the benefits outweigh
the costs, especially in terms of the potential
for productivity and cost improvements. The
chief drawback of this method is that it is
difficult to implement in organizations that
do not already practice some form of systems
engineering, due to the cultural adjustments
that are uften necessary. Once the need for a
rigorous design methodology is apparent, the
systems engineering process of requirements
analysis, technology assessment, solution
synthesis and performance verification can
be utilized to provide an efficient, cost-
effective solution to the managerial and
technical challenges.
The author wishes to thank Dr. Thomas A,
Brackey, W. Richard Brown, and Gdvien
Miyata of the Hughes Aircraft Company for
their support and mentorship in several com-
plex design projects.
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WHAT IS A SYSTEM? NASA's PHASED PROJECT / 7J
DESCRIPTION
From the MSFC Systems Engineering Handbook (1991) _ _ /
Systems engineering is defined in MIL-STD-
499A as
• . . the process(es) required to trans-
form an operational need into a
description of system performance
parameters and a system configuration
through the use of an iterative process
of definition, synthesis, analysis, de-
sign, test and evaluation. It includes
the integration of related technical
parameters and ensures compatibility
of all physical, functional, and program
interfaces in a manner that optimizes
the total system definition and design.
In addition, systems engineering
integrates reliability, maintainability,
safety, survivability, and other such
efforts into the total engineering effort
to meet cost, schedule and technical
performance objectives. (Engineering
Management, May 1, 1974)
Systems engineering is a continuous,
iterative process that has a built-in feedback
mechanism, It is used throughout a project
or program's life cycle to arrive at the best
system architecture and design possible.
Just when systems engineering began to be
practiced as a separate discipline is open to
debate, but there seems to be general agree-
ment that formal recognition and definition
of the process started after World War II.
Large, complex post-war development
projects such as the first U.S. ballistic
missiles and NASA's Apollo program exhib-
ited the characteristics which created the
need for systems engineers.
Among these project characteristics are:
• Large design teams with many highly
specialized designers
• Many contractors involved, widely sepa-
rated geographically, complicating com-
munications
• Many hardware and software systems in
concurrent development
• Complex operational and logistic support
requirements
• Constrained development time
• High level of advanced technology
(Systems Engineering Management
Guide, U.S. Government Printing Office,
1986).
There are many definitions of a system. Two
of these are listed below:
A system is a set of interrelated compo-
nents working together toward some com-
mon objective. (Blanchard, Benjamin S.
and Fabrycky, Wolter J., Systems Engi-
neering and Analysis, Prentice Hall, Inc.,
1990)
A system is a grouping of parts that
operate together for a common purpose.
For example, an automobile is a system of
components that work together to provide
transportation. An autopilot and an
airplane form a system for flying at a
specified altitude. (Forrester, Jay W.,
Principles of Systems, Wright-Allen Press
Inc., 1968).
Systems engineering is a cyclical process as
depicted in Figure 1. The terms shown in
this figure are explained in the following
paragraphs.
1. Project and Mission Requirements/
Need Definition can also be termed as "cus-
tomer engineering." It is the process by
which the needs of the customer (the princi-
pal investigator or other significant parties,
such as Congress or other budgetary author-
ity) are determined. This allows the systems
engineer to define requirements for a system
that will meet the needs of the customer.
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1. Project and Mission Requirements/Need Definition
9. Verification and Validation
8. Technical
Oversight
7. Configuration
Management
2. Risk Analysis/Management
3. Systems Analysis
4. Concept
Development
6. Implementation Planning and
Systems Integration
5. Derived Requirements Definition
Figure 1 Systems Engineering Cycle
2. Risk Analysis/Management is a
continuing process to identify and assess the
risks involved with the development and
operation of the system. These include tech-
nical, schedule, cost and organizational
risks. Following the identification of the
risks involved, the system engineer then de-
velops an implementation plan to control
and, if possible, reduce risks.
3. Systems Analysis involves under-
standing how the key mission and system
functional elements interact. The mission
analysis translates the users' needs into
functional/performance requirements and
design constraints. A functional analysis
takes these requirements and breaks them
down into specific tasks.
4. Concept Development is the process of
making informed trade-offs among the var-
ious options to select the one that best meets
the requirements and design constraints.
Preliminary design and performance re-
quirements and implementation architec-
ture are the results.
5. Derived Requirements Definition is
the process of translating mission and func-
tional analysis results, system operational
concepts, and the selected system architec-
ture into a set of system performance and
interface requirements. At this level, the
requirements must specify either functional
or interface criteria only, without presenting
design solutions. This gives the detail
designers the flexibility needed to arrive at
design solutions that meet the requirements.
6. Implementation Planning and Sys-
tems Integration is a complex activity
resulting in a coherent, integrated set of
implementation tasks and responsibilities
for the design, development, fabrication, ver-
ification and operation of the required
system. It requires negotiation between the
system requirements definition personnel
and the system implementation (develop-
ment) personnel. The plan must also consid-
er the project constraints of schedule and
budget while avoiding unnecessary risk.
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7. Configuration Management activities
ensure that controlled definition of all
engieering documentation is maintained and
correct information is distributed to all
appropriate parties in a timely manner. This
is one of the most important responsibilities
of the systems engineering organization. On
larger programs that have large numbers of
people involved, this process becomes even
more critical. This activity is also the mecha-
nism by which the system development
process is documented (i.e., design knowl-
edge capture).
Configuration Management establishes
the system to control the requirements and
configuration of hardware and software,
evaluate changes, and maintain the defini-
tion of the configuration via baselined docu-
mentation and released drawings.
8. Technical Oversight serves two func-
tions. First, it ensures that all the subsys-
tems work together. Second, it implements
mechanisms to guarantee that the developed
and documented architectural concept is not
inadvertently changed during the develop-
ment process. This allows the developer to
certify that the system, which is ultimately
tested, will meet the customer's require-
ments. Technical oversight consists of the
technical reviews and audits that gather
consensus from all parties involved to ascer-
tain that the effort at any given time is
correct and adequately planned for the
continuance of the work.
A specific task for the systems engineer
to perform is assuring that the systems re-
quirements are understood and correctly
implemented by the design organizations.
This responsibility requires the systems
engineer to work closely with the design
organizations throughout the program. At
the same time, the systems engineer must
recognize that the initial set of systems
requirements will not be perfect. During
design evolution or because of the inability of
a subsystem to meet its intended functional
requirements, changes in the systems
requirements will be necessary, and the
systems engineer should view these changes
as a normal part of the design process. Avoid
the tendency to view the Systems Require-
ments Specification as something, once base-
lined, that is final and unchangeable.
9. During the Verification and Valida-
tion portion of the development activity, the
characteristics and performance of the sys-
tem are compared to the requirements and
specifications. Tests, analyses and demon-
strations are performed to verify that the
hardware and software satisfactorily meet
the performance requirements of the system
specifications.
NASA PHASED PROJECT DESCRIPTION
In the planning of major projects, critical
requirements must be well defined and the
necessary technology must be available. If
these criteria are met, there will be an ac-
ceptable level of risk in meeting technical
goals with reasonable cost and schedule.
To ensure that the program is at a proper
level of maturity when Congress approves
major funding for design and development,
projects go through various phases of analy-
sis and definition. There are five phases in
the life cycle of a typical successful project:
pre-Phase A (concept study), Phase A
(preliminary analysis), Phase B (definition),
Phase C (design) and Phase D (development/
operations). Depending on the complexity of
the system, funding availability and launch
schedules, a project may combine phases or
add intermediate phases. Common
variations would include combining pre-
Phase A and Phase A, adding an advanced
development phase between Phase B and
Phase C, combining Phase C and Phase D
into Phase C/D, or moving operations out of
Phase D into a separate phase. As a further
example, the Space Shuttle program had
both a Phase B' (B prime) and Phase B" (B
Double-prime) in order to further refine the
definition and requirements of the system
before proceeding into Phase C. Figure 2
depicts a typical phased project flow in which
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PRE-PHASE AJ
PHASE A
PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS
• Develop Project
Objectives
• Assess Feasibility
• Identify Research and
Advanced Technology
Requirements
• Identify Support
Requirements Areas
• Develop Gross Plans for
Implementation
• Perform Trade-Off
Analysis
• Identify Favorable and
Unfavorable Factors
• Define Relationships to
Programs
• Perform Cost Analysis
MAJOR MANAGEMENT DECISIONS
• Feasible Project Concepts for
Detailed Study
_I)
PHASE B
DESIGN
• Refine Selected
Alternative Concepts
• Conduct Systems
Analysis
• Develop Preliminary
Requirement and Design
Specifications
• Define Support
Requirements
• Assess Preliminary
Manufacturing and Test
Requirements
• IdentifyAdvanced
Technology and
Advanced Development
Requirements
• Assess Costs and
Schedules
• Define Management
and Procurement
Approaches
• Perform Trade-off
Analysis
• Perform Operation
• Preliminary Design and
Specifications
• Preliminary Schedule,
Resource and Management
Plans
• WBS
_¢{2)
(1)Missionneedstatementapproved
(2)Missionneedstatementreaffirmed
PHASE C
DESIGN
• Develop Detail of
Selected Concept
• Develop Specific
Requirements and
Design Specifications
• Develop Plans for
Manufacturing, Testing,
Operations, Supporting
Systems, Facilities, etc.
• Initiate Required
Long Lead Advance
Development and Define
Plan for Supporting
Development
• Develop Schedules and
Estimates of Costs
• Refine Management and
Procurement Plans
• Project Design and
Specification including
Man ufacture Test and
Operation Plans
• Schedule Resources
Management and
Procurement Plans
PHASE D
DEVELOPMENT/
OPERATIONS
• Developand Test
• Manufacture
• Checkout
• Operate
• Evaluate
• Distribute Results
• Completed Project
Source: MM7120.2, Project Management Handbook
Figure 2 NASA Program Phases
pre-Phase A has been combined with
Phase A.
Safety is a critical systems engineering
function that must be considered during all
program phases and in all studies and analy-
ses. In short, although safety is organization-
ally the responsibility of S&MA, it is a
responsibility of all program participants
and should be a primary consideration
throughout the systems engineering process.
Figure 2 shows the major activities in
each phase, as well as the outputs and major
decision points. Note that this description
pertains to the typical program, in which
NASA contracts with industry to do the
Phase C/D activity. Other types of programs
include small, contracted efforts, as well as
both large and small in-house programs
where NASA may retain all or part of the
design and development responsibility.
The typical program review phasing
includes many more activities and formal
reviews than are shown in Figure 2. For
completeness, these are introduced here and
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PRR
Preliminary Definition T
Analysis Phase B
Phase A
x x
Concept Requirements Preliminary
Definition Generation _ Design
Launch/Vehicle/Payloads
PDR CDR
Design
PhaseC
I Final
Design
Fabrication
AR
T
Development/Operation
Phase D
VerificationIntegration Operation
Flight
Analysis
ATP
Miasion
efinition
IPL
RR
.V-7
Interface
Definition
IPL
PDR
IPL
CDR
x_7
Final
Design
IPL IPL
GOR FOR
X-7
Verification &
Integration
IPL
mR
Ground &
Flight
Operations
Space System Carrier
Notes: PRR - Preliminary Requirements Review
PDR- Preliminary Design Review
CDR- Critical Design Review
AR- Acceptance Review
ATP- Authority to Proceed
IPL- Integrated Payload
RR- RequirementsReview
GOR- Ground OperationsReview
FOR -FlightOperationsReview
IRR- IntegratedReadinessReview
FRR- FlightReadinessReview
Figure 3 Typical Program Review Phasing
shown in Figure 3. This figure also serves to
relate the major reviews to the project
phases and to show the more detailed inte-
gration activities associated with attached
payloads and Spacelab-kinds of experiments.
At MSFC, the Program Development
(PD) Directorate is responsible for nurturing
new projects from idea conception through
concept definition supporting preliminary
design. Systems engineering is emphasized
and utilized throughout this process, both in-
house and during contracted studies. Typi-
cally, concepts that have matured through
this process and gained Congressional new
start approval to become official projects are
then moved into project offices. The new
start review and approval process begins ap-
proximately two years in advance of Phase
C/D authority to proceed (ATP) at which
point funds are applied to begin a major
design and development effort. That two-
year period is used to execute the definition
phase (Phase B) and prepare the request for
proposal (RFP) for Phase C/D. The new start
approval process includes a definition review
or non-advocate review (NAR) generally con-
ducted during the Phase B activity at a time
when the project manager, Center manage-
ment, and Headquarters program office
deem appropriate. Results of the NAR are
factored into the Phase C/D RFP, as well as
the budget approval process. Note that this
timeline pertains principally to large pro-
grams which include in-house and contract-
ed efforts. The timeframe could be much
shorter for smaller projects such as experi-
ments. Figure 4 shows the overall systems
engineering process flow in Program Devel-
opment (PD).
In the course of developing the pre-
liminary systems requirements and the
conceptual design, PD uses many of the same
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I ProgramPlanning
Planning
-l_[ Program/Science IRequirements
Mission Planningand Analysis
Planning
"_[ Project Planmng
I r
la- _l_ Budget Planning
and Implementations
Manpower Planning"
and Analysis
Pr_,ra m Control
[ Advanced Development IR quirements
Operations Planmng
and Analyms
Systems Analysis Applications
I ,
-_ Feasibility and Definition I _ II Concept Definition &
Studi es I _'_l Desi gn
Preliminary Systems
Requirements
Supporting/Advanced Research
and Technology
Preliminary
Desig.
System_Subsystems tAnalysis &Trades
Cost Modeling &
Estimating
Headquarters Approval Lead to
Program Initiation Agreement
Figure 4 Systems Engineering Process Flow in Program Development
analysis tools and techniques that are em-
ployed by Science & Engineering (S&E) in
later program phases. The principal differ-
ences in the outputs of the two organizations
are the quantity, format and maturity of the
documentation and the level of detail in the
analyses. In summary, the analyses and
trade studies by S&E are to refine, not re-
peat, the concepts developed by PD in sup-
port of design implementation. PD develops
the conceptual approach and S&E develops
the design implementation.
PRE-PHASE A (CONCEPT STUDY)
A pre-Phase A study may be accomplished
within the engineering capability of Pro-
gram Development or contracted with
funding from one of the major NASA Head-
quarters offices. Successful results from this
study would provide justification to initiate a
Phase A study or additional pre-Phase A
studies. The genesis of new ideas requiring
further study can come from a variety of
sources: industry, the scientific community,
university and research centers, MSFC con-
tractors and associates, or even from within
MSFC itself. Typically, such ideas receive a
top-level examination by cognizant
MSFC/PD personnel. A quick assessment of
objectives, requirements and the total mis-
sion concept is performed. Often, new ideas
are shared with colleagues through propos-
als (either in response to an RFP or unsolicit-
ed), technical papers at professional society
meetings, or "white papers" propounding the
new idea/concept. From an MSFC in-house
weeding out process, concepts are identified
for further (Phase A) study.
System functional concept trades are per-
formed during the pre-Phase A period,
generally at a fairly cursory level of detail.
This process eliminates architectures that
are too costly or time-consuming to develop.
They are conducted at a level sufficient to
support the definition of the top-level system
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requirements. Architectural options are the
result. Some of the primary sources for this
identification of concepts include brain-
storming, past experience, examination of
other systems and intuition.
Cost estimates are developed in pre-
Phase A and are usually at a very prelimi-
nary level due to the lack of detailed systems
definition. These estimates are based pri-
marily on parametrics adjusted for the new
program, taking into account differences in
mission, size, complexity and other factors.
PHASE A (PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS)
A Phase A study is the preliminary analysis
of a space concept. These concepts could have
come from a pre-Phase A study or from other
sources within or external to NASA. The ma-
jority of concepts that are studied at MSFC
are assigned by NASA Headquarters and
funded accordingly. Documentation in this
Phase usually consists of study reports and
briefing charts.
Schedules are developed during Phase A
studies by Program Development in conjunc-
tion with the organization performing the
study (contractor, PD, S&E). The schedules
include an overall program schedule pro-
vided by MSFC and a detailed technical
schedule developed by the contractor.
The overall program schedule depicts im-
portant milestones that establish the start
and finish dates of each study phase, includ-
ing design, development, launch, and oper-
ations. Programmatic milestones are also
shown. These are dependent on the federal
budget cycle plus proposal preparation and
evaluation time. The contractor schedule
depicts the major activities and phasing
required to develop the hardware in time to
meet the scheduled launch date. Since this is
a concept study, the detail schedule is still at
a relatively high level and would not show
activity below the system level.
Cost estimates developed during Phase A
are generated using a parametric cost
analysis system in conjunction with the cost
database discussed above. The has access to
several cost estimating systems, both
government and commercial. One example is
the GE/RCA Price Model. Each model is
unique with special capabilities and limita-
tions. Complexity factors and Cost Estimat-
ing Relationships are applied to the
estimating software using system weight as
the independent variable. A factor is applied
to the hardware/software costs to account for
wraparounds such as project management,
test and verification, percent new design,
operational complexity, hardware complex-
ity, similarity to other projects or develop-
ment activities and others. As each system is
defined in more detail and the system weight
is further refined, the cost estimates become
more realistic and provide a higher confi-
dence level in the results.
A cost/risk analysis and assessment is
usually completed near the end of each
Phase A study. The analysis is accomplished
with special software that uses statistical
techniques, including a Monte Carlo simula-
tion. The results predict the probability of
completing the program within the estimat-
ed cost. A risk assessment, which follows the
analysis, should identify areas of high risk
that require further cost analysis or possibly
further trade studies to look at alternate sys-
tems that would lower the potential costs
without sacrificing technical capability.
As part of the study activity, the contrac-
tor provides a detailed risk analysis and
assessment to establish a high level of confi-
dence for the program cost. The cost estimate
established during this phase will provide
NASA Headquarters with the funding
requirements to be approved by Congress
before the development program can begin.
The processes occurring during Phase A
include:
• Development of project objectives
• Assessment of project feasibility
• Identification of research and advanced
technology requirements
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• Identification of support requirements
areas
• Performance of trade-off analyses
• Identification of favorable and unfavor-
able factors
• Definition of relationships to other
programs
• Selection of systems concepts
• Identification of maintenance, technology
insertion, and disposal concepts of
payload and orbital debris
• Environmental Impact Analysis.
The outputs from Phase A, which become the
inputs to Phase B, are in the form of reports
or annotated briefing charts and include in-
formation on:
• Concept definition
• Preliminary system requirements
• Preliminary configuration layouts
• Point designs
• Preliminary implementation plans
• Preliminary schedules
• Preliminary cost estimates
• Environmental impact.
PHASE B (DEFINITION AND
PRELIMINARY DESIGN)
This phase of the project consists of the re-
finement of preliminary requirements, cost
estimates, schedules and risk assessments
prior to starting final design and develop-
ment.
Once the feasibility of an idea is estab-
lished, the concept definition phase is begun
to explore alternatives to meet the docu-
mented mission need. Competition and inno-
vation should be employed to ensure that a
wide variety of alternatives are identified
and examined. Modeling and computer ana-
lysis are required to assess the best concepts.
The goal of a concept definition activity is
to determine the best and most feasible
concept(s) that will satisfy the mission and
science requirements. Generally, the re-
quirements available at this point in time
are Level I (NASA Headquarters) require-
ments from preliminary activities.
Level I requirements are broad mission
needs and objectives. Occasionally, there
may be some Level 1I (project office level) re-
quirements at this time.
The mission need determination is the
first step in a multifaceted preliminary con-
cept definition activity. This is the step that
is first performed at a NASA Headquarters
or Center level (or industry, university, etc.)
and is the precursor to concept development.
The mission need determination is that part
of early mission planning that identifies a
scientific knowledge need or gap that could
be met with some kind of NASA sponsored
activity. A set of Level I requirements is gen-
erally developed during or just prior to the
activities described in the following para-
graphs.
A feasibility analysis is conducted to de-
termine the viability of the project. The
study report usually includes requirements,
objectives, problems, opportunities and costs.
A utility analysis is then conducted to de-
termine the value of a project. The following
criteria may be considered during this study:
the needs met, the scientific knowledge ac-
quired, the political benefits, or potential
spinoffs and applications.
Certain satellites and/or instruments are
selected for a more detailed level of design.
The Preliminary Design Office of Program
Development performs these studies. This
office is a miniature replication of the capa-
bilities of the laboratories at MSFC: Propul-
sion, Guidance, Navigation and Control,
Electrical Power, Avionics, Structures,
Operations, etc. One difference is the empha-
sis by Program Development in developing
credible cost estimates. Cost is an important
differential, but often other factors, such as
mission risk or incompatibility with other
instruments that may be grouped on a com-
mon satellite, may predominate.
Throughout the Phase B period the con-
cepts that were developed during Phase A
are iteratively reviewed and analyzed. Using
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trade study techniques, the concepts' capa-
bilities are compared to the system require-
ments. Those concepts that consistently
satisfy the requirements are identified and
refined. Any concepts that do not meet
performance and other requirements are
scrutinized very closely for possible elimina-
tion. Following the examination of those
that do not perform well, assessments are
made regarding their augmentation to dis-
cover the degree of change necessary to bring
their performance into scope. The concepts
that have to change too much or would
experience severe budgetary and/or schedule
impacts are deleted from the concept defini-
tion and analysis cycle. This allows the ana-
lysts' energies to be focused on those concepts
that are valid and workable.
These trade studies provide a more de-
tailed look at the architectural concepts and
result in a narrowing of the field of candi-
dates. Trades performed during this time
consider such things as cost, schedule, life-
time and safety. The evaluation criteria used
to assess alternative concepts are developed
to a finer level of detail than for earlier sys-
tem trades.
Cost estimates from Phase A are refined
as further detailed requirements are identi-
fied during Phase B. The cost estimating
process is still dependent on parametric ana-
lysis. The Program Development cost office
works closely with the study contractor in
evaluating costing methodology and continu-
ously compares government cost estimates
with those of the study contractor. Should a
large discrepancy occur, the assumptions
and schedule inputs of the study contractor
are examined. If this examination yields val-
id assumptions and schedules, the NASA
estimates are adjusted. The cost estimation
process goes through continuous iterations
during the study to reflect the evolution of
detail resulting from trade studies.
Schedules are developed during Phase B
by the task team program control personnel
and by the study contractors. Schedules de-
veloped by the task team are expanded from
the Phase A overall program schedules. In
addition, other schedules are developed that
include Phase C and D procurement strate-
gies, cost phasing and project manning
requirements. The study contractor sched-
ules are expanded to lower levels of the work
breakdown structure (WBS) to include
subsystem development, program manage-
ment, manufacturing, verification, logistics
planning, operations planning and other
technical areas. The schedule detail would
show the phasing of all major activities
through launch and the follow-on operations.
As in Phase A, the typical documentation
of this phase consists of reports and briefing
charts.
The processes occurring during Phase B
include:
• Refinement of selected alternative
concepts
• Performance of trade-off analyses
• Performance of system analyses and
simulations
• Definition ofpreliminary system and
support requirements
• Definition and assessment of preliminary
manufacturing and test requirements
• Identification of advanced technology and
advanced development requirements for
focused funding
• Refinement of preliminary schedules
• Refinement ofpreliminarycost estimate
and trade study results which support
selection of baseline for cost estimate
• Assessment of technical, cost, and sched-
ule risks
• Assessment and refinement of the Mis-
sion Need Statement.
The outputs from Phase B, which become the
inputs to Phase C, may include (in the form
of study reports and annotated briefing
charts) information related to:
• Preliminary WBS
• System requirements
• Preliminary interface requirements
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• Management and procurement ap-
proaches
• Program Implementation Plans
• Request for Proposal (RFP) inputs, where
applicable.
Phase B is normally the final phase of
activity within Program Development. A
separate core of people is selected to form a
task team to manage the Phase B contract.
At the beginning of Phase B, a chief engineer
is appointed to the task team (or project
office) to provide consultation to the task
team manager on all related engineering
matters. The chief engineer also helps
ensure that the study contractor uses accept-
able engineering practices and sound
judgment during the course of the study. The
chief engineer is often the deputy to the task
team manager and is usually the first Sci-
ence and Engineering representative sub-
stantially involved in the process. The chief
engineer's office has personnel resources
available to support the project as needed
during the study. Additional engineering
support from S&E may be used at the discre-
tion of the chief engineer. The chief engineer
plays a key role in determining the state of
technical maturity of the project for starting
the design and development phase.
At the conclusion of Phase B, the task
team is converted to a project office, and it is
no longer under the direction of program
development. On large projects, such as
Space Station, a project office might be
created prior to Phase B; in that case,
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Program Development (PD) support becomes
minimal (such as cost estimating and limited
programmatics) and S&E plays a major role
in the Phase B engineering activities.
At MSFC, it is not uncommon to have
more than one directorate providing
engineering or technical support to a project
throughout its life cycle. The transition of
engineering support is depicted in Figure 5.
Figure 5 shows that Program Develop-
ment typically performs most, if not all, of
the technical support during Phase A. As the
project life cycle evolves, the S&E Director-
ate takes on a larger and larger role as PD's
involvement tapers off. The exact point at
which S&E gets involved varies depending
on the size and priority of the project at
MSFC, as well as the availability of S&E
manpower resources. In every case, however,
Phase C and D activities are exclusively the
domain of S&E.
The extent of information and the level of
detail available at the end of Phase B to
begin the Phase C design are variable and
become a function of the time and money
made available to the PD organization for
the conduct of Phase B studies. As a result,
significant efforts may be needed at the
beginning of Phase C to refine many of the
Phase B analyses.
The hand-over of technical responsibility
from PD to S&E is an interface which
requires a great deal of attention to mini-
mize transition problems and project
disruptions. A key issue to be addressed is
the type and content of documentation
produced in Phases A and B. Since these
early phases typically have limited funding
and PD's manpower resources are limited,
requirements and specifications resulting
from Phase B may require substantial
refinement and rework by S&E at the
beginning of Phase C. It is important that
Phase C planning and schedules account for
this activity.
PHASE C (DESIGN)
This phase requires Congressional budget
approval for projects large enough to be
separate line items in the NASA budget
submission. Funding must be approved and
available at the start of Phase C. Detailed
design is accomplished and plans are refined
for final development, fabrication, test and
operations.
The processes occurring during Phase C in-
clude:
• Refinement of work breakdown structure
• Development of Systems Requirements
Specification
• Development of design and contract end
item specifications
• Development of interface requirements
documents
• Completion of preliminary and detail
design
• Development ofpreliminary interface
control documents (ICDs)
• Performance of detailed system analyses
• Development of manufacturing, testing
verification, integration, operations, sup-
porting systems and facilities plans
• Definition of a development plan
• Refinement of schedules and cost esti-
mates
• Refinement of management and procure-
ment plans.
The outputs from Phase C, which become the
inputs to Phase D, include:
• Updated system requirements documen-
tation
• Updated detail design and CEI specifica-
tions
• Baseline.
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It is typically at the beginning of Phase C,
when industry is heavily involved in design
and project funding is increased dramatical-
ly, that many formal documentation require-
ments are contractually imposed. This can
contribute to large cost increases over
previous estimates in Phases A and B, and
dictates the need for early inputs from the
S&E engineering organization to assure that
design and performance requirement specifi-
cations and data requirements are incorpo-
rated into initial cost estimates.
PHASE D (DEVELOPMENT/OPERATIONS)
During this phase of a project, flight hard-
ware and software are developed, manufac-
tured/coded, tested and qualified for flight.
In addition, support is provided for the
follow-on flight operations.
The processes occurring during Phase D in-
clude:
• Development and test of prototype and
protoflight hardware
• Verification/Validation - qualification of
hardware and sot_ware for flight
• Manufacture and integration offlight
hardware
• Checkout offlight systems
• Launch operations
• Flight operations
• Retrieval or disposal of payload and orbit-
al debris.
The outputs from Phase D include:
• A successful mission,
• Documentation and evaluation of the re-
sults and anomalies
• Documentation oflessonslearned.
In the early days of spaceflight, MSFC
provided expendable propulsion systems, so
most project activity terminated when
launch operations were complete. As the
mission of MSFC evolved into payloads and
experiments, its role in the area of mission
operations and maintenance greatly expand-
ed and now provides an important function
in present projects such as Spacelab, the Na-
tional Space Transportation System, Hubble
Space Telescope, the Advanced X-Ray Astro-
physics Facility, and Space Station Freedom.
These programs involve 15 to 30 years of
technology insertion, operations and main-
tenance activities that would justify a sepa-
rate independent phase in their life cycles.
At MSFC, the design phase is normally
combined with the development and oper-
ations phase to form a Phase C/D. The result-
ing contract takes the Phase B data, refines
it into a final design, develops and fabricates
the hardware, tests and flight qualifies it,
and supports the flight and mission
operations.
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When applied to a system, the doctrine of
successive refinement is a divide-and-
conquer strategy. Complex systems are suc-
cessively divided into pieces that are less
complex, until they are simple enough to be
conquered. This decomposition results in
several structures for describing the product
system and the producing system ("the
system that produces the system"). These
structures play important roles in systems
engineering and project management. Many
of the remaining sections in this chapter are
devoted to describing some of these key
structures.
Structures that describe the product sys-
tem include, but are not limited to, the re-
quirements tree, system architecture and
certain symbolic information such as system
drawings, schematics, and data bases. The
structures that describe the producing sys-
tem include the project's work breakdown,
schedules, cost accounts and organization.
These structures provide different perspec-
tives on their common raison d'etre: the
desired product system. Creating a funda-
mental harmony among these structures is
essential for successful systems engineering
and project management; this harmony
needs to be established in some cases by one-
to-one correspondence between two struc-
tures, and in other cases, by traceable links
across several structures. It is useful, at this
point, to give some illustrations of this key
principle.
System requirements serve two purposes
in the systems engineering process. First,
they represent a hierarchical description of
the buyer's desired product system as under-
stood by the systems engineer. The interac-
tion between the buyer and systems engineer
to develop these requirements is one way the
"voice of the buyer" is heard. Determining
the right requirements -- that is, only those
that the informed buyer is willing to pay for
-- is an important part of the systems engi-
neer's job. Second, system requirements also
communicate to the design engineers what to
design and build (or code). As these require-
ments are allocated, they become inexorably
linked to the system architecture and prod-
uct breakdown, which consists of the hierar-
chy of project, systems, segments, elements,
subsystems, etc.
The work breakdown structure (WBS) is
also a hierarchical structure that contains
the pieces of work necessary to complete the
project. Each task in the WBS should be
traceable to one or more of the system re-
quirements. Schedules, which are structured
as networks, describe the time-phased activi-
ties that result in the product system in the
WBS The cost account structure needs to be
directly linked to the work in WBS and the
schedules by which that work is done.
The project's organizational structure
describes clusters of personnel assigned to
perform the work. These organizational
structures are usually trees. Sometimes they
are represented as a matrix of two interlaced
trees; one for line responsibilities, the other
for project responsibilities. In any case, the
structure should allow identification of re-
sponsibility for each WBS task.
Project documentation is the product of
particular WBS tasks. There are two funda°
mental categories of project documentation:
baselines and archives. Each category con-
tains information about both the product
system and the producing system. The base-
line, once established, contains information
describing the current state of the product
system and producing system resulting from
35
READINGS IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
all decisions that have been made. It is usu-
ally organized as a collection of hierarchical
tree structures, and should exhibit a signifi-
cant amount of cross-linking. The archives
should contain all of the rest of the project's
information that is worth keeping, even if
only temporarily. The archives should con-
tain all assumptions, data and supporting
analyses that are relevant to past, present
and future decisions. Inevitably, the struc-
ture (and control) of the archives is much
looser than that of the baseline, though cross
references should be maintained where feasi-
ble.
The structure of reviews (and their asso-
ciated control gates) reflect the time-phased
activities associated with the realization of
the product system from its product break-
down. The status reporting and assessment
structure provides information on the
progress of those same activities. On the fi-
nancial side, the status reporting and assess-
ment structure should be directly linked to
the WBS, schedules and cost accounts. On
the technical side, it should be linked to the
product breakdown and/or the requirements
tree.
MANAGING THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
PROCESS: THE SYSTEMS
ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT PLAN
Systems engineering management is a tech-
nical function and discipline that ensures
that systems engineering and all other tech-
nical functions are properly applied.
Each project should be managed in accor-
dance with a project cycle that is carefully
tailored to the project's risks. While the pro-
ject manager concentrates on managing the
overall project cycle, the project-level or lead
systems engineer concentrates on managing
its technical aspect. This requires that the
systems engineer perform (or cause to be per-
formed) the necessary multiple layers of
decomposition, definition, integration, ver-
ification and validation of the system, while
orchestrating and incorporating the appro-
priate concurrent engineering. Each one of
these systems engineering functions re-
quires application of technical analysis skills
and tools to achieve the optimum system
solution.
The techniques used in systems engineer-
ing management include baseline manage-
ment, requirements traceability, change
control, design reviews, audits, document
control, failure review boards, control gates
and performance certification.
The Project Plan defines how the overall
project will be managed to achieve the pre-
established requirements within defined pro-
grammatic constraints. The Systems Engi-
neering Management Plan (SEMP) is the
subordinate document that defines to all
project participants how the project will be
technically managed within the constraints
established by the Project Plan. The SEMP
communicates to all participants how they
must respond to pre-established manage-
ment practices. For instance, the SEMP
should describe the means for both internal
and external (to the project) interface con-
trol.
Role of the SEMP
The SEMP is the rule book that describes to
all participants how the project will be tech-
nically managed. The responsible NASA
Center should have a SEMP to describe how
it will conduct its technical management,
and each contractor should have a SEMP to
describe how it will manage in accordance
with both its contract and NASA's technical
management practices. Since the SEMP is
project- and contract-unique, it must be up-
dated for each significant programmatic
change or it will become outmoded and un-
used, and the project could slide into an un-
controlled state. The NASA Center should
have its SEMP developed before attempting
to prepare a "should-cost" estimate, since ac-
tivities that incur cost, such as technical risk
reduction, need to be identified and described
first. The contractor should have its SEMP
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developed during the proposal process (prior
to costing and pricing) because the SEMP de-
scribes the technical content of the project,
the potentially costly risk management ac-
tivities, and the verification and validation
techniques to be used, all of which must be
included in the preparation of project cost
estimates.
The project SEMP is the senior technical
management document for the project; all
other technical control documents, such as
the Interface Control Plan, Change Control
Plan, Make-or-Buy Control Plan, Design
Review Plan, Technical Audit Plan, etc., de-
pend on the SEMP and must comply with it.
The SEMP should be comprehensive and
describe how a fully integrated engineering
effort will be managed and conducted.
Contents of the SEMP
Since the SEMP describes the project's tech-
nical management approach, which is driven
by the type of project, the phase in the project
cycle, and the technical development risks, it
must be specifically written for each project
to address these situations and issues. While
the specific content of the SEMP is tailored
to the project, the recommended content is
listed below.
Part I -- Technical Program Planning
and Control. This section should identify
organizational responsibilities and authority
for systems engineering management, in-
elude control of contracted engineering; lev-
els of control established for performance
and design requirements, and the control
method used; technical progress assurance
methods; plans and schedules for design and
technical program reviews; and control of
documentation.
This section should describe:
• The role of the project office
• The role of the user
• The role of the Contracting Office Techni-
cal Representative (COTR)
• The role ofsystemsengineering
• The role of design engineering
• The role of specialty engineering
• Applicable standards
• Applicable procedures and training
• Baseline control process
• Change control process
• Interface control process
• Controlofcontracted (or subcontracted)
engineering
• Data control process
• Make-or-buy control process
• Parts, materials and process control
• Quality control
• Safety control
• Contamination control
• EMI/EMC
• Technical performance measurement
• Control gates
• Internal technical reviews
• Integration control
• Verification control
• Validation control.
Part II m Systems Engineering Process.
This section should contain a detailed de-
scriptionof the process to be used, including
the specifictailoringofthe process to the re-
quirements of the system and project; the
procedures to be used in implementing the
process; in-house documentation; the trade
study methodology; the types of mathemat-
ical and/or simulation models to be used for
system cost-effectiveness evaluations; and
the generation of specifications.
This section should describe the:
• System decomposition process
• System decomposition format
• System definition process
• System analysis and design process
• Trade study process
• System integration process
• System verification process
• System qualification process
• System acceptance process
• System validation process
• Risk management process
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• Life-cycle cost management process
• Use of mathematical models
• Use of simulations
• Specification and drawing structure
• Baseline management process
• Baseline communication process
• Change control process
• Tools tobe used.
Part III -- Engineering Specialty Inte-
gration. This section of the SEMP should de-
scribe tbe integration and coordination of the
efforts of the specialty engineering disci-
plines into the systems engineering process
during each iteration of that process. Where
there is potential for overlap of specialty ef-
forts, the SEMP should define the relative
responsibilities and authorities of each.
This section should contain the project's
approach to:
• Concurrent engineering
• The activity phasing of specialty disci-
plines
• The participation of specialty disciplines
• The involvement of specialty disciplines
• The role and responsibility of specialty
disciplines
• The participation of specialty disciplines
in system decomposition and definition
• The role of specialty disciplines in verifi-
cation and validation
• Reliability
• Producibility
• Human engineering
• Maintainability
• Safety
• Survivability/vulnerability
• Integrated logistics
• Quality assurance.
Development of the SEMP
The SEMP must be developed concurrently
with the Project Plan. In developing the-
SEMP, the technical approach to the project,
and hence the technical aspect of the project
cycle, are developed. This becomes the keel of
the project that ultimately determines the
length and cost of the project. The develop-
ment of the programmatic and technical
management approaches of the project re-
quires that the key project personnel develop
an understanding of the work to be per-
formed and the relationships among the var-
ious parts of that work. (See sections on work
breakdown structures and network sched-
ules.)
SEMP Lessons Learned from DoD Experience
• A well-managed project requires a
coordinated SEMP that is used through
the project cycle.
• A SEMP is a living document that must be
updated as the project changes and kept
consistent with the Project Plan.
• A meaningful SEMP must be the product
of experts from all areas of the project.
• Projects with little or insufficient systems
engineering discipline generally have
major problems.
• Weak systems engineering, or systems
engineering placed too low in the
organization, cannot perform the functions
as required.
• The systems engineering effort must be
skillfully managed and well
communicated to all the individuals
• The systems engineering effort must be
responsive to both the customer and the
contractor interests.
The SEMP's development requires contri-
butions from knowledgeable programmatic
and technical experts from all areas of the
project that can significantly influence the
project's outcome. The involvement of recog-
nized experts is needed to establish a SEMP
that is credible to the project manager and to
secure the full commitment of the project
team.
Managing the Systems Engineering
Process: Summary
Systems engineering organizations, and spe-
cifically project-level systems engineers, are
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responsible for managing projects through
the technical aspect of the project cycle. This
responsibility includes managing the decom-
position and definition sequence, managing
the integration, verification and validation
sequence and controlling the technical
baselines of the project. Typically, these
baselines are the functional, "design-to,"
"build-to" (or "code-to"), "as-built" (or "as-
coded"), and "as-deployed." Systems engi-
neering must ensure efficient and logical
progression through these baselines.
Systems engineering is responsible for
system decomposition and design until the
design-to specifications of all lower level con-
figuration items have been produced. Design
engineering is then responsible for develop-
ing the build-to and code-to documentation
that complies with the approved design-to
baseline. Systems engineering audits the
design and coding process and the design en-
gineering solutions for compliance to all
higher level baselines. In performing this
responsibility, systems engineering must
ensure requirements traceability and docu-
ment the results in a requirements traceabil-
ity/verification matrix.
Systems engineering is also responsible
for the overall management of the integra-
tion, verification and validation process. In
this role, systems engineering conducts Test
Readiness Reviews and ensures that only
verified configuration items are integrated
into the next higher assembly for further
verification. Verification is continued to the
system level, after which system validation
is conducted to prove compliance with user
requirements.
Systems engineering also ensures that
concurrent engineering is properly applied
through the project cycle by involving the
required specialty engineering. The SEMP is
the guiding document for these activities.
THE WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE
A WBS is a hierarchical breakdown of the
work necessary to complete a project. The
WBS should be a product-based, hierarchical
division of deliverable items and associated
services. As such, it should contain the pro-
ject's product breakdown structure (PBS),
with the specified prime product(s) at the
top, and the systems, segments, subsystems,
etc. at successive lower levels. At the lowest
level are products such as hardware items,
software items and information items (e.g.,
documents, databases, etc.) for which there
is a cognizant engineer or manager. Branch
points in the hierarchy should show how the
PBS elements are to be integrated. The WBS
is built from the PBS by adding, at each
branch point of the PBS, any necessary ser-
vice elements such as management, systems
engineering, integration and verification
(I&V), and integrated logistics support (ILS).
If several WBS elements require similar
equipment or software, then a higher level
WBS element might be defined to perform a
block buy or a development activity (e.g.,
"System Support Equipment"). Figure 1
shows the relationship between a system, a
PBS and a WBS.
A project WBS should be carried down to
the cost account level appropriate to the
risks to be managed. The appropriate level of
detail for a cost account is determined by
management's desire to have visibility into
costs, balanced against the cost of planning
and reporting. Contractors may have a Con-
tract WBS (CWBS), which is appropriate to
the contractor's needs to control costs. A
summary CWBS, consisting of the upper lev-
els of the full CWBS, is usually included in
the project WBS to report costs to the con-
tracting agency.
WBS elements should be identified by ti-
tle and by a numbering system that performs
the following functions:
• Identifies the level of the WBS element
• Identifies the higher level element into
which the WBS element will be integrat-
ed
• Shows the cost account number of the
element.
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Figure 1 The Relationship between a System,
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A WBS should also have a companion WBS
dictionary that contains each element's title,
identification number, objective, description,
and any dependencies (e.g., receivables) on
other WBS elements. This dictionary pro-
vides a structured project description that is
valuable for orienting project members and
other interested parties. It fully describes
the products and/or services expected from
each WBS element.
This section provides some techniques for
developing a WBS, and points out some mis-
takes to avoid.
Role of the WBS
A product-based WBS is the organizing
structure for:
• Project and technical planning and sched-
uling
• Cost estimation and budget formulation
(In particular, costs collected in a
product-based WBS can be compared to
historical data. This is identified as a
primary objective by DoD standards for
WBSs.)
• Defining the scope of statements of work
and specifications for contract efforts
• Project status reporting, including sched-
ule, cost and work force, technical perfor-
mance, integrated cost/schedule data
(such as earned value and estimated cost
at completion)
• Plans, such as the SEMP, and other docu-
mentation products, such as specifica-
tions and drawings.
It provides a logical outline and vocabulary
that describes the entire project and inte-
grates information in a consistent way. If
there is a schedule slip in one element of a
WBS, an observer can determine which other
WBS elements are most likely to be affected.
Cost impacts are more accurately estimated.
If there is a design change in one element of
the WBS, an observer can determine which
other WBS elements will most likely be af-
fected, and these elements can be consulted
for potential adverse impacts.
Techniques for Developing the WBS
Developing a successful project WBS is likely
to require several iterations through the
project cycle since it is not always obvious at
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the outset what the full extent of the work
may be. Prior to developing a preliminary
WBS, there should be some development of
the system architecture to the point where a
preliminary PBS can be created.
The PBS and associated WBS can then be
developed level by level from the top down.
In this approach, a project-level systems en-
gineer finalizes the PBS at the project level,
and provides a draft PBS for the next lower
level. The WBS is then derived by adding ap-
propriate services such as management and
systems engineering to that lower level. This
recursive process is repeated until a WBS ex-
ists down to the desired cost account level.
An alternative approach is to define all
levels of a complete PBS in one design activ-
ity, and then develop the complete WBS.
When this approach is taken, it is necessary
to take great care to develop the PBS so that
all products are included, and all assembly/
integration and verification branches are
correct. The involvement of people who will
be responsible for the lower level WBS ele-
ments is recommended.
A WBS for a Multiple Delivery Project.
Some of the terms for projects that provide
multiple deliveries, are "rapid develop-
ment," "rapid prototyping" and "incremental
delivery." Such projects should also have a
product-based WBS, but there will be one ex-
tra level in the WBS hierarchy immediately
under the final prime product(s) that identi-
fies each delivery. At any point in time there
will be both active and inactive elements in
the WBS.
A WBS for an Operational Facility. A
WBS for managing an operational facility
such as a flight operations center is analo-
gous to a WBS for developing a system. The
difference is that the products in the PBS are
not necessarily completed once and then
integrated, but are all produced on a routine
basis. A PBS for an operational facility
might consist of information products or
service products provided to external cus-
tomers. However, the general concept of a
hierarchical breakdown of products and/or
services would still apply.
The rules that apply to a development
WBS also apply to a WBS for an operational
facility. The techniques for developing a
WBS for an operational facility are the same,
except that services such as maintenance
and user support are added to the PBS, and
services such as systems engineering, inte-
gration and verification may not be needed.
Common Errors in Developing a WBS
There are three common errors found in
WBSs:
Error 1: The WBS describes functions,
not products. This makes the project man-
ager the only one formally responsible for
products.
Error 2: The WBS has branch points that
are not consistent with how the WBS ele-
ments will be integrated. For instance, in a
flight operations system with a distributed
architecture, there is typically software asso-
ciated with hardware items that will be inte-
grated and verified at lower levels of a WBS.
It would then be inappropriate to separate
hardware and software as if they were sepa-
rate systems to be integrated at the system
level. This would make it difficult to assign
accountability for integration and to identify
the costs of integrating and testing compo-
nents of a system.
Error 3: The WBS is inconsistent with
the PBS. This makes it possible that the PBS
will not be fully implemented, and generally
complicates the management process.
Some examples of these errors are shown
in Figure 2. Each one prevents the WBS from
successfully performing its roles in project
planning and organizing. These errors are
avoided by using the WBS development tech-
niques described above.
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I Error 1 I Functions without Products
This WBS describes only
functions, not the products
_ Error 2 ] Inappropriate Branches
This WBS has branch points that are
not consistent with the way the WBS
elements will be integrated
i!_ii!iiiiiiiiiiiiii!i
Error 3 Inconsistency with PBS
This WBS is inconsistent with the
Product Breakdown Structure
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Figure 2 Examples of WBS Development Errors
NETWORK SCHEDULING
Products described in the WBS are the result
of activities that take time to complete. An
orderly and efficient systems engineering
process requires that these activities take
place in a Way that respects the underlying
time-precedence relationships among them.
This is accomplished by creating a network
schedule, which explicitly takes into account
the dependencies of each activity on other ac-
tivities and receivables from outside sources.
This section discusses the role of scheduling
and the techniques for building a complete
network schedule.
Scheduling is an essential component of
planning and managing the activities of a
project. The process of creating a network
schedule can lead to a much better under-
standing of what needs to be done, how long
it will take, and how each element of the pro-
ject WBS might affect other elements. A
complete network schedule can be used to
calculate how long it will take to complete a
project, which activities determine that du-
ration (i.e., critical path activities), and how
much spare time (i.e., float) exists for all the
other activities of the project. An under-
standing of the project's schedule is a
prerequisite for accurate project budgeting.
Keeping track of schedule progress is an
essential part of controlling the project, be-
cause cost and technical problems often show
up first as schedule problems. Because net-
work schedules show how each activity af-
fects other activities, they are essential for
predicting the consequences of schedule slips
or accelerations of an activity on the entire
project. Network scheduling systems also
help managers accurately assess the impact
-A
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Critical Path and Float Calculation
The critical path is the sequence of activities
that will take the longest to accomplish. Activi-
ties that are not on the critical path have a cer-
tain amount of time that they can be delayed un-
til they, too are on a critical path. This time is
called float. There are two types of float, path
float and free float. Path float is where a se-
quence of activities collectively have float. If
there is a delay in an activity in this sequence,
then the path float for all subsequent activities
is reduced by that amount. Free float exists
when a delay in an activity will have no effect on
any other activity. For example, if activity A can
be finished in 2 days, and activity B requires 5
days, and activity C requires completion of both
A and B, then A would have 3 days of free float.
Float is valuable. Path float should be con-
served where possible, so that a reserve exists
for future activities. Conservation is much less
important for free float.
To determine the critical path, there is first
a "forward pass" where the earliest start time of
each activity is calculated. The time when the
last activity can be completed becomes the end
point for that schedule. Then there is a "back-
ward pass," where the latest possible start point
of each activity is calculated, assuming that the
last activity ends at the end point previously cal-
culated. Float is the time difference between the
earliest start time and the latest start time of an
activity. Whenever this is zero, that activity is
on a critical path.
of both technical and resource changes on the
cost and schedule of a project.
Network Schedule Data and Graphical
Formats
Network schedule data consist of:
• Activities
• Dependencies between activities (e.g.,
where an activity depends upon another
activity for a receivable)
• Products or milestones that occur as a re-
sult of one or more activities
• Duration of each activity.
A work flow diagram (WFD) is a graphi-
cal display of the first three data items
above. A network schedule contains all four
data items. When creating a network sched-
ule, graphical formats of these data are very
useful. Two general types of graphical for-
mats, shown in Figure 3, are used. One has
activities-on-arrows, with products and de-
pendencies at the beginning and end of the
arrow. This is the typical format of the Pro-
gram Evaluation and Review Technique
(PERT) chart. The second called precedence
diagrams, has boxes that represent activi-
ties; dependencies are then shown by arrows.
Due to its simpler visual format and reduced
requirements on computer resources, the
precedence diagram has become more com-
mon in recent years.
Activity-on-ArrowDiagram
AI _J_-__A_ ._._____---__- ActivityA has
broken into two
i separate activities.
!
I
_.._._ _BSO___ Activity Description
5 Activity Duration
(e.g., days)
PrecedenceDiagram
A Activity Description
[
I_ ActivityDuration(e.g.,days)
l
L SS5 _ B
This means that Activity B
start5days aftercan
ActivityA starts. i
Note:
Each activity's
description
shouldcontain
an action and
the object of
that action.
i
Figure 3 Activity-on-Arrow and Precedence
Diagrams for Network Schedules
The precedence diagram format allows
for simple depiction of the following logical
relationships:
• Activity B begins when Activity A begins
(Start-Start, or SS)
• Activity B begins only after Activity A
ends (Finish-Start, or FS)
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• Activity B ends when Activity A ends
(Finish-Finish, or FF).
Each of these three activity relationships
may be modified by attaching a lag ( + or - )
to the relationship, as shown in Figure 3.
It is possible to summarize a number of
low-level activities in a precedence diagram
with a single activity. This is commonly
referred to as hammocking. One takes the
initial low-level activity and attaches a
summary activity to it using the first re-
lationship described above. The summary
activity is then attached to the final low-
level activity using the third relationship
described above. Unless one is hammocking,
the most common relationship used in prece-
dence diagrams is the second one mentioned
above. The activity-on-arrow format can
represent the identical time-precedence logic
as a precedence diagram by creating artifi-
cial events and activities as needed.
Establishing a Network Schedule
Scheduling begins with project-level sched-
ule objectives for delivering the products de-
scribed in the upper levels of the WBS. To
develop network schedules that are consis-
tent with the project's objectives, the follow-
ing six steps are applied to each cost account
at the lowest available level of the WBS.
Step 1: Identify activities and dependen-
cies needed to complete each WBS element.
Enough activities should be identified to
show exact schedule dependencies between
activities and other WBS elements. It is not
uncommon to have about 100 activities iden-
tified for the first year of a WBS element
that will require 10 work-years per year.
Typically, there is more schedule detail for
the current year, and much less detail for
subsequent years. Each year, schedules are
updated with additional detail for the cur-
rent year. This first step is most easily ac-
complished by:
• Ensuring that the cost account WBS is
extended downward to describe all sig-
nificant products, including documents,
reports, hardware and software items.
• For each product, listing the steps re-
quired for its generation and drawing the
process as a work flow diagram.
• Indicating the dependencies among the
products, and any integration and verifi-
cation steps within the work package.
Step 2: Identify and negotiate external
dependencies. External dependencies are
any receivables from outside of the cost ac-
count, and any deliverables that go outside
of the cost account. Informal negotiations
should occur to ensure that there is agree-
ment with respect to the content, format and
labeling of products that move across cost
account boundaries. This step is designed to
ensure that lower level schedules can be
integrated.
Step 3: Estimate durations of all activi-
ties. Assumptions behind these estimates
(work force, availability of facilities, etc.)
should be written down for future reference.
Step 4: Enter the schedule data for the
WBS element into a suitable computer pro-
gram to obtain a network schedule and an
estimate of the critical path for that element.
(There are many commercially available
software packages for this function.) This
step enables the cognizant engineer, team
leader, and/or systems engineer to review
the schedule logic. It is not unusual at this
point for some iteration of steps one to four to
be required in order to obtain a satisfactory
schedule. Reserve will also be added to criti-
cal path activities, often in the form of a
dummy activity, to ensure that schedule
commitments can be met for this WBS ele-
ment.
Step 5: Integrate schedules of lower level
WBS elements, using suitable software, so
that all dependencies between WBS ele-
ments are correctly included in a project
Z
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network. It is important to include the im-
pacts of holidays, weekends, etc., at this
point. The critical path for the project is dis-
covered at this step in the process.
Step 6: Review the work force level and
funding profile over time, and make final ad-
justments to logic and durations so that work
force levels and funding levels are reason-
able. Adjustments to the logic and the dura-
tions of activities may be needed to conform
to the schedule targets established at the
project-level. This may include adding more
activities to some WBS element, deleting re-
dundant activities, increasing the work force
for some activities that are on the critical
path, or finding ways to do more activities in
parallel, rather than in series. If necessary,
the project-level targets may need to be ad-
justed, or the scope of the project may need to
be reviewed. Again, it is good practice to
have some schedule reserve, or float, as part
of a risk mitigation strategy.
The product of these last steps is a feasi-
ble baseline schedule for each WBS element
that is consistent with the activities of all
other WBS elements, and the sum of all
these schedules is consistent with both the
technical scope and the schedule goals for the
project. There should be enough float in this
integrated master schedule so that schedule
and associated cost risk are acceptable to the
project and to the project's customer. Even
when this is done, time estimates for many
WBS elements will have been underestimat-
ed, or work on some WBS elements will not
start as early as had been originally as-
sumed due to late arrival of receivables. Con-
sequently, replanning is almost always
needed to meet the project's goals.
Reporting Techniques
Summary data about a schedule is usually
described in Gantt charts, a good example of
which is shown in Figure 4. Another type of
output format is a table that shows the float
and recent changes in float of key activities.
For example, a project manager may wish to
Desirable Features in Gantt Charts
The Gantt chart shown in Figure 4 illustrates
the following desirable features:
o A heading that describes the WBS element,
the responsible manager, the date of the
baseline used, and the date that status was
reported.
• A milestone section in the main body (lines 1
and 2).
• An activity section in the main body.
Activity data:
a. WBS elements (lines 3, 5, 8, 12, 16 and
20)
b. Activities {indented from WBS elements)
c. Current plan (shown as thick bars)
d. Baseline plan (same as current plan, or if
different, represented by thin bars under
the thick bars)
e. Status line at the appropriate date
f. Slack for each activity (dashed lines
above the current plan bars)
g. Schedule slips from the baseline (dashed
lines below the milestone on line 12)
• A note section, where the symbols in the
main body can be explained.
This Gantt chart shows only 23 lines, which is a
summary of the activities currently being
worked for this WBS element. It is appropriate
to tailor the amount of detail to those items most
pertinent at the time of status reporting.
know precisely how much schedule reserve
has been consumed by critical path activi-
ties, and whether reserves are being
consumed or are being preserved in the
latest reporting period. This table provides
information on the rate of change of schedule
reserve.
Good scheduling systems provide
capabilities to show resource requirements
over time, and to make adjustments so that
the schedule is feasible with respect to
resource constraints over time. Resources
may include work force level, funding
profiles, important facilities, etc. Figure 5
shows an example of an unleveled resource
profile. The objective is to move the start
dates of tasks that have float to points where
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Figure 4 An Example of a Gantt Chart
the resource profile is feasible. If that is
not sufficient, then the assumed task dura-
tions for resource-intensive activities should
be re-examined and, accordingly, the re-
source levels changed.
BUDGETING AND RESOURCE PLANNING
Budgeting and resource planning involves
the establishment of a reasonable project
baseline budget and the capability to ana-
iyze changes to that baseline resulting from
technical and/or schedule changes. The proj-
ect's WBS, baseline schedule and budget
should be viewed by the Systems engineer as
mutually dependent, reflecting the technical
content, time, and cost of meeting the proj-
ect's goals and objectives.
The budgeting process needs to take into
account whether a fixed cost cap or cost
profile exists. When no such cap or profile
exists, a baseline budget is developed from
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Figure 5 An Example of an Unleveled Resource
Profile
the WBS and network schedule. This specifi-
cally involves combining the project's work
force and other resource needs with the
appropriate work force rates and other finan-
cial and programmatic factors to obtain cost
element estimates. These elements of cost
include:
• Direct labor costs
• Overhead costs
• Other direct costs (travel, data process-
ing, etc.)
• Subcontract costs
• Material costs
• General and administrative costs
• Cost of money (i.e., interest payments,
if applicable)
• Fee (if applicable)
• Contingency
When there is a cost cap or a fixed cost
profile, there are additional logic gates that
must be satisfied before the systems engi-
neer can complete the budgeting and plan-
ning process. A determination needs to be
made whether the WBS and network sched-
ule are feasible with respect to mandated
cost caps and/or cost profiles. If not, the sys-
tems engineer needs to recommend the best
approaches for either stretching out a project
(usually at an increase in the total cost) or
descoping the project's goals and objectives,
requirements, design, and/or implementa-
tion approach.
Whether a cost cap or fixed cost profile
exists, it is important to control costs after
they have been baselined. An important
aspect of cost control is project cost and
schedule status reporting and assessment.
Another is cost and schedule risk planning,
such as developing risk avoidance and work-
around strategies. At the project level,
budgeting and resource planning must also
ensure that an adequate level of contingency
funds are included to deal with unforeseen
events.
Assessing the Effect of Schedule Slippage
Certain elements of cost, called fixed costs, are
mainly time related, while others, called vari-
able costs, are mainly product related. If a pro-
ject's schedule is slipped, then the fixed costs of
completing it increase. The variable costs re-
main the same in total (excluding inflation
adjustments), but are deferred downstream, as
in the figure below.
+
TNOW
_DEFERRED_
To quickly assess the effect of a simple schedule
slippage:
• Convert baseline budget plan from nominal
(real-year) dollars to constant dollars
• Divide baseline budget plan into fixed and
variable costs
• Enter schedule slip implementation
• Compute new variable costs including any
work force disruption costs
• Repeat last two steps until an acceptable
implementation is achieved
• Compute new fixed costs
• Sum new fixed and variable costs
• Convert from constant dollars to nominal
(real-years) dollars.
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RISK MANAGEMENT
Risk management comprises purposeful
thought to the sources, magnitude and
mitigation of risk, and actions directed to-
ward its balanced reduction. As such, risk
management is an integral part of project
management, and contributes directly to the
objectives of systems engineering.
Risk
The term risk has different meanings depending
on the context. Sometimes it simply indicates the
degree of variability in the outcome or result of a
particular action. In the context of risk
management during the systems engineering
process, the term denotes a combination of both
the likelihood of various outcomes and their
distinct consequences. The focus, moreover, is
generally on undesired or unfavorable outcomes
such as the risk of a technical failure, or the risk
of exceeding a cost target.
NASA policy objectives with regard to
project risks are expressed in NMI 8070.4A,
Risk Management Policy. These are to:
• Provide a disciplined and documented ap-
proach to risk management throughout
the project cycle
• Support management decision making by
providing integrated risk assessments
(i.e., taking into account cost, schedule,
performance and safety concerns)
• Communicate to NASA management the
significance of assessed risk levels and
the decisions made with respect to them.
There are a number of actions the systems
engineer can take to effect these objectives.
Principal among them is planning and com-
pleting a well-conceived risk management
program. Such a program encompasses
several related activities during the systems
engineering process. The structure of these
activities is shown in Figure 6.
The first is the process of identifying and
characterizing the project's risks. The objec-
tive of this step is to understand what uncer-
tainties the project faces, and which among
them should be given greater attention. This
is accomplished by categorizing (in a consis-
tent manner) uncertainties by the likelihood
of occurrence (e.g., high, medium, or low),
and separately, according to severity of
consequences. This categorization forms the
basis for ranking uncertainties by their rela-
tive riskiness. Uncertainties with both high
likelihood and severely adverse conse-
quences are ranked higher than those
without these characteristics. The primary
methods used in this process are qualitative;
hence, in systems engineering literature,
this step is sometimes called qualitative risk
assessment. The output of this step is a list of
significant risks (by phase) to be given
specific management attention.
In some projects, qualitative methods are
adequate for making risk management
decisions; in others, these methods are not
precise enough to elucidate the magnitude of
the problem, or to allocate scarce risk reduc-
tion resources. Risk analysis is the process of
quantifying both the likelihood of occurrence
and consequences of potential future events
(or "states of nature" in some texts). The
[
Risk Identification /and Characterization Risk Analysis
Figure 6 Risk Management Structure
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systems engineer needs to decide whether
risk identification and characterization are
adequate, or whether the increased precision
of risk analysis is needed for some uncertain-
ties. In making that determination, the sys-
tems engineer needs to balance the (usually}
higher cost of risk analysis against the value
of the additional information.
Risk mitigation is the formulation, selec-
tion and execution of strategies designed to
economically reduce risk. Tracking the effec-
tivity of these strategies is also considered
part of risk mitigation. Risk mitigation is
often a challenge because efforts and expen-
ditures to reduce one type of risk may
increase another type. (Some have called this
the systems engineering equivalent of the
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle in quan-
tum mechanics). The ability (or necessity) to
trade one type of risk for another means that
the project manager and the systems engi-
neer need to understand the system-wide
effects of various strategies in order to make
a rational allocation of resources.
Several techniques have been developed
for each of these risk management activities.
The principal ones are shown in Table 1. The
systems engineer needs to choose the tech-
niques that best fit the unique requirements
of each project.
A risk management program is needed
throughout the project cycle. In keeping with
the doctrine of successive refinement, its
focus, however, moves from the "big picture"
in the early phases of the project cycle
(Phases A and B) to more specific issues dur-
ing product design and development (Phases
C and D). During pre-operations and oper-
ations (Phases E and F), the focus changes
again. A good risk management program is
always forward-looking. In other words, a
risk management program should address
the project's ongoing risk issues and future
uncertainties. As such, it is a natural part of
concurrent engineering.
Risk management activities for a project
should be documented in a risk management
program plan. That plan, which elaborates
Risk
Identification
and
Characteriza-
tion
Risk Analysis
Risk
Mitigation
and Tracking
Expert Decision Watchlists/
interviews analysis milestones
Independent Probabilistic Contingency
assessment Risk planning
(cost, schedule Assessment
and technical) (PRA)
Risk templates Probabilistic Critical
(e.g., DoD network items/issues
4245.7-M) schedules (e.g., lists
PERT)
Lessons
learned files
from previous
projects
Probabilistic
cost and
effectiveness
models (e.g.,
Monte Carlo
models)FMECAs/
FMEAs/
Digraphs
Cost/schedule
control
YeStems and
chnical
Performance
Measure
(TPM)
tracking
Table 1 Techniques of Risk Management
on the SEMP and should be updated at each
phase of the project cycle, contains:
• The project's overall risk policy and objec-
tives
• The programmatic aspects of the risk
management activities (i.e., responsibil-
ities, resources, schedules and miles-
tones, etc.)
• A description of the tools and techniques
to be used for risk identification and
characterization, risk analysis, and risk
mitigation
• A description of the role of risk manage-
ment with respect to systems analysis,
baseline change control, formal reviews,
and status reporting and assessment
• Documentation requirements for each
risk management product and action.
The level of risk management activities
should be consistent with the project's
overall risk policy established in conjunction
with its NASA Headquarters program office.
At present, formal guidelines for the
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classification of projects with respect to over-
all risk policy do not exist; such guidelines
exist only for NASA payloads. These are pro-
mulgated in NMI 8010.1A, Classification of
NASA Payloads, Attachment A.
Types of Risks
There are several ways to describe the var-
ious types of risk a project manager/systems
engineer faces. Traditionally, project manag-
ers and systems engineers have attempted to
divide risks into three or four broad categor-
ies namely, cost, schedule, technical, and
sometimes, safety (and/or hazard) risks.
More recently, others have entered the lexi-
con, including the categories of organization-
al, management, acquisition, supportability,
political and programmatic risks. These
newer categories reflect the expanded set of
concerns of project managers and systems
engineers who must operate in the current
NASA environment. Some of these newer
categories also represent supersets of other
categories. For example, the Defense Sys-
tems Management College (DSMC) Systems
Engineering Management Guide wraps
"funding, schedule, contract relations, and
political risks" into the broader category of
programmatic risks. While these terms are
useful in informal discussions, there appears
to be no formal taxonomy free of ambiguities.
One reason, mentioned above, is that often
one type of risk can be exchanged for an-
other. A second reason is that some of these
categories move together, as for example,
cost risk and political risk (e.g., the risk of
project cancellation).
Another way some have categorized risk
is by the degree of mathematical pre-
dictability in its underlying uncertainty.
The distinction has been made between an
uncertainty that has a known probability
distribution, with known or estimated
parameters, and one in which the underlying
probability distribution is either not known,
or its parameters cannot be objectively
quantified.
An example of the first kind of uncertain-
ty occurs in the unpredictability of the
spares upmass requirement for alternative
Space Station Freedom designs. While the
requirement is stochastic in any particular
logistics cycle, the probability distribution
can be estimated for each design from reli-
ability theory and empirical data. Examples
of the second kind of uncertainty occur in
trying to predict whether a Shuttle accident
will make resupply of Freedom impossible
for a period of time greater than x months, or
whether life on Mars exists.
Modern subjectivist (also known as
Bayesian) probability theory holds that the
probability of an event is the degree of belief
that a person has that it will occur, given
his/her state of information. As that infor-
mation improves (e.g., through the acquisi-
tion of data or experience), the subjectivist's
estimate of a probability should converge to
that estimated as if the probability distribu-
tion were known. In the examples of the
previous paragraph, the only difference,
then, is the probability estimator's perceived
state of information. Consequently, subjec-
tivists find the distinction between the two
kinds of uncertainty of little or no practical
significance. The implication of the subjec-
tivist's view for risk management is that,
even with little or no data, the systems
engineer's subjective probability estimates
form a valid basis for risk decision making.
Risk Identification and
Characterization Techniques
A variety of techniques is available for risk
identification and characterization. The
thoroughness with which this step is accom-
plished is an important determinant of the
risk management program's success.
Expert Interviews. When properly con-
ducted, expert interviews can be a major
source of insight and information on the pro-
ject's risks in the expert's area of knowledge.
One key to a successful interview is in
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identifying an expert who is close enough to
a risk issue to understand it thoroughly, and
at the same time, able (and willing) to step
back and take an objective view of the prob-
abilities and consequences. A second key to
success is advanced preparation on the part
of the interviewer. This means having a list
of risk issues to be covered in the interview,
developing a working knowledge of these
issues as they apply to the project, and devel-
oping methods for capturing the information
acquired during the interview.
Initial interviews may yield only qualita-
tive information, which should be verified in
follow-up rounds. Expert interviews are also
used to solicit quantitative data and infor-
mation for those risk issues that qualitative-
ly rank high. These interviews are often the
major source of inputs to risk analysis
models built using the techniques described
later.
Independent Assessment. This technique
can take several forms. In one form, it can be
a review of project documentation, such as
statements of work, acquisition plans, verifi-
cation plans, manufacturing plans and the
SEMP. In another form, it can be an evalua-
tion of the WBS for completeness and consis-
tency with the project's schedules. In a third
form, an independent assessment can be an
independent cost (and/or schedule) estimate
from an outside agency and/or group.
Risk Templates. This technique consists of
examining and then applying a series of pre-
viously developed risk templates to a current
project. Each template generally covers a
particular risk issue, and then describes
methods for avoiding or reducing that risk.
The most widely recognized series of tem-
plates appears in DoD 4245.7M, Transition
from Development to Production... Solving
the Risk Equation. Many of the risks and risk
responses described are based on lessons
learned from DoD programs, but are general
enough to be useful to NASA projects. As a
general caution, risk templates cannot
provide an exhaustive list of risk issues for
every project, but they are a useful input to
risk identification.
Lessons Learned. A review of the lessons
learned files, data and reports from previous
similar projects can produce insights and in-
formation for risk identification on a new
project. For technical risk identification, as
an example, it makes sense to examine pre-
vious projects of similar function, architec-
ture or technological approach. The lessons
learned from the Infrared Astronomical Sat-
ellite (IRAS) project might be useful to the
Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF)
project, even though the latter's degree of
complexity is significantly greater. The key
to applying this technique is in recognizing
what aspects are analogous in two projects,
and what data are relevant to the new
project. Even if the the documented lessons
learned from previous projects are not appli-
cable at the system level, there may be
valuable data applicable at the subsystem or
component level.
FMECAs, FMEAs and Digraphs. Failure
Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA), Failure Modes and Effects Analy-
sis (FMEA) and digraphs are specialized
techniques for safety (and/or hazard) risk
identification and characterization. These
techniques focus on the hardware compo-
nents that make up the system. According to
MIL-STD-1629A, FMECA is "an ongoing
procedure by which each potential failure in
a system is analyzed to determine the results
or effects thereof on the system, and to classi-
fy each potential failure mode according to
its severity." Failures are generally classi-
fied into four severity categories:
• Category I - Catastrophic Failure (possi-
ble death or system loss)
• Category II - Critical Failure (possible
major injury or system damage)
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• Category III- Major Failure (possible
minor injury or mission effectiveness deg-
radation)
• Category IV - Minor Failure (requires
system maintenance, but does not pose a
hazard to personnel or mission effective-
ness).
A complete FMECA also includes an esti-
mate of the probability of each potential fail-
ure. These probabilities are usually based, at
first, on subjective judgment or experience
factors from similar kinds of hardware com-
ponents, but may be refined from reliability
data as the system development progresses.
An FMEA is similar to an FMECA, but typi-
cally excludes the severity classification
category.
Digraph analysis is an aid in determining
fault tolerance, propagation and reliability
in large, interconnected systems. Digraphs
exhibit a network structure and resemble a
schematic diagram. The digraph technique
permits the integration of data from a num-
ber of individual FMECAs/FMEAs, and can
be translated into fault trees, described be-
low, if quantitative probability estimates are
needed.
Risk Analysis Techniques
The tools and techniques of risk analysis rely
heavily on the concept and "laws" (actually,
axioms and theorems) of probability. The
systems engineer needs to be familiar with
these in order to appreciate the full power
and limitations of these techniques. The
products of risk analyses are generally quan-
titative probability and consequence esti-
mates for various outcomes, more detailed
understanding of the dominant risks, and
improved capability for allocating risk re-
duction resources.
common to much of systems engineering, a
complex uncertainty is decomposed into sim-
pler ones, which are then treated separately.
The decomposition continues until it reaches
a level at which either hard information can
be brought to bear, or intuition can function
effectively. The decomposition can be graphi-
cally represented as a decision tree. The
branch points, called nodes, in a decision tree
represent either decision points or chance
events. Endpoints of the tree are the poten-
tial outcomes.
In most applications of decision analysis,
these outcomes are generally assigned dollar
values. From the probabilities assigned at
each chance node, and the dollar value of
each outcome, the distribution of dollar val-
ues (i.e., consequences) can be derived for
each set of decisions. Even large, complex de-
cision trees can be represented in currently
available decision analysis software. This
software can also calculate a variety of risk
measures.
In brief, decision analysis is a technique
that allows:
• A systematic enumeration of uncertain-
ties and encoding of their probabilities
and outcomes
• An explicit characterization of the deci-
sion maker's attitude toward risk, ex-
pressed in terms of his/her risk aversion
• A calculation of the value of "perfect
information," thus setting a normative
upper bound on information-gathering
expenditures
• Sensitivity testing on probability esti-
mates and outcome dollar values.
Decision Analysis. Decision analysis is one
technique to help the individual decision --
maker deal with a complex set of uncertain-
z
ties. Using the divide-and-conquer approach
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). A
PRA seeks to measure the risk inherent in a
system's design and operation by quantify-
ing both the likelihood of various possible
accident sequences and their consequences.
A typical PRA application is to determine
the risk associated with a specific nuclear
power plant. Within NASA, PRAs are used
to demonstrate, for example, the relative
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An Example of a Decision Tree for Robotic Precursor Missions to Mars
In 1990, the Lunar/Mars Exploration Program Office (LMEPO) at JSC wanted to know how robotic precur-
sor missions might reduce the risk of a manned Mars mission. Structuring the problem as a decision tree a -
lows the effects of different missions and chance events to be systematically and quantitatively evaluated.
The portion of the decision tree shown here illustrates the calculation of the probabilities for three distinct
outcomes: (A) a successful Mars landing, (B) a safe return without a landing, or (C) a disaster resulting in
mission and crew loss, when no atmospheric or site reconnaissance robotic precursor missions were made
and aerocapture at Mars was selected. As new information becomes available, the decision tree's data can be
reviewed and updated.
Probability of Each Outcome _ /
/__A_X_ = 8635/ _ _ A Land 0.09_L_L.?_._
//_x.^ =:0600_"=I.000 Propulsive_'_"_,,_ Catastrophic . Crash 0.01// _ A
/
• " Success0.8
 con uccess09 - Crash001
h rxc Chan e and
I • DecisionNode @ Chance Node _ Outcome 0.00 Probability
Making the same calculations for every( branch in the decision tree allows a determination of the best mix of
roboticprecursor missions as an explicit function of: (a) the contribution of each robotic precursor mission to
mannedmission risk reduction; (b) the cost, schedule and riskiness of each robotic mission; (c) the value of
the manned mission; and (d) the science value of each robotic mission in the absence of a subsequent manned
mission. Another benefit of this quantitative approach is that robotic precursors can be traded against other
risk mitigation strategies in the manned mission architecture.
For more information on decision analysis, see de Neufville and Stafford, Systems Analysis for Engineers
and Managers, 1971, and Barclay, et al., Handbook for Decision Analysis, 1977.
safety of launching spacecraft containing
RTGs (Radioisotope Thermoelectric Gener-
ators).
The search for accident sequences is
facilitated by event trees, which depict
initiating events and combinations of system
successes and failures, and fault trees, which
depict ways in which the system failures
represented in an event tree can occur. When
integrated, an event tree and its associated
fault tree(s) can be used to calculate the
probability of each accident sequence. The
structure and mathematics of these trees is
similar to that for decision trees. The
consequences of each accident sequence are
generally measured both in terms of direct
economic losses and in public health effects.
Doing a PRA is itself a major effort,
requiring a number of specialized skills
other than those provided by reliability
engineers and human factors engineers.
PRAs also require large amounts of system
design data at the component level and
operational procedures data. [For additional
information on PRAs, refer to the PRA
Procedures Guide (1983) by the American
Nuclear Society and Institute of Electrical
and Electronic Engineers (IEEE).]
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Probabilistic Risk Assessment Pitfalls
Risk is generally defined in a probabilistic risk
assessment (PRA) as the expected value of a con-
sequence function -- that is:
R = EsPs Cs
where Ps is the probability of outcome s, and Cs is
the consequence of outcomes. To attach probabil-
ities to outcomes, event trees and fault trees are
developed. These techniques have been used
since 1953, but by the late 1970s, they were
under attack by PRA practitioners. The reasons
include the following:
• Fa_'lt trees arelimiting because a complete
set of failures is not definable
• Common cause failures could not be captured
properly. An example of a common cause fail-
ure is one where all the valves in a system
have a defect so that their failures are not
truly independent
• PRA results are sometimes sensitive to sim-
ple changes in event tree assumptions
• Stated criteria for accepting different kinds of
risks are often inconsistent, and therefore not
appropriate for allocating risk reduction re-
sources
• Many risk-related decisions are driven by
perceptions, not necessarily objective risk as
defined by the above equation. Perceptions of
consequences tend to grow faster than the
consequences themselves -- that is, several
small accidents are not perceived as strongly
as o_m large one, even if fatalities are identi-
cal
• There are difficulties in dealing with incom-
mensurables, as for example, lives vs. dollars.
Probabilistic Network Schedules. Proba-
bilistic network schedules, such as PERT
(Program Evaluation and Review Tech-
nique), permit the duration of each activity
to be treated as a random variable. By
supplying PERT with the minimum,
maximum and most likely duration for each
activity, a probability distribution can be
computed for project completion time. This
can then be used to determine, for example,
the chances that a project (or any set of tasks
in the network) will be completed by a given
date. In this probabilistic setting, however, a
unique critical path may not exist. Some
practitioners have also cited difficulties in
obtaining meaningful input data for
probabilistic network schedules.
Probabilistic Cost and Effectiveness
Models. These models offer a probabilistic
view of a project's cost and effectiveness out-
comes. This approach explicitly recognizes
that single point values for these variables
do not adequately represent the risk condi-
tions inherent in a project.
Risk Mitigation and Tracking
Techniques
Risk identification and characterization and
risk analysis provide a list of significant
project risks that require further manage-
ment attention and/or action. Because risk
mitigation actions are generally not costless,
the systems engineer, in making recommen-
dations to the project manager, must balance
the cost (in resources and time) of such
actions against their value to the project.
Four responses to a specific risk are usually
available: (1) deliberately do nothing, and
accept the risk, (2) share the risk with a co-
participant, (3) take preventive action to
avoid or reduce the risk, and (4) plan for con-
tingent action.
The first response is to accept a specific
risk consciously. Sometimes, a risk can be
shared with a co-participant, that is, with a
foreign partner or a contractor. In this
situation, the goal is to reduce NASA's risk
independent of what happens to total risk,
which may go up or down. There are many
ways to share risks, particularly cost risks,
with contractors. These include various
incentive contracts and warranties. The
third and fourth responses require that
additional specific planning and actions be
undertaken.
Typical technical risk mitigation actions
include additional (and usually costly)
testing of subsystems and systems, design-
ing in redundancy, and building a full
engineering model. Typical cost risk mitiga-
tion actions include using off-the-shelf
hardware and providing sufficient funding
during Phases A and B. Major supportability
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risk mitigation actions include providing
sufficient initial spares to meet the system's
availability goal and a robust resupply
capability (when transportation is a signifi-
cant factor). For those risks that cannot be
mitigated by a design or management
approach, the systems engineer should re-
commend the establishment of reasonable
financial and schedule contingencies and
technical margins.
The strategy and underlying rationale
selected for a specific risk should be docu-
mented in a risk mitigation plan and its ef-
fectivity should be tracked through the pro-
ject cycle, as required by NMI 8070.4A. The
techniques for choosing a (preferred) risk
mitigation strategy deal with the larger role
of trade studies and system modeling in gen-
eral. Some techniques for planning and
tracking are briefly mentioned here.
Watchlists and Milestones. A watchlist is a
compilation of specific risks, their projected
consequences and early indicators of the
start of the problem. The risks on the watch-
list are those that were selected for manage-
ment attention as a result of completed risk
management activities. A typical watchlist
also shows for each specific risk a triggering
event or missed milestone (for example, a
delay in the delivery of long lead items), the
related area of impact (production schedule),
and the risk mitigation strategy to be used in
response. The watchlist is periodically
reevaluated and items are added, modified or
deleted as appropriate. Should the triggering
event occur, the projected consequences
should be updated and the risk mitigation
strategy revised as needed.
Contingency Planning. This technique is
generally used in conjunction with a watch-
list. The focus in contingency planning is on
developing credible hedges and work
arounds, which are activated upon a trigger-
ing event. To be credible, hedges often re-
quire that additional resources be expended,
which provide a return only if the triggering
event occurs. In this sense, contingency
planning and resources act as a form of
project insurance. (The term contingency
here should not be confused with use of the
same term for project reserves.)
Critical Items/Issues Lists. A critical
items/issues list (CIL) is similar to a watch-
list, and has been used extensively on the
Shuttle program to track items with signifi-
cant system safety consequences.
C/SCS and TPM Tracking. Two very
important risk tracking techniques--cost
and schedule control systems (C/SCS) and
Technical Performance Measure (TPM)
tracking--are discussed later.
Risk Management: Summary
Uncertainty is a fact of life in systems engi-
neering. To deal with it effectively, the risk
manager needs a disciplined approach. In a
project setting, a good-practice approach
includes efforts to:
• Plan, document and complete a risk man-
agement program.
• Identify and characterize risks for each
phase of the project. High risks, those for
which the combined effects of likelihood
and consequences are significant, should
be given specific management attention.
Reviews conducted throughout the
project cycle should help to force out risk
issues.
• Apply qualitative and quantitative
techniques to understand the dominant
risks and to improve the allocation of risk
reduction resources. This may include the
development of project-specific risk ana-
lysis models such as decision trees and
PRAs.
• Formulate and execute a strategy to
handle each risk, including establish-
ment, where appropriate, of reasonable
financial and schedule contingencies and
technical margins.
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• Track the effectivity of each risk mitiga-
tion strategy.
Good risk management requires a team
effort--that is, managers and systems engi-
neers at all levels of the project need to be
involved. However, risk management re-
sponsibilities must be assigned to specific
individuals. Successful risk management
practices often evolve into institutional
policy.
BASELINE MANAGEMENT
The baseline for a project contains all of the
technical requirements and related cost and
schedule requirements that are sufficiently
mature to be accepted and placed under
change control by the NASA project man-
ager. The project baseline consists of two
parts: the technical baseline and the
business baseline. The systems engineer is
responsible for managing the technical base'
line and ensuring that the technical baseline
is consistent with the costs and schedules in
the business baseline. Typically, the project
control office manages the business baseline.
Baseline management requires the for-
mal agreement of both the buyer and the
seller to proceed according to the up-to-date,
documented project requirements (as they
exist at that phase in the project cycle), and
to change the baseline requirements only by
a formal change control process. The buyer
might be an external funding agency. For
example, the buyer for the GOES project is
NOAA and the seller is the NASA GOES
project office. Baseline management must be
enforced at all levels. In the next level for
this same example, the NASA GOES project
office is the buyer and the seller is the
contractor, the Loral GOES project office.
The project-level systems engineer is
responsible for ensuring the completeness
and technical integrity of the technical base-
line. The content of the technical baseline
includes:
• Definition (or specification) of the func-
tional and performance requirements for
hardware, software and operations
• Interface definitions
• Specialty engineering requirements
• Verification plans
• Documentation trees.
Baseline management includes the following
techniques:
• Baseline definition and approval
• Configuration control (and version con-
trol, if needed)
• Change control
• Traceability
• Data management
• Baseline communication.
Baseline Evolution
The project baseline evolves in discrete steps
through the project life cycle. An initial
baseline may be established when the top-
level user requirements expressed in the
Mission Needs Statement are placed under
configuration control. At each interphase
control gate, increased technical detail is
added to the maturing baseline. For a typical
project, there are five sequential technical
baselines:
• Functional baseline at Program/Project
Requirements Review (PRR, sometimes
called development baseline)
• Design-to baseline at Preliminary Design
Review (PDR)
• Build-to (or code-to) baseline at the Criti-
cal Design Review (CDR)
• Production (or as-built or as-coded) base-
line at the System Acceptance Review
(SAR)
• Operational (or as-deployed) baseline at
Operational Acceptance Review (OAR).
Risk management activity must begin
early and continue throughout the
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decomposition process of the project cycle to
prove that the core-level decisions are sound.
These early detailed studies and tests must
be documented and retained in the project
archives, but they are not part of the techni-
cal baseline.
Configuration Management
Configuration management is the discipline
of identifying and formalizing the physical
and functional characteristics of a configura-
tion item at discrete points in the product
evolution for the purpose of maintaining the
integrity of the product and controlling
changes to the baseline. As a functional
discipline, configuration management man-
ages the documentation of the approved
evolution of a product's configuration. Con-
figuration management includes configura-
tion or baseline identification, configuration
control and configuration communication.
(See Figure 7.)
Configuration management is essential to
the execution of an orderly development
process, to enable the modification of an
existing design, and to provide for later rep-
lication of an existing design. Configuration
management often provides the information
needed to track the technical progress of the
project.
Configuration identification of a baseline
is evidenced by documentation such as
requirements documents, specifications,
drawings, code listings, process specifica-
tions and material specifications. Configura-
tion documentation is not considered part of
the technical baseline until approved by
control gate action of the buyer.
Configuration control is the process of
controlling changes to any approved baseline
by formal action of a change board that is
controlled by the same authority that pre-
viously approved the baseline. Typically, the
change control board meets to consider
change requests to the business or technical
baselines of the project. The project manager
is usually the board chair, and the configura-
tion manager the secretary, who skillfully
guides the process and records the official
events of the process.
In a change control board forum, a num-
ber of issues should be addressed:
the proposed change?
the reason for the change?
the design impact?
the effectiveness or performance
What is
What is
What is
What is
impact?
• What is the schedule impact?
• What is the project life-cycle cost impact?
• What is the impact of not making the
change?
• What is the risk of making the change?
• What is the impact on operations?
• What is the impact to support equipment
and services?
• What is the impact on spares require-
ments?
• What is the effectivity of the change?
• What documentation is affected by the
change?
• Is the buyer supportive of the change?
Configuration
Management
Configuration
Control
Figure 7 Configuration Management Structure
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A review of this information should lead to a
well-informed decision. When this informa-
tion is not available to the change control
board, unfounded decisions are made, often
with negative consequences to the project.
Change Control Board Conduct
Objective: To review evaluations and then ap-
prove or disapprove proposed changes to the pro-
ject's technical, operations or business baseline.
Participants: Project manager (chair), project-
level systems engineer, managers of each affected
organization, configuration manager (secretary),
presenters.
Format: Presenter covers recommended change
and _' -cusses related system impact. The presen-
tati_: Ls reviewed by the systems engineer for
completeness prior to presentation.
Decision: The CCB members discuss the Change
Request (CR) and formulate a decision. Project
manager agrees or overrides.
Configuration control always includes
the management of approved baseline
documentation, so configuration control is
required on a no-change project as well as a
frequently changing one. Configuration
management and configuration control em-
brace the function of data management,
which ensures that only up-to-date baseline
information is available to the project staff.
The data management function also encom-
passes managing and archiving supporting
analyses and trade study data, and keeping
it convenient for project use.
Configuration verification is part of con-
figuration control. It ensures that the result-
ing products conform to the intentions of the
designers and to the standards established
by preceding approved baselines. Each con-
trol gate serves to review and challenge the
data presented for conformance to the pre-
viously established baseline constraints. The
Physical Configuration Audit control gate
verifies that the physical configuration of the
product corresponds to the build-to (or code-
to) documentation previously approved at
the CDR. The Functional Configuration
Audit control gate verifies that the accep-
tance test results are consistent with the test
requirements previously approved at the
PDR and CDR. The Formal Qualification
Review control gate verifies that the as-built
product is consistent with the as-built or as-
coded documentation and describes the ulti-
mate configuration of the product. This
review follows all modifications needed to
implement qualification-caused corrective
actions.
For disciplined software development, ad-
ditional configuration control methods are
recommended:
• Computer Resources Working Group
(CRWG)--ensures the development envi-
ronment is adequate for the job
• Software Configuration Review Board--
change board for software baseline
changes
• Software Development Library--man-
agement controlled repository for soft-
ware development documentation and
tools
• Software Development Folder (SDF)--
developer-controlled repository for devel-
opment documentation and tools.
The configuration manager performs the
following functions:
• Conceives, documents and manages the
configuration management system
• Acts as secretary of the change control
board (controls the change approval
process)
• Controls changes to baseline documenta-
tion
• Controls release of baseline documenta-
tion
• Initiates configuration verification au-
dits.
Configuration communication is the process
of conveying to all involved parties the
approved baseline progression in a timely
manner. This is essential to ensure that
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developers only pursue options that are com-
patible with the approved baseline.
Communication also keeps developers
knowledgeable of the approved baseline and
the necessity of approaching the change con-
trol board for approval of any deviations
considered necessary to further develop the
system.
The project's approach to configuration
management should be documented in the
project's Configuration Management Plan.
Change Control and Version Control
Once a baseline is placed under change con-
trol, any change requires the approval of the
change control board. The project manager
chairs the change control board, while the
systems engineer or configuration manager
is responsible for reviewing all material for
completeness before it is presented to the
board, and for ensuring that all affected or-
ganizations are represented in the change
control board forum.
Change control is essential at both the
contractor and NASA Center levels.
Changes determined to be Class 1 to the
contractor must be referred to the NASA
project manager for resolution. This process
is described in Figure 8. The use of a prelimi-
nary Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) to
forewarn of an impending change provides
the project manager with sufficient prelimi-
nary information to determine whether the
contractor should spend NASA contract
funds on a formal ECP. This technique is
designed to save significant contract dollars.
Class 1 changes affect the approved base-
line and hence the product version identifica-
tion. Class 2 changes are editorial changes or
internal changes not "visible" to the external
interfaces.
Overly formalized systems can become so
burdensome that members of the project
team may try to circumvent the process. It is
essential that the formality of the change
process be appropriately tailored to the
needs of each project. However, there must
always be an effective change control process
on every project.
For software projects, it is routine to use
version control for both pre-release and post-
release deliverable systems. It is equally
important to maintain version control for
hardware-only systems.
Approved changes on a development
project that has only one deliverable ob-
viously are only applicable to that one deliv-
erable item. However, for projects that have
multiple deliverables of "identical" design,
changes may become effective on the second
or subsequent production articles. In such a
I
|
I
Request
.......... ............................. F .......................... i-
Disapprove
Approve
Class II
Approve
Class I
Disa _prove Disapprove
[_ IndicatesBuyer Action
[PrelimECP
, I No
I Buyer j
I Concurrence
I with
I Classification Yes
"III
Request i
_ F°rmal ECPI Prepare _._I Buyerr [ ECP Decision
Approve
prove
Record
Change
Status
Implement
Change
Figure 8 Contract Change Control Process
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situation, the change control board must
decide the effectivity of the change, and the
configuration control system must maintain
version control and identification of the
as-built configuration for each article. Incre-
mental implementation of changes is
common in projects that have a deliberate
policy of introducing product or process
improvements. As an example, the original
1972 plan held that each of the Space Shuttle
orbiters would be identical. In reality, each
of the orbiters is different, driven primarily
by the desire to achieve the original payload
requirement of 65,000 pounds. Proper
version control documentation has been
essential to the sparing, fielding and main-
tenance of the operational fleet.
Data Management and Requirements
Traceability
Data management is an essential and associ-
ated function to configuration management.
Data management ensures that official
baseline data is retained, available and
controlled for all official project use. Data
management is essentially the official
project library and reference desk.
The data manager performs the following
functions:
• Conceives, documents and manages the
documentation management system
• Manages changes to baseline documenta-
tion
• Manages the release of baseline docu-
mentation
• Manages the project library.
Before the project team can produce a
tangible product, engineering must produce
descriptions of the system using words, icons
(drawings) and numbers (i.e., symbolic in-
formation). The project team must have a
common understanding of the words and
icons in order to be able to go from an idea to
a properly functioning system.
Since the systems engineer spends time
working with information about the system
rather than the system itself, there are
several vital characteristics the symbolic in-
formation must have. First, the information
must be shareable. Whether it is in electron-
ic or paper form, the data must be readily
available in the most recently approved
version to all members of the team.
Second, symbolic information must be
durable. This means that it must be recalled
accurately every time and represent the
most current version of the baseline. The
baseline information cannot change or de-
grade with repeated access of the database or
paper files, and cannot degrade with time.
This is not a trivial requirement, poor data
management practices (e.g., allowing some-
one to borrow the only copy of a document or
drawing) can allow controlled information to
become lost. Also, material must be retained
for the life of the program (and possibly be-
yond), and a complete set of documentation
for each baseline change must be retained.
Third, the symbolic information must be
traceable upward and downward. A data
base must be developed and maintained to
show the parentage of any requirement. The
data base must also be able to display all
children derived from a given requirement.
Finally, traceability must be provided to
engineering reports that document trade
study results and other decisions that played
a key role in the flowdown of requirements.
It is the responsibility of the systems
engineer to ensure the active, approved base-
line is communicated to all those relying on
it. This technique keeps all participants ap-
prised as to the distinction between what is
frozen under formal change control and what
can still be decided without change control
board approval.
REVIEWS, AUDITS AND CONTROL GATES
The intent and policy for reviews, audits and
control gates should be developed during
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Phase A and defined in the Project Imple-
mentation Plan. The specific implementa-
tion of these activities should be consistent
with, though not limited to, the types of
reviews and audits described in this section.
The same tailoring applies to the timing of
reviews, audits and control gates.
The purpose of a review is to furnish the
forum and process to provide NASA manage-
ment and their contractors assurance that
the most satisfactory approach, plan or
design has been selected, that a configura-
tion item has been produced to meet the
specified requirements, or that a configura-
tion item is ready. Reviews (technical or
management) are scheduled to communicate
an approach, demonstrate an ability to meet
requirements or establish status. Reviews
help to develop a better understanding
among task or project participants, open
communication channels, alert participants
and management of problems and open ave-
nues for solutions.
Project Termination
It should be noted that project termination,
while usually disappointing to project personnel,
may be a proper reaction to changes in external
conditions or to an improved understanding of
the system's projected cost-effectiveness.
The purpose of an audit is to provide
NASA management and its contractors a
thorough examination of adherence to pro-
gram or project policies, plans, requirements
and specifications. Audits are the systematic
examination of tangible evidence to deter-
mine adequacy, validity and effectiveness of
the activity or documentation under review.
An audit may examine documentation of
policies and procedures as well as verify
adherence to them.
The purpose of a control gate is to provide
a scheduled event (either a review or an
audit) that NASA management will use to
make program or project go/no-go decisions.
A control gate is a management event in the
project cycle that is of sufficient importance
to be identified, defined and included in the
project schedule. It requires formal examina-
tion to evaluate project status and to obtain
approval to proceed to the next management
event according to the Project Implementa-
tion Plan.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR REVIEWS
Review Boards. The convening authority,
who supervises the manager of the activity
being reviewed, normally appoints the
review board chair. Unless there are compel-
ling technical reasons to the contrary, the
chair should not be directly associated with
the project or task under review. The conven-
ing authority also names the review board
members. The majority of the members
should not be directly associated with the
program or project under review.
Internal Reviews. During the course of a
project or task, it is necessary to conduct
internal reviews that present technical
approaches, trade studies, analyses and
problem areas to a peer group for evaluation
and comment. The timing, participants and
content of these reviews are normally de-
fined by the project manager or the manager
of the performing organization. Internal
reviews are also held prior to participation in
a formal, control gate review.
The internal reviews provide an excellent
means for controlling the technical progress
of the project. They also should be used to en-
sure that all interested parties are involved
in the design/development process early on,
and throughout the process. Thus, represen-
tatives from areas such as manufacturing
and quality assurance should attend the
internal reviews as active participants. They
can then, for example, ensure that the design
is producible and that quality is managed
through the project cycle.
In addition, some organizations utilize a
Red Team. This is an internal, independent,
peer-level review conducted to identify any
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deficiencies in requests for proposals, propos-
al responses, documentation or presentation
material prior to its release. The project or
task manager is responsible for establishing
the Red Team membership and for deciding
which of their recommendations are to be
implemented.
Review Presentation Material. Presenta-
tions using existing documentation such as
specifications, drawings, analyses and re-
ports may be adequate. Copies of any pre-
pared materials (such as viewgraphs) should
be provided to the review board and meeting
attendees. Background information and re-
view presentation material of use to board
members should be distributed to the mem-
bers early enough to enable them to examine
it prior to the review. For major reviews, this
time may be as long as 30 calendar days.
Review Conduct. All reviews should con-
sist of oral presentations of the applicable
project requirements and the approaches,
plans or designs that satisfy those require-
ments. These presentations normally are
given by the cognizant design engineer or
his/her immediate supervisor.
It is highly recommended that in addition
to the review board, the review audience in-
clude project personnel (NASA and contrac-
tor) not directly associated with the design
being reviewed. This is required to utilize
their cross-disciplinary expertise to identify
any design shortfalls or recommend design
improvements. The review audience should
also include non-project specialists in the
area under review, and specialists in manu-
facturing and fabrication, testing, quality
assurance, reliability and safety. Some
reviews may also require the presence of
both the contractor's and NASA's contract-
ing officers.
Prior to and during the review, board
members and review attendees may submit
requests for action or engineering change
requests (ECR) that document a concern,
deficiency or recommended improvement in
the presented approach, plan or design.
Following the review, these are screened by
the review board to consolidate them and to
ensure that the chair and cognizant man-
ager(s) understand the intent of the re-
quests. It is the responsibility of the review
board to ensure that adequate closure
responses for each of the action requests are
obtained.
Post Review Report. The review board
chair has the responsibility to develop,
where necessary, a consensus of the findings
of the board, including an assessment of th_e
risks associated with problem areas, and de-
velop recommendations for action. The chair
will submit, on a timely basis, a written
report, including recommendations for ac-
tion, to the convening authority with copies
to the cognizant managers.
Standing Review Boards. Standing review
boards are selected for projects or tasks that
have a high level of activity, visibility and/or
resource requirements. Selection of board
members by the convening authority is gen-
erally made from senior Center technical
and management staff. Supporting members
or advisors may be added to the board as
required by circumstances. If the review
board is to function over the lifetime of a pro-
ject, it is advisable to select extra board
members and rotate active assignments to
cover needs.
SPECIFIC TYPES OF REVIEWS
This section describes the types, purpose,
timing and content of most of the reviews
that may occur during the conduct of projects
or tasks. Review material should be keyed to
project documentation when available to
minimize separate efforts.
Program/Project Requirements Review.
Purpose. The Program/Project Require-
ments Review (PRR) establishes the project
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development (i.e., functional) baseline. It
ensures that:
• The project objectives (particularly the
research and/or science objectives) have
been properly translated into definite and
unambiguous statements of require-
ments.
• The impact of these requirements on the
design of the major project elements and
systems is sufficiently well understood
that trades between requirements and
constraints can be properly made.
• The management techniques, procedures,
agreements and resources to be utilized
by all project participants are evaluated.
Timing. At the completion of the Concept
Definition Phase (Phase B) activities, just
prior to issuing the Source Selection Request
for Proposal.
Agenda. The appropriate items from the
following review items/data checklist should
be addressed:
• Status of action items from the Conceptu-
al Design Review (CoDR)
• Project Plan
• Mission objectives
• Research objectives
• Science objectives
• Design criteria and approach
• System trade analyses
• Design analyses and trade studies
• Final system specification
• Preliminary interface specifications
• Software system requirements
• Work breakdown structure
• Preliminary manufacturing plan
• Preliminary ground operations plan
• Preliminary payload integration plan
• Preliminary flight operations plan
• Preliminary data management plan
• Configuration management plan
• Reliability requirements and plan
• Quality assurance requirements and plan
• System safety requirements and plan
• Project policy and requirements
• Management structure
• Budget constraints
• Schedule
• Risk management activities.
Preliminary Design Review. The Prelimi-
nary Design Review (PDR) is not a single re-
view but a number of reviews starting with
the system PDR, followed by reviews con-
ducted on specific configuration items (CIs).
Purpose. The PDR establishes the
design-to baseline and ensures that it meets
the program, project, system, subsystem or
specific CI baseline requirements. The PDR
process should:
• Establish the ability of the selected de-
sign approach to meet the technical
requirements.
• Establish the compatibility of the inter-
face relationships between the specific
configuration item and other interfacing
items.
• Establish the integrity of the selected
design approach.
• Establish the operability of the selected
design.
• Assess compliance with quality assur-
ance, reliability and system safety re-
quirements.
• Address status, schedule and cost rela-
tionships,
• Establish the feasibility of the approach.
Timing. After design-to specifications
are developed and after risk reduction analy-
ses are available.
Agenda. The appropriate items from the
following review items/data checklist should
be addressed:
• Status of action items from the applicable
Hardware or Software Specification
Review(s)
• Final functional requirements and speci-
fications
• Technical justification for the perfor-
mance specified
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• Experiment performance analysis, in-
cluding an analysis of instrument accura-
cy requirements
• Design parameters and constraints
• Environmental design requirements
• Interface design requirements
• Requirements traceability results
• Software standards to be applied
• Design and safety codes and standards to
be applied
• Results of technical feasibility modeling
and testing
• Design optimization analyses
• Discussion ofblock diagrams
• Compliance with functional require-
ments and specifications
• Suitability of inherited designs and hard-
ware
• Lists of preliminary parts, materials and
processes
• Spares requirements philosophy
• Preliminary data management flow and
reduction plans
• Preliminary payload integration plan
• Preliminary ground operations plan
• Preliminary flight operations plan
• Requirements and plans for support
equipment, including ground support
equipment (GSE)
• Preliminary reliability analyses, includ-
ing single-point failure mode policy
• Preliminary system safety analyses
• Quality Assurance Plan
• Hardware and/or software verification
plans
• Hardware and software development
plans and schedules (including verifica-
tion tests or analyses to be performed)
• Present status of item under review, in-
cluding cost and technical developments
• Risk management activities.
Critical Design Review. The Critical De-
sign Review (CDR) is not a single review but
a number of reviews starting with specific
CIs and ending with the system CDR.
Purpose. The CDR verifies the suitabil-
ity of a CI design in meeting the specified
requirements and establishes its build-to
and/or code-to baseline. The CDR determines
whether the design is compatible with the
specified requirements, and verifies that the
design conforms to the requirements estab-
lished at the PDR and updated to the time of
the CDR. During the CDR, the integrity of
the design is verified through review of ana-
lytical and test data.
Following the CDR, the CI specifications
and drawings are updated and placed under
configuration control, and may be then re-
leased for fabrication and/or coding.
Timing. When the design of a CI is com-
plete and after the completion of producibil-
ity demonstration. It should be held early
enough to allow for corrective action and
before total design freeze, the purchase of
significant equipment or fabrication of final
hardware.
Agenda. The appropriate items from the
following review items/data checklist should
be addressed:
• Status of PDR action items
• Design requirements and specifications
• Interface requirements and specifications
• Design approach
• Assessment of hardware and software
inheritance
• Test procedures
• Producibilitydemonstration results
• Scale model test results
• Design trades and alternatives consid-
ered
• Reliability, maintainability and opera-
bility considerations
• Spares list
• Conformance of the design to functional
and user requirements
• Conformance to environmental design
requirements
• Differences between the configuration
item, system and subsystem perfor-
mances in relation to the performances
estimated at the PDR
• Final hardware and software design ver-
ification plans
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• Detailed mechanical (including electronic
packaging, thermal, hydraulic and pneu-
matic) design
• Detailed electronic and electrical circuit
design
• Detailed software design
• Interface details and agreements
• Mechanical and electronic parts stress
analysis results
• Final reliability analyses, including
single-point failure analyses against the
reliability policy
• System safety analyses
• Electronic parts classifications and
screening specifications
• Nonelectric parts, materials and process-
ing list
• Materials and processing specifications
• Purchased devices list
• Manufacturing and fabrication plans
• Quality assurance plans and procedures
• Configuration control plans
• Qualification and acceptance test plans
• Calibration plan
• Data management flow and data reduc-
tion plan
• Support equipment and GSE require-
ments and plans
• Spares provisioning plan
• Ground operations plan
• Payload integration plan
• Flight operations plan
• Present status of item under review, in-
cluding cost and technical developments
• Risk management activities.
Test Readiness Review. The Test Readi-
ness Review (TRR) is not a single review but
a series of reviews conducted prior to the
start of verification testing of each test arti-
cle, CI, subsystem and/or system.
Purpose. The TRR establishes the deci-
sion point to proceed with planned verifica-
tion (qualification and/or acceptance) testing
of test articles, CIs, subsystems and/or sys-
tems to acquire official sell-off verification
data. The TRR assesses the adequacy of the
test planning and compatibility with the ver-
ification requirements and specifications.
Timing. After completion of preliminary
testing and prior to the start of official verifi-
cation testing.
Agenda. The appropriate items from the
following review items/data checklist should
be addressed:
• Description of test article
• Test objectives
• Verification requirements and specifica-
tions
• Applicable test plans
• Applicable test procedures
• Test configuration and functional block
diagrams
• Test equipment and circuitry
• Test equipment calibration
• Data to be collected, and collection and
preservation methods
• Quality assurance plan
• Safety plan
• Test failure procedures
• Personnel responsibilities and qualifica-
tions
• Present status of item under review in-
cluding cost and technical developments
• Risk management activities.
System Formal Qualification Review.
Purpose. The System Formal Qualifica-
tion Review (SFQR) establishes the system
production baseline by verifying that the
system performance meets the system
qualification specifications. The qualifica-
tion testing demonstrates that the system
meets its performance and operational
requirements within the specified margins.
The SFQR is the decision point for customer
approval of the qualification certification of
the design.
Timing. After the completion of all
lower-level qualification testing.
Agenda. The appropriate items from the
following review items/data checklist should
be addressed:
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• Status of action items from the applicable
CDRs and TRRs
• Description of system tested, including
all subsystems and functional block dia-
grams
• Qualification test objectives
• Qualification test requirements and
specifications
• Description of test facilities
• Description of test configurations
• Subsystem qualification test results
• System qualification test results
• Qualification by similarity analysis
• Nonconformance reports/status
• Waivers and deviations
• Open work list
• Environmental retest following correc-
tive action of any failures
• Strength and fracture mechanics for as-
built hardware
• Software development documentation
• Summary of qualification status of all
end items subjected to separate qualifica-
tion tests
• Operational manuals
• Maintenance manuals
• Present status of system under review,
including cost and technical develop-
ments
• Risk management activities.
Functional and Physical Configuration
Audit.
Purpose. A Functional Configuration
Audit (FCA) verifies that each as-built con-
figuration item, test article, subsystem
and/or system satisfies the functional and
performance requirements specified in their
respective design-to specifications.
A Physical Configuration Audit (PCA)
verifies that each as-built test article, CI,
subsystem and/or system:
Satisfies the physical requirements
(weight, center of gravity, moments of in-
ertia, surface finish, cleanliness, etc.)
specified in their respective design speci-
fications
• Is correctly documented in as-built draw-
ings, code listings, user manuals, etc.
Timing. Following the completion of the
SFQR. Usually held in conjunction with the
System Acceptance Review (SAR). For single
unit projects, the FCA/PCA may be held pri-
or to qualification testing.
Agenda. The appropriate items from the
following project documentation should be
addressed:
• CI, subsystem and system specifications
• Design drawings and engineering orders
• Subsystem and system schematics and
block diagrams
• Design verification matrices for each con-
figuration item, subsystem and system
• Inspection results
• Material and electronic parts certifica-
tions
• Materials process certifications
• Material Utilization List (MUL)
• Installed non-flight hardware list
• Test results
• Demonstration results
• Nonconformance reports/status
• Results of each Configuration Item Ac-
ceptance Review (CIAR)
• Results of the SFQR.
System Acceptance Review.
Purpose. The System Acceptance Review
(SAR) provides the decision point to confirm
that the design is ready for either integra-
tion, acceptance or replication.
Timing. Following the completion of
the SFQR and prior to the Multi-Unit
Procurement Phase and/or the Pre-
Operations Phase (Phase E).
Agenda. The appropriate items from the
following project documentation should be
addressed:
• Brief description of system under review
• Verification requirements
• Results of the system FCA and PCA
• Results of the SFQR
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• System verification report (qualification
and operation)
• System acceptance report
• Final systems operations and mainten-
ance methods
• System development lessons learned
document
• Safety analyses status
• Present status of system under review,
including cost and technical develop-
ments
• Risk management activities.
Safety Reviews. System safety isthe appli-
cation ofengineering and management prin-
ciples,criteria and techniques to optimize
safety within the constraints of operational
effectiveness, time and cost through all
phases ofthe projectcycle.A seriesofsystem
and occupational safety reviews are held
during the project cycle,many of which are
held concurrently with other projectreviews.
Following are descriptions of these reviews
and their relationship to the other project
reviews.
Occupational Safety Reviews. The re-
quirements for these reviews are not covered
here. However, the systems engineer should
be aware that many occupational safety re-
quirements can impose requirements on
flight and/or ground equipment, such as the
shipping and handling of pressure vessels or
toxic or explosive materials. Early reviews
with Center occupational safety personnel
should be held to identify and understand
any problem areas and specify the require-
ments to control them.
Conceptual Design Safety Review.
Purpose. The Conceptual Design Safety
Review (CoDSR) ensures that safety require-
ments have been included in the conceptual
design and that a preliminary assessment of
the potential hazards has been made. At
several NASA Centers, the CoDSR is called
the Phase 0 Safety Review.
Timing. At the completion of the Mission
Needs and Conceptual Studies Phase (Phase
A). It should be held concurrently with the
Conceptual Design Review (CoDR).
Agenda. The appropriate items from the
following list should be addressed:
• Purpose of the project, facility or equip-
ment
• Design requirements
• Safety requirements
• Preliminary project safety plan
• Preliminary hazard analysis
• Safety staffing and management struc-
ture
• Safety budget
• Schedule
• Risk management activities.
Project Requirements Safety Review.
Purpose. The Project Requirements
Safety Review (PRSR) establishes the project
safety requirements baseline and ensures
that:
• The project safety objectives have been
properly translated into definite and un-
ambiguous statements of requirements.
• The impact of these requirements on the
design of the major project elements and
systems is sufficiently well understood
that trades between requirements and
constraints can be properly made.
• The management techniques, procedures,
agreements and resources to implement
the safety program by all project partici-
pants are evaluated.
Timing. At the completion of the Concept
Definition Phase (Phase B) activities just
prior to issuing the Source Selection Request
for Proposal. It should be held concurrently
with the PRR.
Agenda. The appropriate subjects from
the following list should be addressed:
• Purpose of the project, facility or equip-
ment
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• Status of action items from the CoDSR
• Design requirements
• Safety requirements
• Updated preliminary project safety plan
• Updated preliminary hazard analysis
• Safety staffing and management struc-
ture
• Safety budget
• Schedule
• Risk management activities.
Preliminary Design Safety Review. The
Preliminary Design Safety Review (PDSR) is
not a single review but a series of reviews
conducted on specific configuration items,
subsystems and the system.
Purpose. The PDSR ensures that the
proposed CI, subsystem and/or system de-
signs satisfy the project and Center safety re-
quirements. At several NASA Centers, the
PDSR is called the Phase I Safety Review.
Timing. At the completion of prelimi-
nary design and prior to the start of major
detail design activities. It should be held con-
currently with the PDRs.
Agenda. The appropriate subjects from
the following list should be addressed:
• Description of design under review
• Status of safety-related action items from
applicable hardware or software specifi-
cation reviews
• Updated project safety plan
• Updated safety analysis reports
• Updated preliminary hazard analyses
(sometimes called the Phase I Hazard
Analyses)
• Preliminary Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA)
• Preliminary Critical Items List (CIL).
• List of limited-life items
• Accident or mishap investigation reports
• Waiver and deviation request disposi-
tions
• Present status of safety activities, includ-
ing cost and technical developments
• Risk management activities.
Critical Design Safety Review. The Criti-
cal Design Safety Review (CDSR) is not a
single review but a series of reviews conduct-
ed on specific configuration items, subsys-
tems and the system.
Purpose. The CDSR establishes the
baseline for safety requirements, safety haz-
ard controls and verification methods to be
implemented in verifying those controls. At
several NASA Centers, the CDSR is called
the Phase II Safety Review.
Timing. When the design of a configura-
tion item is essentially complete and prior to
total design freeze, the purchase of signifi-
cant equipment, or fabrication of final hard-
ware. It should be held concurrently with the
CDRs.
Agenda. The appropriate subjects from
the following list should be addressed:
• Description of design under review
• Status of safety-related action items from
applicable hardware or software PDSRs
• Final project safety plan
• Updated safety analysis reports
• Updated preliminary hazard analyses
(sometimes called the Phase II Hazard
Analyses)
• Final Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
• FinalCritical Items List
• List oflimited-life items
• Accident or mishap investigation reports
• Waiver and deviation request disposi-
tions
• Present status of safety activities includ-
ing cost and technical developments
• Risk management activities.
System Acceptance Safety Review.
Purpose. The System Acceptance Safety
Review (SASR) provides the decision point to
confirm that all project safety requirements
have been satisfied and confirms the satis-
factory completion of all hazard control
verification items and open safety items. At
several NASA Centers, the SASR is called
the Phase III Safety Review.
68
MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
Timing. Following the completion of the
SFQR and prior to the Multi-Unit Procure-
ment Phase and the Pre-Operation Phase
(Phase E). It should be held concurrently
with the SAR.
Agenda. The appropriate subjects from
the following list should be addressed:
• Description ofdesignunder review
• Status of safety-related action items from
applicable hardware or software CDRs
• Updated safety analysis reports
• Updated preliminary hazard analyses
(sometimes called the Phase III Hazard
Analyses)
• Accident or mishap investigation reports
• Waiver and deviation request disposi-
tions
• Present status of safety activities, includ-
ing cost and technical developments
• Risk management activities.
Launch or Operational Safety Readiness
Reviews.
Purpose. These reviews ensure the flight
and/or ground operational safety of the item
under review by certifying that:
• A CI, subsystem or system complies with
all program and/or project safety require-
ments.
• Approved controls for all identified safety
hazards have been implemented.
• All personnel involved in the handling
and/or operation of the item under review
have received the required training.
Timing. Following installation and inte-
gration and prior to flight and/or start of
ground operations.
Agenda. The appropriate subjects from
the following list should be addressed:
• Brief description of item under review
• Safety requirements and specifications
• Safety compliance data package
• Hazard analyses/reports with supporting
data
• Critical items list
• Limited-life item list
• Accident or mishap investigation reports
• Nonconformance reports/status
• Personnel training requirements
• Personnel training status
• Present status of safety activities, includ-
ing cost and technical developments
• Risk management activities.
STATUS REPORTING AND ASSESSMENT
An important part of systems engineering
planning is determining what is needed in
time, resources and people to realize the
system that meets the desired goals and
objectives. Planning functions such as WBS
preparation, scheduling and fiscal resource
requirements planning, were discussed earli-
er. Project management, however, does not
end with planning; project managers need
visibility into the progress of those plans in
order to exercise proper management con-
trol. This is the purpose of the status report-
ing and assessing processes. Status reporting
is the process of determining where the
project stands in dimensions of interest such
as cost, schedule and technical performance.
Assessing is the analytical process that con-
verts the output of the reporting process into
a more useful form for the project manager;
namely, what are the future implications of
current trends? Lastly, the manager must
decide whether that future is acceptable, and
what changes, if any, in current plans are
needed. Planning, status reporting, and
assessing are systems engineering and/or
program control functions; decision making
is a management one.
These processes together form the feed-
back loop depicted in Figure 9. This loop
takes place on a continual basis throughout
the project cycle.
This loop is applicable at each level of the
project hierarchy. Planning data, status re-
porting data and assessments flow up the
hierarchy with appropriate aggregation at
each level; decisions cause actions to be
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Figure 9 Planning and Status Reporting
Feedback Loop
taken down the hierarchy. Managers at each
level determine (consistent with policies
establi=.hed at the next higher level of the
project hierarchy) how often, and in what
form, reporting data and assessments should
be made. In establishing these status report-
ing and assessment requirements, some
principles of good practice are:
• Use an agreed-upon set of well-defined
status reporting variables
• Report these core variables in a consis-
tent format at all project levels
• Maintain historical data for both trend
identification and cross-project analyses
• Encourage a logical process of rolling up
status reporting variables, (e.g., use the
WBS for obligations/costs status report-
ing and PBS for mass status reporting)
• Support assessments with quantitative
risk measures
• Summarize the condition of the project by
using color-coded (red, yellow, and green)
alert zones for all core reporting vari-
ables.
Regular, periodic (e.g., monthly) tracking of
the core status reporting variables is recom-
mended, through some status reporting vari-
ables should be tracked more often when
there is rapid change or cause for concern.
Key reviews, such as PDRs and CDRs, are
points at which status reporting measures
and their trends should be carefully sCru-
tinized for early warning signs of potential
problems. Should there be indications that
existing trends, if allowed to continue, will
yield an unfavorable outcome, replanning
should begin as soon as practical.
This section provides additional infor-
mation on status reporting and assessment
techniques for costs and schedules, technical
performance, and systems engineering pro-
cess metrics.
Cost and Schedule Control Measures
Status reporting and assessment on costs
and schedules provides the project manager
and systems engineer visibility into how
well the project is tracking against its
planned cost and schedule targets. From a
management point of view, achieving these
targets is on a par with meeting the techni-
cal performance requirements of the system.
It is useful to think of cost and schedule
status reporting and assessment as measur-
ing the performance of the "system that
produces the system."
NHB 9501.2B, Procedures for Contractor
Reporting of Correlated Cost and Perfor-
mance Data, provides specific requirements
for cost and schedule status reporting and
assessment based on a project's dollar value
and period of performance. Generally, the
NASA Form 533 series of reports is applica-
ble to NASA cost-type (i.e., cost reimburse-
ment and fixed-price incentive) contracts.
However, on larger contracts (>$25M)
which require Form 533P, NHB 9501.2B al-
lows contractors to use their own reporting
systems in lieu of 533P reporting. The pro-
ject manager/systems engineer may choose
to evaluate the completeness and quality of
these reporting systems against criteria
established by the project manager/systems
engineer's own Center, or against the DoD's
Cost Schedule Cost System Criteria
(C/SCSC). The latter are widely accepted by
industry and government, and a variety of
tools exist for their implementation.
Assessment Methods. The traditional
method of cost and schedule control is by
comparing baselined cost and schedule plans
against their actual values. In program con-
trol terminology, a difference between actual
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performance and planned costs or schedule
status is called a variance.
Figure 10 illustrates two kinds of vari-
ances and some related concepts. A properly
constructed work breakdown structure
(WBS) divides the project work into discrete
tasks and products. Associated with each
task and product (at any level in the WBS) is
a schedule and a budgeted (i.e., planned)
cost. The Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled
(BCWSt) for any set of WBS elements is the
budgeted cost of all work on tasks and pro-
ducts in those elements scheduled to be com-
pleted by time t. The Budgeted Cost of Work
Performed (BCWPt) is a statistic represent-
ing actual performance. BCWPt, also called
Earned Value (EVt), is the budgeted cost for
tasks and products that have actually been
produced (completed or in progress) at time t
in the schedule for those WBS elements. The
difference, BCWPt-BCWSt, is called the
schedule variance at time t.
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The Actual Cost of Work Performed
(ACWPt) is a third statistic representing the
funds that have been expended up to time t
on those WBS elements. The difference be-
tween the budgeted and actual costs,
BCWPt-ACWPt, is called the cost variance
at time t. Such variances may indicate that
the cost Estimate at Completion (EACt) of the
project is different from the budgeted cost.
These types of variances enable a program
analyst to estimate the EAC at any point in
the project cycle.
If the cost and schedule baselines and the
technical scope of the work are not fully inte-
grated, then cost and schedule variances can
still be calculated, but the incomplete link-
age between cost data and schedule data
makes it very difficult (or impossible) to esti-
mate the current cost EAC of the project.
Control of Variances and the Role of the
Systems Engineer. When negative vari-
ances are large enough to represent a signifi-
cant erosion of reserves, then management
attention is needed to either correct the vari-
ance, or to replan the project. It is important
to establish levels of variance at which
action is to be taken. These levels are gener-
ally lower when cost and schedule baselines
do not support Earned Value calculations.
The first action taken to control an
excessive negative variance is to have the
cognizant manager or systems engineer in-
vestigate the problem, determine its cause
and recommend a solution. There are a
number of possible reasons why variance
problems occur:
• A receivable was late or was unsatisfac-
tory for some reason.
• A task is technically very difficult and
requires more resources than originally
planned.
• Unforeseeable (and unlikely to repeat)
events occurred, such as illness, a labor
strike, a fire or some other calamity.
Although the identification of variances is
largely a program control function, there is
an important systems engineering role in
their control. That role arises because the
correct assessment of why a negative vari-
ance is occurring greatly increases the
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chances of successful control actions. This
assessment often requires an understanding
of the cost, schedule and technical situation
that can only be provided by the systems
engineer.
Computing the Estimate at Completion
EAC can be estimated at any point in the project.
The appropriate formula depends upon the the
reasons associated for any variances that may
exist. If a variance exists due to a one-time
event, such as an accident, then EAC = BUD-
GET + ACEP - BCWP where BUDGET is the
original planned cost at completion. If a variance
exists for systemic reasons, such as a general un-
derestimate of schedule durations, or a steady
redefinition of requirements, then the variance
is assumed to continue to grow over time, and
the equation is: EAC = BUDGET × (ACWP/
BCWP).
It is also possible that EAC will grow at a
greater rate than estimated by the above equa-
tion if there are a growing number of liens, ac-
tion items or significant problems that will
increase the difficulty of future work. Such fac-
tors could be addressed using risk management
methods.
In a large project, a good EAC is the result of
a variance analysis that may use a combination
of these estimation methods on different parts of
the WBS. A rote formula should not be used as a
substitute for understanding the underlying
causes of variances.
Technical Performance Measures
Status reporting and assessment of the
system's technical performance measures
(TPMs) complements cost and schedule con-
trol. By tracking the system's TPMs, the
project manager gains visibility into wheth-
er the delivered system will actually meet its
performance specifications (requirements).
Beyond that, tracking TPMs ties together a
number of basic systems engineering
activities--that is, a TPM tracking program
forges a relationship among systems analy-
sis, functional and performance require-
ments definition and verification and valida-
tion activities.
• Systems analysis activities identify the
key performance or technical attributes
that determine system effectiveness;
trade studies performed in systems ana-
lysis help quantify the system's perfor-
mance requirements.
• Functional and performance require-
ments definition activities help identify
verification and validation requirements.
• Verification and validation activities re-
sult in quantitative evaluation of TPMs.
• "Out-of-bounds" TPMs are signals to re-
plan fiscal, schedule and people re-
sources; sometimes new systems analysis
activities need to be initiated.
Tracking TPMs can begin as soon as a base-
line design has been established, which can
occur as early as Phase B. A TPM tracking
program should begin not later than the
start of Phase C. Data to support the full set
of selected TPMs may, however, not be avail-
able until later in the project cycle.
Selecting TPMs. In general, TPMs can be
generic (attributes that are meaningful to
each Product Breakdown Structure [PBS]
element, like mass or reliability) or unique
(attributes that are meaningful only to spe-
cific PBS elements). The systems engineer
needs to decide which generic and unique
TPMs are worth tracking at each level of the
PBS. The systems engineer should track the
measure of system effectiveness (when the
project maintains such a measure) and the
principal performance or technical attri-
butes that determine it, as top-level TPMs.
At lower levels of the PBS, TPMs worth
tracking can be identified through the func-
tional and performance requirements levied
on each individual system, segment, etc.
In selecting TPMs, the systems engineer
should focus on those that can be objectively
measured during the project cycle. This mea-
surement can be done directly by testing or
indirectly by a combination of testing and
analysis. Analyses are often the only means
available to determine some high-level
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TPMs such as system reliability, but the
data used in such analyses should be based
on demonstrated values to the maximum
practical extent. These analyses can be
performed using the same measurement
methods or models used during trade stud-
ies. In TPM tracking, however, instead of
using estimated (or desired) performance or
technical attributes, the models are exer-
cised using demonstrated values. As the
project cycle proceeds through Phases C and
D, the measurement of TPMs should become
increasingly more accurate because of the
availability of more "actual" data about the
system.
Lastly, the systems engineer should se-
lect those TPMs that must fall within well-
defined (quantitative) limits for reasons of
system effectiveness or mission feasibility.
Usually these limits represent either a firm
upper or lower bound constraint. A typical
example of such a TPM for a spacecraft is its
injected mass, which must not exceed the ca-
pability of the selected launch vehicle.
Tracking injected mass as a high-level TPM
is meant to ensure that this does not happen.
Assessment Methods. The traditional
method of assessing a TPM is by establishing
a time-phased planned profile for it, and
comparing the demonstrated value against
that profile. The planned profile represents a
nominal "trajectory" for that TPM taking
into account a number of factors. These
factors include the technological maturity of
the system, the planned schedule of tests and
demonstrations, and any historical exper-
ience with similar or related systems. As an
example, spacecraft dry mass tends to grow
during Phases C and D by as much as 25 to
30 percent. A planned profile for spacecraft
dry mass may try to compensate for this
growth with a lower initial value. The final
value in the planned profile usually either
intersects or is asymptotic to an allocated
requirement (or contract specification). The
planned profile method is the technical per-
formance measurement counterpart to the
Earned Value method for cost and schedule
control described earlier.
Examples of High-Level TPMs for
Planetary Spacecraft and Launch Vehicles
High-level technical performance measures
(TPMs) for planetary spacecraft include:
• End-of-mission (EOM) dry mass
• Injected mass (includes EOM dry mass, base-
line mission plus reserve propellant, other
consumables and upper stage adaptor mass)
• Consumables at EOM
• Power demand (relative to supply)
• Onboard data processing memory demand
• Onboard data processing throughput time
• Onboard data bus capacity
• Total pointing error
Mass and power demands by spacecraft subsys-
tems and science instruments may be tracked
separately as well.
For launch vehicles, high-level TPMs include:
• Total vehicle mass at launch
• Payload mass (at nominal altitude or orbit)
• Payload volume
• Injection accuracy
• Launch reliability
• In-flight reliability
• For reusable vehicles, percent of value recov-
ered
• For expendable vehicles, unit production cost
at the n th unit.
A closely related method of assessing a
TPM relies on establishing a time-phased
margin requirement for it and comparing
the actual margin against that requirement.
The margin is generally defined as the differ-
ence between a TPM's demonstrated value
and its allocated requirement. The margin
requirement may be expressed as a percent
of the allocated requirement. The margin
requirement generally declines through
Phases C and D, reaching or approaching
zero at their completion.
Depending on which method is chosen,
the systems engineer's role is to propose
reasonable planned profiles or margin re-
quirements for approval by the cognizant
manager. The value of either of these meth-
ods is that they allow management by
exception--that is, only deviations from
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planned profiles or margins below require-
ments signal potential future problems re-
quiring replanning. If this occurs, then new
cost, schedule and/or technical changes
should be proposed. Technical changes may
imply some new planned profiles. This is il-
lustrated for a hypothetical TPM in Figure
ll(a). In this example, a significant demon-
strated variance (i.e., unanticipated growth)
in the TPM during design and development
of the system resulted in replanning at time
t. The replanning took the form of an in-
crease in the allowed final value of the TPM
(the "allocation"). A new planned profile was
then established to track the TPM over the
remaining time of the TPM tracking
program.
The margin management method of as-
sessing is illustrated for the same example in
Figure l l(b). The replanning at time t oc-
curred when the TPM fell significantly below
the margin requirement. The new higher
allocation for the TPM resulted in a higher
margin requirement, but it also immediately
placed the margin in excess of that require-
ment.
Both of these methods recognize that the
final value of the TPM being tracked is un-
certain throughout most of Phases C and D.
The margin management method attempts
to deal with this implicitly by establishing a
margin requirement that reduces the
chances of the final value exceeding its allo-
cation to a low number, for example, five per-
cent or less. A third method of reporting and
assessing deals with this risk explicitly. The
risk management method is illustrated for
the same example in Figure l l(c). The
replanning at time t occurred when the
probability of the final TPM value being less
than the allocation fell precipitously into the
red alert zone. The new higher allocation for
the TPM resulted in a substantial improve-
ment in that probability.
The risk management method requires
an estimate of the probability distribution
for the final TPM value. Early in the TPM
tracking program, when the demonstrated
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An Example of the Risk Management Method for
Tracking Spacecraft Mass
During PhasesC and D,a spacecraft'sinjectedmass
can be consideredan uncertainquantity.Estimates
ofeachsubsystem'sand eachinstrument'smass are,
however,made periodicallyb thedesignengineers.
These estimateschange and become more accurate
as actualpartsand components are builtand
integratedintosubsystems and instruments and
are integratedintospacecraft.Injectedmass can l
alsochangeduringPhasesC and D asthe quantity
of propellantis fine-tunedto meet the mission
design requirements. At each point during
developmentthen,the spacecraft'sinjectedmass is
betterrepresentedas a probabilitydistribution
ratherthanasasinglepoint.
The mechanics of obtaining a probability
distributionfor injectedmass typicallyinvolve
making estimatesofthreepoints-- the lowerand
upper bounds and the most likelyinjectedmass
value.These three values can be combined into
parameters that completelydefinea probability
distributionliketheone shown inthefigurebelow.
SpacecraftInjectedMass,Kg
The launch vehicle's"guaranteed" payload
capability,designated the "LV Specification,"is
shown as a boldverticaline.The area under the
probabilitycurvetotheleftofthe boldverticaline
representsthe probabilitythat the spacecraft's
injectedmass willbe lessthan or equal to the i
launchvehicle'spayloadcapability.Ifinjectedmass
isa TPM beingtrackedusingtheriskmanagement
method, thisprobabilitycould be plotted in a
display similar to Figure ll(c).
If this probability were nearly one, then the
project manager might consider adding more
objectives to the mission in order to take advantage
of the "large margin" that appears to exist. In the
above figure, however, the probability is
significantly less than one. Here, the project
manager might consider descoping the project, for
example, by removing an instrument or otherwise[
changing mission objectives. The project manager]
could also solve the problem by requesting a larger[
launchvehicle! J
value is based on indirect means of estima-
tion, this distribution typically has a larger
statistical variance than later, when it is
based on measured data, e.g., a test result.
When a TPM stays along its planned profile
(or equivalently, when its margin remains
above the corresponding margin require-
ment), the narrowing of the statistical distri-
bution should allow the TPM to remain in
the green alert zone (in Figure 11(c)) despite
its growth. The three methods represent
different ways to assess TPMs and communi-
cate that information to management, but
whichever is chosen, the pattern of success or
failure should be the same for all three.
Relationship of TPM Tracking Program
to the SEMP. The SEMP is the usual docu-
ment for describing the project's TPM track-
ing program. This description should include
a master list of those TPMs to be tracked and
the measurement and assessment methods
to be employed. If analytical methods and
models are used to measure certain high-
level TPMs, then these need to be identified.
The reporting frequency and timing of as-
sessments should be specified as well. [n de-
termining these, the systems engineer must
balance the project's needs for accurate,
timely and effective TPM tracking against
the cost of the TPM tracking program. The
TPM tracking program plan, which elabo-
rates on the SEMP, should specify each
TPM's allocation, time-phased planned pro-
file or margin requirement, and alert zones,
as appropriate to the selected assessment
method.
Systems Engineering Process Metrics
Status reporting and assessment of systems
engineering process metrics provides addi-
tional visibilityinto the performance of the
"system that produces the system." As such,
these metrics supplement the cost and sched-
ule control measures discussed earlier.
Systems engineering process metrics try
to quantify the effectivityand productivity of
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the systems engineering process and organi-
zation. Within a single project, tracking
these metrics allows the systems engineer to
better understand the health and progress of
that project. Across projects (and over time),
the tracking of systems engineering process
metrics allows for better estimation of the
cost and time of performing systems engi-
neering functions. It also allows the systems
engineering organization to demonstrate its
commitment to the TQM principle of con-
tinuous improvement.
Selecting Systems Engineering Process
Metrics
Generally, systems engineering process
metrics fall into three categories: those that
measure the progress of the systems engi-
neering effort, those that measure the qual-
ity of that process, and those that measure
its productivity. Different levels of systems
engineering management are generally
interested in different metrics. For example,
a project manager or lead systems engineer
may focus on metrics dealing with systems
engineering staffing, project risk manage-
ment progress and major trade study
progress. A subsystem systems engineer
may focus on subsystem requirements and
interface definition progress and verification
procedures progress. It is useful for each
systems engineer to focus on just a few
process metrics. Which metrics should be
tracked depends on the systems engineer's
role in the total systems engineering effort.
The systems engineering process metrics
worth tracking also change as the project
moves through the project cycle.
Collecting and maintaining data on the
systems engineering process is not without
cost. Status reporting and assessment of sys-
tems engineering process metrics divert time
and effort from the process itself. The system
engineer must balance the value of each
systems engineering process metric against
its collection cost. The value of these metrics
arises from the insights they provide into the
process that cannot be obtained from cost
and schedule control measures alone. Over
time, these metrics can also be a source of
hard productivity data, which are invaluable
in demonstrating the potential returns from
investment in systems engineering tools and
training.
Examples and Assessment Methods.
Table 2 lists some systems engineering pro-
cess metrics to be considered. That list is not
Systems Engineering
Function Process Metric
Requirements
development and
management
Design and
development
Verification and
Validation IV&V)
Requirements identified vs.
completed vs. approved
Requirements volatility
Trade studies planned vs.
completed
Requirements approved per
systems engineering hour
Specificationsplanned vs.
completed
Processing of ECRs/ECOs
Engineering drawings planned
vs. related
V&V plans identifiedvs.
approved
V&V procedures planned vs.
completed
Functional requirements
approved vs. verified
V&V plans approved per
systems engineering hour
V&V procedures completed per
systems engineering hour
Processing oftrouble reports
Reviews Processing ofReview Item
Discrepancies (RIDs)
Processing ofaction items
Cate-
gory
S
Q
S
P
S
Q
S
S
S
S
P
P
Q
Q
Q
S = Progress, or schedule-related
Q = Quality-related
P = Productivity
Table2 SystemsEngineeringProcessMetrics
intended to be exhaustive. Because some of
these metrics allow for different interpreta-
tions, each NASA Center needs to define
them in a common-sense way that fits its
own processes. For example, each Center
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needs to determine what it meant by a
completed versus an approved requirement,
or whether these terms are even relevant. As
part of this definition, it is important to
recognize that not all requirements, for
example, need be lumped together. It may be
more useful to track the same metric sepa-
rately for each of several different types of
requirements, for example.
Quality-related metrics should serve to
indicate when a part of the systems engi-
neering process is overloaded and/or break-
ing down. These metrics can be defined and
tracked in several different ways. For
example, requirements volatility can be
quantified as the number of newly identified
requirements, or as the number of changes to
already-approved requirements. As another
example, engineering change request (ECR)
processing could be tracked by comparing
cumulative ECRs opened versus cumulative
ECRs closed, or by plotting the age profile of
of open ECRs, or by examining the number of
ECRs opened last month versus the total
number open. The systems engineer should
apply personal judgment in picking the
status reporting and assessment method.
Productivity-related metrics provide an
indication of systems engineering output per
unit of input. Although more sophisticated
measures of input exist, the most common is
the number of systems engineering hours
dedicated to a particular function or activity.
Because not all systems engineering hours
cost the same, an appropriate weighing
scheme should be developed to ensure
comparability of hours across systems engi-
neering personnel.
Displaying schedule-related metrics can
be accomplished in a table or graph of
planned quantities vs. actuals. With quality-
and productivity-related metrics, trends are
generally more important than isolated
snapshots. The most useful kind of assess-
ment method allows comparisons of the
trend on a current project with that for a
successful completed project of the same
type. The latter provides a benchmark
against which the system engineer can judge
personal efforts.
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SPACECRAFT SYSTEMS ENGINEERING:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PROCESS AT GSFC
by Tony Fragomeni and Mike Ryschkewitsch
Systems engineering means different things
to different people. Some say it applies only
to one spacecraft or a total mission. Others
say it applies only to hardware and not to
software, but that assumption is flatly
wrong. Still others say it is electrically
oriented while others say it is mechanically
oriented; that depends upon whether you
talk to an electrical or a mechanical engi-
neer. Systems engineering is often equated
with systems management and systems
design. Some would reduce it to a purely ana-
lytical process and others would reduce it to
mere hands-on physical integration.
Systems engineering is all of these and
much more. It encompasses such terms as the
system approach, system analysis and sys-
tems integration. It includes systems re-
quirements analysis and functional analysis.
The Goddard Space Flight Center's Code 400
Project Manager's Handbook says it is "one of
the most important technical efforts of a pro-
jeet and . . . assures the design adequacy of
the complete system to meet the stated
user/experimenter requirements for a mis-
sion." These efforts include both the ground
and flight segments, launch vehicle inter-
face, and the end-to-end data system from
collection of raw data on orbit to reduced
data on the ground ready for analysis. The
handbook says: "The Systems Manager of a
project serves as Chief Engineer and
provides a focal point for the systems engi-
neering effort throughout all phases of the
project."
As a succinct definition, that is as good as
any but not really very helpful in under-
standing the systems engineering process,
especially in the development of spacecraft.
The concept becomes much clearer and richer
when we ask why we need systems engineer-
ing, who a systems engineer is, what the
N 9 3 - 2,46/8 3
#,¢
systems engineer does and what are some of
the products.
But first we can state what systems engi-
neering is not. It is not one, single, isolated
process. The whole process of systems engi-
neering is better described as an attitude...
a plan of attack.., a way of thinking. Con-
sider, for example, the difference between a
chemist adding one ingredient to a fixed
solution to achieve a predictable result, and a
doctor who must consider a variety of uncer-
tain and ever changing physical and emo-
tional factors in the diagnosis and treatment
of a patient.
As shown in Figure 1, systems engineer-
ing is not a process that is easily contained in
a single manual or cookbook. Rather, it is the
systematic use of many time-tested and
experience-verified disciplines, tools and
human resources needed to identify, define
and solve problems. Which tools to use or
expertise required depends not only on the
mission under consideration but also the
phase or stage of the project. The process
thus demands a great deal of versatility and
flexibility.
Finally, systems engineering is not
always one individual or even one organiza-
tion. Instead, it is a flexible process which
makes the development and design meet the
requirements and constraints imposed by the
user and the system environment. It is a
process characterized by multiple starts and
stops, frequent shifts and alternate ap-
proaches, as opposed to a clear-cut path or a
simple recipe for success.
Systems engineering is clearly a dynamic
process that cannot and will not be pinned
down into a simple procedural formula. This
process, however, is generally the same for
different kinds of projects. In these times of
increasingly constrained budgets, it is
PRE($EDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMED
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incumbent upon the systems engineer to
optimize the systems design and to do things
efficiently and not just effectively. Systems
engineers are called upon to identify the
risks in increasingly complex projects, and
then attempt to minimize the impact of those
risks. In very complex spacecraft, which are
expected to perform delicate and ultrasophis-
ticated functions, a minor intrasystem per-
turbation can have a major performance
impact across multiple systems. Systems
engineering is a disciplined technical ap-
proach that forces us to do our homework up
front and early on, to uncover problems be-
fore they become showstoppers. Although we
cannot conclusively test for everything, we
are expected to identify and verify realities
and adequate margins.
In a sense, we have always had systems
engineering in NASA, but it may aptly be
termed "informal." Certainly, we recall engi-
neers and managers who had a big-picture
perspective, looking at all functions and how
they interrelate, but more often than not,
their trade studies were on isolated scratch
pads and the logic kept in their heads or in a
desk drawer. You can almost hear them say:
"This is the way we've always done it."
Sometimes this informal system worked,
especially on small, relatively simple pro-
jects. But as the spacecraft became more
complex and development time elongated, a
more formal process of systems engineering
emerged. In simple terms, it starts with func-
tional analysis and leads to functional
requirements and then design requirements,
It starts at the top and works down, fully
documented at each step and traceable. The
greater the complexity and duration of a pro-
ject, the greater the penalty for not catching
errors early on, and the greater the need for a
well understood and well documented pro-
cess. The SE process should ensure that all
fixes be made before the start of hardware
fabrication when the cost of fixes is relatively
inexpensive. To wait until later is costly, and
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it can be prohibitive at the interval between
acceptance testing and launch.
SE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The main objective in systems engineering is
to devise a coherent total system design capa-
ble of achieving the stated requirements.
Requirements should be rigid. However, they
should be continuously challenged, rechal-
lenged and/or validated. The systems engi-
neer must specify every requirement in order
to design, document, implement and conduct
the mission. Each and every requirement
must be logically considered, traceable and
evaluated through various analysis and
trade studies in a total systems design. Mar-
gins must be determined to be realistic as
well as adequate. The systems engineer must
also continuously close the loop and verify
system performance against the require-
ments.
The fundamental role of the systems
engineer, however, is to engineer, not man-
age. Yet, in large, complex missions, where
more than one systems engineer is required,
someone needs to manage the systems engi-
neers, and we call them "systems managers."
Systems engineering management is an
overview function which plans, guides, moni-
tors and controls the technical execution of a
project as implemented by the systems engi-
neers. As the project moves on through
Phases A and B into Phase C/D, the systems
engineering tasks become a small portion of
the total effort. The systems management
role increases since discipline subsystem
engineers are conducting analyses and
reviewing test data for final review and
acceptance by the systems managers.
REQUIREMENTS
The name of the game in systems en-
gineering is requirements, The statement,
traceability and eventual verification of re-
quirements is probably the most important
aspect of systems engineering. Requirements
are initially derived from user needs, i.e., the
customer. It is understood that for each re-
quirement there is an associated margin that
must continually be challenged. As the pro-
ject nears completion, the amount of avail-
able margin is expected to decrease since the
margins are updated based on "actuals."
Functional Requirements provide a
description of the functions and subfunc-
tions required to conduct the mission.
These are generally derived from func-
tional analysis and allocation.
Performance Requirements or source
requirements define what the system
must accomplish and how well the system
must perform. These requirements are
initially derived from user needs and
requirements statements and refined
through requirements analyses and trade
studies. They are defined during each
application of the systems engineering
process based on outputs from previous it-
erations of the process, program decisions
and updates to user requirements. They
provide the metrics that must be verified
through appropriate analyses, demon-
strations and tests.
• Derived Requirements are lower level
(subsystem and components) performance
requirements resulting from an analysis
of the user stated performance require-
ments and the definition of functional re-
quirements. These derived requirements
are used by subsystem discipline engi-
neers in characterizing the subsystem
performance requirements necessary to
ensure the attainment of the user-stated
performance or source requirements.
Reflected Requirements are require-
ments placed on other subsystems or on
the higher level systems which must be
provided to each of the subsystems to en-
sure proper performance of the subsystem
and the eventual attainment of the user
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stated performance or source require-
ments.
Design Requirements are described by
drawings, material lists, process descrip-
tions and other supporting documents for
the fabrication, production or manufac-
turing of a system element. These are
generally derived from the synthesis of a
solution for one or more higher level re-
quirements.
The systems engineer must be able to
demonstrate the traceability of each require-
ment through each level, right up to the
contractually binding source requirements.
User requirements are determined and
refined during Phase A studies. A host of
considerations are made in order to produce
the best set of "integrated performance
requirements," considering technical perfor-
mance, first as mitigated by cost and sched-
ule. Systems engineers should not and do not
make cost and schedule decisions, especially
in the later phases, but in Phases A and B,
cost and schedule are trade-off parameters
that must be considered in determining the
best course of action.
PHASE A - MISSION ANALYSIS
In Phase A Mission Analysis, systems engi-
neers will translate user needs or goals into a
quantifiable set of functional requirements
that can be translated into design require-
ments. User requirements are defined as a
"set of objectives" that are quantified in
broad terms and basic functions. The user
should also state performance measures in
terms of preferences as well as trade evalua-
tion criteria. The systems engineers will
conduct functional, parametric and system
analyses to define and refine mission
requirements and to generate alternative
candidate system designs. Baseline system
conceptual designs should emerge as design
drivers are identified, as well as high risk
areas and offsets. Common system drivers
include size, weight, power, data rate, com-
munications, pointing, orbital altitude,
mission operations coverage (geometry and
timing) and scheduling. Trade-off studies are
conducted to balance the requirements, but
even the optimal technical approach may not
be the best way when the design is evaluated
in terms of cost, schedule and risks. Since all
projects will undergo cost, schedule and tech-
nical perturbations during development, it is
imperative that a good system be developed.
However, contractual, legal and fiscal re-
quirements dictate that the technical ap-
proach must be agreed to by the start of
Phase C/D. The overall system architecture
must be established during Phase A; this
includes the apportionment of functions be-
tween the flight and ground segments. It is
imperative that proper studies and analyses
be done to result in the correct structure
since this affects the remainder of the project
up through the operations phase.
Phase A outputs or products include a
Phase A Report, a Science Requirements
Document, preliminary Instrument Interface
Requirements Documents, cost, schedule and
a Project Initiation Agreement (PIA). The
Phase A Report includes functional and oper-
ational descriptions, hardware and software
distribution, design requirements, system/
subsystem descriptions, mission description,
a preliminary work breakdown structure
(WBS) and recommendations for Phase B.
The Phase A Report must have sufficient
data to answer questions such as these:
• Do the conceptual design and operational
concept meet the overall mission objec-
tives?
• Is the design technically feasible?
• Is the level of risks acceptable?
• Are schedules and budget within the
specified limits?
• Do preliminary results show this option
to be better than all others?
=
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PHASE B - DEFINITION PHASE
Assuming that each crucial question is an-
swered affirmatively during Phase A, the
systems engineer will continue development
of the system requirements by conducting
more detailed analyses to refine the baseline
system conceptual design. These Phase B
tasks must result in technical requirements
and operational functions that are reflected
in Interface Control Documents, perfor-
mance and design specifications and state-
ments of work that are _sed to produce the
hardware during Phase C.
Specifications are defined as "a descrip-
tion of the technical requirements for a mate-
rial or product that includes the criteria for
determining whether the requirements are
met." Basically, there are four types of speci-
fications:
• Functional - describes only the ultimate
end use; contractor is responsible.
• Performance - describes quantitatively
what it must do; contractor is responsible.
• Design - what to make and how to make
it; buyer is responsible.
• Levels of Effort - used only for support
services.
The statement of work (SOW) describes
the work needed to carry out the entire mis-
sion as well as how and where the work is to
be done. The work breakdown structure
(WBS) is used for reporting progress, perfor-
mance and engineering evaluations. The
WBS will structure the family of specifica-
tions and drawings resulting from the pro-
gressive stages of systems engineering. The
final result of the Phase B process is a system
definition in sufficient depth of detail to
allow beginning the detailed design process
for each of the individual subsystems.
PHASE C/D - EXECUTION PHASE
During Phase C/D, systems engineering
provides technical oversight during design,
development, test and evaluation to ensure
that timely and appropriate intermeshing of
all technical disciplines are reflected in the
overall design. Technical performance re-
quirements and margins are continually
reaffirmed through analyses and tests dur-
ing this phase. Phase C/D outputs or pro-
ducts will also include a variety of analytical
and test reports on hazards, faults, single-
point failures and failure modes for "what-if"
or worst-case scenarios. Trade-offs and other
analyses continue but in greater detail at the
subsystem and component levels to ensure
proper conversion of performance require-
ments into the design and into the hardware.
PHASES E AND F - PRE-MISSION AND
MISSION OPERATIONS
Phases E and F, Pre-mission and Mission
Operations, also involve systems engineer-
ing, although to a lesser degree since the
most important SE work is done early on.
However, the final verification of a space
flight, system can only be done in flight, on-
orbit. The systems engineering team is full
time with the flight operations team during
initial on-orbit engineering checkout and on
call during mission operations. The final
product is the "On-Orbit Engineering Perfor-
mance Report" which measures mission
performance against requirements. This
document becomes useful in subsequent pro-
jects, especially if it contains lessons learned.
Finally, the systems engineer's job is only
completed when the user has the final deliv-
ered product, e.g., scientific data, in hand.
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING ANALYSES
Systems engineering is a highly analytical
process. Throughout the entire project (not
just at the beginning) the systems engineer
will conduct or review numerous analyses to
establish strong performance and design
parameters as well as to continually evalu-
ate design approaches and options. A
systems engineer is expected to establish
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performance parameters and margins, verify
them with test and inspection data, and com-
pare the actual to the predicted. Everything
must be "what-ifed" to the lowest necessary
level, not just once but continually, so that
there are few if any surprises.
One tool used by the systems engineer is
functional analysis. This is a top-to-bottom
effort done in all phases and at every hard-
ware level. The systems engineer takes a
performance requirement (function) at one
hardware level of assembly and, after
thorough analysis, determines the optimum
distribution and implementation of the re-
quirement at the next lower hardware level.
Functional analysis is also used to determine
whether a particular function is best accom-
plished in flight or on the ground. Functional
analysis results in a hierarchical structure
(i.e., architecture) that progressively divides
and allocates how a function is to be
accomplished, down to the lowest common
denominator. This is extremely useful in
deciding where to cut the interface, especial-
ly in view of verification, accountability and
jurisdictional (i.e., contractual) boundaries.
Another top-to-bottom systems engineer-
ing analysis done in all phases is the require-
ments flowdown and allocation analysis.
This can be described as an equitable, attain-
able and realistic distribution of system-level
performance requirements and resources,
including margins, to successively lower
levels of hardware assemblies. To verify the
validity and distribution of tolerances and
margins, continued analysis and review are
required throughout the project. This starts
during Phase A and continues through every
on-orbit checkout. Distribution should be
compared to actuals, and estimates should be
quantified as a function of design maturity.
Trade-off studies and analyses also define
margins and identify potential problem
areas. They are done on all systems and for
all technical disciplines to select the configu-
ration that best satisfies a user requirement.
Alternative technologies are examined to
satisfy functional and design requirements,
including those with moderate to high risk.
Trade-off studies also support make-or-buy
decisions and help manage technical risk. In
Phases A and B, they establish system archi-
tecture and configuration. In Phase C/D,
they evaluate alternate solutions in sys-
tem/subsystem/component design. After
critical design review (CDR), however, trade-
off studies are conducted only during the
evaluation of design changes or responses to
failures. All factors that affect the function
or requirement must be studied: perfor-
mance, reliability, safety, cost, risk, sched-
ule, maintainability, servicing, power,
weight, thermal, complexity, etc.
System parametric and sensitivity model-
ing and analyses are used to develop confi-
dence that a design satisfies higher level
requirements, and to provide traceability of
functional, performance and design require-
ments. This is accomplished by varying a
particular performance parameter between
its established worst-case limits and as per-
turbed by worst-case environmental stresses
to determine the resultant effect on succes-
sively higher assembly levels or performance
parameters. These analyses can serve as a
primary vehicle for conducting trade studies
and to assess the whole system effectiveness
of synthesized design options and alterna-
tives. Like all other studies and analyses,
these analyses are done during all phases
and are updated based on actual test data.
RISK ASSESSMENT
Risk assessment is approached from different
but related directions. During Phases A and
B, the systems engineer will want to do suffi-
cient analyses to ensure that the technical
approach is valid and that any new develop-
ments or state-of-the-art items and their risk
offsets have been identified. During Phase
C/D, sufficient analysis must assure that
performance requirements and margins are
adequate and are in fact satisfied. Through-
out the entire project life cycle, risk assess-
ment and particularly Failure Mode Effects
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Analyses and fault tree analyses should be
used as design tools to enhance the overall
system design and make it immune to fail-
ures, both hardware and human.
Risk assessment is the identification and
evaluation of the impact upon the technical
performance of those system elements that
appear to possess an inherent probability of
failing to meet some critical performance or
design requirement essential for the success-
ful accomplishment of the intended mission.
Systems engineering identifies the potential
failures, establishes margins and quantifies
the risk. Risk taking gets down to knowing
what your margins are and how they are dis-
tributed. How do you know what the margins
are? By doing lots of analyses and backing
them up with tests. Two of the best tools are
Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) and
hazards analyses.
The FMEA assures that the failure modes
of a system are known and can be addressed
in an orderly fashion. Initially the analysis
must identify all critical functions and the
effects of the impairment of those functions
on mission success. Following this, a detailed
component and system interaction study is
conducted to determine all the ways a func-
tion could be impaired, the effect on mission
success and how such an impairment could
be detected. The impact of these failures and
the probability of occurrence must be evalu-
ated in light of the user requirements and
the desired level of reliability.
The FMEA is also used in compiling the
system-level fault tree used by the flight op-
erations team (FOT) during mission oper-
ations. The fault tree is a listing of every
plausible anomaly or failure that may occur
on orbit. It starts out with the detection of
the anomaly or failure as observed by the
FOT via telemetry. It then provides a road
map used by the FOT in isolating the cause
of the anomaly and taking the required cor-
rective action or operational work-around so
that the mission can proceed. The fault tree
analysis and the development of the FMEA
should be done together.
Systems safety hazards analyses are also
considered a systems engineering function.
The intent of the systems safety hazards ana-
lysis is to identify design deficiencies that
could directly -- or indirectly through opera-
tor error -- result in personnel injury or
damage to the flight hardware. In this case,
any potential hazards that could result in
death, severe injury or illness must be elimi-
nated. The impact of a major system loss or
damage must be evaluated in light of user
requirements.
Operations hazards analyses look at
possible failures occurring during testing,
handling and transportation that could jeop-
ardize the hardware or personnel. All catas-
trophes and critical hazards resulting in
death, severe injury or illness, or major
system loss or damage must be eliminated.
Marginal hazards may be tolerated if they
can be rationally justified and accepted.
REVIEWS, PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
AND VERIFICATION
The systems engineer is best advised to start
early and stay late in reviewing and assess-
ing performance requirements and the asso-
ciated verification methods employed to
prove the requirement has been satisfied.
Reviews must be done at all levels. Non-
advocate reviews (NARs) should be conduct-
ed at the end of Phase B to evaluate the
technical, cost and schedule approach for
accomplishing the mission. System-level
reviews and lower-level hardware design and
test reviews should be conducted continually.
Peer reviews are vital at all levels and must
be conducted by "looking at the drawings and
not the viewgraphs." Trend analysis is need-
ed on all critical performance parameters,
from box level acceptance through on-orbit to
enable the early identification of potential
problem areas. Technical performance mea-
surement (TPM) is one proven method of as-
sessing compliance to requirements and the
level of technical risk. TPM is defined as the
continuing analysis, test and demonstration
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of the degree of anticipated and actual
achievement of selected technical measures
and performance parameters. TPM involves
analysis of the differences among the
achievement to date, current estimate and
the required or target value for the par-
ameter.
SUMMARY AND SOME ADVICE
Systems engineering is much more than a
one-person job. It is best described as "the
technical conscience of a project." As such,
systems engineering is a highly structured
and disciplined engineering process that cuts
across all technical disciplines to ensure
interface design compatibility, both inter-
system and intrasystem. It organizes at the
system level m not at the subsystem level,
where compromises may be made. It estab-
lishes performance requirements and
margins. Systems engineering evaluates the
validity of hardware through analysis and
review of test data. It identifies risk and
offers approaches for the project manager to
eliminate or reduce the impact. One eye of
the system engineer is on how the end prod-
uct is used during mission operations; the
other is focused on how analyses and tests
can prove it can do the job within acceptable
margins. Both eyes work in tandem, togeth-
er, clearly andin focus. Remember:
1. Perform sound systems analyses and de-
sign; consider all options.
2. Don't box yourself in with unnecessary
and undue constraints.
v
3. Exercise extreme-care in system design,
especially incorporating appropriate (to
the risks) redundancy and provisions for
late design changes and on-orbit oper-
ational work-arounds, and factor in test-
ing ability.
4. Institute the discipline to ensure pains-
taking attention to details -- great and
small.
5. Maintain a total dedication to quality
quality is designed in, it does not acci-
dentally happen.
6. Ensure rigorous pre-launch testing to es-
tablish that requirements are in fact
satisfied, and any workmanship or mar-
ginal designs are uncovered.
7. Insist on inexhaustible diligence in test-
ing -- allow an unexplained or random
failure only after all reasonable and
practical steps to isolate are taken.
8. Attempt to design backwards -- satisfy
mission requirements first.
9. Conduct extensive reviews -- look at the
drawings, not viewgraphs.
10. Have adequate documentation to know
where you are going, how you are get-
ting there, where you have been and
when you are there.
11. Have an open door policy to foster strong
intra-project technical communications.
12. Ensure total openness regarding prob-
lem identification and resolution.
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SYSTEMS ENGINEERING & INTEGRATION AND MANAGEMENT
FOR MANNED SPACE FLIGHT PROGRAMS
by Owen Morris /Z__j /_
The development of systems engineering and In these projects, essentially all of the tech-
program management in NASA manned
space programs has grown in a largely un-
coordinated manner over the last 30 years.
However, the systems and practices that
have been developed form a proven pattern
for successfully integrating large, technical-
ly complex programs executed in several geo-
graphical locations. This development has
not been recorded in a comprehensive man-
ner, and much of the reasoning behind the
decisions made is not obvious.
For the purposes of this discussion, sys-
tems engineering is defined as the inter-
disciplinary engineering that is necessary to
achieve efficient definition and integration
of program elements in a manner that meets
the system-level requirements. Integration
is defined as the activity necessary to de-
velop and document the systems' technical
characteristics, including interface control
requirements, resource reporting and analy-
sis, system verification requirements and
plans, and integration of the system
elements into the program operational
scenario.
This paper discusses the history of SE&I
management of the overall program archi-
tecture, organizational structure and the
relationship of SE&I to other program orga-
nizational elements. A brief discussion of the
method of executing the SE&I process, a
summary of some of the major lessons
learned, and identification of things that
have proven successful are included.
HISTORY
NASA, then the National Advisory Commit-
tee for Aeronautics (NACA), participation in
the management of major aerospace pro-
grams began shortly after World War II with
the advent of the X series research aircraft.
nical responsibility was delegated to one of
the Centers, which were primarily expert in
the technical area being explored (i.e., aero-
dynamics, stability, control and structures)
but did not have experts in the development
of hardware. Accordingly, NACA entered
into agreements with the Air Force or Navy
to manage the actual development of the
aircraft. The NACA Centers focused their
direction on the technical requirements and
performance characteristics to be demon-
strated by the aircraft. The contractor's
responsibility was similar to that for the
development of any aircraft, and the contrac-
tor usually furnished test pilots for early
demonstration flights.
With the formation of NASA and the
start of major manned space programs, it
was necessary for NASA to develop the capa-
bility to manage complex development
activities. Very little SE&I capability exist-
ed within the functional organizations of the
NASA Centers. As a result, SE&I expertise
was developed within each of the program
offices. In particular, the Gemini program
office was set up with autonomous capability
to manage SE&I and direct the development
contractor.
With the advent of the Apollo program,
SE&I was again managed from the project
offices at the development centers. The
project offices used specialized technical
capability from the Center functional orga-
nizations and prime contractors and initiat-
ed the practice of hiring support contractors
to assist in implementing SE&I. After the
Apollo I fire, a review committee was estab-
lished to determine the cause of the fire and
recommend modifications to the program.
One of the recommendations made was that
NASA acquire a technical integration and
engineering support contractor to assist in
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accomplishing SE&I activity. The Washing-
ton program office selected Boeing as the
contractor and managed the contract for this
activity; however, a large portion of the work
force was located at the Centers. The con-
tractor's responsibilities included moni-
toring the development and operational
activities at the Centers, forming integrated
assessments of the activity, and making
recommendations to the program director for
improvements. As the program matured, the
contract, focus was changed, and the contrac-
tor provided a significant number of person-
nel to directly support the Centers in SE&I
and systems development activities.
With the initiation of the Space Shuttle
program and the adoption of the Lead Center
concept, it was decided to manage the Level
II integration activity, including SE&I, by
providing a small management core within
the program office and using many of the
Centers' functional organizations to provide
technical support in a matrix fashion. At the
Johnson Space Center (JSC), the lead person
from the functional organization was gener-
ally a branch head or an assistant division
chief. JSC had a relatively large staff to
draw from to provide the specific technical
expertise and the level of effort needed to
accomplish a given task.
The Space Station Freedom program was
started using the Space Shuttle program as a
model. As the Lead Center, JSC managed in-
tegration. Later, the Level II function was
moved near Washington, D.C., under the
deputy program director, and an indepen-
dent contractor was brought in to assist the
integration process. The Space Station Free-
dom management organization will be dis-
cussed in more detail in the next section.
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
A single NASA Center largely managed ear-
ly NASA manned space flight programs,
which allowed for a relatively simple organi-
zational structure to accomplish program
integration. JSC, then called the Manned
Space Center, managed both development
and flight operational aspects of the Mercury
and Gemini programs with the checkout and
preflight testing being performed by support
elements at Cape Canaveral.
Apollo became organizationally more
complex (Figure 1). The spacecraft develop-
ment was managed by JSC, the launch vehi-
cle development by Marshall Space Flight
Center (MSFC), the prelaunch activities by
Kennedy Space Center (KSC)mby then an
independent NASA CenterRand the flight
operations by JSC. In all of these programs,
the responsibility for the development of the
flight hardware was delegated to the
Centers, and the interfaces between projects
were intentionally kept as simple as possi-
ble. The Washington office, under direction
of the program director, was responsible for
overall direction of the program including
budgetary allocations, congressional rela-
tions, and management of development
issues between the project offices at the
different Centers. The actual integration
activity (SE&I) was coordinated by a series
of panels and working groups in which
individuals from the Washington program
office served as either chairperson or
members, with the program director over-
seeing the activity. In the early programs
(Mercury and Gemini), this activity was the
responsibility of a single Center, and the
Washington office was coordinated in an
informal manner, but by the end of the
Apollo program, the management of the pan-
el and working group activity was relatively
formal. In all of these programs the Center
directors took an active part and personally
felt responsible for the technical excellence
of the work performed by their Centers. This
intercenter involvement was accomplished
primarily through the management council
and major program reviews where Center
directors personally participated in major
decisions.
In part of the Apollo program, the
Washington office retained the responsibil-
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Figure I Apollo Program Management Organization
performing the SE&I activity with the actu-
al work being led by Bellcom, a division of
Bell Laboratories. Ultimately, this approach
was abandoned, at least partly because much
of the Center director's responsibility was
lost, and an adversarial relationship be-
tween the program director and the Center
organizations developed. The execution of
the SE&I was returned to the Centers with
management and coordination of intercenter
activities achieved through the use of work-
ing groups, panels and management re-
views.
At the outset of the Space Shuttle pro-
gram (Figure 2), the management of SE&I
was markedly changed. Some of the more im-
portant changes were adoption of the Lead
Center management concept in which one of
the participating Centers was delegated the
management of program level integration
including SE&I activities; the adoption of a
configuration with functional and physical
interfaces of much greater complexity; and
the employment of one of the major hard-
ware development contractors as the inte-
gration support contractor. The complex
interfaces made SE&I activity voluminous
and involved and required the commitment
of a larger percentage of the program re-
sources to this activity.
The Space Station Freedom program was
structured so that the interface activity
between the work packages was even more
complex than that of the Shuttle program.
Initially, the Lead Center approach to SE&I
activity was adopted, but the implementa-
tion was not effective. As a result of recom-
mendations made by study groups and the
committee reviewing the Challenger acci-
dent, it was decided to transfer the responsi-
bility for program integration activity,
including SE&I, to the deputy program
director in Reston, Virginia, and to bring on
a contractor to provide program integration
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Figure 2 Space Shuttle Program Management Organization
support (Figure 3). Contractors having sig-
nificant hardware development contracts
were excluded from the contract competition.
The first approach was to provide detailed
management of SE&I activity by the Reston
civil service personnel with the integration
contractor providing support in executing
the activity. Additionally, it was thought
that much of the technical integration could
be accomplished by having the work package
contractors negotiate the definition and
execution of much of the detailed integration
process directly between themselves. This
proved ineffective, however, because there
was no clear lead responsibility and no clear
way to resolve differences. As a result,
because of the complexity of program in-
tegration and the lack of in-depth backup ca-
pability, this management approach has not
been completely effective.
|
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Recently, it was decided to give the inte-
gration support contractor direct responsibil-
ity for the integration of the program but
without authority to directly manage the
work packages or their contractors. In an
attempt to obtain more in-depth capability,
the program director and deputy program
director decided to execute the systems in-
tegration portion of the SE&I activity at two
of the Centers with the deputy director for
integration physically located at one of the
Centers. Since these functions were still re-
tained organizationally within the program
office, they were under the control of the dep-
uty program director and, at the same time,
had the advantage of drawing from the in-
depth technical capability residing at the
Centers. Simultaneously, the integrating
contractor's work force at the Centers was
increased in both responsibilities and num-
bers.
GROWING PROGRAM COMPLEXITY
One of the major factors determining the
efficiency of the integration of a program is
the methodology used to delegate the engi-
neering and development responsibilities to
the project offices at the Centers. It has been
found that less complex organizational
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structures and simple interfaces are ex-
tremely important to allow efficient manage-
ment of SE&I activities. Each of NASA's
manned space programs has been organiza-
tionally more complex than its predecessor
and has had more complex interfaces. In both
the Mercury and Gemini programs, the
flight elements were divided into two parts,
spacecraft and launch vehicle, and the phys-
ical and functional interfaces between the
two were quite simple. The induced environ-
mental interfaces were somewhat more com-
plex but readily amenable to experimental
and analytical determination.
The Apollo program involved a major in-
crease in program complexity. The space-
craft was divided into two project offices and
the launch vehicle was divided into four
project offices. By assigning the four launch
vehicle projects to the same Center (MSFC),
the integration between launch vehicle
stages could be accomplished at the Center
level. Similarly, both spacecraft projects
were assigned to one center (JSC) for the
same reason. The physical and functional in-
terfaces between the spacecraft and launch
vehicle, and hence between Centers, was rel-
atively simple. In a 1971 paper titled "What
Made Apollo a Success," George Low stated:
"Another important design rule, which we
have not discussed as often as we should,
reads: minimize functional interfaces be-
tween complex pieces of hardware. Examples
in Apollo include the interfaces between the
spacecraft and launch vehicle and between
the command module and the lunar module.
Only some 100 wires link the Saturn launch
vehicle and the Apollo spacecraft, and most
of these have to do with the emergency detec-
tion system. The reason that this number
could not be even smaller is twofold: redun-
dant circuits are employed, and the electrical
power always comes from the module or
stage where a function is to be performed.
For example, the closing of relays in the
launch vehicle could, in an automatic abort
mode, fire the spacecraft escape motor. But
the electrical power to do this, by design,
originates in the spacecraft batteries. The
main point is that a single person can fully
understand this interface and can cope with
all the effects of a change on either side of the
interface. If there had been 10 times as many
wires, it probably would have taken a hun-
dred (or a thousand?) times as many people
to handle the interface." However, the oper-
ational complexity of the Apollo vehicle
demanded a more extensive integration
activity between the Centers and for the first
time posed the problem of accomplishing
detailed technical coordination between
Centers.
One of the basic tenets of the Space
Shuttle was to have an integrated vehicle
that would recover the most expensive ele-
ments of the system for reuse. This led to a
design concept that placed a great majority
of the electronics and major components of
the main propulsion systems in the orbiter.
This design concept led to very large
increases in interface complexity between
the program elements and, more important-
ly, between the Centers. For instance, the
number of electrical wires running between
the external tank and the orbiter was more
than an order of magnitude greater than
between the spacecraft and launch vehicle of
Apollo, and for the first time, major fluid
systems ran across the interfaces. This
represented a formidable increase in the ef-
fort required to successfully accomplish the
SE&I activity. As previously noted, a new
program management structure (Figure 1)
was adopted to accommodate the increase.
The accomplishment of program-level SE&I
was given to a "Lead Center." The program
director at Headquarters was still respon-
sible for program budgetary control, Con-
gressional relations and a technical staff
sufficient to assure that the program tech-
nical activity was being properly implement-
ed. At JSC, which was the Lead Center for
the Shuttle program, a Level II program
office was established totally separate from
the Level IH orbiter project office located at
the same Center.
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The development of the flight hardware
was delegated to four project offices with the
orbiter office located at JSC, as mentioned
above, and the other three--the Space Shut-
tle main engine office, the external tank
office, and the solid rocket booster officew
located at MSFC. In addition to the hard-
ware development project offices, a pre-
launch processing office was formed at KSC.
All of the project offices reported to the Level
II program manager for all programmatic
direction except budget allocation, which
was retained by the program director at
Headquarters.
The SE&I activity was delegated to the
systems integration office located within the
JSC Level II office. The orbiter contractor,
Rockwell International, was selected to be
the integration support contractor, but to
increase objectivity, the integration activity
was made a separate exhibit to the contract
and technical direction was delegated to the
Level II systems integration office. The
MSFC Space Shuttle project office appointed
an integration manager to manage the
integration of the Marshall Space Shuttle
projects and to serve as the primary interface
to the Level II systems integration office.
The flight hardware developmental dele-
gation of the Space Station Freedom
program was formulated in an even more
complex manner (Figure 4). End-to-end
developmental responsibility for each of the
major functional systems was delegated to
one of four project offices called work pack-
age offices in the Space Station Freedom
program. Responsibility for assembling and
delivering the flight hardware was broken
down by launch elements, again assigned to
one of the work package offices. Each of these
launch elements incorporates components of
most of the distributed systems, neces-
sitating the transfer of an extremely large
number of hardware and software items
between work packages prior to their deliv-
ery to the Government. This resulted in
another major increase in the complexity of
the program-level SE&I process and directly
contributed to the difficulty of implementing
a satisfactory SE&I process in the Space
Station Freedom program.
M8
f6
Figure 4 Space Station Integration Job
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SE&I SCENARIO
As a program develops from concept to oper-
ational status, the characteristics of the
SE&I activity vary greatly. Early in the pro-
gram, conceptual SE&I is intimately in-
volved in defining systems that will meet the
overall program objectives and in evaluating
the relative merits of each. This is usually
accomplished in NASA manned programs by
the civil service organizations, often in con-
cert with Phase A/B contracts with industry.
After the general systems specification has
been developed and a detailed evaluation of
systems concepts has been completed, SE&I
provides a lead in the preparation of the pro-
curement specifications for the Phase C and
D activities and is usually directly involved
in the source selection process. After award
of the Phase C and D contracts and final
selection of the design approach chosen for
implementation, SE&I is responsible for pre-
paring system-level technical specifications,
which define the performance requirements
to be satisfied by each of the major program
elements. SE&I then develops the system
characterization process to be used (dis-
cussed in detail later) and starts an initial
analysis cycle. The results of this cycle are
extremely important in verifying the valid-
ity of the system technical specifications and
providing a technical basis for conducting
the Program Requirements Review (PRR).
After completion of the PRR and updating of
the technical specifications, SE&I starts the
definition of the interface control document
tree and the initial document drafts. An-
other system characterization cycle is start-
ed, based on the updated specifications and
the hardware and software concepts chosen
to assess the adequacy of the proposed pre-
liminary design approach.
By this time in the program, the ad hoc
organizational structure should be well in
place and functioning routinely. The commu-
nication and management overview provided
by this structure of working groups, panels
and reviews is central to accomplishing hori-
zontal integration among the project offices
and is discussed in more detail later.
In preparation for the preliminary design
review (PDR), SE&I defines the minimum
content required in the PDR data packages
and is responsible for preparing system-level
documents supporting the Integrated
System PDR. During the PDR process, SE&I
representatives participate in the project-
level reviews with particular emphasis on
the compliance of the project to the system-
level requirements. During the Integrated
System PDR, emphasis is placed on assuring
that the preliminary designs proposed by the
projects are compatible across the interfaces
and that the integrated system is capable of
meeting the operational requirements of the
program. The SE&I organization is inti-
mately involved with the evaluation and dis-
position of review item discrepancies (RIDs)
that are submitted during the review.
As a result of the PDR process, changes to
the requirements and modifications to the
preliminary design of the elements are incor-
porated. A new characterization cycle is then
initiated to evaluate the compatibility be-
tween the modified requirements and pro-
posed system capabilities. At this time, the
drafts of the interface control documents are
expanded and quantitative detail is added to
assure that the documents are mature
enough to become baseline requirements in
the program. This maturation process inevi-
tably results in the identification of physical
and functional disconnects among the ele-
ments and in a significant number of
changes to the baseline.
In a similar manner, the verification
plans of the elements and the integrated
system are refined and baselined. The
responsibility for executing the test and ana-
lysis required by the integrated system ver-
ification plan are delegated to appropriate
organizations that prepare detailed plans for
accomplishing the assigned portions of the
verification.
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Detailed mission operational scenarios
and timelines are prepared by the operations
organizations, and the operations and SE&I
organizations jointly conduct an analysis of
the system capabilities to support the sce-
narios. Concurrently, the acceptance test
and prelaunch operations requirements and
plans are prepared and delegated for execu-
tion.
In preparation for the critical design
review (CDR), another system characteriza-
tion cycle is performed, based upon the
detailed design of the elements. This cycle
typically uses mature models to synthesize
the hardware and software systems and also
incorporates the results of tests performed to
that time. SE&I participates in the conduct
of the CDR in a manner similar to that of the
PDR. After completion of the CDR, the
system requirements and design changes re-
sulting from the CDR are incorporated into
the documentation, and another complete or
partial system characterization cycle vali-
dates the decisions made during CDR.
After CDR, the primary activity of the
SE&I organization is to analyze test results
and conduct analysis to verify the capability
of the system that is being manufactured.
Particular emphasis is given to verifying the
interface characteristics of the elements as
defined by the interface control documents.
This activity directly supports the prepara-
tion for the design certification review
(DCR), and provides interface information
necessary to allow acceptance of the system
hardware and software by the Government.
The DCR is conducted similarly to the
PDR and CDR but addresses the as-built
hardware and software. Successful comple-
tion of the DCR certifies the acceptability of
the as-built elements and the ability to be
integrated into an overall system that will
satisfy the initial program operational re-
quirements. Final operational certification
of the system is obtained by a combination of
the DCR process and analysis of information
obtained during early flight operation of the
system.
The SE&I organization's participation
throughout the program development cycle
supports operational planning and real-time
operations. SE&I is the repository of corpo-
rate knowledge of the details of system
capability, which is vital to the effective and
efficient operation of the system.
RELATIONSHIP OF SE&I TO OTHER
PROGRAM FUNCTIONS
To effectively accomplish the SE&I task, the
SE&I management organization must main-
tain good communications and obtain the
support of other program office organiza-
tions. Some of the more important interac-
tions are discussed below.
Configuration Management. The in-
teraction between SE&I and configuration
management is particularly strong. As the
developers and keepers of the systems speci-
fications, SE&I has an interface with the
configuration management function that is
extremely active throughout the life of the
program. The SE&I office recommends the
baselining of the technical requirements as
they become sufficiently mature and then
serves as the office of primary responsibility
for defining and evaluating most of the pro-
posed changes to this baseline. The SE&I of-
rice, after proper coordination throughout
the integration function, also recommends
the processing of noncontroversial changes
outside of the formal control board meetings,
where appropriate. This significantly re-
duces the board's workload and conserves the
time of the key managers who are members
of the change control board. As significant is-
sues are referred to the board, SE&I presents
an analysis of the issues involved and makes
appropriate recommendations for action.
Program Control. SE&I supports the
program control function in the development
of program schedules and budgets. The key
to making this support effective is the use of
the SE&I logic networks and estimates of the
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manpower required to accomplish the activi-
ties. Because of SE&I's interdisciplinary
nature, SE&I can assist in planning activi-
ties in many areas of the program.
Early in the program, SE&I helps define
the content and schedule milestones of each
project to permit coherent development of
project-level schedules and cost estimates.
SE&I also provides program control with the
engineering master schedules (EMS) and
associated budget estimates for incorpora-
tion in the overall schedule and budget
system. SE&I also works with program
control in planning major program reviews;
provides technical leadership in conducting
the reviews; and frequently chairs the
screening groups and pre-boards.
Operations. In all of the NASA manned
space programs to date, the SE&I function
has been managed in an organization differ-
ent from the operations definition and plan-
ning function. Although this is undoubtedly
the best choice in the later phases of the pro-
gram, it may result in a less thorough incor-
poration of operational requirements in the
systems specifications and other SE&I pro-
ducts early in the program. It may be desir-
able to combine the management of SE&I
and operations in the same office early in the
program and then separating them later,
perhaps at the completion of the preliminary
design review. The stated reason for separat-
ing the functions in the past has been that
they serve as a check and balance on each
other; however, the separation also discon-
nects the detailed interfaces between the two
functions.
SR&QA. The interactions between SE&I
and the system reliability and quality assur-
ance (SR&QA) functions depend on how
responsibility for executing the program is
delegated. If a large part of the SR&QA
activity is accomplished within the SR&QA
organization, SE&I is used as a reservoir of
information or to perform specific tasks as
requested by SR&QA. However, if the
SR&QA office is responsible for setting the
requirements for SR&QA activities and for
evaluating the outcomesmwhile other orga-
nizations are delegated the responsibility for
executing the workmthen SR&QA must de-
fine and obtain baseline approval of task re-
quirements, monitor execution of the task by
SE&I, and evaluate the results to assure sat-
isfactory achievement.
The former mode of operation was exem-
plified during the early Apollo program, in
which the SR&QA activities were largely ac-
complished within the SR&QA office using
basic engineering information obtained from
SE&I and other program organizational
offices. Later in the Apollo program, the
second mode of execution was adopted; the
engineering offices, primarily SE&I, actual-
ly performed the work and made a first-level
analysis before formally transmitting the
results to SR&QA for authentication. This
latter method was considered more effective
primarily because problems and discrepan-
cies were often discovered by the originating
engineering office and corrected even before
the task was completed.
SE&I EXECUTION
Techniques developed in past NASA manned
programs have proven effective and have
become an integral part of implementing
SE&I activities. The following paragraphs
describe, in no particular order, some of the
most important techniques in planning and
implementing new programs.
Importance of SE&I Early in a Pro-
gram. In the early stages of complex
programs, comprehensive SE&I support
helps determine the architecture to be used
to delegate project responsibility. This is
accomplished by dividing the program into
the next lower level of management, the pro-
ject offices. The primary outputs are compre-
hensive and clear program requirement
specifications, identification of major pro-
grammatic interfaces, development of the ad
±
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hoc SE&I management structure, definition
of operating concepts, and preparation of
initial specifications for the hardware to be
delegated to each project office.
The SE&I organization is responsible for
managing technical integration both verti-
cally between different levels of the man-
agement organizations and horizontally
across the organizations at each level. To
efficiently achieve both dimensions of inte-
gration, it is necessary to develop logic
diagrams of the major SE&I activities to be
accomplished by each of the organizational
elements and then to determine the interre-
lations between them. By developing these
diagrams and playing them against different
organizational structures, it is possible to
evaluate the proposed organizations in
simple terms and easily define the inter-
actions between the organizational ele-
ments, thus helping to choose the most
efficient management structure. The impor-
tance of the logic diagrams will be discussed
later.
Development and Use of Ad hoc Inte-
gration Structure. To manage the defini-
tion and implementation of the SE&I
activities in manned space programs, NASA
has developed an effective ad hoc organiza-
tional structure. The structure consists of a
series of reviews, panels and working groups
that address the definition and management
of integration functions throughout the pro-
gram. Each organization has members who
represent all of the organizations interested
in the particular integration function being
managed. In the Space Station Freedom pro-
gram, the working group structure is formed
by technical disciplines and distributed
systems, such as Guidance, Navigation and
Control, Robotics, and Loads and Dynamics.
The panels are formed to address specific
programmatic management areas (i.e., as-
sembly requirements and sLage definition,
system design integration, and element de-
sign integration) that span a number of orga-
nizations. The reviews are formed to address
relatively broad program areas as shown in
Figure 5.
Program Management
Integration
Engineering Integration
Management
Mission
Integration
Element
Integration
System
Integration
Figure 5 Space Station Freedom Technical Review Structure (1990)
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Each organization is responsible for de-
veloping the integration plan in its area of
responsibility, monitoring the execution of
the tasks, identifying problem areas, and
either resolving them or submitting them to
the overall program management structure
for resolution. Although these organizations
by their nature do not perform work, the
members, by working back through their
functional organizations, greatly influence
the work being accomplished in their par-
ticular area of expertise. As rapport develops
between members, many potential problems
and issues are identified and resolved with-
out being referred to formal management
decision channels. In addition, the quality of
the work materially improves. This ad hoc
organizational structure also provides obvi-
ous places for program elements to present
any issue for deliberation and resolution. All
of the panels and working groups support
each review as needed, and submit their
open issues to the most appropriate review
for resolution.
The reviews address broad issues and
serve as a communication channel between
the panels and the working groups. Since the
reviews cover all of the panels and working
groups, they provide an excellent way of
assessing and recommending to manage-
ment the interdisciplinary priorities of the
program.
Chairpeople of the panels and working
groups are the most qualified individuals
available in a particular discipline. Only sec-
ondary consideration is given to selecting a
person from a specific organizational ele-
ment. As a result of their recognized stature,
the chairpeople provide leadership, which
makes their recommendations and decisions
more credible. The panels and working
groups also call in outside expertise when
needed, but such outside inputs are filtered
by the panels and working groups before
making a recommendation to the reviews or
other management organizations.
Internal vs. Matrix SE&I Staffing. As
already noted, SE&I has been staffed and
accomplished in different ways in different
NASA manned programs. In the early
manned space programs, the personnel
required to accomplish the SE&I activity
were assigned directly to the program and
project offices. During the Apollo and Shut-
tle programs, the program office had only the
people necessary to manage the SE&I activ-
ity, and most of the work was accomplished
by technical experts assigned from the
Centers' functional organizations in a
matrix fashion. Although each method has
its advantages and disadvantages, the ma-
trix approach generally has more advan-
tages in that manpower can be increased or
decreased as needed by pulling support from
the matrix organizations without reassign-
ing the people involved. The primary disad-
vantage is that the leader of a particular
area does not report functionally to the pro-
gram or project office, which means that the
line of direction is not as strong. The
importance of this negative factor, however,
is inversely proportional to the working
relationship between the organizations. In
the Space Shuttle program, this relationship
and the matrix approach worked well. In
other programs, the relationship was not as
good and direction through the matrix was
less effective. On occasion, program man-
agement appointed all panel and working
group chairpeople from the program office
staff, giving less regard to the individual's
personal qualifications. This led to a marked
decrease in the stature of the ad hoc
structure, which then resulted in a lack of
support from the functional organizations
and a decrease in the quality of the integra-
tion activity and products. As in many areas
of SE&I, effective implementation relies
heavily on the quality of the leadership and
the maintenance of free and open communi-
cations among the organizations involved.
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Logic Networks. As the NASA manned
space programs have become increasingly
complex, it has become difficult to define the
specific content and tasks needed to accom-
plish the SE&I function. Central to the de-
velopment of a comprehensive SE&I plan is
the development of detailed logic networks,
which form the basis for planning, executing
and evaluating the SE&I activities.
As used in the Space Shuttle program,
logic networks covered all of the SE&I activi-
ties that had to be accomplished by all
elements of the program organization. Thus,
these networks were able to interrelate
SE&I activities both vertically and horizon-
tally throughout the program management
structure. The basic summary logic net-
works were developed for the entire program
duration, to identify all major activities
required as a function of time, and were
instrumental in developing cost and man-
power forecasts for the entire duration of the
program. Detailed logic networks were then
prepared for the near-term in the Shuttle
program for 12 months, identifying in
greater detail the specific activities to be
accomplished by each organizational ele-
ment during that period. The networks were
revised every six months to extend the detail
planning horizon; in addition, the summary
networks were reviewed and modified as
needed on an annual basis. The logic
networks were a primary input to the devel-
opment of the engineering master schedules
discussed in the next paragraph.
Engineering Master Schedules (EMS)
and Associated Dictionary. The activities
identified in the SE&I integration logic net-
works were then assigned to specific organi-
zations for execution and presented as a
schedule for each organization involved. By
using a numbering system for the activities,
the logic network and the schedule could be
easily correlated. The schedules allowed cost
and manpower estimates to be prepared for
each organization and provided an excellent
21
means of determining status and managing
activities in real time.
Associated with the EMS, a dictionary
was prepared with an entry for each activity.
Each entry identified all input information
required to allow the accomplishment of the
activity; described the contents of the pro-
ducts; and identified the primary user of
each product, the scheduled completion date,
and the person responsible for preparing the
product. The EMS and the dictionary were
the primary tools for defining and communi-
cating SE&I activities throughout the entire
program structure.
As would be expected, the content of the
EMS changes character over the life of the
program and accordingly, requires various
technical capabilities over time. Early in the
program, the design activities involve a
large number of trade studies and the devel-
opment of synthesis tools to be used in evalu-
ating the capabilities of the proposed design.
As the program matures and the design so-
lidifies, the activities become more involved
with exercising the system models, conduct-
ing tests and analyzing data. As the flight
phase approaches, the activities are pre-
dominated by operational considerations, in-
cluding the development of operational data
books, mission requirements, certification of
system readiness, and support of mission
planning and real-time mission operations.
System Characterization Process. A
major SE&I activity throughout the program
life span is the assessment of the capability
of the system to meet specified requirements.
In the NASA manned space program, this
has been accomplished in an analytic sense
by synthesizing the vehicle characteri-
zations in the form of either models or
simulations, and then developing detailed
performance characterizations by exercising
the models against selected mission time-
lines and significant mission events.
The methodology used to perform the sys-
tem synthesis is central to the development
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of the logic networks and schedules described
earlier. An examination of the system usual-
ly reveals scenarios useful in conducting the
overall system evaluation; after selecting
the most desirable scenario, it forms the nu-
cleus of the overall SE&I logic. In the Space
Shuttle program, the scenario chosen was (1)
develop the necessary models and simula-
tions; (2) determine the structural modal
characteristics; (3) determine the loads on
each of the system elements; and (4) perform
stress analysis of the system when subjected
to these loads. Using this scenario it was rel-
atively easy to define and interrelate the
SE&I activities of other disciplines, such as
GN&C, propulsion, and thermal, among
others. After defining all of the required ac-
tivities, a document was prepared to identify
the models to be used, and the mission events
to be analyzed and to define the configura-
tion to be used. The sequence described
above formed an analysis cycle of a specific
configuration subjected to specific operation-
al requirements. In the Shuttle program, it
was termed an integrated vehicle baseline
characterization cycle (IVBC). As previously
described in the SE&I scenario, several char-
acterization cycles are needed during the
program: as the program matures, the cycles
have additional synthesis detail, more de-
finitive configuration information, and bet-
ter operational information.
At the completion of each of the charac-
terizations cycles, system deficiencies are
identified and modifications to either the
system specifications or the requirements
are made. For program management pur-
poses, it is usually convenient to schedule
the completion of one of the characterization
cycles to occur just before each of the major
program-level review milestones.
Program Reviews. SE&I has a large
input to each of the program-level reviews,
such as system requirements review, pre-
liminary design review, critical designre-
view, design certification review, and flight
readiness reviews. As mentioned above, corn-
pletion of one of the system characterization
cycles is an excellent indicator of whether
the system design meets the specified
requirements. The engineering master
schedule gives a graphic representation of
whether the integration progress is being
achieved. Reports produced by the SE&I ac-
tivity, such as resource allocation status and
margins, interface control document status,
design reference mission maturity, and sys-
tem operational data books indicate the
maturity of the element participation in the
system-level SE&I process.
Design Reference Missions. Most of the
manned space programs had to be capable of
performing a relatively large number of di-
verse missions, and the specifications are
written to allow hardware and software sys-
tems and elements that are flexible enough
to satisfy all of the missions. For analytical
purposes, however, it is convenient to define
and adopt one or more design reference mis-
sions (DRMs) that stress all of the systems
capabilities to a significant extent. The
DRMs are used as the primary mission re-
quirements in the system characterization
cycles, and in evaluating the ability to meet
performance specifications. In addition to
evaluating the baselined configuration
against the DRMs, other specification
requirements are evaluated by the accom-
plishment of specific analyses or tests, as
necessary.
The DRMs also allow the user community
to evaluate whether the system is capable of
meeting specific user needs and whether
these needs are specifically in the system
specifications. The DRM is used by mission
planners to determine the system's capabil-
ity of performing any specific mission under
consideration.
Verification. Verification plays a major
role in program planning and in the ultimate
cost of the system. Although most of the
verification is delegated to projects, SE&I is
responsible for identifying the overall
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verification requirements and specific
system-level verification tests and simula-
tions, which frequently require specialized
facilities and significant amounts of system
hardware and software. Since these system-
level verification tests are frequently com-
plex and expensive, planning for them needs
to start very early in the program. The
system-level verification network is devel-
oped as an integral part of the program SE&I
logic networks and is baselined early in the
program.
Final verification of some system require-
ments can only be accomplished in the real
flight environment, _nd these are demon-
strated in early operations before final certi-
fication of system operational capability is
accomplished. It is also important to inte-
grate the system-level verification planning
and the operations planning to promote the
maximum synergism possible between sys-
tem verification and operational training.
In manned space programs, all of the
major system level verification tests have
been assigned to program or functional orga-
nizational elements other than SE&I for
implementation. This has helped to assure
that the management of SE&I can remain
objective in the evaluation of overall certifi-
cation adequacy.
DCR Process. One of the most signifi-
cant activities of SE&I its role in the certifi-
cation of the system design prior to the start
of the flight operations and then later, prior
to committing the system to operating
throughout the entire design envelope. SE&I
is instrumental in setting the overall re-
quirements for the DCR and is directly re-
sponsible for the system-level portion of the
review. This process becomes the final major
system characterization cycle, using a syn-
thesis of the as-built vehicle hardware and
software capabilities and results of tests and
analyses. DCR results also form the basis for
the system operational data books that are
used to plan and conduct the operational
phase of the program. The DCR requires that
all system requirements be evaluated
against all of the as-built system capabil-
ities, and where possible, the system mar-
gins are quantified to assist the operations
organization in planning and conducting
flight operations.
ICD Development. As the program
management organizational structure is
determined and responsibility for developing
hardware and software is delegated, it is nec-
essary to start the development of the
interface control document (ICD) tree, which
identifies each required ICD and the content
to be presented. As previously noted, the di-
vision of program activities to minimize the
number and complexity of interfaces has a
strong influence on the overall program cost
and the ability of the program to meet sched-
ules. The early development of strawman
ICD trees can greatly assist in optimizing
the overall program management structure.
As the program progresses and the system
configuration becomes better defined, the
content of each ICD is developed in more de-
tail and ICD working groups are formed to
quantify the environmental, physical, func-
tional and operational characteristics in
detail. In most manned programs, the ICDs
have been baselined at a relatively early
point in the program and have usually con-
tained a large number of TBDs (to be
determined). After baselining the ICDs,
working groups continue their work to arrive
at specific values for each of the TBDs and to
continually assess the adequacy of the ICDs
as the design matures.
The ICDs are primary documents at each
program review and provide a basis for eval-
uating the adequacy of the items being
reviewed to satisfactorily function as part of
the total system.
Program Management Organization-
al Structure. The efficiency of program
management is greatly influenced by the
organizational structure selected. Organi-
zational structures that are compact and
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simple promote effective program manage-
ment. Compactness is measured vertically
by the number of levels of the program man-
agement organization and horizontally by
the number of organizations at each level.
Each additional organizational element
significantly increases the manpower and
costs of achieving program integration, in-
cluding SE&I. If each organizational ele-
ment must interface with all others in the
program, the number of interfaces increases
rapidly as organizations are added. Adding
management levels increases the complexity
for delegating the execution of the program.
This factor was evident to the Augustine
Commission in their recent summary report
The Future of the U.S. Space Program, in
which they recommended that "multicenter
projects be avoided wherever possible, but
when this is not practical, a strong and inde-
pendent project office reporting to Headquar-
ters be established near the Center having
the principal share of the work for that
project; and that this project office have a
systems engineering staff and full budget
authority."
In addition to keeping the management
structure compact, it is also very important
to select an architecture that divides the
program into project offices, to enable simple
interfaces between projects and delegation
that is all-encompassing. All of the deliver-
able hardware assigned to a given project
should be the responsibility of that project to
design and manufacture. In all manned
programs prior to the Space Station, there
was little transfer of hardware and software
between projects--with one exception, that
being the development flight instrumenta-
tion in the Apollo program.
Early in Apollo, a decision was made to
establish a civil service project office to
develop, procure and deliver the specialized
development flight instrumentation to the
prime spacecrai_ contractors for installation
and integration in the early spacecraft.
Coordination of the large volume of interface
information required the development and
maintenance of the complex bilateral sched-
ules and support required. The complexity of
providing support after the transfer of the
instrumentation was a significant manage-
ment problem throughout the entire time
that the development flight instrument was
used. In the Space Station Freedom program,
considering the many hardware and soft-
ware items that must be passed between
work packages, it will be difficult to develop,
coordinate and maintain all of the interface
information required.
Objectivity In Management. To pro-
mote objectivity in managing SE&I, one of
the basic ground rules in the Shuttle pro-
gram was that the SE&I function would not
be responsible for the development of any
flight hardware or software products; thus,
they had no conflicting pressure to make
their development job easier at the expense
of another organization. It was found that
any bias, either perceived or real, immedi-
ately brings the objectivity of management
into question and rapidly destroys the confi-
dence between organizational elements.
Need for Good Communication. The
nature of SE&I is such that most of the pro-
gram elements and many other agency orga-
nizations are involved in the execution of
SE&I tasks. To facilitate accomplishment of
the work, the importance of free and open
communication cannot be overstressed. One
of the ways of accomplishing this is "to live
in a glass house." All decisions and, of equal
importance, the logic behind those decisions
must be communicated to all parties
involved if they are to understand their role
and how it fits into the overall picture. All
parties must feel that their inputs are in-
cluded in the decision-making process. This
openness, and the accompanying feeling of
vulnerability, is often not welcomed and
requires faith and confidence between the
organizations involved. The fact that mis-
takes will be made must be accepted, and all
organizations involved must constructively
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assist in correcting them. Frequent open
meetings of the ad hoc organizational ele-
ments described above have proven to be an
effective tool in developing rapport between
peers and communicating information and
decisions throughout the program structure.
As noted earlier, however, such meetings
become increasingly time-consuming and
expensive as the complexity of the organiza-
tional structure is increased.
Importance of Margins. At the time
programs are initiated, they are frequently
sold on the basis of optimistic estimates of
performance capability, cost and schedules.
This often results in reducing margins to low
levels at program initiation and solving
early program costs and schedule problems
by reducing weight, power and other re-
source margins. As a consequence, margins
are reduced to zero or negative values early
in the program, making it necessary to modi-
fy the program to either reduce requirements
or introduce program changes that will
reestablish positive margins. The recovery of
the margin inevitably leads to significantly
higher ultimate program costs in both
dollars and days. Minimum life cycle costs
are achieved by holding relatively large
margins early in the program and then
allowing them to be expended at a prudent
rate during the program life cycle.
THINGS THAT HAVE WORKED WELL
In the management of the manned space pro-
grams' SE&I activities, several approaches
have been particularly successful. Some of
the most important, have been discussed pre-
viously but are readdressed here because of
their assistance in the management of SE&I.
Ad hoc Organizations. The use of ad
hoc organizations to coordinate SE&I activi-
ties has proven to be a valuable tool. The
effectiveness of SE&I depends heavily on
good communications between organizations
and the assurance that all organizational
elements take a common approach to the
implementation of SE&I. This is difficult to
accomplish using the normal program office
organizations because they cannot directly
address inter-organizational communica-
tions and have difficulty managing across or-
ganizational lines. The ad hoc organizational
structure, on the other hand, is made up of
specialists from each of the affected organi-
zations, and their activities directly promote
inter-organizational communications. Using
this technique, technical peers can plan and
monitor the execution of specific SE&I ac-
tivities. When a resolution cannot be reached
within the ad hoc organization, the issue can
be referred to the proper program manage-
ment office for decision.
Standard Organization Structure
within the Program and Project Offices.
During the Apollo program, the program di-
rector decided to have all of the program
management offices at both Level II and
Level III adopt a standard organization
structure: five offices reported to the
program manager and the same five offices
reported to each project manager. This tech-
nique assured that the work breakdown
structure was similar for all offices, that
direct counterparts could be identified in
each of the offices, and that budget alloca-
tions flowed down in a uniform and predict-
able manner. All of these features resulted in
less cross-linking between organizations and
made the required program management
activity more rational and predictable.
Although the specific office structure chosen
would be different for each program, having
uniformity between the Level II and Level
III management offices should be considered
for future programs.
System Characterization Cycles. Con-
structing the SE&I plan and identifying the
required tasks is a very complex under-
taking in large programs. As previously
described, it is best to have a well-defined
core of activity that, when completed, will
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characterize the capability of the system to
meet the specified requirements. Analysis of
the results reveals deficiencies and allows
modifications to either the requirements or
the system design to be identified, thus as-
suring an adequate margin of performance.
Building on this core analysis cycle, it is rel-
atively easy to plan the other SE&I tasks in
a consistent manner, and create a complete
characterization of the system capability.
Matrix Management Organizational
Approach. The concept of staffing the
program management office with a small
number of people who serve as managers
only and then augmenting their capability
with personnel drawn from other Center or-
ganizations in a matrix fashion has signifi-
cant advantages. Manpower can be brought
in from the organizations only when it is
actually needed, and the technical composi-
tion can be changed over time to satisfy pro-
grammatic needs. The quantity of personnel
can be augmented to meet program needs,
i.e., during major program reviews; the per-
sonnel involved can be assured of a career
path in their parent organization; and the
individuals involved can continually replen-
ish their expertise by participating in the
R&D activities of their parent organization.
This mode of operation has been quite
successful and has demonstrated several
additional advantages, such as reducing fric-
tion and undesired competition between the
program office and Center functional organi-
zations, improving technical communica-
tions across programs being implemented
simultaneously, and providing an efficient
way of phasing the development program
into an operational role. In particular, the
assignment of program-level SE&I to a Lead
Center, coupled with the execution of this
assignment using Center functional organi-
zations in a matrix fashions, allows the pro-
gram to take advantage of both the quality
and quantity of technical expertise available
throughout the Center.
Use of a Prime Development Contrac-
tor to Provide SE&I Support. In the
Shuttle program, the SE&I support contrac-
tor was also the prime contractor for the de-
velopment of the Space Shuttle orbiter.
Although there was considerable concern
about the ability of the contractor to main-
tain objectivity in supporting SE&I, this con-
cern was reduced to an acceptable level by
separating the direction channels of the
development and integration activity both
within NASA and within the contractor's
organization. The support contract was also
set up with an award fee structure in which
SE&I was responsible for providing inputs
for the SE&I activities. There were many
advantages in this arrangement:
a) The integration personnel were familiar
with one of the major program elements
and did not need to become familiar with
that element or the general program
structure.
b) Technical experts could be made avail-
able for both activities as needed.
c) Many of the synthesis tools required by
both activities were similar, and fre-
quently one model could be used for both
purposes with only minor modifications.
d) Uniformity in approach assured ease of
comparison of results from both project-
level and program-level activities.
The management of SE&I in NASA man-
ned space programs has developed over the
last 30 years to satisfactorily integrate
relatively complex programs. Some of the
approaches and techniques described in this
paper may be helpful in integrating future
programs. Careful consideration of the
organizational structure and systems archi-
tecture at a start of a program has an
overriding effect on the effort required to
accomplish the SE&I activity.
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THE SE ROLE IN ESTABLISHING, VERYIFYING AND
CONTROLLINGTOP-LEVEL PROGRAM'REQUIREMENTS
by Charles W. Mathews p _ /0
People working in the field of systems engi-
neering have differing views as to the range
and depth of this subject. Without venturing
into the controversial arena of specific defini-
tions, I will assert that systems engineering
has much to do with the definition, evalua-
tion and control of the technical effort aimed
at achieving the objectives of a program.
Efforts in the field of systems engineering
may in fact go well beyond purely technical
considerations, e.g., when cost or political
considerations impact the technical ap-
proach to a program. In this context, the
systems engineering process must function
to maximize the probability that a program's
technical requirements can be met while at
the same time recognizing and including
other program factors and constraints. New
constraints as well as technical problems can
be encountered at all stages of a program,
often necessitating some adjustment to the
program objectives and requirements. Such
activities are part of the systems engineer-
ing process, which must begin immediately
at the start of a program and continue
throughout the life of the program.
Sometimes a program manager will con-
centrate on insuring that hardware elements
perform well and all play well together,
assuming that this alone will enable the
program requirements to be met. Then on
entering the operational phase, while the
system may indeed perform, it may not do
what was intended. This situation frequent-
ly occurs because many engineers, scientists,
managers, and yes, even administrators tend
to be intrigued by and want to concentrate
on configuration selection and design prob-
lems. It is the responsibility of the top-level
systems engineering professionals to be the
conscience of all participants in making sure
that program requirements are met or prop-
erly adjusted.
The need is to focus on program require-
ments during all phases and facets of a
program, e.g. definition, development, man-
ufacturing, testing, operations, growth and,
most important, effective use or mission
accomplishment. The effort just described in-
volves the entire systems engineering task;
however, the main emphasis of this paper is
the interaction of the systems engineering
process with the top-level program require-
ments. This aspect of systems engineering is
often given inadequate attention during
certain phases of a program. This paper will
endeavor to answer such questions as:
What is meant by top-level program re-
quirements, and who generates them?
How are these requirements validated,
altered, and controlled by the systems engi-
neering process?
What capabilities are needed to accom-
plish such efforts effectively?
WHAT ARE TOP-LEVEL PROGRAM
REQUIREMENTS?
Top-level program requirements are directly
related to program objectives or systems uses
determined and stated early during the
program definition. Probably the most re-
membered program objective of the past was
to "land men on the moon and return them
safely to Earth." The program requirements
that emerged from early studies included,
among others, one to two-week mission dura-
tions, lunar landing, extravehicular activi-
ties, launch from a remote site, rendezvous,
and reentry from near escape velocity, all of
which had never been accomplished at the
time of President Kennedy's statement.
These requirements in turn highlighted
the need to define and validate specific
technical approaches--redundancy concepts,
simple system interfaces, new technology
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requirements (e.g., fuel cells), operational
demonstrations such as Gemini, entirely
new configurations such as the LM, and the
nature of the flight program buildup. Inci-
dentally, many of the program requirements
for Apollo determined the mission objectives
for the earlier Gemini program. In any
event, program requirements must be estab-
lished early and stated distinctly so that all
necessary steps for meeting and validating
them can be determined. This effort is a fun-
damental systems engineering function.
Types of Program Objectives and
Requirements
The program objectives and requirements
described in the preceding paragraphs em-
phasize mission demonstrations. Obtaining
desired science or applications information is
another type of program objective. The pro-
gram requirements then state the need for
specific data, usually specifying a particular
instrument or instrument set; the operating
conditions under which the data is to be ob-
tained (e.g., orbit altitude, field of view, and
pointing accuracy); and the data handling
and use. Conversely, a new instrument may
be conceived or created with the program ob-
jective to establish its use potential. The
Multispectral Scanner employed in the
Landsat program is an example.
Another space program category includes
service functions such as Earth-to-orbit
transportation or a space laboratory. In the
first case, the program objective might be
economical and an easy access to the space
environment for the using community. Pro-
gram requirements then include such pa-
rameters as dollars per pound to orbit,
launch frequency and payload integration
lead times. Conversely, in this case, the
program objectives might also be stated in
terms of capability demonstrations such as
the reentry of a winged spacecraft, ground
landing and reusability. The program
requirements then are related to system
performance in accomplishing these mission
and configuration demonstrations.
It is important to firmly establish which
of the above two categories reflect the real
program objectives because a capability
demonstration has a higher potential for suc-
cess than a tightly specified use commit-
ment. The systems engineering organization
should be providing top-level program man-
agement with the information to make such
determinations. The program objectives may
vary during program implementation be-
cause of early "selling" pressures or because
of unforeseen technical problems When this
happens, the systems engineering organiza-
tion should provide concrete evidence to
management so that a strategy can be devel-
oped to properly inform the outside world,
e.g., Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), Congressional committees and the
media; if the outside elements are not made
to understand and accept such changes in a
timely way, support can be alienated,
placing extreme pressure on the program.
Establishing Priorities
When a large number of objectives and asso-
ciated requirements are included in a given
program, an additional complication occurs.
Several past programs qualify including pro-
grams as early as Gemini and space station
programs such as Skylab. Even Apollo, with
its simply stated mission objective, had
many secondary objectives associated with
lunar exploration and lunar science. It is
very important to establish priorities with-
out precluding the accomplishment of objec-
tives of lower priority. For example, the two
top priorities in the Gemini program were
demonstration of long duration flight and
rendezvous, but large quick-opening hatches
were incorporated to accommodate extrave-
hicular activities (EVA) and the spacecraft
structure was designed to permit the firing
of a large propulsive stage once docked to it.
Most of these secondary objectives were
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accomplished. In fact, because of the way the
actual flight program developed, EVA was
one of the first accomplishments. The secon-
dary program objectives also afforded some
flexibility; the paraglider system planned for
use in ground landing, for example, was
dropped from Gemini in order to meet cost
and schedule objectives.
To summarize what has been stated thus
far, a number of classes of top-level program
requirements exist. They can be associated
with mission objectives, scientific investiga-
tions or space services, among others. In
addition, different ways of looking at top-
level program requirements include demon-
strations as compared with tightly specified
commitments. Many programs have multi-
ple requirements. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to 'zero in' on these requirements early
in the systems engineering process, i.e.,
during Phase A. Most important, they must
combine to realistically meet the stated
objectives of the program; they must be
prioritized when necessary; and they must
be clearly stated and documented in the
Program Requirements Document.
These requirements may have to be
changed, adjusted or reprioritized as the
program proceeds, and any changes must be
carefully controlled and formally approved
at the top level of the program throughout its
life. If program objectives are affected, a
decision by the administrator is required (at
least for medium-to-large programs). The
outside world needs to be kept abreast of
significant changes in objectives or top-level
requirements so that no sudden surprises
occur that affect support.
The systems engineering function should
provide the initial evaluation and validation
of the top-level program requirements and
should continue to evaluate proposals or
events that would produce any change. The
effort should occur at the top level of a dis-
tributed systems engineering function and
guide upper level program management and
the administrator.
WHO GENERATES TOP-LEVEL PROGRAM
REQUIREMENTS?
A program objective can be conceived and
stated initially by almost anyone working at
any level, from the President, as in Apollo, to
others on down. If considered seriously, such
an objective is studied to determine its valid-
ity, practicality and usefulness. Sometimes
it takes a short time to obtain a go-ahead;
sometimes it takes many years, as on the
Space Station. One of the fallouts of these
efforts should be a clear statement of top-
level program requirements.
The involvement of the right people in
the generation of top-level program require-
ments is extremely important. Depending on
the nature of the program, this involvement
can include customers, users, operators and,
of course, designers and developers. Program
managers and directors, however, should
guard against limiting involvement in this
activity to just the latter two. Systems engi-
neering, should be involved early to assure a
reasoned and logical approach to the genera-
tion and iteration of program requirements.
In the space science and applications
arenas, program requirements are frequent-
ly generated by a process that begins with a
program objective or a flight system capabil-
ity being stated in an "Announcement of
Flight Opportunity." Investigators are then
selected through evaluation of the responses
obtained. The experiments selected deter-
mine the actual requirements of the flight
program. Other inputs are often required, as
adjustments may be needed in consideration
of technical limitations or program costs, for
example. The analysis and resulting output
of the systems engineering group usually
gives rise to an iteration of the program
requirements, which again involves the sci-
ence team. Frequently, a selected proposal
provides for excellent science but does not
deal adequately with other constraining
technical considerations and the cost impli-
cations associated with the overall effort.
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Hierarchical Consideration in
Requirements Generation
In all classes of space flight programs, the
systems engineering organization should
work closely with groups having expertise in
and cognizance over program requirements.
In Apollo, because the primary program
objective was oriented to the accomplish-
ment of a specific mission demonstration,
operational personnel--particularly those
involved in flight operations--tended to be
near the top of the program requirements
hierarchy. Even though science re-
quirements existed and science teams and
advisory committees were active, the science
requirements were of lower priority, at least
until after the first lunar landing was accom-
plished. In contrast, a program such as
Skylab always included the solar scientists
and Earth resources investigators, among
others, at the top of the requirements hierar-
chy, even though the engineering and
operations personnel may have been
somewhat confused by this arrangement.
The Space Shuttle involves still another
situation. The operations groups can be per-
ceived to be the customers for the system,
but the real users at the top of the hierarchy
are the scientists, commercial firms, indus-
trial experimenters and NASA engineers
who provide the payloads that fly on the
Space Shuttle or conduct related experi-
ments or other use functions. This is similar
to the relationship between passengers and
shippers, the airlines, and the commercial
airplane developer in the air transport
industry. In addition to general operating ef-
ficiency, consideration must be given to user
accommodation from the start. Such needs
are now quite successfully accomplished in
commercial aviation. Naturally, expecta-
tions are less in the case of the Space Shuttle
because of its experimental nature, but it is
fair to say that user accommodation has not
been accomplished to the degree desired.
The foregoing discussion is not meant to
imply that successful hardware design,
development and systems integration is not
an important facet of systems engineering.
There are instances where these consider-
ations are at the top of the requirements
hierarchy. An instrument demonstration
such as the Multispectral Scanner is one case
in point, and the Advanced Communications
Technology Satellite (ACTS) is another tech-
nology demonstration of this type. In most
respects, the research airplanes such as the
X-1 and X-15 fit into this category. However,
this case does not fit the situations occurring
in most NASA programs. It is therefore criti-
cal for top-level program management to
examine its program, determine who the
main contributors or generators of the pro-
gram requirements are, and assure that they
are interfacing adequately with the systems
engineering function. This need exists at the
outset of the program but should continue
through the design and development phases,
for as hardware and software systems prob-
lems are encountered, the tendency is to
focus on them, and top-level program re-
quirements can be altered or even disappear
without due consideration.
WHO VALIDATES TOP-LEVEL PROGRAM
REQUIREMENTS?
Activities that validate top-level program
requirements are mostly of a systems en-
gineering nature. This validation, is an
important, though small, part of the total
systems engineering job. In total, systems
engineering, particularly during design and
development, is a distributed activity. Space-
craft hardware systems such as electrical
power, attitude control and communications
all have to be systems engineered. Total
systems elements (e.g., a launch vehicle
stage, a checkout facility, a launch complex
and a flight control center) all have to be sys-
tems engineered to correctly perform their
functions. In the end, all elements involved
in a program--the total flight system, the
operational support facilities, the mission
planning, and the user integration, among
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others--need to be brought together in a
timely fashion to meet the program objec-
tives and requirements. An effort of this na-
ture, even for a very modest program, is too
complex to be handled in a purely top-down
fashion. The cardinal rule is that all the in-
terfaces at any particular level, both hori-
zontally and vertically, should be as clean
and simple as is practical.
Validation Efforts During Program
Definition
At the start of program evolution, practically
all of the mainstream effort is of a systems
engineering character and is more top-down
than later in the program. The validation
effort begins in pre-Phase A, where options
are examined for meeting the program objec-
tives as well as certain initially stated pro-
gram requirements. These requirements
should endeavor to incorporate most of the
major program factors but are usually gener-
al and often are quite optimistic. All aspects
of the technical and programmatic approach
should be studied. Although effort is limited
in this phase, a determined attempt must be
made to establish and to ascertain the feasi-
bility of meeting the program requirements.
This work should usually be accomplished by
a team working at a single location,
although supporting effort and information
can be obtained from groups in other loca-
tions. There have been cases where alterna-
tive approaches are studied by separate
teams, which has proved to be effective in
some pre-Phase A efforts. In all likelihood,
the program requirements will be changed
and expanded to account for such factors as
technology readiness, knowledge of the
operating environment, mission complexity
and similar factors. A need for additional
technology development or operational
verifications may be identified as well. Any
pre-Phase A study that is completed with
everything looking rosy should be viewed
with caution.
Phase A efforts are aimed at selecting
and analyzing a single programmatic and
technical approach, at least in theory, to best
meet the requirements of the program.
Again, the Phase A activity is chiefly a sys-
tems engineering effort usually conducted by
a single team at a single location. If a work
breakdown structure with clear interfaces
can be established at this time, then systems
engineering at multiple locations may be
possible. In any case, the group that worked
during the pre-Phase A study needs to be
augmented considerably, and the support of
one or more contractors is frequently
obtained.
In this phase, emphasis should be placed
not only on hardware but on validating the
mission design and other operational or use
aspects of the program. This emphasis is par-
ticularly important where the operational
life of the program is envisioned to be very
long, e.g., Space Shuttle, Hubble Telescope,
Space Station and the Earth Observing
System (EOS). It is important to clearly
establish what is required in the operational
phase and to establish with adequate confi-
dence the feasibility of accomplishing the
programs with realistic operational costs
and schedules.
At the time the program enters Phase B,
a complete work breakdown structure should
be established, including all facets of the pro-
gram with simple and clear interfaces and as
little overlap as possible. Program work
assignments will be made. For moderate to
large programs, these assignments may
involve program groups at different geo-
graphic locations, including parts of the total
systems engineering effort. The top-level
program requirements should have been
established in adequate detail, and each
program organizational element should
regard these requirements as program con-
straints.
The program requirements or even the
objectives can be changed because of unfore-
seen events or other activities occurring
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throughout the course of the program, but
they should be subject to formal change
control. Obviously this particular change
control activity deals with top-level program
requirements and must occur at the highest
level in the program; in certain cases, the
administrator should be informed of an
impending change and must be informed
when program objectives are significantly
impacted.
Validation Efforts During Design,
Development and Operations
Although the top-level systems engineering
effort in the definition phases of a program is
important, this function is critically impor-
tant in Phases C/D, the design and develop-
ment phases. It is during this time that most
of the technical difficulties and other pro-
gram limitations surface. There is a strong
tendency to focus on the flight hardware and
to get it delivered and flying. These situa-
tions sometimes allow the top-level require-
ments to "fall through the cracks," later
producing surprises, embarrassments and
undue pressures, which can contribute to the
potential for accidents and failures in the
operational phase.
Systems engineering must continue
throughout the operational phases of a pro-
gram. Although the character of the top-
level activities change, there still is a need to
deal with program requirements and their
alteration. Some of the possible subjects are
the rate and nature of the flight program
buildup, working around performance
deficiencies or failures, and adjustments to
mission objectives. On the positive side, the
top-level systems engineering in the oper-
ational phase involves the incorporation of
new system capabilities and mission exten-
sions, including the development and control
of the associated program requirements.
Support to the activities just described is
accomplished by a systems engineering
group also operating at the highest level in
the program's organizational structure. This
group is the guardian and conscience of the
top-level program requirements but by no
means includes the total systems engineer-
ing effort. The group should be composed of
engineering personnel, each of whom has
considerable technical experience in one or
more of the applicable areas and possesses a
natural talent and desire to deal with all
aspects of the program. The individuals
should be selected so the group encompasses
as many of the technical, scientific and
programmatic disciplines involved in the
program as possible, but the group does not
have to be large. By selecting people with the
right backgrounds and talents, the work can
be done in part by obtaining information
from other elements of the program--in
particular, other systems engineering
groups.
HOW ARE TOP-LEVEL PROGRAM
REQUIREMENTS CONTROLLED?
Control of top-level program requirements is
extremely critical to program success. This is
not to say that such requirements cannot be
changed. Almost without exception changes
will occur, but they must be carefully
controlled by a well-defined process that es-
tablishes the change impact on the program,
particularly its objectives. This process also
must inform program participants inside
and outside the program organizational
structure, including those having responsi-
bilities or scrutiny from above.
The program director is the individual
who is personally responsible for the integri-
ty and control of the top-level program
requirements. As such, the program director
must assure that a Program Requirements
Document is produced during Phase A and
that it is properly updated immediately
following a change. This effort is supported
mainly by the program director's systems
engineering group described in previous sec-
tions. This group is responsible for analyzing
any proposed change that could potentially
impact the top-level program requirements.
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The analysis can be done by the group itself
or by support groups, including contractors.
The analysis must specifically include in
writing how the affected requirement(s)
would be changed and the determination of
other impacts such as cost or schedule, which
could be either positive or negative.
Change Control of Program
Requirements
Change proposals are brought before a
standing committee, usually called a change
board, selected by the program director.
There will be other change boards through-
out the program, but this one should deal
only with top-level program requirements.
Anyone who proposes a legitimate change in
the program requirements should be able to
come before this board. In general, individu-
als who have a significant input should also
be invited. The proposed change is usually
presented by its sponsor and is followed by a
presentation of the analysis of the systems
engineering group. Following discussion, the
program director makes the disposition,
which can include acceptance, rejection, or a
requirement for further analyses or informa-
tion. Following an acceptance, the Program
Requirements Document should be changed
immediately. Regardless of the nature of the
decision, the affected elements of the pro-
gram organization need to be informed im-
mediately. Affected elements outside the
program should also be informed in a timely
manner but only after an appropriate strate-
gy is developed.
One of the chief difficulties associated
with this change control activity is that
events that impact the top-level program re-
quirements can occur at any place, at any
time and at any level in the program, and
there is a natural tendency to try to fix a
problem at its source without passing on
information. Several things can be done to
alleviate this difficulty as it relates to the
activities of the top-level systems engineer-
ing group. Individuals in the group must
attend design reviews and other program
reviews associated with all the program ele-
ments. They must be able to have free infor-
mation exchange with other program and
project personnel and to accompany them on
visits to contractors when the occasion
demands. These activities are best accom-
plished if the group and its members operate
with a low profile. They should not give or
imply directions or conclusions in discus-
sions with program and project people. All
direction as a result of their work should
come from the program director. Naturally,
these individuals must be able to request
and analyze program documentation, but all
such activities should be done in a way to
maintain good rapport with other groups
working in the program.
TOP-LEVEL PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS IN
PREVIOUS PROGRAMS
In general, most of NASA's past major pro-
grams have successfully met their program
objectives and must have fulfilled their pro-
gram requirements. Some brief observations
of the results obtained during some of the
previous manned programs may provide use-
ful insight into future programs. Although
the very early programs were not explicitly
divided into program phases, in retrospect, it
is possible to discuss them within a phased
context.
The Mercury Program
The Mercury program objective was to place
a manned spacecraft in orbit around Earth
and return safely. In pre-Phase A, several
winged (lifting) configurations were studied
as well as the so-called "capsule." The cap-
sule was selected on the basis of greater
technical simplicity and limitations on
launch vehicle payload capability. In Phase
A, in addition to developing the spacecraft
systems specifications, safety requirements
were emphasized, including the proper posi-
tioning and support of the crew to handle
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launch and reentry accelerations, which
were demonstrated on a centrifuge; the con-
cept of a system to escape from the launch
vehicle if necessary; and the layout of a
worldwide tracking and monitoring network.
In Phase B, a full-scale demonstration of the
reentry heat protection system was conduct-
ed, and the results produced minor design
changes. The concepts of flight control and
recovery were evolved, including a mission
control center and flight controller deploy-
ment to remote sites, worldwide communica-
tion for near real-time surveillance of the
missions, and recovery procedures involving
ship deployment.
The spacecraft configuration and specifi-
cations proved to be satisfactory although
considerable development problems were
encountered. The biggest systems engineer-
ing problem was associated with the lack of
appreciation of the difficulties in conducting
factory and preflight checkout. The checkout
required more or less continuous human
presence in the extremely confining interior
of the spacecraft, producing wire breakage
and other damage. These conditions were
severe enough to curtail the flight program,
although six manned flights were made,
building up to a duration of approximately
one day in orbit.
The Gemini Program
The pre-Phase A activity concentrated large-
ly on correcting some of the basic problems
encountered in Mercury, i.e., a Gemini
spacecraft design that had most of the equip-
ment outside the pressure vessel and was
also checkable from the outside, allowing a
relatively clear cockpit area. The spacecraft
was enlarged to provide for a two-man crew,
but the basic external configuration and heat
protection system of the Mercury spacecraft
was retained.
Most of the Phase A activity involved
defining the mission objectives, in support of
Apollo, and the related program require-
ments associated with rendezvous and long
duration flight, e.g., the Atlas-Agena target
vehicle, orbit maneuvering system, rendez-
vous radar, fuel cells, and the cryogenic
storage of hydrogen and oxygen in a super-
critical state. Again, considerable develop-
ment problems emerged, largely associated
with the newer systems, such as ablative
thrusters and fuel cells. Problems were also
encountered in the flight program. The ini-
tial rendezvous exercise revealed inadequate
attention to mission design, which was later
corrected, and several classes of rendezvous
were successfully demonstrated. The extra-
vehicular activities revealed deficiencies in
training, and neutral buoyancy simulation
was introduced late in the program.
One significant systems engineering
achievement emphasized the checkout
systems and checkout procedures, and the
delivery of flight ready spacecraft. To gain
confidence, many of the checkout personnel
at the Cape were sent on temporary duty
(TDY) to the factory to participate in the
factory checkout of the early spacecraft. This
approach allowed the ten manned flights to
take place on about two-month cycles and
contributed immensely to the on-time
launches required for rendezvous.
The Apollo Program
The Apollo Program was characterized by a
disjointed definition program. Because of the
obvious schedule pressures, certain contracts
involving Phase B-type effort were let before
either the mission design or the lunar
landing mode had been selected. For exam-
ple, the command and service module con-
tract was awarded while questions about the
use of Earth orbit rendezvous, lunar orbit
rendezvous, and the so-called direct ascent
were still being debated. Sufficient pre-
Phase A effort was completed to enable a
decision to go with the lunar orbit rendez-
vous route in the spring of 1962, but the
Phase A work on the lunar module, even
when accomplished in-house on a highly ac-
celerated schedule, did not allow the lunar
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module contractor to be selected until nearly
a year after the selection of the command
and service module contractor. This situa-
tion proved to be very distracting to the
latter and resulted in major inefficiencies in
the contracted effort caused by premature
work force buildup.
What saved the situation was the main-
tenance of simple interfaces between the two
spacecraft. In fact, not much more than a
docking interface existed; however, there
was also an important structural interface
recalling that service module propulsion was
used to place the docked configuration in
lunar orbit. No support was required be-
tween the two spacecraft except status moni-
toring, and no commonality of systems was
specified, although by some rationales, this
approach appears inefficient. The simple
system organizational and programmatic
interfaces obtained greatly benefited the
program. It was also the approach taken in
connection with other elements of Apollo.
The operational phase of the Apollo pro-
gram provides good illustrations of systems
capability extension and mission extensions.
The major extensions to the lunar surface
stay-time of the lunar module is an example.
The decision to accomplish this was made
about the time of the first lunar landing, and
a Headquarters systems engineering group
provided the impetus for the validation. An-
other capability extension was the addition
of the lunar rover contract, awarded about
six years after the Apollo start but before the
first lunar landing. Both these added capa-
bilities greatly enhanced the lunar surface
science and exploration aspects of the Apollo
program.
The Skylab Program
The definition activities of the program that
ultimately became Skylab proceeded in what
must be described as a highly confused state;
most of the program objectives and user-
oriented program requirements, however,
remained stable for the entire duration of the
program. The program first known as Apollo
Applications started out as a series of single-
mission flights involving a larger number of
scientific and technical experiments. This
program concept was the basis for approval
in the President's budget for FY 1968. About
the same time, a command decision was
made to incorporate these experiments in a
concept known as the "wet workshop," in
which a spent upper stage of the Saturn V
would be left in orbit, purged, occupied and
outfitted to perform the experiments. Many
believed the concept could not work, but the
program proceeded to preliminary design
and, in many cases, detailed design. In the
spring of 1969, a decision was made to go to a
"dry workshop" wherein all the flight hard-
ware elements would be assembled and
checked out on the ground and launched us-
ing the first two stages of the Saturn V as the.
launch vehicle. It took another four years of
design and development to bring the pro-
gram to flight readiness. The flight program
was quite successful in the accomplishment
of the many experiments. The data obtained
from a large solar telescope, for example, the
Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM), was regard-
ed as outstanding by the scientists involved.
This capability was included in the earliest
program requirements.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has endeavored to highlight the
importance of generating top-level program
requirements at an early stage in the pro-
gram evolution or Phase A definition phase.
These requirements should include all the
factors involved in meeting the program-
objective(s) and should be stated with clarity
so a determination can be made as to wheth-
er they can or are being met. Depending on
the nature of the program, these require-
ments can relate to uses of a capability, a
mission objective or other factors, including
a simple hardware demonstration such as a
test of a new instrument. It is critical to
understand whether specific performance
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requirements are to be met or only a demon-
stration of capability is entailed, for the
latter provides more flexibilityfor program
adjustments.
The establishment of program require-
ments usually requires input and involve-
ment of people both inside and outside of the
program organization. Determination ofjust
what disciplinesare involved is important,
particularly forthe users and operators.
Validation of the top-level program
requirements isa systems engineering func-
tion.At the outset,the systems engineering
organization works with entitiesresponsible
for generating the requirements in an
iterative process to assure their validity.
This activitycontinues throughout the lifeof
the program because of unforeseen events
that impact the program effort.At times,
this will necessitate changes to top-level
program requirements. Changes should be
under formal change control, and the sys-
tems engineering organization operating at
the top of the program organization struc-
ture should be responsible for the validation
effort. Systems engineering is a program-
distributed activity that allows the top-level
systems engineering organization to be rela-
tively small because it depends on others for
most of the required analysis. It should oper-
ate with a low profile.
Past programs serve to illustrate the
range of program requirements consider-
ations and the associated systems engineer-
ing effort. In the early manned programs,
safety was a dominant consideration. Exper-
ience in these programs showed that
preflight checkout is an important consider-
ation, as is mission design, training, and
simulation, all of which can impact the hard-
ware design.
The top-level program requirements and
the associated systems engineering activi-
ties should obtain and maintain simple
interfaces between program elements, even
though this produces some apparent pro-
gram inefficiency. At least one past program,
Skylab, has shown that top-level program
requirements can be maintained even when
considerable fluxing occurs with regard to
the hardware and mission design.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF COST CONSIDERATIONS IN THE
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS
by John D. Hodge ¢_ _-" / /
One of the most vexing aspects of managing
large programs within NASA (or any other
high technology government programs) is
how to allocate program funds in a way that
is best for the program. One of the major
reasons is that the role of cost changes
throughout the phases of the program. An-
other reason is that total cost is not all that
easy to define; yet another is that funding,
which is based on annual appropriations, is
almost never consistent with fiscally effi-
cient program spending rates. The net result
is that program costs almost always escalate
and inordinate amounts of time are spent
controlling costs at the expense of maintain-
ing performance or schedule.
Many studies have been performed to try
and understand this problem. They show
that program costs will escalate by at least a
factor of three, from approval to completion.
The studies suggest a number of guidelines
that should be followed if costs are to be kept
down, including clear definition of require-
ments, stable management and strong cen-
tral control. Unfortunately, these factors are
not always under the control of the program
manager.
This paper examines the question of cost,
from the birth of a program to its conclusion,
particularly from the point of view of large
multi-center programs, and suggests how to
avoid some of the traps and pitfalls. Empha-
sis is given to cost in the systems engineer-
ing process, but there is an inevitable
overlap with program management. (These
terms, systems engineering and program
management, have never been clearly de-
fined.) In these days of vast Federal budget
deficits and increasing overseas competition,
it is imperative that we get more for each
research and development dollar. This is the
only way we will retain our leadership in
high technology and, in the long run, our
way of life.
BASIC PRINCIPLES
The principles are simple. First, define very
carefully what it is you are trying to do.
Check everything you do against that base-
line, even if it has to be changed, and resist
change once the decisions have been made.
Second, break up the program into manage-
ably sized chunks of deliverables that can be
measured in terms of cost, schedule and per-
formance, and define the interfaces between
the chunks. Third, continuously assess the
risks to success as the program proceeds, and
modify only as necessary.
REQUIREMENTS TRACEABILITY
Most studies have shown that the primary
reason for cost escalation is that not enough
time or resources are spent in defining the
program. It is clear that you cannot control
what you have not or cannot define. It is dur-
ing this period that some of the most elegant
systems engineering should be performed,
especially in understanding the cost of every
requirement and its systems implication.
Even if the definition is adequate during the
early phases of the program, it is imperative
that great vigilance be exercised in main-
taining the baseline definition of the pro-
gram and the fundamental reasons for doing
the program. This process establishes a
small but influential part of the program
office, preferably within the systems engi-
neering organization, dedicated to the trace-
ability of requirements and to ensuring that
a clear path exists from program rationale to
program requirements to systems require-
ments to systems design. Too often, once a
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design has been established, changes are
proposed and enacted that bear little rela-
tionship to the original premises of the
program. As will be discussed later in this
paper, there are many reasons for change,
but where possible, changes should be con-
sidered during the formulation of the pro-
gram and not later when the program struc-
ture is in place and the program is in
progress. Change is almost always costly;
requirements traceability provides a bul-
wark against which the program manager
and the systems engineer can stand and
defend.
BASELINE COST, SCHEDULE AND
PERFORMANCE
The three main parameters in the control
process--cost, schedule and performance--
are the program manager's bread and butter.
Again, program definition is vital and neces-
sary from the very beginning. It may be
argued that clear definition is not possible,
particularly early in the program; never-
theless, an approved, traceable baseline, al-
though it may alter, must be known at any
given time, and must include everything in
the program. The "I forgots" can kill you.
The key to success in handling these
three parameters is to manage the balancing
act between them. Cost, schedule and perfor-
mance are usually dependent variables and
at various times, one or another may assume
greater or lesser importance. A single vari-
able, however, should never be changed
without knowing the impact on the other
two. Within the NASA culture, performance
is generally the predominant factor, and
schedule is a distant second. Cost tends to be
considered mostly in the context of the annu-
al appropriation, but from the point of view
of the program manager, all three param-
eters must be defined and approved continu-
ously, which is a function of the systems
engineering process.
PROGRAM RISK ANALYSIS
In recent years, especially since the Chal-
lenger accident, program risk analysis has
come to be used largely in the context of crew
safety, but this is only a part of program risk.
Basically, program risk analysis assesses the
probability of meeting requirements as
changes occur. A number of analytical tools
now available can be used to understand the
relationships between cost, performance and
schedule. Again, a small group within the
systems engineering organization should be
dedicated to understanding the impact of
any change on all three parameters. Armed
with this information, risk can be reduced in
many ways. Adding more money, reducing
the performance requirements, or extending
the schedule are most often used. A compe-
tent systems engineer will know the rela-
tionships between these three variables and
the impact of any situation on the total pro-
gram.
THE ROLE OF COST IN PHASED
PROCUREMENT
The most common form of procuring high
technology capability within the Federal
Government is known as phased procure-
ment. The theory behind this procurement
method is that commitment to the program
gradually increases with time and in dis-
crete stages. Within NASA, there are four
standard phases; others are beginning to
creep in as the ability to establish new pro-
grams becomes more difficult and the dura-
tion and cost of operations becomes a more
significant part of total program costs. The
role of cost is different in each of the phases.
The phases are:
Pre-phase A" This is a very unstruc-
tured period that examines new ideas,
usually without central control and mostly
oriented toward small studies. This period
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can last for a decade or more and produces
the list of ideas and alternatives from which
new programs are selected.
Phase A" Sometimes called the feasibil-
ity phase, this is a structured version of the
previous phase. Usually a task force or pro-
gram office is established, and multiple con-
tracts will be awarded. The goal of this
phase, which may last for several years but
usually is limited to one or two years, is to
decide whether a new program will be start-
ed and what its purpose and content should
be. This phase represents less than one per-
cent of the total program costs. Nevertheless,
it is largely a systems engineering effort and
sets the stage for everything that follows.
Phase B: Sometimes known as program
definition, this phase is the most important
in establishing the basic parameters of the
program. By the time this phase is finished
(a period of two or three years), the program
rationale, cost, schedule, performance, man-
agement style and the most likely technical
solution will have been established. This
phase usually involves multiple contracts to
establish a variety of ideas and a competitive
environment, should the program proceed.
Cost is continuously assessed as a function of
design solutions relative to basic require-
ments. Studies indicate that from five per-
cent to ten percent of the total program costs
will need to be expended if control is to be
maintained over the program during Phases
C and D.
Phase C/D" Originally separate phases,
this period covers design, development, test
and evaluation. Contracts may be open to all
qualified bidders or only to those involved in
the previous phase. Although competition is
not usually open between Phases C and D,
commitment to Phase D depends on a suc-
cessful and acceptable design. In past pro-
grams, two-thirds of the total program cost
was expended during this period. The sys-
tems engineering role has begun to shift
toward systems specification and systems in-
terfaces. The secret to cost control is a sound
definition of end items and their interfaces
with a tight hold on changes.
Phase E" In most past programs, the op-
erations costs were less than 20 percent of
the total cost. This was because there was a
definite end to a relatively short-term pro-
gram. In recent years, particularly in the
manned programs, the length of the oper-
ational phase has increased significantly. In
the case of the Shuttle, it could be conceived
as indefinitely long. For this reason, life cy-
cle costs should be a major consideration
from the beginning.
SELLING THE PROGRAM
The definition of a new start within NASA
varies by program and organization but can
generally be said to occur at the beginning of
Phase B. Prior to that time, the program
manager is selling the program. The total
expenditure of funds during the selling peri-
od is usually far less than one percent of the
final program costs; this is, however, when
the basic parameters of the program are es-
tablished. It is a time of building constitu-
ents both inside and outside the Agency.
Assuming that a feasible technical solution
is available and an acceptable management
scheme can be provided, much of the debate
about whether a program should be approved
centers largely around the question of cost.
Of course, with only preliminary designs
available, only cost estimates can be made
and these are obtained from standard cost
models.
COST ESTIMATING
During Phase A of the program, when the
most rudimentary designs are available, it is
essential that program cost estimates are
made before the program start can be autho-
rized. Estimates are made using cost models
that have been developed on the basis of past
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experience on similar programs. These
models are among the most arcane devices
invented by engineers, so a few words on how
they work are appropriate.
Past experience is captured by document-
ing the cost of each system on the basis of
weight. Regression analysis is performed to
determine a straight line log relationship.
Once the weight of the system has been esti-
mated, the cost can be determined. This esti-
mate is multiplied by a complexity factor to
allow f_r the risk associated with the select-
ed technology and may vary from as little as
0.50 to 2 or more. This is repeated for each
system, and the total becomes the baseline
cost. This total is multiplied by a factor to
allow for systems engineering and testing by
the prime contractor. This is known as the
"prime wrap" factor and is again determined
based on all relevant past experience. All
prime contractor estimates are added and
then multiplied by a second factor known as
the "nonprime wrap." This is the cost of gov-
ernment work. Finally, a reserve factor is
used to allow for problems during the pro-
gram. There are separate cost models for
manned and unmanned programs, which are
significantly different. In general, for the un-
manned programs, about 40 cents of every
dollar goes to hardware, and in the manned
programs, about 20 cents.
These cost models pose a great many
problems. First, they are normalized on the
basis of weight. Clearly this is not valid in
all cases, particularly structure. Second,
they do not explain why the costs are what
they are. Factors such as management style,
procurement strategy and test philosophy
are not differentiated. Third, they include all
past experience, including errors and over-
runs. In this respect, these cost models
assume no learning curve. As it was in the
beginning, is now, and forever shall be! They
must therefore be used with great caution.
From the systems engineer's point of view,
these cost models can be used to assess the
relative costs of various design solutions; on
a_ absolute basis, however, they are of little
So far we have been able to make a tenta-
tive estimate of the cost of the flight system.
To this must be added the cost of new facili-
ties, including launch, test beds, flight oper-
ations, networks and data reduction, among
other factors, and finally the cost of oper-
ations.
It is at this point that the program man-
ager faces the first dilemma: What should be
included in the program cost? That sounds
like a simple question, but it is complicated
by the fact that not all costs are under the
control of the program manager nor is he or
she responsible for justifying all of the asso-
ciated appropriations. For example, launch
costs are provided by the Office of Space
Flight, network costs are provided by the Of-
fice of Operations, and civil service costs are
provided by the research and program man-
agement fund managed by the Office of the
Comptroller. New buildings are provided un-
der the construction of facilities budget. In
addition, most new program managers are
surprised to find that a tax based on the
number of civil servants working on the pro-
gram varies from Center to Center, and nei-
ther the number of people nor the level of tax
is under the control of the program manager.
Taxation without representation! Despite
this dilemma, the systems engineer should
include all of these factors in the cost esti-
mate because the chosen design will affect
all of them; overall program costs are as im-
portant to the Agency as direct program
costs.
Program costs tend to be presented as
only those costs that are under the control of
the program manager. No matter how much
this limitation is stated in presentations, it
is assumed that it is the total program cost
(especially when it is a popular program)
that has the support of the Executive branch,
the Congress and other constituencies. It is
no wonder that the average program in-
creases in cost by a factor of about three from
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the time of approval to completion and that
most program managers during this period
are accused of everything from naivet_ to
self-deception to outright lies. There is the
added ethical question that if all costs were
presented, the program would not be ap-
proved!
DEFINING THE PROGRAM
This phase of the program, usually known as
Phase B, will take from one to two years. The
purpose is to take the various concepts con-
sidered in Phase A and select a single valid
solution. By the time Phase B is over, a clear
set of requirements should be available with
a complete set of functional specifications
and a cost estimate based on preliminary de-
sign concepts rather than on cost models.
These are primarily produced by the systems
engineering organization and include at
least one preliminary design and selected
technologies with well-understood risks as-
sociated with those technologies. Don
Hearth, who recently retired from NASA as
director of the Langley Research Center, per-
formed a study on how much this phase has
cost for various past programs as compared
to the success of the program in later phases.
Success was measured as the ability to main-
tain performance, schedule and cost as deter-
mined at the end of Phase B. He concluded
that the most successful programs spent
between five percent and ten percent of the
total program cost in Phase B. The scope was
limited to unmanned programs, but the ra-
tionale can reasonably be extended to man-
ned programs.
Apart from establishing a credible func-
tional system specification, it is essential to
determine the management structure, the
procurement strategy and a baseline cost for
the life of the program, including the cost of
operations. Once again, the primary method
for cost estimating is the cost model, but
there should be sufficient detail available to
check the model with bottom-up costs based
on feasible design solutions. The systems
engineer is responsible for comparing these
two cost estimating techniques. It is unwise
to proceed to the next phases unless some
bottom-up cost estimating has been per-
formed.
Perhaps the most important product of
this phase is a complete work breakdown
structure. Again, this is largely the responsi-
bility of the systems engineering organiza-
tion. The axiom to be followed is, "You
cannot control what you have not defined."
WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE
Too often a program will be approved with-
out a well-established work breakdown
structure (WBS) describing the whole pro-
gram, which inevitably results in large cost
overruns. The WBS is the basis for the pro-
curement strategy and often for the manage-
ment structure. Without it, program changes
will take place after the contractors are in
place and have to be paid. Overlaps between
contracts, as well as missing elements and
contract changes, are always expensive.
The following simple rules have to be fol-
lowed:
1. Each element of the WBS should contain a
deliverable that can be defined.
2. The sum of the WBS elements must be the
total program. (Note that a given program
manager may not have the responsibility for
all elements, but they should each be defined
and allocated.)
3. Each deliverable should be accompanied
by a cost and a schedule. The cost should in-
clude a reserve based on the estimated risk
associated with that element, and the cost
should be allocated to that element.
As simple as these rules sound and as much
as NASA requires contractors to adhere to
119
READINGS IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
them, the internal track record is dismal. We
can go a long way toward containing costs if
discipline is established early and main-
tained.
One last word of caution. A WBS element
should never be established on the basis of
function or organization. These elements are
not end items. Other mechanisms exist for
identifying these elements, which in general
could be defined as program overhead and
not entirely the responsibility of the program
manag._.r. They should be recognized for
what they are and identified, but they should
not be included in the WBS.
MANAGING THE PROGRAM
We have now reached the time in the pro-
gram when promises have been made, deals
have been struck, and the program has been
approved. All that remains is to deliver. A
custom within NASA stipulates that new
managers are installed with the belief that
the skills required to sell a program and to
define it are different than those required to
run it. Certainly some changes can be ex-
pected, but I believe that such changes are
better if they occur sometime after a phase
has been entered and the basic management
structures have been established. What the
program needs at this time is ownership of
the concept, and changes in management
will usually result in program changes that
inevitably will lead to increased costs. This
is particularly true of the systems engineer-
ing group that has carefully balanced the
requirements against the design and is fa-
miliar with the "why" of a decision as well as
the "what." So far the total expenditure has
been relatively low, but once the contractors
are onboard and the manpower begins to
build up, costs can escalate at an alarming
rate. In a very short time, increases or de-
creases in performance, extensions or reduc-
tions in schedule, and decreases in annual
funding will all increase cost.
Design to cost. There is much talk about
design to cost but very little action, and for
this there are a number of reasons. Earlier, I
mentioned that within NASA there is a ten-
dency to order the three variables by perfor-
mance first, schedule second, and only then
worry about cost. So by tradition, cost tends
to be put on the back burner. One of the rea-
sons for this is that during the Apollo pro-
gram, the cost function was transferred to
the budget and program control groups. In a
program where the technical problems were
so difficult and the budgets were ample, this
was understandable, but this is no longer the
case. This situation resulted in a shift away
from making the design engineer account-
able for cost as well as performance and
schedule. The second problem occurs when
the cost is not allocated at the WBS element
level, where it can readily be traded against
performance and schedule and easily traced.
I believe that cost must be allocated to the
lowest possible level (a little scary for the
program manager), but unless this is done, it
will be impossible to hold the designer ac-
countable and unlikely that overall costs
will be held in check. The third problem is
that in an organization that prides itself on
technical excellence, it is very difficult not to
make things a little better; consequently,
there are always plenty of ideas around. The
credo of the systems engineer should there-
fore be: "The better is the enemy of the good."
Design to life cycle cost. Over the past
decade, the operational costs of NASA pro-
grams have steadily risen as a percentage of
total program costs. This is largely due to the
fact that programs have a longer life in the
operational phase. Whereas 20 years ago
operational costs amounted to no more than
20 percent of costs, they are now approach-
ing half of the NASA budget. It is time to
place design to life cycle cost on an equal
footing with design to cost. The dilemma is
that a design that allows low-cost operations
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will usually demand higher development
costs and in turn, this means larger front-
end program costs. It is essential that the
systems engineer make these assessments.
The simplest thing for a program manager to
do is walk away from this dilemma and let
the operations people worry about it later.
As this is becoming an overall problem for
the Agency, the ability to make new starts
will depend on the ability to ensure that a
sufficient percentage of the budget is avail-
able for operations. Unfortunately, it is
difficult to get enough operations people to
participate early in the program, but I be-
lieve it is essential. Some kind of veto power
should be established when it comes to mak-
ing design decisions; too many program
managers do not feel responsible for oper-
ations costs and perhaps, what is worse, are
not held accountable for it. Let there be no
doubt that operational costs are unaccepta-
bly high. An operational concept must there-
fore be developed early enough in the pro-
gram to have an effect on the design process.
Change control. Once a program is under-
way, the program manager's responsibility
is controlling change, which is inevitable.
Earlier I said that you cannot control what
you have not defined. It is equally true that
you cannot control changing something that
is not defined. First know what it is! A com-
plete WBS with allocated schedule and cost
is, once again, the key. Change requests
must not be limited to solving a technical
problem. They must be accompanied by cost
and schedule impacts and, just as important,
life cycle cost impacts. In addition, there is
always a rippling cost impact caused by
change. Other WBS elements may be affect-
ed, including items in different contracts or
in totally different NASA codes, or line
items. For these reasons, change must be as-
sessed at the systems engineering level as
well as at the WBS level. Perhaps the over-
riding rule is that changes should be difficult
to approve but easy to implement once the
decision is made.
Managing cost reserves. A qualified cost
estimator would not let a program get start-
ed without making provision for cost over-
runs or reserve. The many uncertainties in a
development program make it essential. An
analysis of past programs allows a fairly
accurate estimate to be made of what is a
reasonable total amount as a percentage of
total costs, assuming that the programs are
similar. Determining how and when the al-
lowance should be allocated is much more
difficult. One school of thought says that
reserves should be held at the highest level
in the program and applied only to correct
unforeseen occurrences. The problem is that
this tends to bail out poor performers. I be-
lieve that the reserve should be determined
based on the perceived risk of the element
when the WBS is formulated. The manager
of the element should then be held responsi-
ble for the stewardship of the reserve. In
order for this to work, some sort of reward
system must be established for the manager
who does not spend the reserve. In any case,
it would be prudent to maintain some re-
serve at the central level for those things
that cannot be anticipated. Just to keep the
system honest, a very simple tracking pro-
gram can be established to follow the expen-
diture of the reserves at the WBS element
level after the fact. I would like to see an in-
depth study done on this subject.
TRAPS AND PITFALLS
So far we have talked about where cost fits
into the program management and systems
engineering processes. There are a few areas
that may catch the program manager unpre-
pared and a few ideas that may be used to
make life a little easier in the future. It may
not be possible to implement all of them, but
it is worth a try.
Buying in. If you are involved in the selling
of the program, the easiest trap to fall into is
underpricing the program. Despite stories to
the contrary, I do not believe that this is a
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matter of deliberate low bidding. Although I
once heard a distinguished gentleman say
that we do business the old fashioned way,
we do underbid and make up on change re-
quests. The fact is that every program man-
ager I have ever met was convinced that he
or she could do it for less than the past record
would suggest. Unfortunately, this usually
involves changing the way we do business. I
believe that there are less expensive ways,
but you should tackle this one at your own
risk and only if you have the support of the
very top of the organization. The systems en-
gineer must be the conscience of the program
manager during this period.
Design to budget. Let us assume that we
have completed a perfect Phase B and that
everything is in place, including the rate of
expenditure by year. It is a virtually certain
that two things will happen. First, with elo-
quent rationales and spreadsheets by the
ton, the various element managers will find
a need to increase their funding allocation.
One favorite argument will be that the sell-
ers of the program, who are no longer in
charge, will be blamed for not understanding
the problem. In addition, Congress may add
a requirement or two. Second, the budget
will be cut in the Agency, at the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), and finally
in Congress. At this point, the intricate pat-
terns of dependency between performance,
cost and schedule begin to unravel. In the
first year, this is not devastating because
you can always delay bringing the prime
contractors on board. But by the time they
arrive, the trap has been set for the most in-
sidious form of management, design to bud-
get. Unfortunately, a fact of life is that very
few research and development (R&D) pro-
grams have multi-year funding, and annual
budgets will be less than planned. The net
effect is that program costs will escalate, and
enormous pressures will attempt to bring
down the annual funding. The first remedy is
to stretch the schedule, and the second is to
reduce the scope of the program. You will no
doubt find yourselves in this position, and
you will receive a great deal of advice from
the nonparticipants, but you should beware
of "descoping." A cursory examination of the
cost models will show that in the manned
programs, only 20 cents of every dollar go to
hardware. (In the unmanned programs, the
number is closer to 40 cents.) Once the man-
agement structure is in place and the con-
tracts have been awarded, virtually all of the
other costs are fixed or very difficult to
reduce. Take out all the content and the pro-
gram cost will still be 80 percent of the
estimate! The lesson is that if you are forced
to remove content, you should be sure to take
out every cent that is associated with that
content: prime wraps, nonprime wraps, test
beds, personnel, and, if necessary, the kitch-
en sink. It will be difficult to find, but it will
be worth the effort. If this were a mystery
novel, it might well be called "The Case of
the Missing 80 Percent." Where does it all
go, and why is it only 60 percent for
unmanned programs? Much of this is valid
and accounts for systems engineering and
integration at all levels of the program,
including test and evaluation, operations,
and many other things. But it also accounts
for duplication of test facilities, overlaps
between assignments, management style,
inefficiencies and a host of hidden costs asso-
ciated with maintaining the institutions
that are often invisible to the program man-
ager. The systems engineer is responsible for
ferreting out the good from the bad. It is a
simple fact that the first one percent reduc-
tion in these wraps (80 percent to 79 percent)
increases the amount of hardware by five
percent (20 percent to 21 percent)! A 20 per-
cent improvement in the wraps (80 percent
to 60 percent) results in a doubling of the
hardware (20 percent to 40 percent) or cut-
ting the program costs in half for the same
amount of hardware! "Thar's gold in them
thar hills."
The UPN System. The NASA budget is
prepared and submitted using a system of
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breakdowns known as the unique project
number (UPN) system. All parts of the agen-
cy are required to report their annual needs
on the basis of this system, including the pro-
gram offices. From a program point of view,
a fatal flaw in this process is the numbering
system, which generally describes functions
rather than end items and is therefore not in
consonance with the principles of a WBS sys-
tem. It is essential that the program man-
ager be able to trace the equivalence of the
UPN number and its corresponding WBS
element. This will require a joint effort
between systems engineering and the pro-
gram control people. Without this traceabil-
ity matrix, the program manager will not
know what is being asked for or where the
money is going. Too often the UPN number
is perceived as directly equivalent to the
WBS element, but this is very seldom the
case unless the WBS is not end-item orient-
ed. (The latter happens more often than it
should.) One way to avoid this situation is to
make the annual budget call for the program
using the WBS system and then translate it
to thv UPN system for the purpose of aggre-
gating the total NASA budget. I have never
seen this happen.
The cost of operations. I mentioned earlier
that the costs of operations are now about 50
percent of the NASA budget. This is partly
due to the increase in the operational life of a
program and to the fact that we have not
learned to design systems for operability. It
has not been necessary in the past. It is also
true that the productivity of the operations
infrastructure has not been high on the pro-
gram manager's list. If we are to reduce total
program costs, which are vital to the Agency
and to the program, it is time to strike a new
level of cooperation between these two nor-
mally separate parts. The program and the
systems engineer must assume a large part
of the responsibility.
THE INSTITUTION AND THE PROGRAM
Although not directly related to the systems
engineering process, a number of things bear
directly on the program and have a major
effect on the ability to perform the various
program functions. These generally concern
the relationship between the program and
the institution. NASA was originally
established using the resources of the Na-
tional Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
(NACA), an aeronautical research organiza-
tion that was seldom involved in large
development programs. The budget was rel-
atively small, and there were few contrac-
tors. In fact, all contracts were signed at the
Washington office, the NACA equivalent of
Headquarters. It quickly became apparent
that, in addition to the research centers, a
development center was needed. The God-
dard Space Flight Center (GSFC) was estab-
lished to perform this function. This was
rapidly followed by the Lyndon B. Johnson
Space Center (JSC) in Houston, the George
C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in
Huntsville, and the Jet Propulsion Laborato-
ry (JPL) in Pasadena. Almost immediately,
GSFC and JPL became responsible for multi-
ple unmanned programs, which were largely
contained within a single Center, and JSC
and MSFC became responsible for multi-
center manned programs. In both cases,
program offices were established and the
Centers provided the resources, both person-
nel and facilities, to support the program.
With the exception of JPL, which was a fed-
erally funded research and development
center and operated outside the civil service
system, all NASA personnel and basic facili-
ties are funded separately from the programs
in line items known as Research and Pro-
gram Management (RPM) and Construction
of Facilities (CoF). Program-specific facili-
ties are funded by the program and these
facilities are most often operated by support
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contractors, also funded by the program.
This system was established so that the pro-
grams would be managed by government
personnel who would rotate from program to
program and carry their experience with
them. This worked very well until the late
1960s when the budget began to fall rapidly,
and there was a significant reduction in
NASA personnel. By the early seventies,
both the budget and the number of personnel
had been cut in half, but the number of
Centers remained essentially the same. The
cost of maintaining the institution could not
longer be sustained by the RPM and CoF line
items. The solution was to tax the programs
based on the number of personnel that were
applied to the program. Unfortunately, the
program manager does not decide how many
people should work on the program, which,
by tradition, is the responsibility of the
Center director. Neither does the program
manager participate in determining the
level of the tax. These decisions, again by
tradition, are made by the comptroller.
MAINTAINING THE INSTITUTION
Unless the basic system of funding personnel
is changed, the programs will most certainly
be responsible for funding some of the insti-
tutional costs that are not related to the pro-
gram; the RPM budget will never be allowed
to grow to compensate for this. The question
is rather how large the institution needs to
be to support the program and how that deci-
sion is made. I mentioned earlier that the
WBS should represent the totality of the
program and should always describe deliver-
ables; this problem runs counter to that
principle. I believe that the solution lies in
accepting this cost for what it is, negotiating
the level of tax with the program manager
for the duration of the program, and taking
it offthe top each year. It may not be control-
lable in the normal sense, but at least it is a
known number.
Personally, I believe that the Agency
would be better served if the development
centers were managed using an industrial
funding system similar to JPL and many
other government facilities, including the
Navy labs. But until that happens, it will be
necessary to find some balance between the
institutional and program needs.
MANAGEMENT STABILITY
Every program will change management
during its life cycle. The common practice in
NASA has been to make these changes delib-
erately between phases. It is not uncommon
to see as many as four different managers
during a program, including a specialist in
closing off completed programs. The positive
side to this is that it is possible to match the
needs of each phase of a program to the
special capabilities within the agency. The
negative side is that each manager has a
different style, each program has different
management needs, and often these do not
match when the change-over occurs between
phases. One way is not always right and an-
other always wrong, but each is different,
and changes even in management style can,
and usually do, increase the cost of the pro-
gram. The secret then is to stick with a team
as long as possible, particularly the systems
engineering team, something that is easy to
say and difficult to do in these times of
declining internal expertise and increasing
retirements.
THE TYRANNY OF EXPERIENCE
Too often, you will find resistance to change
in the way things are done. "We have always
been successful (measured by performance)
doing it this way, and its very dangerous to
change winning ways." "If it ain't broke,
don't fix it." "You get no credit for an on-time
failure." All true and at the same time, de-
structive to valid new ways of doing busi-
ness, especially when it comes to introducing
more efficient or less expensive ways. When
the space program started, we had no
experience and what followed was the most
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innovative and exciting period in the history
of high technology programs. But now we
have all that experience, and it has become a
burden. By all means, you should keep the
wise heads around (they may still save you),
but take advantage of the explosion in new
technologies and capabilities, which allows
for things that we could only dream of 30
years ago. You should be careful before you
introduce a change, but you should not dis-
miss it out of hand.
DOES IT MATTER?
We have been in the civilian space business
for almost 40 years, and time after time we
have shown that we can rise to any challenge
and lead the competition, provided we have
the resources. Time and time again the Fed-
eral Government has provided the resources.
We have been the envy of the world. We have
written the book on the subject, both from a
technical and a management sense.
Until now, it was enough to know that we
were the best. There was no established
competition, most of the money was spent
internally, and cost efficiency was second to
performance. Some have characterized it as
a Works Projects Administration (WPA) for
the technologists! The problem is that in this
era of budget deficits and trade deficits,
there is not enough discretionary money to
go around. Even without international com-
petition, it would be imperative to get more
out of our research dollars. The trouble is
that we have learned profligate ways, as
neither the government nor the contractors
give rewards for cost efficiency. And while
we were basking in this glory, the rest of the
world has been catching up. They have been
reading the book, and the competition, sup-
ported by their governments, is getting good
and fierce.
But there is a difference; the competition
believes that the space business is here to
stay. I said space business, but I meant com-
merce, and in commerce cost efficiency is
paramount. Do we still want to stay at the
top, or are we ready to leave it to the rest of
the world? Are we prepared to do what is
necessary to stay in the game? After all, it's
only a space program. Does it matter? You
bet!
CAN ANYTHING BE DONE?
In this paper, I have attempted to show
where cost fits into the space program's engi-
neering and management business. A combi-
nation of things have placed cost at the
bottom of the priority ladder except in mat-
ters of the inexorable annual budget. There
are many ways to improve cost efficiency,
some of which are available to the program
manager. In the long run, it will take a con-
certed effort by all of us to make a difference.
The Executive branch and Congress, togeth-
er with industry and academia, must work
as before, when we perceived that we were
second. In the meantime, I hope that I have
been able to give the budding systems engi-
neer and program manager a few tips to do
something about the problem of cost consid-
erations. We can only do something about it
if we want to!
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SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND THE USER: INCORPORATION OF
USER REQUIREMENTS INTO THE SE PROCESS 5_-_ /
by John E. Naugle
assure everyone--the scientists, the project5
management, the Center management andS,-
NASA Headquarters--the scientific objec-
tives and requirements have been incorpo-
rated into the systems engineering process.
This paper is organized into four parts. In
the Gestation Phase, I describe the process of
starting a new mission and establishing its
rough boundaries. Next I show how the sci-
entific experiments are selected. Then we en-
ter the Preliminary Design Phase, where we
incorporate the scientist's instruments into
the systems engineering process. Finally, I
show how the Preliminary Design Review
(PDR) assures NASA management and the
scientists that the scientific requirements
have been incorporated into the systems en-
gineering process to everyone's satisfaction.
Throughout I emphasize the dual role of
servant and master that the systems engi-
neer plays with respect to the scientist and
the project manager. As servant, the systems
engineer works to assure the scientists that
the project will meet the requirements of
their experiment and their instrument; as
master, the systems engineer works to as-
sure the project manager that the scientists
and their instrument will meet the require-
ments of the project. A glossary of terms
appears at the end of this paper.
I emphasize the need for the systems en-
gineering process to consider all of the pieces
of hardware that the mission will require
and all the activities that must be conducted
during the entire mission. It is easy, in the
early phases of a mission, to focus on the
spacecraft and the instruments and to ignore
or push into the background those activities
and facilities that will be needed later or are
the responsibility of other offices. The associ-
ate administrator for the Office of Space Sci-
ence and Applications needs to know, before
committing to undertake a mission, that the
A scientific mission goes through two
distinct stages, each with its own special
requirements for systems engineering. A
division director at NASA Headquarters, as-
sisted by a program chief and a program
manager, conducts the first stage. These
three people, assisted by committees and
working groups, define the mission, formu-
late its objectives, establish its rough
boundaries and manage the selection of the
experiments. The division director practices
a rough and ready kind of systems engineer-
ing, balancing the desire of the scientist for
the most complex sophisticated instrument
possible against the desire of the Office of
Management and Budget and Congress to re-
duce the NASA budget. If the division direc-
tor's systems engineering is done well, the
mission will be supported and scientific re-
sults obtained. If, on the other hand, the sys-
tems engineering is poor, the mission may be
canceled either because the scientific com-
munity concludes the scientific objectives do
not merit the cost or because the Office of
Management and Budget or Congress thinks
the cost is too high.
After the experiments have been selected,
the action shifts from Headquarters to one of
the NASA Centers, and the second stage be-
gins. A project manager, assisted by a project
scientist and supported by an engineering
and a financial staff, is in charge of the sec-
ond stage. The second stage begins with the
preliminary design phase and ends when the
last scientific paper has been published. All
the hardware for the mission is constructed,
tested and operated in the second stage.
Systems engineers incorporate the scien-
tists and their instruments into the systems
engineering process during the preliminary
design phase. At the conclusion of the
preliminary design phase, the project man-
ager conducts a preliminary design review to
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entire mission has been thought through,
that the facilities will be available, and that
the funding is adequate to procure all the
flight and ground-based hardware and to pay
for all the work that will be required.
I arbitrarily end this paper with the PDR.
Clearly there will be continuous interaction
between the scientists and the systems engi-
neers throughout the remainder of the mis-
sion. However, the main purpose of the PDR
is to see that the user requirements have
been properly incorporated into the system.
Other papers discuss the role of systems en-
gineers in later phases of the mission.
THE GESTATION PHASE
If we are to successfully incorporate user
requirements into the systems engineering
process, we need to know how NASA creates
a new mission and establishes its principal
boundaries; we need to know who selects the
scientific instruments and when.
New missions get started in a variety of
ways. A person with a new idea may initiate
a new space mission. A scientist at a NASA
Center or a university may make a discov-
ery, ask a new question or invent a new
instrument. An engineer at a NASA Center
or in industry may invent a new control sys-
tem enabling more precise measurements to
be made. A technology may mature.
New missions have been started this way
in the past, but now, more and more, new
missions either come from a group of people
convened by NASA specifically to think
about new missions or are logical follow-ons
to existing or completed missions. The
Hubble Space Telescope was started as a
logical step after the Orbiting Astronomical
Observatories. Its scientific objectives were
laid down in 1964 during a summer study
conducted for NASA by the National Acade-
my of Sciences Space Science Board. The
Advanced X-Ray Astronomical Facility con-
tinues the x-ray observations begun with
Uhuru and High Energy Astronomy Obser-
vatory. Ulysses continues the study of the
Sun begun by HELIOS. Some missions are
precursors to later more complex missions.
Surveyor and the Lunar Orbiter were pre-
cursors to Apollo. The Lunar Observer and
the Mars Observer, in addition to increasing
our knowledge of the Moon and Mars, will be
designed to provide data needed to design
manned lunar bases and manned missions to
Mars.
Applications missions result from a need
for additional coverage, better resolution,
more complete coverage of the electromag-
netic spectrum or a new operational space-
craft.
Although there is no set process by which
a new mission gets started, once it begins,
there is a fairly predictable process by which
it moves from concept to design to flight.
Usually a new mission gets underway when
a dedicated advocate devotes the time and
energy required to get the idea accepted
within NASA. This advocate may be located
at a Center, a university, another federal
agency, an aerospace company or in NASA
Headquarters. The advocate prepares a
rough design of the spacecraft and a list of
potential instruments. With these in hand,
the advocate buttonholes scientists, engi-
neers, Center and Headquarters personnel to
persuade them to become supporters of the
mission. At a Center, the advocate may boot-
leg some feasibility studies at the Center be-
fore taking the concept to Headquarters. At
some point, the advocate must describe the
mission to the director of the appropriate di-
vision in NASA Headquarters and persuade
the director that NASA should undertake
the mission. If it is an astronomy mission,
the advocate must convince the director of
the Astrophysics Division; if a planetary
mission, the director of the Solar System
Exploration Division; if an Earth science or
applications mission, the director of the
Earth Science and Applications Division.
The director may ask the advocate and
supporters to describe the concept to the ap-
propriate NASA advisory committee or to a
summer study sponsored by the Space
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Science Board. The director may ask a
Center or a contractor to make a feasibility
study of the mission before committing to the
5- or 10-year effort that is required to get a
new mission underway. The advocate may
appeal to the associate administrator for the
Office of Science and Applications to tell a
reluctant division director to undertake the
mission, but until the director is convinced
that the mission is worth doing, it is almost
impossible to get a new mission started.
Once the division director becomes enthu-
siastic about the mission, it will be incorpo-
rated into the director's long-range plan, and
the groundwork will be prepared for approv-
al by NASA senior management, Office of
Management and Budget and Congress.
Once the division director includes a descrip-
tion of the mission in the division's advanced
program, the advocate's work is over; the
mission takes on a life of its own. The divi-
sion director provides funds for studies and
for research and development and may pro-
vide funds to several scientists to begin work
on potential instruments for the mission.
Applications missions are started by an
agreement between the division director at
NASA Headquarters and the division direc-
tor's counterpart at the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, or which-
ever agency needs the mission. They agree
that the mission has merit and that they
should begin to jointly plan for the mission.
Agreements are made as to what research
and development will be conducted, who will
conduct it, and which agency will pay for it.
They will produce a mutually acceptable
plan of action by which they will seek ap-
proval and funds.
SE'FrING THE BOUNDARIES
The scientific or applications objectives
establish some but not all of the boundaries
of a space mission. Other factors, such as the
kind of transportation or the funds available
help set the boundaries. Nonscientific
criteria may have influenced the scientific
objectives themselves. The initial diameter
of the Hubble Telescope, four meters, was
chosen in the mid-sixties because that was
the diameter of the largest spacecraft that
could be put inside the shroud of the Saturn
V launch vehicle. Later, the diameter was
reduced to 3.2 meters to take advantage of
existing manufacturing, test and calibration
equipment. The broad boundaries of the
Viking mission were set by the capability of
the Titan launch vehicle. As a matter of fact,
in its formative stage, Viking was called the
Titan Orbiter-Lander Mission. An earlier
Mars orbiter-lander mission, Voyager, had
been planned for a Saturn V; this big
Voyager was canceled by Congress because it
was too large and too expensive and because
the scientists involved would not support
such an expensive mission at that stage in
the exploration of Mars. The competition
with the Soviets also helped set the bound-
aries for Viking. The scientific returns from
Viking had to be sufficient to justify the cost
of the mission, even though the Soviets
might land a spacecraft on Mars before
Viking got there. National needs--foreign
policy, security, development of new technol-
ogy and the maintenance of an institution or
a capability--may influence the size, scale
and timing of a mission. For a decade scien-
tists unsuccessfully tried to persuade NASA
to start a mission to study the interplanetary
medium near the Sun. After President
Johnson offered to undertake a joint space
mission with Germany, it took NASA just 24
hours to establish the HELIOS Mission to
make a close flyby of the sun. The need to
test the Titan HIC launch before the launch
of the Viking mission dictated that HELIOS
would use the unproven Titan IIIC rather
than the existing Atlas-Centaur.
The actions of the members of Congress
as they review, authorize and appropriate
funds for a mission may help establish the
boundaries of a mission. A key chairperson
or a powerful committee member may decide
that a particular mission is worth $500
million but not $750 million; the chairperson
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may decide to support a mission if it will in-
crease employment or prevent the closure of
a facility in the chairperson's district.
Purists may argue that systems engi-
neering should focus on technical constraints
and need not take into account nebulous
political and managerial constraints. Unfor-
tunately, such constraints have been with us
since the first time two people joined togeth-
er to accomplish a task neither could do
alone. Incorporation of such constraints into
the systems engineering process is just as
important as incorporating the purely tech-
nical constraints. The division director,
however, must keep the political and techni-
cal constraints separate and should never
attempt to justify a political constraint with
some flimsy technical justification. If this
happens, the rest of the participants in the
mission will become confused and the
division director will lose credibility. If the
participants are kept straight, then later, if
relief is needed from some such constraint,
the division director will know who must be
persuaded to get relief and the kind of justifi-
cation that must be prepared.
In the early days of NASA, with a power-
ful administrator and with space exploration
a major national goal, a project manager
could ignore factors other than the scientific
and technical requirements. Today, the as-
sembly and maintenance of the necessary
support for the mission are so difficult that
these other factors may become as impor-
tant, if not more important, than the re-
quirements derived from the objectives of the
mission.
Out of this combination of political and
technical considerations, the major bound-
aries are set for a mission. The launch vehi-
cle is selected, the project management
center is picked, the trajectory and a
tentative launch date identified, and a rough
idea formed of the kind and number of
instruments that will make up the payload.
The availability of transportation and the
support of the Office of Operations is estab-
lished. A rough cost estimate is made.
THE ROLE OF THE PAYLOAD AND THE
TECHNICAL WORKING GROUPS
As soon as the broad boundaries of a mission
are established and the division director is
confident about obtaining approval, the
groundwork begins for selecting principal
investigators--the scientists who will per-
form the mission experiments. To make the
selection, the division director first needs to
know how many and what kind of instru-
ments can be placed on the spacecraft, an
analysis accomplished by two working
groups: a Payload Working Group and a
Technical Working Group. The Payload
Working Group consists of NASA and aca-
demic scientists from the scientific disci-
plines involved in the mission, and the Tech-
nical Working Group of system engineers
and discipline engineers representing all the
engineering disciplines and subsystems re-
quired to design, build and operate the
spacecraft. Working together, these two
groups will design a trial payload that will
accomplish the scientific objectives of the
mission and a spacecraft capable of support-
ing that payload. In this joint activity, we
begin to incorporate the user requirements
into the systems engineering process.
The trial payload and the spacecraft
emerge through an iterative process. The
members of the Payload Working Group se-
lect a trial payload--a group of instruments
that accomplish the objectives of the mission.
In assembling this trial payload, the Payload
Working Group may invite scientists to come
to a meeting to describe instruments they
hope to fly on the mission. They may invent
new instruments that are needed to accom-
plish the objectives. The Payload Working
Group will estimate the weight, volume,
power and communication needs, and specify
the orientation and stabilization require-
ments for each instrument. One or more
members of the Technical Working Group
will attend the meetings of the Payload
Working Group to help them develop the re-
quirements and to design the spacecraft and
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bring back to the Technical Working Group a
better understanding of the payload that is
emerging.
Meanwhile, the Technical Working
Group will use the scientific objectives and
broad constraints of the mission and design a
hypothetical spacecraft for the mission. The
Technical Working Group then takes the
first trial payload prepared by the Payload
Working Group and integrates it into the
spacecraft. The two groups then hold a joint
session where the Technical Working Group
reviews the fit between the payload and the
spacecraft, and the descriptions of changes
that must be made either in the spacecraft or
in the payload to make them compatible.
Additional power may be required, the struc-
ture of the spacecraft modified, or one or
more instruments may have to be redesigned
or eliminated. At the conclusion of the joint
meeting, the two groups agree on the actions
each will take during the next iteration with
the mutual objective of making the payload
and the spacecraft compatible. The Payload
Working Group refines the payload and the
Technical Working Group refines the design
of the spacecraft. They meet again, review
their progress, and decide on the next course
of action.
After a year or so of joint effort and two or
three such iterations, a spacecraft and a
payload will emerge that are satisfactory to
both groups, the scientific community, the
division director, the program manager, the
program scientist and to senior NASA man-
agement. The division director and the pro-
gram scientists are now ready to select the
actual scientists, and their instruments, for
the mission.
SELECTION OF THE SCIENTIFIC
EXPERIMENTS
The associate administrator for the Office of
Space Science and Applications selects the
scientists who do research in space. The divi-
sion director, using an ancient procedure
established in 1960, is in charge of all the ac-
tivities associated with the selection process.
People sometimes ask why the experiments
are selected by an official at NASA Head-
quarters rather than by one at the NASA
Center that will manage the project. Others
ask, why not use the instruments selected by
the Payload Working Group for the trial pay-
load and avoid all the time and energy that
goes into the NASA selection process? Why
NASA Headquarters, why not the National
Academy of Sciences Space Science Board?
These are good questions, and in some cases,
the answer is easy: the particular method
has been tried and found not to work; in oth-
ers, the answer is not obvious and some ex-
planation is necessary.
History shows that the nation needs a
vigorous broad-based space science program
that involves many academic scientists.
Academic scientists are a fertile source of
new ideas, and their involvement rapidly
disseminates the knowledge and experience
gained in the space program to the next gen-
eration of scientists and engineers. In addi-
tion, the participation of academic scientists
and their graduate students helps assure a
continuing supply of space scientists and
aerospace engineers. Academic scientists
also form a strong, vociferous lobby for the
NASA space science program.
History also shows that NASA needs
competent, creative scientists at its Centers
to help conceive and design new missions
and to work with the academic scientists
who participate in NASA's missions.
The academic scientists and the NASA
scientists at the Centers fiercely compete for
the right to conduct investigations on NASA
missions. If an official at the Center respon-
sible for the mission selected the principal
investigators, then the academic scientists
would feel that the Center scientists had an
unfair advantage. The NASA scientists
would be more familiar with the mission and
therefore able to prepare better proposals. In
addition, they would be colleagues of the
Center people handling the selection. If the
Space Science Board, made up entirely of
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non-NASA scientists, handled the selection,
then the NASA scientists would feel that
academic scientists had an unfair advan-
tage. By mutual agreement between NASA
and the Academy, NASA scientists cannot
serve on the Board because they would be
providing advice to themselves.
NASA procedures were formulated to re-
duce the fears of these two groups of scien-
tists and to encourage them to participate in
NASA's space science program. NASA pro-
vides a competitive process that assures
equal access to NASA's space science mis-
sions for all scientists, whether they are at
universities, NASA Centers or in industry,
and whether they are domestic or foreign
scientists. Administrative scientists at
NASA Headquarters, who are no longer con-
ducting research and hence have no conflict
of interest, conduct the selection process.
The selection process proceeds through
three stages. The first stage, the creation of a
trial payload and the design of the space-
craft, was discussed above. Next NASA
issues an Announcement of Flight Opportu-
nity (AFO) to scientists to inform them that
NASA intends to proceed with the mission
and invites them to submit a proposal to
conduct experiments during the mission.
After the proposals are submitted, they are
evaluated, and a final selection is made by
NASA Headquarters.
THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF FLIGHT
OPPORTUNITY
As soon as the division director is reasonably
sure that the mission will be approved by
NASA senior management and by Congress,
he or she will issue an AFO. The AFO speci-
fies the objectives of the mission and invites
scientists to propose investigations. It gives
the ground rules for the proposals and the
deadline for their submission.
The AFO is a very important document.
Several (sometimes 100 or more) teams of
scientists will spend several months prepar-
ing their proposals. Each team consists of
scientists, engineers and financial analysts
who use the information in the AFO to pre-
pare the scientific, technical and financial
parts of their proposals. Their written pro-
posal is the final and generally the only
opportunity they have to persuade NASA to
select their experiment. (Sometimes com-
peting scientists are invited to brief the re-
viewers.) NASA bases its selection on the
written proposal. Once the procedure is
completed and the experiments are selected,
it is almost impossible for a dissatisfied
scientist to overturn the decision. Once the
selections are made and contracts awarded,
the principal investigator's team is legally
obligated to produce the instrument, conduct
the experiment and publish the results.
NASA is legally obligated to provide funds
and space on the spacecraft and to conduct
flight operations and provide data to the in-
vestigator.
Careful preparation of the AFO is essen-
tial. Large amounts of time and energy are
required to prepare and evaluate the propos-
als. If the information in the AFO is
inadequate or wrong, experimenters may be
discouraged from competing, or experiment-
ers with instruments not suitable for the
spacecraft may be selected, which can lead to
costly overruns or schedule slips.
The preliminary systems engineering
done by the Technical Working Group and
the Payload Working Group plays a crucial
role in the preparation of the AFO. The AFO
contains a description of the trial payload
and the spacecraft generated by the two
working groups. The AFO specifies the sub-
systems planned for the spacecraft in suffi-
cient detail so that the proposers can design
their instruments to function in harmony
with subsystems. The AFO must specify any
special requirements for the instruments
such as the need to keep electromagnetic
interference, nuclear radiation levels or
outgassing below specified levels. The ther-
mal characteristics of the spacecraft are de-
scribed, and the thermal specifications that
the instruments must meet are included.
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The AFO specifies the date the proposals
must be returned and in some cases limits
the number of pages of a proposal to avoid
getting lengthy proposals loaded with ex-
traneous information.
EVALUATING THE PROPOSALS
The scientists send their proposals to the di-
vision director at NASA Headquarters who
is responsible for the mission. After receipt
of all proposals, the division director forms
two groups to assist in the evaluation. The
first group, chaired by the program scientist,
consists of scientists who are peers of those
proposing experiments and who will evalu-
ate the scientific and technical merits of the
proposals and assign them a priority for
inclusion in the mission. This group of scien-
tists must be free of any legal conflict of
interest with respect to any of the proposals,
which is the reason why they cannot be cho-
sen until all the proposals are in. The second
group consists of engineers at the project
management Center similar in membership
to the Technical Working Group (in many
cases it will be the Technical Working
Group). This group will examine all the pro-
posals to see if the instruments proposed are
compatible with the spacecraft and judge
whether the proposer has the team and the
facilities required to carry out the investiga-
tion.
As soon as the division director has the
proposals, copies are sent to both groups.
After the two groups complete their work,
they send the results of their evaluation to
the division director. If an otherwise high
priority investigation is incompatible with
the spacecraft, the division director may ask
the project team to conduct a short study to
determine whether the instrument or the
spacecraft can be modified to make the two
compatible and, if so, to prepare an estimate
of the costs involved.
After receiving the evaluation made by
the scientific working group and the project
team, the division director and the chief
scientists prepare a list of the principal
investigators who they think are the best
qualified to accomplish the objectives of the
mission. Their selection is based on, and
must be consistent with, the evaluations of
the scientists and the project team. The divi-
sion director is free to choose between two
competing proposals that have been given
the same priority by the scientists but is not
free to pick a proposal that was given a lower
priority. In other words, the division director
must select a principal investigator whose
proposal was placed in Category I by the
scientific working group rather than pick an
investigator whose proposal was placed in
Category II, even though the Category II
experiment might be cheaper or easier to
integrate with the spacecraft. The instru-
ments of the principal investigators selected
must be certified compatible with the space-
craft or the division director must have the
results of a study that shows that the instru-
ment or the mission can be modified to make
the instrument compatible. Since each of the
investigators selected has proposed a specific
instrument, in the process of selecting the
investigators the division director has also
selected the suite of instruments that will
make up the payload for the mission.
After completing the list of principal
investigators and the justification for their
selection, the division director takes the
recommendations to the members of the
Space Science Steering Committee for their
review and recommendation.
THE ROLE OF THE SPACE SCIENCE
STEERING COMMITTEE
The Space Science Steering Committee is
composed of the directors and the deputies of
each of the program divisions in the Office of
Space and Applications. Traditionally, if the
director is an engineer, the deputy is a scien-
tist and vice versa. Thus the Space Science
Steering Committee consists of roughly
equal numbers of scientists and engineers
and is capable of reviewing the merits of
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investigators, the selection procedure, and
all other technical and managerial aspects of
the mission. !t is chaired by the chief scien-
tists in Office of Space Science and Applica-
tions and reports directly to the associate ad-
ministrator for that Office.
The Space Science Steering Committee
reviews the investigations that have been
selected and the process by which they were
selected. It reviews the investigations for
their scientific and technical merit and for
their c_mpatibility with the spacecraft. If
there are any objections or reservations
raised by anyone about the payload, the
Space Science Steering Committee reviews
those objections. Normally the investigators
chosen by the division director are accepted;
however, if a member of the Steering Com-
mittee objects to a selection or questions the
selection process, then the Committee may
send the division director back to prepare a
different version of the payload.
The Space Science Steering Committee
serves as the court of final review for a pay-
load. By its acceptance of the principal inves-
tigators and their instruments, it certifies
that, up to this stage, the user requirements
have been properly incorporated into the sys-
tems engineering process for the mission.
After the members of the Committee com-
plete their review, the chairperson sends
their recommendations to the associate ad-
ministrator of the Office of Space Science and
Applications who approves the investigators.
After approval of the investigators by the
associate administrator, the only way to
change an investigator or an instrument is to
appeal over the head of the associate admin-
istrator, to the deputy administrator or the
administrator of NASA. Only once in the
past 30 years has the decision of an associate
administrator been reversed. In that case,
NASA modified its selection procedure to
facilitate the selection of investigators for
the Apollo-Soyuz Mission. The chairperson of
the Space Science Board objected to the
change; NASA redid its selection and fol-
lowed the normal procedure.
THE ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR'S
APPROVAL
After the associate administrator approves
the principal investigators, each of them is
sent a letter to inform them of their selection
and to give them any guidelines or qualifica-
tions that come from the selection process.
For instance, only a part of the investigator's
proposal may have been approved or the
investigator may have agreed to provide en-
vironmental data to other investigators on
the mission to aid them in the interpretation
of their data. Funding for the mission may be
limited; the associate administrator may
direct each investigator to control costs very
carefully and request that some aspect of the
investigation be modified or excluded if it
becomes apparent that the costs will exceed
the funds allocated for the investigation. If
the interest in the mission is high and the
funds are limited or the resources of the
spacecraft, such as the weight, power and
telemetry, are very constrained, the associ-
ate administrator may give provisional ap-
proval to one or more investigators pending
an analysis by the project to determine if the
res.ources are available.
The associate administrator's letter to a
principal investigator is an informal con-
tract between the associate administrator
and the principal investigator that obligates
the investigator to devote the time and ener-
gy required to accomplish the objectives of
the investigation. It obligates the associate
administrator to proceed with the mission
and provide the resources and assistance
that the principal investigator will need.
At the same time the letters are sent to
the principal investigators, the associate ad-
ministrator also sends a letter to the director
of the Center responsible for managing the
project. This letter notifies the director of the
investigators selected and the qualifications
or guidelines that have been given. The
letter is accompanied by the authorization
and transfer of funds that enable the project
team to negotiate contracts with and fund
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the work of the principal investigators. This
contract should provide for the support of the
principal investigator and specify the work
to be done during design, manufacture, pre-
flight testing, operations, analysis of the
data and publication of the results. The fun-
ding for data analysis is normally carried in
a separate line item in the Space Science
budget and is transferred to the Center
through a separate channel at a later date.
Regardless of how the funding for the oper-
ational phase is handled, the associate ad-
ministrator should require that the project
team provide for data analysis and publica-
tion of the results in these contracts with the
principal investigators. The incorporation of
the user requirements into the systems engi-
neering process will not be complete unless
all phases of the mission are considered,
including data analysis, interpretation and
publication of the results.
The Space Science Steering Committee's
review and the associate administrator's ap-
proval of the principal investigators com-
plete those phases of the mission that are led
by the division director at NASA Headquar-
ters. Once the investigators have been
selected, the focus of the work shifts from
Headquarters to the Center, where the pro-
ject manager and the project scientist take
over the technical and scientific leadership of
the mission. They are responsible for the
final steps in the incorporation of the users
requirements into the systems engineering
process.
ASSESSMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL
INVESTIGATORS
When the associate administrator for the
Office of Space Science and Applications
selects the principal investigators and au-
thorizes the Center to negotiate contracts
with them, the responsibility for working
with the scientists is transferred from the
division director and the program scientists
at Headquarters to the project manager and
the project scientists at the Center. Receipt
of the letter triggers an intensive assessment
by the project manager of each investigator
and of the status of each instrument. This
assessment should be completed prior to the
beginning of preliminary design activity.
The assessment is conducted by a team
appointed by the project manager. The team
consists of several engineers from the Cen-
ter. A key member of the project manager's
review team is the project scientist, who,
among other tasks, serves as the communi-
cation link between the investigators and
the project team.
THE ROLE OF THE PROJECT SCIENTIST
The Center director, with concurrence of the
Office of Space Science and Applications as-
sociate administrator, appoints the mission's
project scientist. This project scientist has a
powerful role during a scientific mission,
quite different from that of the project man-
ager and, at this stage, equally important. If
the project scientist and the project manager
have a conflict they cannot resolve and that
may affect the mission's scientific outcome,
the project scientist is expected to carry the
case to Center management and, if it is a
good case, to prevail.
The project scientist should have as vest-
ed an interest in the scientific success of the
mission as the one who conceived the mission
or as an investigator on the mission. As an
experienced space scientist and person who
has conducted investigations in space, the
project scientist should understand what
information the project needs from the prin-
cipal investigator in order to conduct the
mission and should be able to accurately
communicate those requirements, and the
reasons for them, to the scientists. The pro-
ject scientist should understand the techni-
cal requirements submitted by the principal
investigators and be able to communicate
them to the project. In addition, the project
scientist should be able to judge which of the
requirements of the principal investigator
are mandatory and which are only highly
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desirable so that the resources of the project
are not squandered. Conversely, the project
scientist should be able to sort out the highly
desirable from the mandatory requirements
of the project manager so that unnecessary
constraints, reporting requirements or re-
views are not placed on the principal investi-
gators. Clearly, the project scientist must
have the confidence of the project manager
and the investigators on the mission in order
to succeed. The assessment of the principal
investijators provides an excellent opportu-
nity for the project scientist to become a reli-
able representative of the scientists to the
project team and of the project team to the
scientists.
People ask, why all this concern about the
communication channel between the project
and the investigators? Why can't the project
manager deal with the investigators just as
one would with the person responsible for
any other subsystem on the spacecraft?
Early experience in space science showed
that a project manager who was not a scien-
tist, or who did not have a strong competent
project scientist working with him or her,
usually got into one of two kinds of trouble.
Either the project manager regarded the
scientists as all powerful and gave in to all
their whims, thereby driving the costs of the
mission out of sight, or the project manager
regarded the scientists as overly bright
children and overrode their legitimate re-
quests, thus causing their instruments to fail
or forcing the scientists to complain to Cen-
ter management or NASA Headquarters and
try to get the project manager replaced.
FACT FINDING
The initial assessment of each principal in-
vestigator by the project team is the most im-
portant part of the incorporation of the user
requirements into the systems engineering
process of a mission. The primary purpose of
the assessment is to determine the technical
requirements of the instruments and their
compatibility with each other and with the
spacecraft and the operational equipment. In
addition, it provides the project manager
with the first opportunity to determine the
experience and capability of each principal
investigator and of the team, and to assess
whether the investigator's institution can
and will provide the support that will be
needed.
The assessment begins with "fact find-
ing," a systematic effort by the review team
to collect information about the investiga-
tors. The team conducts its review at the in-
vestigator's institution, rather than bringing
the investigator and the team to the Center.
A visit to the institution enables the review
team to not only examine the laboratory
model of the instrument, but also to review
the calculations and test results that support
the design. The team can review the facili-
ties that will be available to investigators to
develop, test and calibrate the flight instru-
ments. If the investigator plans to have most
of the work done by a contractor, then the
review team conducts a similar review at the
contractor's plant.
The review should cover all the elements
that are required by the investigator to com-
plete the objectives of the experiment. By
"all the elements," I mean all the pieces of
hardware, all the facilities, all the testing
gear that will be required, and all the work
and the people that will be required to enable
the investigator to design, build, test and fly
the instrument. In addition, the review
should identify all the computers, all the pro-
grams and all the software that the investi-
gator will require to analyze the data and
publish the results. The review should cover
the entire mission, from design and develop-
ment, to testing and calibration, to place-
ment of the published results and of the data
in the archives. The plans, scheduled actions
and funding requirements as a function of
time are key elements to be reviewed. The
impact of project requirements on the inves-
tigator or the instrument should be covered
in the review. Throughout the review, its
two-way nature must be emphasized. The
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purpose of the review is to determine what
the investigator requires of the project and to
inform the investigator of the requirements
of the project.
The review begins with information and
data collection by the team. The team must
collect information on the technical re-
sources on the spacecraft that the instru-
ment requires such as weight, telemetry,
band width, volume, power, commands and
thermal control.
The team must collect data on the engineer-
ing constraints imposed by the instrument
on the spacecraft, including but not limited
to:
Location of the instrument
Look angle and field of view
Pointing and stabilization required
Operational requirements
Special treatment during testing, launch,
and operations
Limitations on vibration and shock
Limitations on stray electromagnetic
fields
Limitations on material surrounding the
instrument
Limitations on outgassing.
The team needs to know the facilities
that will be required by the instrument and
their availability, either at the investigator's
institution, the contractor, or at the field
center or its contractors, including but not
limited to:
Vacuum chambers
Shock and vibration tables
Solar simulators
Computers
Special test and calibration facilities
Special data handling and analysis
facilities.
The team must collect information and plans
for the funding, manpower and management
capability that will be required by the inves-
tigator at the host institution and by the
project team to monitor the work of the
investigator.
Obviously, not all of this data will be
available at this first review. However,
where information is not available, the need
should be established and the project man-
ager and the principal investigator must
formulate a mutually acceptable plan as to
who will generate the information and on
what schedule.
This initial data gathering phase pro-
vides an excellent opportunity for the project
manager and the systems engineers to assess
the capability of the principal investigator
and the team. NASA policy makes the prin-
cipal investigator, responsible for all phases
of the investigation, beginning with the de-
sign of the instrument, continuing through
to the delivery of a calibrated, tested and
flight worthy instrument, and culminating
in the publication of the results. During the
review, the principal investigator should
demonstrate understanding and the ability
to discharge this responsibility and should
be able to describe how to conduct the day-
by-day work of the team. The principal
investigator should state whether the day-
by-day work of the team will be under the
investigator's direction or whether a man-
ager will be appointed to direct the work. If a
manager is appointed, do the principal inves-
tigator, the manager and the project
manager all understand the limits of the
authority of the manager? What decisions
can be made by the manager and which ones
must go to the investigator? Has the investi-
gator delegated sufficient authority to the
manager so that decisions can be made and
the work can be kept on schedule? How does
the principal investigator plan to oversee the
work of the manager? Does the investigator
plan to attend certain key reviews to see how
things are going? Will the manager give
weekly reports?
The project manager and the principal
investigator should agree on which reviews
the investigator will attend and which can
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be delegated to the manager. They also need
to agree on how they will resolve disputes
that will arise between the principal investi-
gator's manager and the project manager.
If the principal investigator plans to han-
dle the day-to-day operations, another set of
questions needs to be asked. Is the investiga-
tor prepared and able to spend the time and
energy to handle the daily work? Is the in-
vestigator prepared to travel to the Center or
to a contractor when reviews must be held
and decisions need to be made? Is the investi-
gator prepared to give up other research dur-
ing the development of the instrument?
Appointing a good project manager is
generally better for the investigator and the
team. The project manager can concentrate
on the daily activity of managing the team
and the investigator can focus on meeting
the requirements that will be levied by the
project manager and the team.
The review team needs to ask other ques-
tions. Is the investigator's team adequate for
the task? Have they planned their work and
laid out a sensible schedule? Are they cooper-
ative and forthright about the status of their
instrument? Are the kinds of engineers and
technicians that will be needed either on the
investigator's team or at the contractor? Has
the investigator done a good job estimating
the costs as a function of time? Has a reserve
been allowed for unforeseen problems, and if
so, have criteria and a schedule been laid out
for its use? Any weakness in planning or
management at this stage, if not corrected,
will inevitably result in more serious prob-
lems later in the project.
The analysis of the strengths and weak-
nesses of a principal investigator's team
serves an important function in the incor-
poration of the user requirements into the
systems engineering process. If an investiga-
tor has a competent team and adequate
facilities and equipment, the project man-
ager can reduce the monitoring require-
ments for that investigator. The investigator
can reduce the time allocated for testing and
integration and may waive certain tests. On
the other hand, if the investigator has a
weak team or inadequate facilities, then the
project manager has to lay out a project plan
and a schedule that takes this weakness into
account. Additional money must be set aside
to cover overruns. Provisions for additional
monitoring must be made and additional
time for testing and integration must be
allowed. An engineer from the project may
be assigned to aid the investigator. The in-
vestigator is placed on the list of the project's
"Top Ten Problems," thereby alerting the
Center management and Headquarters of
the problem. Any management or technical
problems unearthed in this initial assess-
ment should be treated just as thoroughly
and just as promptly as the failure of any
subsystem would be treated later in the
schedule. Prompt action at this stage will
prevent many hardware problem_ from aris-
ing later when there is less time and less
money to resolve them.
The review of each principal investigator
culminates in the negotiation of a contract
between the Center and principal investiga-
tor, whereby the investigator is to produce a
flight instrument using funds provided by
the Center. At the conclusion of the assess-
ment process, a principal investigator will
have two contracts: one with the associate
administrator of the Office for Space Science
and Applications to accomplish the objec-
tives of the experiment proposed, and the
other with the project management center to
produce an instrument that is ready for
flight. A principal investigator who thinks
that a Center decision will jeopardize the
investigation has the right to appeal the
decision directly to the associate administra-
tor of the Office for Space Science and Appli-
cations. This appeal channel is rarely, if
ever, used.
THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS
Once the review team has completed its fact
finding and its assessment of the investiga-
tor's capability, the systems engineers are
138
USER REQUIREMENTS
ready to complete the conventional systems
analysis of the system. The information the
review team has collected enables them to
incorporate the user requirements into that
process.
By this time, all the broad boundaries of
the mission are established; the investiga-
tors have been selected, a preliminary design
of the spacecraft is available, the transporta-
tion system is specified, the total cost of the
mission has been set (or a ceiling placed on
the total cost) and a preliminary launch date
scheduled.
If there is no hard fast launch date, then
the launch schedule may become a variable
in the systems analysis and shifted forward
or back to reduce costs or improve the scien-
tific return of the mission. If it is a planetary
mission, however, the launch date is not a
variable but is rigorously set by planetary
dynamics; the role of the systems engineer is
to identify the decisions that must be made
and the actions that must be taken to assure
the sanctity of that launch date.
In the case of a high priority scientific
mission, such as Viking or the Hubble Space
Telescope, the scientific objectives may be
the primary constraint. The systems engi-
neer can adjust the launch vehicle, the
launch date and the total cost to meet the
scientific objectives.
For most missions, however, the primary
constraints will be technical and financial.
The launch vehicle may be specified; there
may be a cap on the funding, certain subsys-
tems may be specified and in many cases the
spacecraft itself will be specified. In such
highly constrained missions, the only vari-
ables the systems engineer has to work with
are the number and complexity of the scien-
tific instruments that can be accommodated.
For such highly constrained missions, the
associate administrator of the Office of Space
Science and Applications will usually select
a core payload that is certain to be accom-
modated and then add one or more in-
vestigations to be included if the systems
analysis shows they can be accommodated.
In this highly constrained case, the systems
engineer takes the requirements of the core
payload and the existing constraints
and,working closely with the project scien-
tist and the principal investigators, makes a
number of tradeoff studies to determine the
maximum number of investigations that can
be accommodated and the maximum amount
of scientific information that can be collect-
ed.
The objective of the systems engineering
effort at this stage is to plan the entire mis-
sion, establish the specifications for the in-
struments and the spacecraft, lay out a
schedule for all the activities of the mission,
establish milestones for completion of major
activities, schedule the testing and integra-
tion work, set a launch date, estimate the
cost and lay out a funding plan for the entire
mission. The systems engineers identify any
technical conflicts that exist between instru-
ments or between an instrument and the
spacecraft. Where they find conflicts, they
identify the options available to the project
to solve them, conduct tradeoffs between the
options and recommend the option that they
think will produce the greatest scientific
return for the lowest cost.
As the systems engineers conduct their
analyses, there is a continuous iteration pro-
cess that takes place throughout the project
and among the investigators. Different loca-
tions of the instruments on the spacecraft
are studied and discussed with the investiga-
tors to determine which are best. Tradeoffs
may have to be made between the value of
adding an investigation and adding more
power or more telemetry bandwidth for the
core payload. In rare instances, the systems
analysis may show that additional resources
are available on the spacecraft; then trade-
offs are made to determine how to allocate
the resources among the investigators to bet-
ter accomplish the scientific objectives.
Many complicated tradeoffs are made at
this stage in a project. As an example, sys-
tems engineers working closely with the
project scientist and the investigators may
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conduct tradeoffs to determine how much
data processing should be done on board by
each instrument, thereby increasing the
weight and power required by the instru-
ments but reducing the complexity of, and
the weight and power required by, the com-
munications system of the spacecraft.
Mutually acceptable schedules for the use
of common ground facilities such as shake
tables, vacuum chambers and calibration
equipment are worked out between the pro-
ject, the investigators and the persons re-
sponsible for those facilities. A detailed
schedule of all the tests, calibration runs and
flight operations is established with each in-
vestigator. These schedules, as emphasized
repeatedly in this paper, should carry
through flight operations and data analysis.
Only by doing this can a systems engineer be
sure that all the requirements of the scien-
tists have been incorporated into the mission
plan. By forcing the occasionally unwilling
investigator to sit down and think through
the entire experiment, the systems engineer
may bring to the surface a major technical
problem or an inadequate cost estimate.
Once the entire mission is laid out, the in-
vestigators accommodated, their expenses
estimated and a launch date established, the
systems engineer must estimate how much
and what kind of resources need to be re-
served for unanticipated problems. Extra
slack time must be placed in the schedule to
accomplish unanticipated work. The systems
engineer must reserve some weight, power
and communications capability for shortages
that will inevitably arise. Funds to cover
overruns must be reserved and a schedule by
which the funds are to be released must be
prepared. If there is no schedule for the re-
lease of reserve funds, then they may all be
used up in the early months of the project,
leaving nothing for the major problems that
will occur later.
The project manager and the overseers at
the Center and Headquarters should exam-
ine any deviation by an investigator from the
planned use of the reserves with the same
care they would examine an instrument that
is not meeting its design specifications or its
milestones. Such a deviation in the rate of
use of reserves may identify a weakness in
the investigator's team or in the design of
the instrument early in the development
cycle. If the project manager takes prompt
action when an unexpected use of the re-
serves is first seen, technical or schedule
problems that may occur later in the devel-
opment phase can be eliminated or reduced.
At this time, the project manager estab-
lishes another important policywhow the
information about the reserves will be treat-
ed. The project manager can choose to oper-
ate somewhere between two extremes:
"everything on the table" or "hold all the
cards close to the chest." In the first extreme,
everybody in the project is informed, includ-
ing all the subsystem managers, all the
principal investigators and the contractors,
exactly what the reserves are, who is holding
them and the schedule for their use. At the
other extreme, the project manager treats
the reserves as highly classified information
known only to the project manager and possi-
bly some of the senior management. Both
extremes have worked. The choice largely
depends on the experience and personality of
the project manager and NASA's current
management philosophy. A new, insecure or
weak project manager may want to keep this
information confidential to help control the
project. A more confident project manager
may choose to operate an open system. If a
project manager chooses to operate an open
system, there must be a willingness to accept
a high level of acrimony in the project. A
principal investigator fighting a weight
problem or overrunning the l_udget will eye a
compatriot's reserve and scheme to get it. On
the other hand, by operating in an open
manner the project manager may create a
more healthy climate of trust between the
investigators and the project team and
thereby discover problems earlier than if all
the reserves are kept secret. Sharing knowl-
edge of the problems and the reserve being
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maintained can help a project manager pro-
mote teamwork on the project, raise the mo-
rale, and encourage the investigators to
carefully manage their reserves. On the oth-
er hand, if NASA's current policy is to pull
all identifiable reserves into a Headquarters
reserve to be held by the comptroller, then
project managers will instinctively bury any
financial reserves somewhere in the project.
Ultimately, the user requirements will be
assimilated into the systems engineering
process, the preliminary designs will be com-
pleted, the schedules established, and the
rate of expenditure established. When this is
done, the project is ready for its first major
design review, the preliminary design re-
view.
PRELIMINARY DESIGN REVIEW
The Preliminary Design Review (PDR) ends
the preliminary design work, and completes
the incorporation of user requirements into
the systems engineering process. All aspects
of the mission and all future activities re-
quired to accomplish the mission should be
planned by this time.
The choice of a chairperson for the PDR
depends upon the complexity, cost and
national interest in the project. The division
director may chair the PDR of a routine,
small scientific project. The associate admin-
istrator for the Office of Space Science and
Applications will chair the PDR of a larger,
more complex mission. The administrator or
deputy administrator of NASA may chair
the PDR of a large, complex, costly, highly
visible mission such as the Hubble Tele-
scope, or Earth Observing System. The
chairperson should be someone who thrives
on crowds and controversy and has a vast
curiosity about the mission and a penchant
for uncovering unforeseen or concealed prob-
lems. The chairperson should use the PDR to
identfy and resolve any issues that the pro-
ject team or the investigators may have over-
looked or may be trying to avoid.
The good chairperson goes around the
room after the discussion of a controversial
item and questions the key people involved
to see if they all understand and agree on the
project's plan. The chairperson of the PDR
cannot be a "shrinking violet" or an introvert
(at least not during a PDR).
The project manager conducts the review.
Attendance from Headquarters includes, but
is not be limited to: the associate administra-
tor for the Office of Space Science and Appli-
cations or a designee, the division director,
the program manager, the program scientist,
the financial analyst, the NASA comptroller
or the designee, and the associate adminis-
trators for the Offices of Space Flight and
Operations or their designees. Someone from
the Office of International Affairs attends if
there are foreign investigators or if it is a
joint mission with another country. Atten-
dance from the Center will include the direc-
tor, the financial analysts, representatives of
the engineering disciplines and the systems
engineers. All the principal investigators
attend. Senior people from the major con-
tractors also attend. If the PDR is for an
applications mission, then senior people from
the agency who will use the system will
attend.
The chairperson expects the project man-
ager to present a clear, concise statement of
the overall objectives of the mission. If there
are other nonscientific objectives for the
mission--if, for instance, one of the objec-
tives is to test a new subsystem, a new space-
craft or a new tracking system--then the
project manager is expected to clearly specify
the relationship and priorities between those
other objectives and the scientific objectives.
The chairperson should make sure that all
objectives are clear, understood and agreed
to by the attendees.
The project manager should present a
complete schedule, extending from the PDR
through the Critical Design Review, on
through development, testing and calibra-
tion of the instruments and continue on to
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launch operations, data analysis and publi-
cation or use of the results. Slack time should
be clearly shown. Even though detailed
plans for operation and data analysis may
not be complete at this time, the systems
engineering process should have produced a
list of the facilities required and a schedule
for their use. Very often, the examination of
the mission's schedule at the PDR will un-
cover potential conflicts for the use of facili-
ties or an underestimate of the cost of some
phase of the mission.
The chairperson reviews the status of
each instrument. Ideally, the review of an in-
strument will consist of two parts, a presen-
tation by the principal investigator followed
by the project scientist's assessment of the
status of the instrument. The principal in-
vestigator should describe the experiment,
its objectives and how they relate to the
objectives of the mission. The principal in-
vestigator should describe the instrument,
show the schedule and slack times, and
present a cost breakdown and a funding
schedule. The investigator should identify
any issues with the project manager, includ-
ing any foreseeable technical and procure-
ment problems, and list the top four or five
problems. The project scientist should then
give the project's view of the status of the
instrument and should state whether the
project agrees with the status as presented
by the investigator. The project scientist
should present any concerns the project has
about the principal investigator, the team,
the institution or the contractor.
This review by the project scientist at the
PDR should not lead to a confrontation be-
tween the principal investigator and the pro-
ject scientist or the project manager; through
earlier discussions, each should be aware of
what the other intends to say; each should be
aware of the concerns of the other and at the
review they should present a jointly devel-
oped plan to solve the problems that exist.
The project manager and the principal inves-
tigator should understand and accept the
actions that the other intends to take to
resolve the problems. If the investigator has
only a tentative approval to fly on the mis-
sion, then the actions and milestones should
be specified that will lead to final acceptance
or rejection.
The project manager or the manager's
designee should review the status of the
other elements of the mission, their sched-
ules and problems. If the cost or configura-
tion of a subsystem is being determined by a
requirement of a particular investigation,
that fact should be presented so that senior
management and the principal investigator
can decide whether the particular aspect of
the investigation merits the additional cost
or complexity.
The project team should present an over-
all assessment of the instruments and their
interaction with each other and with the
subsystems on the spacecraft. The project
manager may elect to divide the experiments
into two groups: one group consisting of
those investigations in which the design of
the instrument is on schedule, within bud-
get, and the investigator is not in need of
careful monitoring; the second group consist-
ing of those instruments that have major
problems, that will require careful monitor-
ing and perhaps even a backup instrument.
The project manager should review the
status of the resources available to the pro-
ject, the reserves that are being held and the
schedule for their release. At the conclusion
of the PDR, the project manager should
identify the top 10 problems for the overall
project and describe plans to resolve them.
At the conclusion of the PDR, all the
participantsmHeadquarters, Center man-
agement, the project team, the principal
investigators and the subsystem managersm
should all understand and accept the status
and requirements of the investigations
scheduled for the mission. The principal
investigators should agree with the status of
their experiment as presented, and they
should understand and be prepared to accept
the requirements and meet the schedules
that have been placed on them by the project.
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Once the actions that were assigned to the
project and the investigators by the PDR
have been completed, the requirements of
the investigators should be incorporated into
the systems engineering process. The project
team and the investigators are then ready to
proceed with the detailed design and manu-
facture of the instruments and the space-
craft.
The majority of the systems engineering
effort required to incorporate the user re-
quirements should be complete at this time.
Normal project management and engineer-
ing techniques should be adequate to com-
plete the integration of the investigators into
the mission. There will, however, be a
continuing need for systems engineers to
support the project team. No matter how
good and how complete the systems engi-
neering effort has been, and how carefully
the PDR is conducted, problems will still be
encountered in the instruments or in the
subsystems and changes will have to be
made. The systems engineer will have to
trace the impact of those changes through
the system, identify the problems that are
created and provide the options for their
solution. Inevitably, there will be a shortage
of resources available--additional power or
weight required--and the systems engineer
will have to assess the system to see how the
resources can be found and analyze the im-
pact of using those resources. Occasionally,
excess resources will become available; the
systems engineer will have to examine these
extra reserves and determine how they can
best be applied to enhance the quality of the
mission.
As the work progresses, the engineers
will eventually understand the instruments
and their spacecraft, their designs will be
frozen, all the options will be eliminated and
the systems engineer will no longer be need-
ed. Sometime before this stage is reached,
the good systems engineers will become
bored and will move on to a new system with
new challenges.
GLOSSARY
Mission. An effort to increase human knowl-
edge that requires the launch of one or more
spacecraft. A mission begins with the initial
concept and concludes with the publication of
the results.
System. All the tasks and all the equipment,
both ground and space based, required to ac-
complish a mission.
Systems engineering. The systematic
planning activity that begins with the mis-
sion objectives and the requirements of the
scientists and turns them into specifications
for hardware and facilities, conducts tradeoff
studies between competing subsystems, ana-
lyzes the interaction between the subsys-
tems to eliminate unwanted interference,
and prepares schedules, cost estimates and
funding plans.
Program. The formulation and documenta-
tion of a mission prepared by NASA Head-
quarters and used to obtain authorization
and funding from Congress to conduct the
mission.
Project. All the equipment produced or pur-
chased by, and all the activity conducted and
directed by, a NASA Center to accomplish a
mission.
Division director. An individual at NASA
Headquarters responsible for a group of re-
lated scientific programs.
Program manager. A person, usually an
engineer, at NASA Headquarters in charge
of a program. A program manager reports to
a division director.
Program scientist. A scientist at NASA
Headquarters responsible for formulating
the scientific objectives of a program. A pro-
gram scientist reports to a division director.
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Project manager. The person, usually an
engineer, at a NASA Center who is responsi-
ble for the success of a project. The project
manager reports to the senior management
of the Center.
Project scientist. The scientist at a NASA
Center responsible for accomplishing the
scientific objectives of a project. The project
scientist reports to the senior management
of the Center.
Principal investigator. A scientist, select-
ed by NASA Headquarters, to conduct an
experiment during a mission.
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SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND INTEGRATION PROCESSES
INVOLVED WITH MANNED MISSION OPERATIONS /
by Eugene F. Kranz and Christopher C. Kraft /f_'_ _-_'I I
The quality of the systems engineering and the early Mercury program to the mature
integration (SE&I) process determines the and structured process used for Apollo. The
viability, effectiveness and the survivability flight experience of the Mercury program re-
of major NASA flight programs. In mission vealed the need for a deeper knowledge of
operations, SE&I is the process by which the spacecraft systems by flight operations
technical, operational, economic and politi- teams. It further indicated a need for
cal aspects of programs are integrated to systems documentation tailored to the opera-
support the program objectives and require- tor's real-time task. By the completion of
ments consistent with sound engineering, Mercury, a systems handbook had been
design and operations management princi- developed as an "on-console," real-time docu-
ples. ment for flight systems data. Direct commu-
Major flight programs involve operation- nication was established between the operat-
al, cost, and political elements and priorities, ing team and the manufacturer so that any
international prerogatives, and often poorly additional systems data needed during the
focused utilization requirements, in addition course of the mission could be obtained. This
to traditional technical trades, technology communication also provided a means for
utilization, and interface definition and con- getting engineering judgment on operational
trol. This combination demands an effective trades, whenever time permitted. The flight
SE&I process that spans and involves all rules became the focus of operational poli-
these elements, cies.
SE&I, therefore, is a distributed process The Gemini program required the devel-
that involves the structuring and integrated opment of the trajectory capabilities needed
management of a program within and be- for rendezvous and docking, as well as a
tween the program, project and technical guided reentry capability. These require-
levels, with a life cycle consistent with the ments established the linkage between tra-
program phase. SE&I must anticipate pro- jectory; guidance, navigation and control
gram needs by providing clear technical (GNC) systems; and propulsive consumables.
assessments, trades and alternatives aimed The Gemini extravehicular activity (EVA)
at satisfying the program objectives and increased awareness of the relationship be-
requirements, tween crew, the task and the working envi-
This paper will describe the key princi- ronment.
ples and processes used within mission oper- During Apollo, science became the final
ations, emphasizing the pre-mission prep- mission component supported by the oper-
aration activities most useful for describing ations teams. The Apollo operations team
the principles of an effective SE&I process, worked in an integrated fashion on all issues
involving flight systems, flight design,
EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF MISSION science and manned operations.
OPERATIONS It was during the Skylab program that
the first formal and broad-scale application
The development of mission operations capa- of the mission operations (SE&I) process
bilities for manned space flight involved a emerged to support the early flight system
rapid evolution from the traditional method hardware and software design. During the
of aircraft flight test operations used during Skylab design reviews, many of the review
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item discrepancies (RIDs) revealed the need
for much closer relations between systems
design and operational utilization.
The multiple Skylab systems elements,
combined with the broad spectrum of scienti-
fic objectives and the complexity of manned
and unmanned flight, required an early and
effective relationship between flight systems
designer, scientist-user and mission oper-
ations. A Johnson Space Center (JSC) oper-
ations team and a Marshall Space Flight
Center (MSFC) engineering team joined to
conduct a series of systems operations com-
patibility assessment reviews (SOCARs).
During these and all subsequent reviews, the
Skylab systems and software handbooks pro-
duced by mission operations were used as the
baseline reference documentation for the
SOCAR. These documents were also used by
the JSC and MSFC teams for the flight phase
of the program. Skylab real-time operations
demonstrated the effectiveness of this rela-
tionship between the JSC and MSFC teams.
The mission operations team supported
the design and development phase of the
Space Shuttle program at the program and
project levels and helped develop operational
workarounds for flight systems and software
deficiencies that could not be corrected be-
fore the flight test phase of the program.
MISSION OPERATIONS STRUCTURE
management, avoiding conflicting priorities
and providing leadership focus. The only
exception is a Flight Design and Dynamics
Division (FDDD), which provides integrated
flight design for the Shuttle and all pro-
grams using Shuttle services.
Each division is responsible for integra-
tion within its work area and provides
mission operations representation to the
project-level boards. Program-level boards
are generally supported through the Flight
Director Office, by the Operations Division
and by the FDDD. Integration between pro-
grams is accomplished by the MOD assistant
directors for the Shuttle and for the Space
Station.
In addition to the internal integration
process, each division generally has a hori-
zontal integration responsibility that identi-
fies, collects and documents the capabilities
and constraints imposed by other elements.
This integration process frequently incorpo-
rates participants external to mission oper-
ations (for example, participants from the
program and the project), as well as the
flight system contractor and the payload
user. In most cases, this is accomplished by
mission operations directed panels that are
chartered by the program.
INTRODUCTION TO MISSION OPERATIONS
SE&I
The Mission Operations Directorate (MOD)
at the Johnson Space Center is highly inte-
grated and structured around the principal
skills needed for mission preparation, plan-
ning, training, reconfiguration, facility de-
velopment, facility operations and real-time
flight operations.
Each mission operations element consists
of a single functional discipline, e.g., mission
design, flight systems, reconfiguration,
training, etc. Usually each organizational
element is structured to provide dedicated
support to either the Shuttle or Space Sta-
tion. This is believed to be the best way for
assuring accountability in individuals and
This paper will discuss three mission oper-
ations functions that are illustrative of the
key principles of operations SE&I and of the
processes and products involved.
• The flight systems process was selected to
illustrate the role of the systems product
line in developing the depth and cross-
disciplinary skills needed for SE&I and
providing the foundation for dialogue
between participating elements.
• FDDD was selected to illustrate the need
for a structured process to assure that
SE&I provides complete and accurate
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results that consistently support program
needs.
The flight director's role in mission oper-
ations was selected to illustrate the com-
plexity of the risk/gain tradeoffs involved
in the development of the flight tech-
niques and flight rules process as well as
the absolute importance of the leadership
role in developing the technical, oper-
ational, and political trades.
Flight Systems Division SE&I
The early Mercury program employed a mix-
ture of operations and engineering personnel
to support the real-time operations. Later,
flight experience established the need for a
full-time systems operations team. The need
for an integrated compilation of flight sys-
tem data usable by the crew and ground
team for real-time operations led to early
versions of the systems handbooks that are
the foundation for today's handbooks. Rudi-
mentary integrated schematics were used for
Gemini, but with the Apollo program came
more complex inflight computing capability.
Consequently, the schematics were expand-
ed to define the computer interfaces and used
significantly more of the vehicle design and
performance data base within the schematic
notes.
As mentioned earlier, the schematics
were used for the first time to support the
Skylab critical design reviews and the
SOCAR. During these reviews, program and
project management recognized that the sys-
tems operations teams and the systems
handbooks were an SE&I asset. The modu-
larity of the Skylab elements, along with the
integrated nature of the systems, established
the pre-mission role for the systems hand-
books to support the flight system design
review process as an integrated activity. The
usefulness of the handbooks in addressing
integrated systems issues was thus formally
established. For the Apollo Soyuz Test Pro-
gram (ASTP), and the Shuttle and Spacelab
programs, the preliminary version of the
mission operations schematics were complet-
ed prior to the flight system critical design
review (CDR) and were used as the founda-
tion for the mission operations assessments.
The Systems Handbook Today
Mission operations schematics are developed
by the controllers to a common set of internal
drafting standards and conventions and use
the design engineering drawings, vendor
schematics and software source code. For the
Shuttle, operations personnel were required
to develop Houston Aerospace Language/
Shuttle software language skills as a job
requirement. Permanent, prime contractor,
in-house and in-plant support assures the
flow of the raw design data and provides the
communications conduit between the sys-
tems operations personnel and the prime
contractor design engineers so they can ad-
dress questions as they arise. After the STS-
51L accident, all handbook schematics were
expanded to provide direct traceability to
design drawings by title, drawing number,
revision and date.
The systems controllers who develop the
schematics derive significant training from
using design data and translating this data
into an operationally useful format. The
schematic development and the integration
of data from supporting systems and subsys-
tems provides independent validation of the
system design intent. In particular, it identi-
fies issues where the integrated design may
have compromised the program intent. The
drawing configuration control process re-
quires verification by section and branch
chiefs and final approval by the division
chief. Formal reviews are conducted before
major handbook releases. As a result, the op-
erator and the supervisory chain derive a
training benefit from the systems handbook
process.
The systems handbooks are used by
crews, flight directors, training instructors
and mission operations payload support per-
sonnel. They are a formal portion of training
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documentation and are carried in the Shuttle
flight data file. The schematics support
airborne system troubleshooting and provide
a common base for the crew and the ground
to discuss suspected problems and follow-on
actions. They provide the basis for MOD dis-
cussion with the contractor engineering
team and with the mission support team.
Flight Procedures. The development of the
systems handbook provided the foundation
for the development of flight procedures.
Three basic categories of flight procedures
are developed: the operations checklists, the
pocket checklists and the malfunction proce-
dures.
The operations checklist procedures allow
the crew and ground systems operations to
accomplish a planned activity and are nor-
mally developed as blocks of integrated sys-
tems activities; for example, aligning the
inertial measurement unit. Procedures de-
velopment requires intimate familiarity
with the system; its interfaces, controls, and
displays; and with the intended task to be
accomplished. Operations checklist proce-
dures cross all systems and technical disci-
plines, and as a result of their development,
provide another level of systems integration
and design validation. Procedures associated
with an Orbital Maneuvering Subsystem
burn, for example, involve loading the ma-
neuver targets into the computer, selecting
and configuring engines for the burn, acti-
vating the correct digital autopilot, selecting
displays, and specifying of data to be record-
ed.
Pocket checklists are emergency proce-
dures based on the operations checklist. The
term "pocket" is used because the checklists
must be readily available for critical mission
phases and are sized to be carried by the crew
in the pockets of their flight suits.
The pocket checklist procedures define
the steps to be taken when an unplanned
event occurs. These procedures address
critical failures and are flight-phase unique.
They require knowledge of system perfor-
mance limits, crew capabilities, failure
modes, and crew and ground response times.
The emergency procedures therefore provide
a bridge from operations checklist proce-
dures into options that allow the crew to con-
tinue the current flight phase with modifica-
tion, to reconfigure to recover capabilities, or
to utilize an alternate capability. Figure i is
a typical procedure used during powered
flight for a main B undervolt condition.
The final type of flight procedures devel-
oped by the controllers are the malfunction
procedures (MALS), which are used when
time is available to troubleshoot, locate and
define the boundaries of problems that occur
inflight. To solve the problem, the crew and
ground use the full range of instrumentation
available and any visual or external cues
available. The procedures are developed in a
logical format using a series of "if," "and,"
and "or" statements. Warning notes are pro-
vided, as well as permissive steps when
ground and crew consultation is required pri-
or to continuing the procedural sequence.
These procedures have allowed the correct
isolation of the majority of inflight problems
for the Shuttle program.
A final category of flight procedures con-
cern payload operations and involve multiple
flight elements.
Flight Systems Organizations. Since
Gemini, the MOD flight systems organiza-
tions have been structured to address a
complete space system. Examples include
command service module, lunar module and
Shuttle. Each section within an organization
has responsibility for an assigned system,
with its subsystems, software, instrumen-
tation, display, crew controls, command
controls, procedures, mechanical, power,
cooling, and thermal and consumable inter-
faces. During the Skylab program, each or-
ganization also had to know about inflight
maintenance and support logistics.
The systems organizations of the MOD
participate in flight systems design via for-
mal membership on the working groups,
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panels and boards established by the pro-
gram office. During the early design phase,
they establish the data base for the develop-
ment of schematics and procedures for the
flight controllers. Because of this, direct con-
tractor liaison is maintained within the
MOD systems organization and in-plant.
Development of the mission product line
by the systems flight controllers increases
their skills and knowledge. In addition, the
product line focuses the operations assess-
ments of overall flight system architecture
and provides the foundation for subsequent
steps. Finally, as a recognized product, it is
used by several groups in support of their
individual responsibilities. Program SE&I
products typically must exhibit the same
characteristics--they must pass the value-
added test.
The systems operations contribution to
the early design and eventual operation of
the flight system has been essential in assur-
ing safe, effective and functional system
capability for space flight. The perspective of
the systems operator provides the cross-
disciplinary assessment needed to assure ef-
fective overall systems engineering and
integration. This perspective is the corner-
stone of the real-time capability of the man-
ned spaceflight operations team.
Flight Design Division SE&I
The flight design process involves the inte-
gration of payload and engineering require-
ments with mission objectives to form an
integrated mission design. The flight design
must satisfy both Shuttle system design and
payload design constraints while considering
the additional constraints imposed in consid-
eration of safe mission conduct and mission
success.
The flight design process is a critical node
in the Shuttle mission preparation process.
In addition to flight design, the process
provides initialization data for the ground
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facilities, Shuttle primary and backup soft-
ware, flight and payload planning, and real-
time decision support products.
Within the flight design and dynamics
discipline there are three mission phase ana-
lysis and design work areas--ascent, orbit
and descent--and one functional area--real-
time operations. The FDD, working in
coordination with other mission operations
elements, establishes and integrates the
propulsive and non-propulsive consumables,
abort propellant dump analysis, and manip-
ulator requirements and analysis into the
overall flight design. The overall integration
of activities supporting a mission is provided
by a flight design manager.
The flight design process acquires a vast
amount of input data from a wide variety of
sources. The input data for the early phase of
the program is typical specification data, but
during the operational phase of the program
it becomes highly flight specific and fre-
quently component specific. A good example
would be constraints for engine throttling
related to a specific Space Shuttle Main
Engine turbo pump.
Flight Design Cycles. The flight design
process has three principal cycles designed to
satisfy the requirements and lead times of
the many users. The conceptual flight profile
cycle provides the program office with data
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for making commitments to the payload
customers and assessing the overall suitabil-
ity of the operations flight design approach.
The engineering cycle supports the ini-
tialization of the engineering and test facili-
ties as well as the initial shuttle mission
simulator (SMS) training load. The flight
cycle supports MCC and SMS initialization
for final training and operations, Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) Launch Processing
System checkout and launch support, God-
dard Space Flight Center network support,
and range safety. The flight design cycles are
under review to determine if a single cycle
could be used to satisfy all user require-
ments. This latter objective requires signifi-
cant standardization within the program,
improved and timely provision of payload
specific data and significant training stan-
dardization.
Flight Design Documentation. The flight
design process is the last of the mission oper-
ations processes to be documented as a
structured flow from the conceptual phase
through the delivery of the launch-loads
used for flight. The full documentation of
these processes is now contained in 22 vol-
umes of flight design handbooks. Documen-
tation was undertaken to serve four distinct
objectives: (1) document the corporate mem-
ory of this process before it is lost; (2) estab-
lish an error- and omission-free process,
necessary because of the critical nature and
use of the flight design products; (3) support
the design of an integrated computing sys-
tem as an aid to support the flight design
process; and (4) assure consistent design and
rationale between similar missions.
The two years after the STS-51L accident
were used to safe the flight design system,
document the process and initiate a multi-
year plan for code conversion, consolidation,
documentation and configuration control of
all applications software. Process flow charts
were developed for every activity involved in
the flight design analysis and production
activity.
The flight design handbooks developed
during recent years have documented the
flight design SE&I process and, to a great
extent, represent the structure and relation-
ships that must exist to incorporate integrat-
ed trajectory design into any space program.
These documents are invaluable examples of
the structure and approach needed for fur-
ther space exploration activity. They also
provide a good textbook for personnel in-
volved in SE&I management to describe the
relation between trajectory, systems, soft-
ware and objective data. In addition, they
define input/output requirements, integra-
tion nodes, audit points and interfaces to
external elements for data acquisition and
transfer.
An Illustration of the Flight Design Pro-
cess. The integration of the constraints im-
posed by the flight system, environment,
payload and operations in the determination
of the launch window will be used to illus-
trate one aspect of the flight design process.
The launch window is the time period
that the Shuttle should launch to achieve
precise program requirements. This activity
is described in the flight design handbook via
three processes that satisfy Shuttle and
payload requirements. These processes are
further combined and iterated to develop the
integrated launch window. This initial step
of the process provides input data for subse-
quent planning involving deorbit opportuni-
ties, sequence of events, pointing, thermal
assessments and so forth.
The constraints imposed in launch win-
dow determination represent the broad
range of considerations faced by the flight
designer in this task. Where practicable,
priorities are established to assist the flight
designer. The actual development of the
launch window analyses is governed by a 27-
page procedure within the flight design
handbook.
Flight design is an essential element for
space flight. The documentation of this pro-
cess captured what was in the minds of the
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talented and imaginative individuals work-
ing in this field, and provided the definitive
text for future flight design work for space
exploration.
For the Space Station Freedom program,
MOD has developed process flow charts for
all functions that describe the input/output
activities within mission operations and be-
tween mission operations and the Level II
program elements, MSFC, KSC, GSFC and
international partners. These flow charts de-
scribed interfaces, product exchanges and
work templates. They were used to define the
roles and mission boundaries needed for sus-
tained and effective relationships between
participants. Documentation of the SE&I
process is absolutely essential to clear and
effective role and responsibility definition,
and is a primary step in minimizing jurisdic-
tional battles between SE&I elements.
Flight Directors SE&I
The mission operations SE&I process uses
the Flight Director Office to provide the top
level, multidisciplinary integration, risk/
gain assessment and validation of the inte-
grated mission preparation.
Flight directors are selected from the
ranks of MOD personnel. Selection is based
on leadership, technical abilities, stability
and judgment as established by their perfor-
mance during flight operations. They are
already intimately familiar with the operat-
ing disciplines, interfaces, flight and ground
systems capabilities, crew capabilities and
the mission risk/gain process. The challenge
for the flight directors is acquiring and
maintaining the clear perspective needed for
multidisciplinary technical, operational and
political trades and leading the many di-
verse elements to operationally correct risk/
gain decisions.
The lead flight director is central to the
process for the assigned missions.
Pre-CDR Support. Support to a program
from the Flight Director Office is initiated
between the preliminary design reviews
(PDRs) and CDRs. This phase is character-
ized by major tradeoffs between program
requirements, flight system design, crew and
ground and customer roles, schedule and
cost. During this period the flight director,
supported by all mission operations ele-
ments, refines the operating _concepts and
leads the operational trades involving auton-
omy, fault tolerance, crew and ground func-
tions, and flight design and payload suppor-
tability. As flight system design becomes
more focused during this period, the program
costs and the real world design trades con-
verge and program tradeoffs must be imple-
mented. As a result, the mission operations
integration process is initiated to provide the
program and project managers with a clear
understanding of available options. The op-
tions are generally provided by in the form of
operations compatibility studies, similar to
the SOCARs described previously, or in the
form of an integrated mission design assess-
ment.
CDR Support. The CDR support to the
program from the mission operations team is
significantly different because of the avail-
ability of the mission operations flight
systems handbooks and the increased knowl-
edge of the team. The operations team has
acquired significant experience in working
with the program and project as a member of
the change control board (CCB) and through
the CCB processes. The CDR represents a
milestone for reassessing the design and is
frequently the first time that the maturity of
the software begins to approach the maturity
of the hardware.
The principal contribution from mission
operations during this time is in the detailed
operational suitability assessments. These
assessments concern the mission suitability
of the flight system design and involve pro-
gram requirements, hardware and software
design, mission design, and crew and ground
capabilities. Through these assessments the
preliminary risk/gain trades and fault down
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options are established, operating philos-
ophies are defined and mission options ascer-
tained. Within mission operations, the CDR
is not a discrete process. It is considered one
of the many milestones of a process charac-
terized by an increasing involvement by
operations personnel in the change boards
and control mechanisms established by the
program. The involvement extends to the
flight preparation period, which has two dis-
tinct processes and products representative
of the flight director's role in the mission
operations SE&I. These processes involve
flight techniques and flight rules.
Flight Techniques. The initial flight tech-
niques process was developed, and since
Apollo, has been chartered by the Level II
program. The process was established to
address the growing complexity of the inter-
action between flight software, flight system
and flight objectives. This process provided
the technical focus for the operations, engi-
neering and contractor teams to address the
use of the as-built flight system, the soft-
ware, and the crew and ground capabilities
in accomplishing flight objectives. During
Apollo, the ground system, flight procedures
and flight software were the only elements
that could be readily changed within cost
and schedule considerations. The flight tech-
niques process, assisted by Draper Laborato-
ries and the operational vehicle and software
developers, established virtually all of the
navigation capabilities for Apollo. They
developed the technique for the Apollo 12
pinpoint landing and were a principal contri-
butor to the Apollo 13 return.
The product line of the techniques process
is initially the series of detailed meeting
minutes, which provide the basis for flight
procedures and the rationale for the majority
of the flight rules and mission design con-
straints. The flight techniques process pro-
vides the integration of the knowledge base
available on the flight system to drive flight
designs, procedures and flight rules.
Flight Rules. Flight rules are the funda-
mental risk/gain policy document for mis-
sion conduct. The "flight rules outline
preplanned decisions to minimize the
amount of real-time rationalization required
when non-nominal situations occur from the
start of the terminal countdown through
crew egress."
The most complex, difficult and critical of
the integration processes provided by the
Flight Director Office is flight rules develop-
ment. Flight rules used today trace their
beginnings to aircraft flight tests. Rudimen-
tary guidelines were provided for the flight
test pilots relative to test conditions, and go-
no-go criteria were provided for test continu-
ation or termination. Similarly, during
Mercury the rules for selected systems fail-
ures were also a simple set of go-no-go crite-
ria involving powered flight abort and
mission continuation or termination. Rules
also addressed the control center, network
and flight instrumentation requirements.
Today's flight rules involve sophisticated
risk/gain trades across redundant systems,
multiple mission phases, engineering and
payload objectives, and crew and controller
capabilities. They also reflect and tradeoff
the payload objectives, crew adaptation and
flight system survivability in defining mis-
sion duration for off-normal conditions.
Additionally, they clearly define the respon-
sibilities of key personnel implementing
flight operations.
While the rules are infinitely more com-
plex, the principle of the rules remains the
same; that is, "to establish the risk versus
gain trades" before the mission, utilizing the
full range of operational, program and engi-
neering judgment available in the pre-
mission environment.
To assure complete visibility to all trade-
offs involved in the flight rules, rule ratio-
nale, techniques data and Systems Oper-
ations Data Book (SODB), references are
contained in the published rules. The SODB
and its variants were developed during
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Figure 3 Mission Operations Integration
Gemini by mission operators with support by
the prime contractor for the purpose of docu-
menting the performance capabilities and
limitations of the flight system. Since
Apollo, the SODB has been maintained by
the prime contractor, with mission oper-
ations as the primary user.
The leadership function provided by the
flight director, using the flight techniques
and flight rules process, provides the focus
for the integration of flight-specific work
within mission operations.
The rules and rationale section in the all-
flights document is almost 900 pages. The
flight-specific annex published for each
mission is about 70 pages. It is provided to
address the flight-unique objective and
payload risk/gain trades for each specific
mission, flight objective and payload ele-
ment.
Flight directors, like program and project
managers, depend on a matrix structure of
organizations to accomplish their responsi-
bilities. The flight directors are consistently
successful because their roles are well
defined, and because the integration tech-
niques are facilitated by the MOD organiza-
tion structure as well as by clearly defined
product line and support processes. These
characteristics must exist to successfully
cope with the complex issues imposed by all
mission elements.
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PRINCIPAL REQUIREMENTS OF AN
EFFECTIVE SE&I PROCESS
The mission operations elements, processes,
and products are oriented to the singular ob-
jective of safe and successful manned flight
operations. The spacecraft on the drawing
board, like the ship in a harbor, is a safe
ship, but that is not what spacecraft and
ships are for. The mission operations job is to
take the spacecraft from the harbor of the
drawing board into space, accomplish a mis-
sion and then safely return the spacecraft to
Earth.
In recognition of this responsibility, the
mission operations processes are structured
to assure effective policy, objective, system
and operations integration. Within this
framework, complex risk/gain trades are
conducted and validated at all levels, culmi-
nating in a completely independent and
dynamic assessment and stress test during
the integrated training process.
The mission operations process can illus-
trate the principles necessary to a successful
SE&I. It is believed that these principles are
useful to other SE&I elements that have the
responsibility for NASA flight programs at
the project and program level.
1. SE&I must have necessary roles and
missions that are clearly defined by the pro-
gram and implemented by the project and
technical organizations.
SE&I is necessary because the integra-
tion processes needed to address the techni-
cal, operational, political and economic
aspects of major programs are complex.
The value-added principle is the basic
test that should be used in determining role
and mission assignments.
SE&I by its nature will be controversial
and participating elements may stonewall
the process. When this occurs, the program,
project or technical manager must quickly
and personally address the issue, establish a
program position and demand the support
required.
2. SE&I must utilize the existing capabil-
ities of organizations.
SE&I is the "integration" of the techni-
cal, operational, economic and political as-
pects needed to support a major program.
The broad range of work, skills required and
complexity of issues virtually precludes the
development of a single SE&I organization
for a major program. SE&I responsibility
must be distributed to be successful.
3. SE&I elements must recognize and ac-
cept that major and complex programs will
involve technical, operational, political and
economic needs.
Major programs must address and sup-
port the needs of the various constituencies
involved in establishing the program and
must consider all of the economic issues
involved in program development and
operations. This recognition is essential if
NASA and its contractors are to develop a
more flexible and responsive approach to
program management.
4. SE&I must have a process-based struc-
ture and a defined product line and life cycle.
The complexity of SE&I requires a struc-
tured process to assure all interfaces are ad-
dressed, proper responsibilities assigned,
and SE&I is effectively mechanized. SE&I
requires a solid grasp of all the elements to
be brought together, where the elements
logically come from, where they fit in the
sequence, what the end product is and what
the alternatives are.
SE&I can be accomplished by a few gifted
people for a limited time, but without
structured processes, SE&I will become
inefficient, outputs will not meet schedule
commitments, "more integration resources
will be needed, and the downward spiral will
begin." SE&I is not provided by massive ap-
plication of resources. It comes about by
structured processes that clearly establish
the roles and responsibilities of the support-
ing elements and use them effectively.
The SE&I process definition is also used
to establish the product line of participating
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elements and define input/output require-
ments. This product line must be phased to
the life cycle of the program.
5. SE&I leadership must exist within all
elements of the SE&I process structure and
must be clearly recognized and accepted by
the assigned individuals and their organiza-
tions.
Accepting an SE&I leadership role is to
recognize and accept conflict, particularly in
the project and technical organizations.
Organizations assigned an SE&I role must
recognize and accept the technical, oper-
ational, political and economic implications
of the SE&I role. SE&I must address the
needs of the program, which must supersede
the needs of individuals and organizations.
SE&I within NASA's flight programs is a
constantly evolving and complex process
involving many conflicting requirements
that must be brought together to support
program needs throughout the program's life
cycle. An SE&I process that is effectively
structured with distributed responsibilities
will support program needs and recognize
many of the prerogatives of the existing
NASA elements. Each complex program,
however, will have some elements that do
not fit neatly into the existing NASA
infrastructure because of economic, political
or other considerations. SE&I will always be
controversial, in structure and in implemen-
tation.
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by Robert O. Aller (0 /
Operations support as considered here is the
infrastructure of people, procedures, facili-
ties and systems that provide NASA with
the capability to conduct space missions.
This infrastructure involves most of the
Centers but is concentrated principally at
the Johnson Space Center, the Kennedy
Space Center, the Goddard Space Flight
Center, and the Jet Propulsion Laboratory.
It includes mission training and planning,
launch and recovery, mission control, track-
ing, communications, data retrieval and
data processing.
Operations support of NASA's space
flight systems during the 1960s and the
1970s was associated with operations char-
acterized as Research and Development.
Flight programs were a single flight of
limited duration or a series of flights to ob-
tain specific data or to demonstrate an oper-
ational capability. This required operational
support systems to be reactive and respon-
sive to relatively short duration programs.
In the past ten years, this has continued
with some notable exceptions. With ad-
vances in space and data technologies, the
demonstrated capabilities and advantages of
space operations and the increased cost and
complexity of space systems has led to longer
duration and repetitive flight programs. Sys-
tems engineering of operational support sys-
tems must accommodate this evolution and
the increasing operational nature of NASA.
The need for systems engineering is criti-
cal to NASA in its preparations for conduct-
ing operations in the late 1990s and into the
next decade. The planning and implementa-
tion of the operational support systems for
this era are under way. Proper systems
engineering is vital to the development of
each new system, as well as to a "total sys-
tems engineering" of the functionality and
interfaces of the entire operational system.
Implementation, integration and transition
of these major changes to the Agency's oper-
ational capacity require significant manage-
ment attention. To assure NASA's future in
research, development and operations, this
system must be implemented successfully
and designed to minimize NASA's operation-
al costs.
TOTAL SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
The need for incorporation of systems engi-
neering concepts and discipline is much
broader for operations support systems than
the hardware and software systems for
which it is normally considered. As noted,
operations support is an infrastructure of
people, procedures, facilities and systems.
Although systems engineering is routinely
applied to each new system, the major prob-
lems often occur between systems and
frequently among people, procedures and fa-
cilities. A disciplined systems engineering
approach formulating each of these elements
in the establishment of the "system" cannot
be overemphasized. NASA has learned many
times that good system contractors do not
necessarily nurture good operational person-
nel and technicians nor do they necessarily
develop usable maintenance procedures. Ex-
perience has also shown that facilities not
adequately analyzed in conjunction with the
planned utilization of the facilities require
constant modification to meet operational
needs. In considering support capability,
each of the infrastructure elements requires
analysis and carefully managed selection
and attention.
An organizational tier of system analysis
from the whole to each element can be ap-
plied in a macro sense to assure consider-
ation of both technical and nontechnical
systems. A macro analysis of the system
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involves many considerations; two nontech-
nical areas that have often caused problems
are inadequately skilled personnel and un-
derdesigned facilities.
The nature of operations support requires
a spectrum of talents and skill levels. Most
newly developed systems have not properly
analyzed the experience and skill mix need-
ed nor the number of personnel required,
which varies from skilled flight controllers to
maintenance and repair technicians. Too of-
ten a process to analyze the system operation
and system maintenance and repair require-
ments is not properly developed in advance,
resulting in an operations team that is un-
dersized and underskilled.
A second issue is simply undersizing
facilities. While managers operate on the
"nature abhors a vacuum" principle and
insist that each square foot of a new facility
needs clear functional definition, too often
new facilities are found to be inadequately
sized even before they are put into operation.
This is particularly true with new operation-
al systems. Facilities should be designed to
accommodate the unforeseen. Quite often the
unforeseen is a result of an incomplete
analysis of the operational and system
requirements prior to facility design, but
also new requirements will emerge. A contri-
buting difficulty is NASA's facility approval
process, which is instituted before a reliable
utilization analysis is available. It is prudent
to provide capacity for some growth to ac-
commodate new requirements.
Another nontechnical factor that is of
increasing importance to NASA is life cycle
costing (LCC). NASA has not traditionally
incorporated LCC as a critical selection, de-
sign or engineering process. The elements
critical to LCC have all been managed and
considered, but an LCC process has not been
established within NASA or by NASA's con-
tractors as a routine process. LCC was used
as a contract selection factor by NASA for
the first time in 1988 with the selection of
the second Tracking and Data Relay Satel-
lite System (TDRSS) Ground Terminal. It is
rare that a contractor has an established
technique to trade and iterate design cost
against operations costs. LCC needs to be a
driving discipline to assure that the costs of
operating the increasingly more sophisticat-
ed flight systems can be controlled. The
flight systems of today are projected for 15-
20 years of operation. This demands that the
operational support systems be analyzed and
designed to minimize LCC, or the cost of op-
erations will increasingly erode NASA's re-
sources for new development capacity.
NASA and its contractors should establish
more sophisticated models of development,
operations and maintenance costs that will
provide more reliable data for conducting
operations cost trades against alternative
system designs.
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS
Systems engineering for operational support
systems follows the traditional disciplines
applied to the development of major flight
systems. Operational support requirements
need to be translated into performance pa-
rameters and configurations through multi-
ple iterations to optimize system design. The
purview of systems engineering includes
requirements definitions and verification,
system analysis and design, integration
planning, requirements control, configura-
tion control and testing.
While similar to the design and develop-
ment of major flight systems, the emphasis
of the systems engineer for operational sup-
port systems is generally to provide generic
support to an aggregate of flight programs
and the increasing necessity to provide sys-
tems with extended operational usefulness.
This operational longevity can be attained
by systems capable of accommodating
change while continuing to provide service.
The Deep Space Network operated by Jet
Propulsion Laboratory and the Goddard
Space Flight Network are excellent exam-
ples of major systems that have provided
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space flight program support with tracking
and data retrieval service for 30 years, all of
the while undergoing changes to provide
support for increasingly complex missions.
In addition to providing generic support
to many users, a vital characteristic of sup-
port systems is operability. The focus in the
vehicle development community is principal-
ly directed toward designing a system that
optimizes performance; the operations com-
munity's focus is directed more toward an ef-
fective and efficient operation of the system.
Operability emphasizes ease of operation,
resistance to system problems and failures,
maintainability, reparability, simplicity, ef-
ficiency, capacity for growth and modifica-
tion, and accommodation of users.
These two features, multiple program
support and system operability, are key to
assuring the proper systems engineering of
operations support systems. They are
historically the most difficult to sustain as
cost and schedule pressures frequently tend
to compromise the system's range of utility
and operability.
REQUIREMENTS, EVALUATION,
VERIFICATION AND CONTROL
Operations systems development is general-
ly driven by new, expanded or improved
support service required by new flight pro-
grams or expanded program objectives. The
systems engineer needs to challenge user
requirements to assure the "real" needs are
not sacrificed at the expense of low priority,
highly demanding requirements. Occasion-
ally, requirements are driven by the fact
that new technology is available and not
that it is essential (or even desirable) for
effective operation. The systems engineer
must consider the broad base of program
users and not provide a narrow focus of
support that overly complicates or ignores
operations of the aggregate of users.
While sharply defining real needs, it is
equally critical to consider the potential to
provide for future capacity. In the informa-
tion age, the computer (including software),
communications, and electronics industries
have developed new technologies and capa-
bilities often before a flight program's sup-
port requirements are established. The
incorporation of these new services needs
careful examination and scrutiny; when
these new services clearly enable future or
expanded programs, however, the operation-
al community should provide them to
enhance future operations. An example of
capability beyond defined need was clearly
incorporated in the TDRSS program in 1975.
The TDRSS provides capacity and data rates
that will meet the requirements of the 1990s
and well into the next century. It has also
enhanced flight control concepts by greatly
increasing the capability to access and con-
trol spacecraft. If phasing in of added capa-
bilities can be accommodated, it will permit
smoothing of resources and help the budget-
ing process.
Another important consideration of the
systems engineer in the evaluation of sup-
port requirements is the impact these
services will impose on the user. The goal is
always to limit the interface restrictions
imposed on the user program. Two of NASA's
major operating systems have caused major
constraints in their use. The Shuttle Pro-
gram has imposed major safety and integra-
tion complications on deployed payloads and
the TDRSS program has imposed scheduling
and radio frequency interface constraints
that have been restrictive to some users.
Some of these constraints with both the
Shuttle and the TDRSS were intrinsic to
their operational concepts, but some were
avoidable, had operability and utilization
been more completely evaluated.
When developing systems such as the
Shuttle and the TDRSS that represent a
major departure in operating concepts and
expansion of the operational envelope, the
systems engineer needs to broaden analysis
to the entire mission or spectrum of missions
to better define and limit the major compli-
cations to system operations and utilization.
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NASA's experience with both of these pro-
grams has clearly indicated much more ef-
fort is required to operationally understand
the implications of their use. This experience
should be understood and applied in the de-
velopment of the Space Station, the Earth
Observation System, and their associated
support systems in consideration of their
broad utilization objectives.
Requirements verification and control is
generally practiced with all new develop-
ments, but control can be difficult to sustain
throughout an extended development of an
operational support system and its oper-
ational life. Unfortunately, the nature of
flight programs is to evolve operational sup-
port requirements and occasionally to trans-
fer capabilities planned for the flight system
as requirements to the ground support sys-
tems. Careful monitoring and control of
these requirements is essential, particularly
in the development of software support sys-
tems. Requirement changes will constantly
occur, however, and an efficient process to
identify, approve and control requirements is
vital. Clear and precise interface definition
is necessary to enable this control. A detailed
knowledge of the flight programs that intend
to use the support system, as well as an un-
derstanding of other related support systems
(operational support systems rarely provide
the total functional support services), is re-
quired for effective requirements control by
the systems engineer. Interface definition
and control are essential to maintaining
requirements control.
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE AND SOFTWARE
DESIGN
For those operational systems that contain
standard computers and specialized soft-
ware, which are a majority of the ground
systems, a special subset of systems engi-
neering must be performed to obtain the op-
timum hardware and software combination.
The selection of the wrong hardware may
result in software needs that are difficult
and expensive to develop. Similarly, less
expensive hardware solutions may be possi-
ble when the full range of software abilities
is considered. (The designer must always
bear in mind, however, the probable need for
system expansion, which may make the
selection of a more complex hardware ele-
ment the prudent choice since software modi-
fications are generally less costly than
computer replacement.) This analysis of
system architecture may involve the estima-
tion of size, complexity and structure of the
software needed for a series of mainframe
computers.
Management and the systems engineer
must realize the definition, design and
implementation of major software packages
require the same systems management
disciplines and controls as do hardware
components. Because software code can be
easily erased or changed, it does not follow
that changes should be considered any more
lightly than they are for hardware. The
flexibility associated with software is its
greatest asset, but if not well managed and
controlled, it becomes its greatest problem.
Although software design has made aston-
ishing progress over the years, software
development remains a significant problem
to most major systems. The inability of
management to accurately predict software
costs, delivery schedules and performance
has consistently been a severe problem in the
development of major operational systems.
LONG-RANGE REQUIREMENTS
An area often inadequately considered in
the design of a support system is its capacity
for future modification and upgrade as new
technology becomes available and as re-
quirements change over time. Many systems
must continue to provide services while
undergoing these modifications. Proper con-
sideration for redundancy and capacity can
greatly alleviate future expense and compli-
cations. Making assumptions regarding
future support requirements can lead to a
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system design that reasonably accommo-
dates alternative future growth require-
ments. Designs that fail to gracefully accom-
modate change are limited and will lead to a
dead end.
While the Deep Space Network and the
Goddard Space Flight Network have effec-
tively accommodated change, the initial
design of the TDRSS ground station failed to
properly consider the long-term need to mod-
ernize and upgrade. This required extensive
redesign and change at significant cost. A
focus on the current needs may result in
limited system utility, and pressures to
implement the least cost system may con-
strain future expansion and ultimately, be
the least cost effective.
The development of new features or major
changes to operating systems is frequently
implemented with new contractors. General-
ly, if NASA and the systems engineer did not
specifically assure that the original contrac-
tor provided adequate hooks, the new con-
tractor's implementation will be difficult and
costly. The term "transition phase" is ap-
plied by NASA to the period when an online
system is undergoing change while continu-
ing to provide support services. This is a deli-
cate and challenging problem to the systems
engineer and critical in the selection of an
appropriate design. It is important that tran-
sition be planned in conjunction with the
design process and not after the design is
established.
In considering long-range requirements
for operational systems, the type of system,
the importance of support, and accessibility
are major factors. These factors were central
to NASA's decision and ability to sustain the
Deep Space Network (DSN) and the Goddard
Space Tracking Network over their extended
lifetimes while undergoing numerous modi-
fications and changes. The continuous avail-
ability of these sites has been possible
because of the redundancy within each
ground station, a configuration of multiple
sites (redundancy among the ground sta-
tions), and their accessibility. The recent
major rebuilding of the 240-ft. DSN antenna
reflectors prior to the Uranus Encounter was
feasible because each antenna was sequen-
tially modified, and alternate antenna
systems were available at each DSN location
to provide continuous tracking support.
Redundancy within the system--provided
because of the critical nature of tracking and
communications support--and ground sta-
tion accessibility have been critical to
NASA's ability to continuously operate these
networks while modernizing their capabil-
ities.
When considering system changes, space-
based operational support systems present a
different challenge. Two major factors influ-
ence the consideration to changemaccessi-
bility and cost. Cost is directly related to the
lack of direct access. Accessibility is difficult
at best and impractical for most. The Hubble
Space Telescope is accessible at great
expense by using the Shuttle but the TDRSS
satellites are presently inaccessible. The
systems engineering of space-born support
systems must consider the criticality of the
service to be provided, the longevity of the
service (providing adequate redundancy and
projected service requirements), and the lack
of ready access to the system. Satellites can
of course be replaced by an upgraded satel-
lite; systems that use multiple satellites at
multiple locations, however, such as TDRSS,
require identical satellite configurations to
provide orbital coverage as an effective oper-
ational system. Spacecraft replacements are
normally planned to sustain the system
through its projected life with no ground in-
terface and no service changes to the system.
When new services become necessary,
they are expensive and require an extended
period to implement. A space-based system
that consists of several satellites, such as
TDRSS, requires a change to the services of
each satellite in orbit to provide an effective
orbital service to the user. This is consistent
with the practice of upgrading all ground
station locations to the same service configu-
ration; the accessibility makes the upgrade
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of space systems more costly and requires a
much longer time.
NASA is now planning to modify the
TDRSS with a higher data rate KA band
service. The system and budget planning for
this upgrade was begun in earnest in about
1985, and it is anticipated the satellite fleet
will not be in orbit until early in the next
century, a 15- to 20-year period. The TDRSS
will have been operating for 20 years or more
by that time. A similar projection will mean
the replacement system, Advanced TDRSS,
will likely be operating to the year 2020 and
perhaps beyond. It is clear this system will
be as challenging as the original, with new
problems replacing those resolved with
TDRSS. The transition of replacing the
TDRSS systems presents a significant new
challenge not faced with initiating the origi-
nal service. Providing systems engineering
for the Advanced TDRSS to remain viable 20
to 30 years in the future will tax any man-
ager. Systems can no longer be replaced
frequently or modified to meet individual
program desires. Careful and complete sys-
tem analysis and forward-thinking engineer-
ing are essential to the establishment of
durable, effective support systems.
ASSURING OPERABILITY
To succeed in developing a support system
that meets the goals of operability--ease of
operation, failure resistance, maintainabil-
ity, efficiency, expandability and accommo-
dation to usersmrequires continuous effort
and emphasis by the systems engineer. An
oversight and regular review from the opera-
tor's viewpoint will contribute to success.
Both the government and the contractors
should provide an operational position with-
in their program management structure that
is responsible for maximizing the system's
operability. Developments that continuously
focus on the ultimate operation are consis-
tently superior in performance and in total
costs.
The need for NASA to be alert to systems
engineering is more prevalent now than ever
before in NASA's history. The implementa-
tion of new operating systems is planned
throughout the 1990s to prepare the agency
for managing the operations of complex, long
duration and extremely high data rate pro-
grams. The quantity of data the agency will
be processing and managing in the later part
of the decade was unimaginable in the 1960s
and the 1970s. This data will be generated
by programs that will be launched in a
period when NASA will already be operating
and supporting a complex array of flight
vehicles. New ground systems, with evolving
capabilities and changing interfaces, will
come into operation almost continuously
throughout this period. The complex nature
of interaction among these systems demands
a visibility and overarching control that can
only be accomplished through a systems
engineering network. Management and co-
ordination of the individual systems is re-
quired to assure total system functionality,
interface definition, requirements control
and the optimization of each system.
NASA has done an excellent job for the
past 30 years in providing an operations
infrastructure that has met the demands of
exploring space. The next 30 years of space
operations are equally exciting but represent
a far greater challenge. The quality of the
systems engineering of the operations
support team is critical to both the success of
the nation's civil space flight programs and
to sustaining a viable operational role with-
in NASA.
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POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
by John F. Yardley
Most systems engineering courses and text-
books discuss only the engineering aspects of
the subject and are silent about the non-
technical world's influence on the planned
project. This approach, although entirely
satisfactory for many engineering programs,
including smaller NASA programs, leaves
out a significant element affecting large
NASA programs. Some traditionalists be-
lieve these nontechnical aspects should not
even be considered in the systems engineer-
ing process. However, if we take the broad
view that systems engineering should take
into account all significant requirements in
order to produce the proper end-product,
then it should include consideration of those
outside non-technical parties who can levy
requirements on NASA programs. This pa-
per identifies these elements, discusses their
viewpoints and probable influence, and re-
views some past case histories as illustra-
tions of these problems. It also presents some
suggestions for working with these non-
technical groups, which ma) better achieve
overall optimum systems engineering and
integration (SE&I) solutions.
THE NON-TECHNICAL GROUPS
There are many outside parties that provide
inputs to NASA program requirements.
The public at large can have a profound
influence on whether large sums are appro-
priated for NASA's major programs. They
respond to NASA triumphs and disasters
and are sensitive to NASA's role in projec-
ting the American image around the world.
Their influence is exercised by letters to
Congress and the White House, by public
appearances (interviews and speeches, for
example), and through public opinion polls
regarding the space program. All of these
methods influence both the executive and
legislative branches of our government.
The President and his staff are very im-
portant to NASA's programs. They must
make a positive decision to include money for
specific NASA programs in the budget re-
quest before it is even considered by Con-
gress. In these times of large government
deficits, which makes starting new programs
very difficult, NASA is pressured to cut back
requirements and save money. This pressure
even results in the stretch-out and cancella-
tion of some ongoing projects. Sometimes in
negotiations with the Office of Management
and Budget, NASA is asked to choose be-
tween programs.
The Congress is one of the most signifi-
cant groups that has a major impact on
NASA's requirements. In addition to repre-
senting their constituents' opinions, mem-
bers feel it is their duty to closely watch the
details of NASA's large programs. In the last
several decades, they have acquired the tech-
nical staff needed to exercise this detailed
oversight. As a result, they are in a position
to demand program requirement changes,.
and they have the appropriation muscle to
back up their demands. _
The Department of Defense (DoD) and
other national security agencies often get
involved in NASA's programs because they
have agreed to participate in a joint develop-
ment or because they plan to use the end-
product. They are involved in monitoring
NASA's projects from a national security
viewpoint, and they sometimes require
changes in NASA programs if they see
potential security problems. DoD is always
included as a major player in any high-level
White House space study or committee.
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Some NASA partisans feel that certain DoD
offices take a biased view and try to reduce
the NASA program so DoD can play a larger
role in space study.
Other executive departments substan-
tially involved in NASA program matters
include the State Department, the Com-
merce Department, the Transportation
Department, and the Office of Management
and Budget.
Government agencies and national com-
missions that fact-find, study and advise the
executive and legislative branches upon re-
quest include the General Accounting Office,
the Office of Technology Assessment, the
National Academy of Sciences, the National
Academy of Engineering, the National
Research Council, the National Commission
on the Challenger Accident, the Advisory
Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space
Program, and a number of other ad hoc com-
mittees.
International cooperation agreements
often involve political considerations, and
the foreign parties usually desire a part of
the job that interfaces with many of the
mainstream elements. If these agreements
are not structured with the interface prob-
lems in mind, they can have major effects on
systems engineering.
Scientific specialist groups feel they could
more wisely spend the money appropriated
for the large NASA manned space programs
on their own research or on unmanned scien-
tific space programs. This group sometimes
works through "associations" seeking to
plead their case in the media.
Local communities near NASA centers
often inject themselves into the process of
dividing the program work between Centers.
The actual division of work can have a sub-
stantial effect on the efficiency of the collec-
tive NASA effort and can make the systems
engineering effort much more difficult than
a distribution based on technical merits. The
political realities usually result in a "techni-
cally non-optimum" work split.
EXAMPLES FROM THE PAST
History provides examples of political and
institutional influences that illustrate how
these factors affect NASA's programs. After
the first Sputnik launch, the basic thrust to
start the space agency, as well as to initiate
the Mercury Program, came mostly from
Congress, with lukewarm support from the
Eisenhower administration. NASA's foun-
ding organizations, the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), was
used as a technical staff; decisive actions
were primarily political in nature.
During the sixties, the Kennedy Admin-
istration's decision to land astronauts on the
Moon and return them safely was political;
namely, to catch up with the Russians and
get back U.S. world technological leadership.
NASA provided a large part of the technical
staff work, which consisted of preliminary
analyses and estimated success probabil-
ities.
In the case of the Space Shuttle start deci-
sion, interaction increased between systems
engineering and the non-technical world.
Richard Nixon had become President in ear-
ly 1969, just a few months before the lunar
landing. He requested the National Space
Council to study and report on the options for
the next phase of space flight and the long-
term future. NASA was heavily involved in
this year-long study. The report recommend-
ed that development of a Space Station and a
fully reusable Space Shuttle be undertaken
in parallel as the next step in manned space
flight and as the precursor of later lunar
colonies and manned Mars expeditions. At
this point, a political decision was made to
continue study of the Space Shuttle but to
defer the Space Station. Work then proceed-
ed on the Shuttle with Phase A contracts and
then Phase B contracts. It soon became
apparent that the Shuttle development cost
was more than double the original prelimi-
nary estimates used in earlier decision
making. Much interaction ensued between
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NASA, the Office of Management and Bud-
get, and Congress, with NASA trying to get
the added funding commitment. When this
was not forthcoming, the program manage-
ment exhorted the projects to reduce cost
without changing the basic concept.
After more work confirmed that the cost
ceiling could not be achieved with the two-
stage fully reusable Shuttle, it was finally
decided by NASA management that the
concept had to be changed in order to stay
within funding limitations imposed by the
Administration. Phase B contracts were
extended, a major realignment of contractor
teams was required, and the current Space
Shuttle configuration (solid first stage,
parallel burn) emerged. After the Apollo
program and its blank check atmosphere,
NASA was not used to this limited funding
approach.
This process left much to be desired from
many points of view. It delayed the program,
caused a lot of wasted effort, and contractors
formed teams and wasted a lot of their dis-
cretionary funds (estimated at $100 million).
No one is to blame for this, since everyone
was feeling their way in a new environment.
A better process, however, would have been
very worthwhile.
In contrast to the Shuttle, the Space Sta-
tion did have strong support from President
Reagan. This support was not for short-term
political gain but rather because President
Reagan believed it was in the best long-term
interest of the country, despite the fact that
most of the President's cabinet members and
his close advisors were against starting the
space station (Hans Mark's book).
The fragmented nature of the final Space
Station hardware split between Centers
resulted from an intense tug of war for
appropriate shares of the program between
the NASA Centers and their supporting
political communities. Some NASA Centers
felt that much of this struggle was for their
very survival. Others in NASA felt this type
of work distribution was necessary for broad
Congressional support. While the final sys-
tem is probably workable, it certainly is not
considered optimum from a technical or effi-
ciency viewpoint.
MINIMIZING DISRUPTION FROM
POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SOURCES
We have identified many of the outside
sources of SE&I requirements and have
given some examples to illustrate how im-
portant these inputs can be. Although most
of these examples involve major program
changes, many smaller requirements are
questioned and changed. Now we will discuss
methods of dealing with these inputs effi-
ciently, minimizing disruption and avoiding
adversarial relationships with these outside
organizations.
Good two-way communication between
NASA and these outside groups is one of the
major keys to negotiating proper agreements
on these external requirements. In order to
properly deal with these outside inputs, we
need to know what new requirements they
are considering before these requirements
are placed on NASA as irreversible de-
mands. If we wait until then, it is very
probable that we will develop adversarial re-
lationships with the requester who has "gone
public" and will be embarrassed to lose the
argument. This will make the requestor very
difficult to deal with during subsequent
negotiations.
This means NASA must be organized and
managed in a manner that facilitates com-
munication of both internal and external
pertinent information.
Most of these outside inputs are discussed
at lower levels during interface or coordina-
tion meetings as "what ifs." They rarely first
surface at the NASA decision level in the
program office or the SE&I management.
This means that the lower-level NASA peo-
ple interfacing with outside organizations
must be trained to recognize these potential
inputs at the beginning, and the overall
NASA organization must have good commu-
nications at all levels so these issues can get
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to the appropriate level early, a strategy can
be developed, special analyses can be per-
formed, and contacts to discuss the issues
can be planned.
When preparing the material for discus-
sion with the requester, NASA must be very
careful to consider the requestor's point of
view objectively and not just from the NASA
parochial viewpoint of pure engineering
ease, i.e., the "invented here" syndrome or
the "bad for the Center" rationale. NASA
must remember it is not the user or the own-
er but rather the implementor of someone
else's requirements. When presenting the
material, NASA must be careful to avoid
patronizing the requester. If the requestor
senses a patronizing attitude, the relation-
ship rapidly becomes adversarial.
It is also important for NASA to advise
and sell the appropriate outside groups on
any requirement changes they feel are neces-
sary before the action has been taken beyond
the point of reasonable return. This is par-
ticularly true when NASA wants to relax
requirements that were important to outside
groups once the program was begun. Many
examples exist where Congress finds out
after the fact that the program can no longer
meet the planned launch rate or some other
fundamental requirement, and the original
"NASA promise" must be broken. This has a
very negative effect on rapport with Con-
gress, the scientific community or any other
major stakeholder. It is therefore important
to level with these outside groups as quickly
as possible after deciding to revise a basic
requirement.
NASA must also develop harmonious re-
lationships with the pertinent outside groups
and individuals. This can be done, among
other ways, using a network of committees or
scheduled small meetings among selected
individuals. The important thing is to plan
for relationships and have the meetings reg-
ularly. These meetings should be used to
bring the groups up to date, to permit them
to ask questions and critique the activity, to
smoke out impending requirements, changes
or additions, and to develop rapport. While
doing these things, it is very important for
NASA individuals to come across as open,
forthright, and on top of their jobs. If the out-
side participants sense ulterior motives that
are not discussed, or evasiveness and bluff-
ing, trust cannot develop. In fact, many of
these groups currently have a "corporate
memory," which includes perceptions of
many NASA Center biases. These must be
overcome by careful and fair negotiations,
bending over backward to diffuse any biased
reputation.
NASA Centers have tended to think of
many of these non-technical meetings as
NASA Headquarters' responsibility (and a
big, time-wasting nuisance), believing the
Center's only role should be the engineering
and management of the program. For NASA
to do the most efficient and effective job, this
concept must be changed. Whereas NASA
Headquarters should participate in many of
these contacts, the Center people who best
know the subject and have prepared the
material should present it. This is also an
excellent training mechanism. The younger
Center people will rapidly develop a much
broader view of the outside world from inter-
acting with NASA. Working with the
centers in this manner, Headquarters also
facilitates better internal communications.
Interfacing with Congress presents some
special problems, particularly when NASA
is trying to sell them a new program. There
are laws prohibiting government employees
from lobbying, and the line between lobbying
and briefing on the merits of a new program
is somewhat blurred. NASA must use its leg-
islative and legal offices to help the program
people properly interpret the law. In all
probability, NASA will not be able to com-
municate with Congress on critical subjects
in the manner and with the frequency they
desire.
An alternative to direct NASA communi-
cation with Congress is for NASA to work
with its contractors and keep them informed.
The contractors are not bound by any laws
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against lobbying and can communicate more
freely with Congress. The contractors will
contact the appropriate Representatives and
their staffs with their own messages, in any
case. It is not necessary for NASA to direct
them to lobby (this being illegal), but NASA
should inform them of its position so that if
the contractors do contact Congress, they
have the correct information.
On some past programs, all of the prime
contractors informally worked together to
keep Congress informed. One technique that
has been popular with Congress isan "Infor-
mation Notebook" on a given NASA pro-
gram. This notebook is kept in the Congres-
sional member's officefor easy reference and
is updated monthly, providing a useful
monthly resource for informal discussions.
NATIONAL STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR
SPACE
After the Apollo program and President
Kennedy's clear mandate to land astronauts
on the Moon and return in the sixties, the
U.S. space program suffered from a lack of
clear national goals and a strategic plan to
achieve them. In the Apollo era, all of the
diverse forces involved coalesced behind
President Kennedy because they wanted to
beat our superpower adversary, the U.S.S.R.,
in the technological war. Since that time, we
have been unable to generate such a unify-
ing environment. If this could be done, and a
framework for future space activity could be
agreed on in the form of a strategic plan, the
problems of interfacing with the outside
groups would be much easier.
As of this writing, the Bush administra-
tion has outlined a long-range plan for explo-
ration that includes colonizing the Moon a
and a manned exploration of Mars, which
could form the framework for a good strate-
gic plan. However, it must be accepted by
these outside parties and backed with appro-
priations by Congress before any plan can
realisticallybe made. During this period of a
growing national deficit, tensions in the
Middle East, and the bail-out of the savings
and loan industry, such an ambitious plan
will be difficult to accomplish.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
External groups have a significant impact on
NASA's programs. Ten groups affecting
NASA are identified, and examples are
given for some of the them. Methods of deal-
ing with these external inputs are discussed,
the most important being good and open two-
way communications and an objective atti-
tude on the part of the NASA participants.
The importance of planning ahead, of devel-
oping rapport with these groups, and of effec-
tive use of NASA contractors is covered. The
need for an overall strategic plan for the U.S.
space program is stressed.
In order to obtain the broadest range of
opinions on the political and institutional
factors that affect systems engineering, the
writer requested thoughts from a number of
senior individuals who have been involved in
the interfaces between NASA and the out-
side world.
In any subject as complex as this one,
there are always some differences of opinion.
The viewpoints expressed above are those of
the writer and sometimes agree with the
majority, and at other times do not. To pro-
vide the reader with another viewpoint, an
additional paper by David Wensley is repro-
duced in its entirety in the appendix to this
chapter. Mr. Wensley examines the subject
through the eyes of a prime Space Station
contractor executive.
The author concludes that NASA does not
pay sufficient attention to the impact of
political and institutional factors in con-
ducting its business and is being hurt by this
attitude. NASA should therefore focus on
working with these outside groups, adjust
NASA policies and organizations to
facilitate interfacing with them, and train
NASA personnel to conduct themselves ap-
propriately in this environment.
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POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS AFFECTING
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING: AN INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVE
by David Wensley
The "nominal" or "idealized" systems engi-
neering process must take into consideration
the political and institutional factors that
have become prevalent in the government
funded and, to a certain extent, the privately
funded civil space activity. Attempts to ig-
nore these influences may result in delay and
frustration of the systems engineering pro-
cess.
NASA programs are currently growing
larger in scope, longer in duration and fewer
in number. The increasing number of partici-
pants includes NASA Centers, other U.S.
agencies, international agencies and contrac-
tors. NASA programs are also characterized
by higher public visibility, and are more cost-
ly and more politically sensitive.
In this environment, the Congressional
committees that appropriate and authorize
budgets will demand more justification for
expenditures, more political return from the
investments and more oversight of ongoing
activities.
POLITICAL FACTORS
Space projects have always been an instru-
ment of domestic politics and a tool of politi-
cal influence in international relations. As
the scope and importance of these projects
increases, we can expect more political influ-
ence on the systems engineering process.
The political influence may take any of
several forms:
• Geographical distribution of funds to gain
political support.
• Creation ofinternationalpartnerships.
• Insertion of technical requirements to
satisfy strategic national goals.
• Increased Congressional and Administra-
tion involvement in the technical
decision-making processes.
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• Funding constraints used as a mechanism
of technical and political control.
An effective project management and
systems engineering process must deal con-
structively with these influences. They may
affect program content, allocation of respon-
sibilities, schedules, interface definitions,
optimization and trade-off criteria, and tech-
nical decisions. They may even affect mission
definition, and they most certainly will affect
funding availability versus time. Effective
management must provide for flexibility to
react to these influences without undue pen-
alties on performance, cost or schedule. A
constructive and cooperative relationship
between the legislators and program man-
agement can minimize the impact of these
interactions on planned efforts.
Many examples of the influences noted
above can be cited in the Space Station Free-
dom program, including:
• Legislated use of a Flight Telerobotic
Servicer to advance U.S. robotic technol-
ogy.
• Allocation of responsibilities to interna-
tional partners.
• Political influence on the work distribu-
tion between NASA Centers.
• Increased complexity of interfaces and
management processes resulting from
distributed responsibilities.
• Funding constraints (fencing) in budget
authorization bills.
• Oversight committees and hearings to
critique technical progress and to influ-
ence resolution of technical issues.
The systems engineering process must
stand the tests of external review and cri-
tique. The assumption that technical man-
agement and decision making is part of an
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immune internal process is, unfortunately,
unrealistic. Techniques for effectively
managing the external factors include:
• Open communication between project
management and stakeholders to under-
stand needs and develop trust.
• Realistic planning to support schedule
and cost commitments.
• Disciplined control of requirements to
avoid unwarranted cost and schedule
growth.
• Effective use of risk management tech-
niques to minimize iterations on design
and testing.
• Cost-effectiveness and life-cycle cost ana-
lysis to substantiate trade decisions.
• Early emphasis on operations, mainten-
ance and logistical support to avoid un-
predicted support costs.
• Early constructive resolution of responsi-
bility conflicts between NASA Centers
and between NASA and international
partners.
These features are characteristic of tradi-
tional management and represent the expec-
tations of legislators and budget authorities.
Deviations from these norms, especially if
uncovered through Congressional or media
probing, can be disruptive and potentially
dangerous to the stability and continuity of a
program. The systems engineering process
can significantly reduce these risks by stay-
ing on track and by making summary data
available to project managers to use in open
dialogue with legislators.
Program changes are unavoidable, and
systems engineering and project manage-
ment must be equipped with the analytical
tools to respond effectively to these changes.
The ability to re-prioritize and reschedule ac-
tivities rapidly and with reasonable accuracy
is essential, especially in response to funding
adjustments emanating from the annual
budgetary process. More often than not,
these events are unanticipated and result in
traumatic and costly adjustments. A pre-
planned strategy for deferral of less critical
elements, retaining the systems engineering
effort to establish interface requirements
and essential design definitions, can mini-
mize such effects.
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
Numerous institutional factors will affect
the systems engineering process, principally
those inherent in NASA and the participat-
ing Centers. Examples include:
• Accepted standards, design criteria, and
specifications.
• Design, management and operational
preferences of the Center functional divi-
sions.
• Availability and preference for use of
Center test facilities.
• The organization and management struc-
ture adopted for the program.
• Traditional practices such as use of com-
mittees, panels, boards, documentation
formats and integration processes.
• Use of support contractors to supplement
NASA staff.
• NASA and Center policies and priorities
that may influence, for example, technol-
ogy selections, responsibility issues and
requirements decisions.
The above considerations can have a
major impact on systems engineering
requirements derivations, trade studies, ar-
chitecture and design selections, test plans
and operational concepts. They will also af-
fect the schedule and effort required to
evolve the design baseline, to resolve inte-
gration issues and to establish interface
agreements. The potential magnitude of
these effects dictates early planning for their
accommodation in the systems engineering
process. It is virtually pointless to embark on
a systems engineering process that ignores
these considerations. The institutional char-
acteristics have evolved over time and are
the product of many successes and failures. It
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is unlikely that personnel assigned to new
projects will adopt practices that violate
tradition. Contractor personnel should be
prepared to adapt to customer preferences,
but customer (NASA) personnel should be
prepared to consider new alternatives as part
of a continuous improvement process.
THE SEARCH FOR IMPROVEMENT
Increased budget pressures and heightened
concern for foreign competition create a
demand for NASA to seek new methods of
achieving quality and reducing costs. Indus-
try is similarly under pressure in these areas
and is rapidly adopting techniques such as
Total Quality Management (TQM) princi-
ples. NASA is beginning to apply TQM crite-
ria in new procurements and has started to
look for TQM opportunities within its organi-
zational structure. Conversion to these prin-
ciples represents a major cultural change
and, in many respects, is contrary to recent
trends within NASA. TQM teachings empha-
size reduction in top-down management di-
rection, preferring increased delegation and
empowerment of the lower tier personnel.
Since the Challenger accident, the tendency
within NASA has been to increase manage-
ment and technical oversight. In the Space
Station Freedom program, for example,
many layers of management and technical
oversight exist within the Level II and Level
III organizations above the prime contractors
and their subcontractor teams. Although
contractors are generally committed to cost
and schedule objectives, their progress is of-
ten controlled by the efficiency and speed of
the NASA management and systems engi-
neering processes and integration. If the in-
volved participants agree that improvement
is essential to create an environment of
credibility and trust at the political level,
recognition of these relationships can lead to
constructive changes.
Measurement of performance is essential
in the search for improvement. Both NASA
and contractors must be measured as ele-
ments of a closed-loop process that affects the
efficiency and quality of our space activities.
The identification of improvement candi-
dates should focus on the inanimate process,
not on the organizations or people. This
allows the people to conduct constructive
problem identification and resolution with-
out personal implications.
CONCLUSION
NASA stands at a crossroads. The opportuni-
ties for space exploration and the exploita-
tion of space attributes and resources have
never been better. Public acceptance of space
projects and reliance on space technology as
a means to resolve worldwide environmental
and resource issues have never been higher.
Yet NASA lacks credibility with the legisla-
tors of this country who are eager to voice
criticism of NASA's planning and implemen-
tation of space projects. Their depth of pene-
tration into NASA's technical activities is
increasing. Not only is the continuity of
NASA funding at risk, the scope of NASA's
responsibilities is also threatened. Transfer
of responsibilities to other agencies and even
the creation of new agencies is topical con-
versation. Resolution of this dilemma
requires more than a willingness to commu-
nicate and to negotiate differences; it re-
quires a change in the NASA management
culture that recognizes the degree of matur-
ity of the space industry. The mystery of
discovery and the complexity of space tech-
nology is no longer an adequate defense for
cost or schedule overruns. Critics demand
performance that meets expectations. NASA
has the opportunity to lead the family of
federal agencies in demonstrating fiscal
responsibility combined with technical
achievements. Systems engineering will be a
major contributor to this success by provid-
ing the guidance for timely decisions leading
to effective project management.
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OPTIMIZATION IN THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS
Loren A. Lemmerman
The essential elements of the design process
consist of the mission definition phase that
provides the system requirements, the con-
ceptual design, the preliminary design and
finally the detailed design (Figure 1). Mis-
sion definition is performed largely by oper-
ations analysts in conjunction with the cus-
tomer. The result of their study is handed off
to the systems engineers for documentation
as the systems requirements. The document
that provides these requirements is the basis
for the further design work of the design en-
gineers at the Lockheed-Georgia Company.
The design phase actually begins with
conceptual design, which is generally con-
ducted by a small group of engineers using
multidisciplinary design programs. Because
of the complexity of the design problem, the
analyses are relatively simple and generally
dependent on parametric analyses of the con-
figuration. The result of this phase is a base-
line configuration from which preliminary
design may be initiated.
Preliminary design is far more complicat-
ed, both because the analysis techniques are
more complex, and also because these tech-
niques require specialized knowledge. The
objective of this step is to refine the design
estimates made during conceptual design
and to add additional detail to the descrip-
tion of the configuration. At the conclusion
of this phase, the aircraft is defined well
enough so that a company can comfortably
bid the cost of producing it.
Detail design is largely mechanical in na-
ture, and normally occurs after receipt of an
order for production. This is not an area of
concentration in this presentation, however.
To provide a basis for amplification of the
conceptual design process, look at Figure 2.
The function of the conceptual design process
is to conduct a multidisciplinary analysis of
an aircraft to produce values of parameters
that describe an aircraft. These parameters
are top level descriptions that leave most of
the actual configuration details undefined.
Contracted
Studies
Proposal Contract
Requested Award
1-3 Years
MissionDefinition
Market Research
Operations Analysis
1-2 Years 1 Year
System _ ConceptualRequirements Design
Advanced Design
Systems Engineering
_ PreliminaryDesign
Aerodynamics
Structures
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Figure 1 Essential Elements of the Design Process
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However, implicit in this process is the
trading of factors that relate to the perfor-
mance of the configuration. The trades I
mean are typified by the thinness of a wing
desired by an aerodynamicist versus the
thickness of a wing as desired by a structural
analyst.
_ Multidisciplinary
Analysis [F//__is
Figure 2 Conceptual Design
Typical parameters defined at this stage
are fuselage length and width, wing area,
sweep, aspect ratio and, to a limited extent,
control surface.
In former times, conceptual design was
manually directed and highly iterative. The
process consisted of guessing an initial con-
figuration, analyzing that configuration, and
then systematically varying each of several
design parameters to examine a design space
within which manual optimization could
take place. Normally the number of param-
eters examined did not exceed four, because
of the human limitations in absorbing more
variations than that. There were several
disadvantages to the former approach. This
process was time consuming, fallible and
tedious. It was time consuming because the
answer depended on many executions of a
computer code. It was fallible because the
choice of the parameter variation to be exam-
ined was entirely at the discretion of the
designer. Thus, the quality of the answers
was directly dependent on the skill of that
designer. In addition, no one could be sure
that a large enough design space had been
investigated to ensure that a true optimum
had been found. This old procedure was also
tedious. All data had to be manipulated man-
ually. Although this did provide useful in-
sight to the designer, the cost was a further
delay. Dozens of computer runs had to be
scanned, the results judged for correctness,
and the results plotted on carpet plots. Many
hours of talented labor were consumed per-
forming menial tasks.
cut optiHInitial Subject toConfigura-
tion Constraints
f
Evaluate
Configura-
tion
Figure 3 Preliminary Design
The former process was basically elimi-
nated at Lockheed-Georgia several years
ago, in favor of the approach shown here,
based entirely on numerical optimization.
The new process is described schematically
here (Figure 3). The former process was usu-
ally completed in one day. Many of the man-
ual actions have been eliminated. Now, a
given study may consume as much time as
formerly, but a much larger range of design
variables has been included.
PRELIMINARY DESIGN PROCESS
(PARTIAL)
The next step in the design process is pre-
liminary design. This is the process, partially
illustrated in Figure 4, by which the concep-
tual design baseline is analyzed in greater
depth to confirm the design or provide foun-
dation for changing the design. This process
is typified by the more or less simultaneous
execution of many detailed design codes in
several disciplines. Obviously, the communi-
cation during the process is difficult, and the
designs proposed by each discipline are fre-
quently inconsistent. Iterative loops, while
very common, cannot be represented because
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Figure 4 Preliminary Design Process
of the indeterminate sequence of such iter-
ation.
As an example of the type of analysis con-
ducted in this phase, consider aerodynamics
for a moment. The codes frequently applied
in this phase consist of full potential subsonic
or transonic codes for configuration analysis,
full potential codes for direct design, and
Navier-Stokes codes for highly complex vis-
cous flow analyses. As a result of the aerody-
namic analysis done during this phase of
design, the wing external contours are fully
defined and more reliable estimates of the
vehicle performance are available. Similar
refinements and definition are added by each
of the participating disciplines.
The deficiencies of the current approach
are immediately obvious. First and foremost,
the result is a suboptimal configuration.
Even though optimization may be used
within isolated analyses, the difficulty of
communication in real-time and the lack of
available tradeoff criteria mean that no glo-
bal, rigorous optimization occurs.
I have already alluded to the use of opti-
mization on individual analyses in this
phase. Here are some examples of such opti-
mizations. The aerodynamics discipline has
been very active in developing optimization
techniques for the design of wings in tran-
sonic flow, largely based on FLO codes. These
methods provide a wing shape, starting with
a specification of a desirable pressure distri-
bution. Using such methods, the wing con-
tour and twist distribution may be calculated
directly.
Subsonic optimization techniques have
generally been limited to the design of high
lift systems. In this case, the optimal location
of a slotted trailing edge flap can be found by
optimizing on the axial force for the system
and by using paneling methods for calculat-
ing the flap system pressure distribution.
Structural optimization has been done for
minimizing structural weight, given loading
conditions. In this case, the structure is mod-
eled using finite element techniques, with
element geometries such as thicknesses or
cross sectional areas taken as design vari-
ables. Another example of structural opti-
mization is in the design of composite panels.
The objective is to determine the ply orienta-
tion to respond to specific loading conditions.
If I were to summarize the preliminary
design optimization work currently being
done at Lockheed-Georgia, I would have to
say that its use is relatively new, that it has
been very well accepted, and that its use is
certainly increasing. But this may eventual-
ly become a severe problem for us, since the
optimization is being applied to subprocesses
within design. Worse yet, it is being applied
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Figure 5 Proposed Preliminary Design Process
to old design philosophies. The result has to
be suboptimal designs.
The preliminary design process is clearly
another candidate for improvement by opti-
mization. The technical challenge of this
problem is much greater that that of the con-
ceptual design process, but the potential pay-
off is also much larger. The challenge comes,
in part, from the large number of individuals
and computer programs normally invoked at
this design state, and the current dearth of
technology available to solve the very differ-
ent problems thus posed.
One possible way to apply optimization in
the preliminary design process is shown
here. The fundamental idea is that candidate
design parameters flow downward to the in-
dividual analysis modules and the result of
the analysis flows back up to the optimizer.
Obviously, such a system is far from reali-
ty. The technical challenges outweigh those
of optimization itself. The analysis methods
normally used in preliminary design are
state-of-the-art methods that are time con-
suming, user-sensitive and modeling sensi-
tive. Because of this, not only will new
optimization techniques be needed, but so
will entirely new operational procedures. For
example, optimization now is executed most-
ly as a black box program. The analysis
points provided by support codes are consid-
ered to be correct and not subject to code
sensitivities. In the preliminary design pro-
cess illustrated here, the former approach
clearly will not work. The new process must
include a method for disciplinary engineers
to examine the analysis code results as they
are being generated to ensure that the opti-
mized results are valid. When such an opti-
mization method is available, however, I
submit that the problem is far from finished.
This is so because people inevitably are the
designers, and the design techniques, wheth-
er through optimization or not, must take the
human element into consideration.
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING - A DEFINITION
To expand on this theme, let me begin be giv-
ing you my orientation. I am in the Systems
Engineering Department at Lockheed-
Georgia. This gives a reasonable definition of
what Systems Engineering means to us: a
discipline that coordinates the engineering
activities within large organizations to help
produce a superior, cost-effective, timely
product. By its very definition, it is a process
of dealing with people in a large design op-
eration. As such, our interest is not in the
internal working of design codes, but rather
in how individuals use given design codes to
produce designs, and then how those indi-
viduals transmit their information to other
designers in the organization.
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Let me present the four main tasks of the
Systems Engineering operation. They
involve the management of trade studies, re-
quirements, interfaces and technical risk.
Another way to express these four tasks is
Communication, Communication, Communi-
cation, Communication.
Decisions are the design process. By its
very nature, design requires definition of
some configuration from an infinity of possi-
bilities. The best design is some compromise
of many and widely varying constraints.
Many times the choices to be made are
aesthetic, or subjective, or not amenable to
computer analysis. In these situations, and
sometimes even in well-defined engineering
choices, trade studies must be performed that
are outside the domain of the optimization
process.
Vehicle
Figure 6 Hierarchy of Decisions to Select a
Navigation System for an Airplane
The illustration above (Figure 6) is a sim-
ple representation of the decisions that
might be made to select a navigation system
for an airplane. These choices are displayed
as a hierarchy, beginning with the top level
vehicle considerations, and then working
downward to finer levels of detail. Systems
Engineering is responsible for generating
such a trade tree to illustrate the decisions to
be made, defining the design groups to be
involved, coordinating the studies needed,
and documenting the result.
Some of the decisions illustrated in this
trade tree are supported by optimized meth-
ods. For example, the vehicle may be initial-
ly sized with optimization, and components
may also be designed with optimized meth-
ods. Nonetheless, when design decisions are
to be made, there is a high likelihood that not
all the decisions will have been supported
through optimization. The point is, optimiz-
ation methods are embedded in the total
design process, and this must be taken into
account in the development of these optimiz-
ation methods.
This last feature is what I am trying to
illustrate in Figure 7. Some decisions of the
design process will be made within the opti-
mization process. Some will not. But those
that do not must have information available
from the optimization to assist the manual
decision-making process.This istrue wheth-
er the outside decision is being made concur-
rently with the optimization or whether it
lags the optimization by days, weeks or
months.
LJIN vI U 
Figure 7 Trade Studies with Optimization
The implication is that information more
comprehensive than just the final optimized
configuration must be provided and stored.
Possible information needs include sensitivi-
ties around the optimal point and the
optimization history. In addition, it will be
necessary to provide a way to interrupt the
optimization process as it is occurring to
input new information to the optimization
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process and to influence, on the fly, the out-
come.
REQUIREMENTS FLOWDOWN
Let me provide one more example, that of
requirements flowdown. This is another ex-
ample of the communication involved in the
design process. In this case, the objective is to
communicate to each individual designer the
importance of design in meeting the top level
performance requirements. This is done by
analyzing the top level system requirements
and assigning or allocating these top level re-
quirements to the next lower level to deter-
mine the drivers in the system. This process
is repeated to successively lower levels until
the final objective is accomplished. That is,
the question "What is each individual's con-
tribution to the total system performance?"
is answered at the lowest logical level.
A specific performance might be mainten-
ance manhours per flight hour, or it might be
minimum range requirements. Whatever the
requirement, this process allocates it to the
lowest level of the configuration, maintains
the traceability to the top level requirement
and assures that the total system require-
ment will be met.
The question is, "What is a proper alloca-
tion?" If a top level requirement is rippled to
the lowest level, which functional area
should contribute what proportion to the
final performance? If we rely on a optimiz-
ation process that merely gives a final an-
swer, we are blind. This is another case of not
all functions being included in the optimiz-
ation process. For these "outside" functions,
we have no sensitivity information upon
which to base realistic allocations. The actu-
al situation might be as illustrated here,
where the cost of attaining a given level of
performance varies greatly from one disci-
pline to another. I have used cost as the mea-
sure, but I could have used any measure of
merit. For the illustration I have given, the
System Level
Performance
Requirements
I
AllocatableElementsbetween I
1
[ 1
Allocatable
between Subsys
Unique to
Subsystem
Allocatable
between Comp
Unique to
Component
Unique to
Element
Figure 8 Requirements Flowdown
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Figure 9 Optimize Allocations
optimal allocation of the requirement is that
which simultaneously attains the top level
system performance and minimizes the cost.
In the future, our optimization processes
must provide visibility for such data.
I have attempted to illustrate that opti-
mization has a role in our design process,
both today and in the future. The benefits are
well known already, but I believe that we are
only seeing the proverbial tip of the iceberg.
Optimization must, however, continue to
be sold and this selling is best done by consis-
tent good performance. For this good perfor-
mance to occur, the future approaches must
be clearly thought out so that the optimiz-
ation methods solve the problems that actu-
$
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ally occur during design. The visibility of tile
design process must be maintained as fur-
ther developments are proposed. Careful at-
tention must be given to the management of
data in the optimization process, both for
technical reasons and for administrative
purposes. Finally, to satisfy program needs,
provisions must be included to give data to
support program decisions, and to communi-
cate with design processes outside of the opti-
mization process.
If we fail to adequately consider all of
these needs, the future acceptance of optimiz-
ation will be impeded. We simply cannot
allow that to happen. Optimization is too
important.
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THE INITIAL FLIGHT ANOMALIES OF SKYLA P 3 9
By the NASA Investigation Board
At approximately 63 seconds into the flight
ofSkylab 1 on May 14, 1973, an anomaly oc-
curred which resulted in the complete loss of
the meteoroid shield around the orbital
workshop. This was followed by the loss of
one of the two solar array systems on the
workshop and a failure of the interstage
adapter to separate from the S-II stage of the
Saturn V launch vehicle. The investigation
reported herein identified the most probable
cause of this flight anomaly to be the
breakup and loss of the meteoroid shield due
to aerodynamic loads that were not account-
ed for in its design. The breakup of the mete-
oroid shield, in turn, broke the tie downs
that secured one of the solar array systems to
the workshop. Complete loss of this solar ar-
ray system occurred at 593 seconds when the
exhaust plume of the S-II stage retro-rockets
impacted the partially deployed solar array
system. Falling debris from the meteoroid
shield also damaged the S-II interstage
adapter ordnance system in such a manner
as to preclude separation.
Of several possible failure modes of the
meteoroid shield that were identified, the
most probable in this particular flight was
internal pressurization of its auxiliary tun-
nel which acted to force the forward end of
the meteoroid shield away from the shell of
the workshop and into the supersonic air
stream. The pressurization of the auxiliary
tunnel was due to the existence of several
openings in the aft region of the tunnel. An-
other possible failure mode was the separa-
tion of the leading edge of the meteoroid
shield from the shell of the workshop (par-
ticularly in the region of the folded ordnance
panel) of sufficient extent to admit ram air
pressures under the shield.
The venting analysis for the auxiliary
tunnel was predicated on a completely sealed
aft end; the openings in the tunnel thus re-
sulted from a failure of communications
among aerodynamics, structural design, and
manufacturing personnel. The failure to
recognize the design deficiencies of the mete-
oroid shield through six years of analysis,
design and test was due, in part, to a pre-
sumption that the shield would be "tight to
the tank" and "structurally integral with the
S-IVB tank" as set forth in the design crite-
ria. In practice, the meteoroid shield was a
large, flexible, limp system that proved diffi-
cult to rig to the tank and to obtain the close
fit that was presumed by the design. These
design deficiencies of the meteoroid shield,
as well as the failure to communicate within
the project the critical nature of its proper
venting, must therefore be attributed to an
absence of sound engineering judgment and
alert engineering leadership concerning this
particular system over a considerable period
of time.
The overall management system used for
Skylab was essentially the the same as that
developed in the Apollo program. This sys-
tem was fully operational for Skylab; no con-
flicts or inconsistencies were found in the
records of the management reviews. None-
theless, the significance of the aerodynamic
loads on the meteoroid shield during launch
were not revealed by the extensive review
process. Possibly contributing to this over-
sight was the basic view of the meteoroid
shield as a piece of structure, rather than as
a complex system involving several different
technical disciplines. Complex, multidisci-
plinary systems such as the meteoroid shield
should have a designated project engineer
who is responsible for all aspects of analysis,
design, fabrication, test and assembly.
The Board found no evidence that the de-
sign deficiencies of the meteoroid shield were
the result of, or were masked by, the content
and processes of the management systems
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that were used for Skylab. On the contrary,
the rigor, detail, and thoroughness of the sys-
tems are doubtless necessary for a program
of this =magnitude. At the same time, as a
cautionary note for the future, it is empha-
sized that management must always be alert
to the potential hazards of its systems and
take care that an attention to rigor, detail
and thoroughness does not inject an undue
emphasis on formalism, documentation, and
visibility in detail. Such an emphasis can
submerTe the concerned individual and de-
press the role of the intuitive engineer or
analyst. It will always be of importance to
achieve a cross-fertilization and broadened
experience of engineers in analysis, design,
test or operations. Positive steps must al-
ways be taken to assure that engineers be-
come familiar with actual hardware, develop
an intuitive understanding of computer-
developed results, and make productive use
of flight data in this learning process. The
experienced chief engineer, who can spend
most of the time in a subtle integration of all
elements of the system under purview, free
of administrative and managerial duties,
can also be a major asset to an engineering
organization.
THE SKYLAB PROGRAM
Skylab missions have several distinct goals:
to conduct Earth resources observations,
advance scientific knowledge of the sun and
stars, study the effects of weightlessness on
living organisms, particularly human, and
study and understand methods for the
processing of materials in the absence of
gravity. The Skylab mission utilizes the as-
tronaut as an engineer and as a research
scientist, and provides an opportunity for
assessing potential human capabilities for
future space missions.
Skylab uses the knowledge, experience
and technical systems developed during the
Apollo program along with specialized equip-
ment necessary to meet the program objec-
tives.
Figure 1 shows the Skylab in orbit. Its
largest element is the orbital workshop, a
cylindrical container 48 feet long and 22 feet
in diameter weighing some 78,000 pounds.
The basic structure of the orbital workshop
is the upper stage, or S-IVB stage, of the S-IB
and S-V rockets which served as the Apollo
program launch vehicle. The orbital work-
shop has no engines, except attitude control
thrusters, and has been modified internally
to provide a large orbiting space laboratory
and living quarters for the crew. The Sky-
lab 1 (SL-1) space vehicle included a payload
consisting of four major units---orbital work-
shop, airlock module, multiple docking
adapter, Apollo telescope mount--and a
two-stage Saturn-V (S-IC and S-II) launch
vehicle as depicted in Figure 2. To provide
meteoroid protection and thermal control, an
external meteoroid shield was added to cover
the orbital workshop habitable volume. A
solar array system (SAS) was attached to the
orbital workshop to provide electrical power.
The original concept called for a "wet
workshop." In this concept, a specially con-
structed S-IVB stage was to be launched
"wet" as a propulsive stage on the S-IB
, _: launch system filled with propellants. The
empty hydrogen tank would then be purged
and filled with a life-supporting atmosphere.
A major redirection of Skylab was made on
July 22, 1969, six days after the Apollo 11
lunar landing. As a result of the successful
lunar landing, S-V launch vehicles became
available to the Skylab program. Conse-
quently, it became feasible to completely
equip the S-IVB on the ground for immediate
occupancy and use by a crew after it was in
orbit. Thus it would not carry fuel and
earned the name of"dry workshop."
The nominal Skylab mission called for
the launch of the unmanned S-V vehicle and
workshop payload SL-1 into a near-circular
(235 nautical miles) orbit inclined 50 degrees
to the equator. About 24 hours after the first
launch, the manned Skylab 2 (SL-2) launch
would take place using a command service
module payload atop the S-1B vehicle. After
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the command service module rendezvous and
docking with the orbiting cluster, the crew
enters and activates the workshop; Skylab is
then ready for its first operational period of
28 days. At the end of this period, the crew
returns to Earth with the command service
module, and the Skylab continues in an
unmanned quiescent mode for some 60 days.
The second three-person crew is launched
with a second S-IB, this time for a second
56-day period in orbit after which they will
return to Earth. The total Skylab mission
activities cover a period of roughly eight
months, with about 140 days of manned
operation.
THE FLIGHT OF SKYLAB 1
Skylab 1 was launched at 1730:00 (range
time, R =0) on May 14, 1973, from Complex
39 A, Kennedy Space Center. At this time,
the Cape Kennedy launch area was exper-
iencing cloudy conditions with warm tem-
peratures and gentle surface winds. Total
sky cover consisted of scattered cumulus at
2,400 feet, scattered stratocumulus at 5,000
feet, broken altocumulus at 12,000 feet, and
cirrus at 23,000 feet. During ascent, the
vehicle passed through the cloud layers but
no lightning was observed in the area. Upper
area wind conditions were being compared to
General Characteristics
Condition work volume 12,700 cu ft (354 cubic meters)
Overall length 117 ft (35.1 meters)
Weight including CSM 199,750 (90,606 Kilograms)
Width OWS including solar array 90 ft (27 meters)
...... Solar Panels
Experiments
• Micrometeoroid
• ' Shield
Apollo Telescope..
Mount ......
Multiple
Docking
Adapter
Command &" •
Service
Module
Airlock Modu
Ward Room
Waste Compartment
° o
Sleep Compartment
Saturn Workshop
Figure 1 SkylabCluster
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PS Payload Shroud
Diameter 6.6 meters (21.7 feet)
Length 16.8 meters
Weight 11,794 kilograms (26,000 lbs.)
ATM
Wi
Apollo Telescope Mount
Width 3.3 meters
Length 4.4 meters
Weight 11.181 kilograms (24,650 lbs.)
MDA Multiple Docking Adapter
Diameter 3 meters (lo feet)
Length 5.2 meters (17.3 feet)
Weight 6,260 kilograms (13,800 lbs.)
AM Airlock Module
Diameter STS 3 meters (10 feet)
Diameter FAS 6.6 meters (21.7feet)
Length 5.3 meters (17.5 feet)
Weight 22,226 kilograms (49,000 lbs.)
IU Instrument Unit
Diameter 6.6 meters (21.7 feet)
Length 0.9 meter (3 feet)
Weight 2,064 kilograms (4,550 Ibs.)
OWS Orbital Workshop
Diameter 6.6 meters (21.7 feet)
Length 14.6 meters (48.5 feet)
Weight 35,380 kilograms (78,000 lbs.)
S-II Second Stage
Diameter 10 meters (33 feet)
Length 24.8 meters (81.5 feet)
Weight 488,074 kilograms (1,076,000 lbs.)
fueled
35,403 kilograms (78,050 Ibs.) dry
Engines J-2 (5)
Propellants: Liquid Oxygen 333,837 liters
(88,200 gallons)
Liquid Hydrogen 1,030,655
liters (272,300 gallons)
Thrust 5,150,000 Newtons (1,150,000 lbs.)
Interstage Approx. 5,171 kilograms (11,400)
Ibs.)
S-IC First Stage
Diameter 10 meters (33 feet)
Length 42 meters (138 feet)
Weight 2,245,320 kilograms (4,950,0001bs.)
fueled
130,410 kilograms (287,500 lbs.) dry
Engines F-1 (5)
Propellants: Liquid Oxygen 1,318,315 liters
(348,300 gallons)
RP-1 (Kerosene) 814,910 liters
(215,300 gallons)
Thrust 31,356,856 Newtons (7,723,726 lbs.)
Figure 2 SL-1 vehicle
184
most other Saturn-V flights. The flight envi-
ronment was quite favorable.
The automatic countdown proceeded nor-
mally with Guidance Reference Release oc-
curring at R-17.0 seconds and orbit insertion
occurring at R+599.0 seconds. The orbital
workshop solar array deployment was com-
manded on time; however, real-time data in-
dicated that the system did not deploy fully.
The solar array system (SAS) on the or-
bital workshop consists of two large beams
enclosing three major sections of solar cell
assemblies within each. During ascent, the
sections are folded like an accordion inside
the beams which in turn are stowed against
the workshop. The meteoroid shield is a
lightweight structure wrapped around the
converted S-IVB stage orbital workshop and
is exposed to the flight environment. The two
hinged solar array system wings are secured
to the orbital workshop by tie downs above
and below the meteoroid shield. Seals at-
tached to the solar array system perimeter
actually press against the shield to form an
airtight cavity prior to launch. Once in orbit,
the solar array system beams are first de-
ployed out 90 degrees. The meteoroid shield
is deployed later to a distance of about five
inches from the orbital workshop wall. After
the ordnance release is fired, meteoroid
shield deployment is effected by torsion rods
and swing links spaced around the structure
fore and aft. The rods are torqued prior to
launch and simply unwind in orbit to move
the meteoroid shield away from the tank,
Detection of pertinent conditions associated
with the meteoroid shield and solar array
system is afforded by measuring various pa-
rameters by telemetered instrumentation.
When the orbital workshop solar array
system was commanded to deploy, telemeter-
ed data indicated that events did not occur as
planned. The flight data was analyzed by
flight operations personnel to reveal the pos-
sible source of the problem. At about R + 60
seconds, the S-II telemetry reflected power
increased slightly. At about 63 seconds,
numerous measurements indicated the
SKYLAB 1
apparent early deployment and loss of the
meteoroid shield. At this time, the vehicle
was at about 28,600 feet altitude and at a
velocity of about Mach 1.
At this time, vehicle dynamic measure-
ments such as vibration, acceleration, atti-
tude error, and acoustics indicated strong
disturbances. Measurements which are nor-
mally relatively static at this time, such as
torsion rod strain gauges, tension strap
breakwires, temperatures, and solar array
system position indicators, indicated a loss of
the meteoroid shield and unlatch of the
SAS-2 wing. Further preliminary evaluation
revealed abnormal vehicle accelerations, vi-
brations, and solar array system tempera-
ture and voltage anomalies at about R + 593
seconds. Temperature data loss and sudden
voltage drops indicated that the SAS-2 wing
was separated from the orbital workshop at
this time. Other data later in the flight indi-
cated the SAS-1 wing did not fully deploy
when commanded to do so. Although not ap-
parently associated with the 63-second and
593-second anomalies, the S-II stage range
safety receiver signal strengths showed sev-
eral drops throughout the flight beginning at
about R + 260 seconds.
63-SECOND ANOMALY: LOSS OF
METEROID SHIELD
The Investigation Board evaluated the te-
lemetry data in order to explain the various
anomalies that occurred on Skylab 1. The
first anomalous indication was an increase
in S-II telemetry reflected power from a
steady 1.5 W beginning at R + 59.80 seconds.
At this time the telemetry forward power
remained steady at 58.13W. By 61.04 sec-
onds, the reflected power had reached
1.75 W, and by 80.38 seconds, the reflected
power had stabilized at about 2.0 W. This
abnormal increase in power might be in-
dicative of a vehicle physical configuration
change which altered the antenna ground
plane characteristic.
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Shortly after the telemetry reflected
power increase, the meteoroid shield torsion
rod 7 forward (measurement G7036) indicat-
ed a slight change toward the deployed
condition. This occurred at R+60.12 sec-
onds, and at 61.78 seconds the vehicle roll
rate decreased slightly from a normal value
of 1.1 degrees per second clockwise looking
forward. The next torsion rod 7 forward
sample at about 62.52 seconds revealed a
further relaxation. The increase in telemetry
reflected power and the movement of torsion
rod 7 forward tend to indicate meteoroid
shield lifting between positions I and II.
Between R+62.75 and 63.31 seconds,
several vehicle dynamic measurements
indicated a significant disturbance. A sensor
on the orbital workshop film vault showed an
abnormal vibration at 62.75 seconds fol-
lowed by disturbances sensed by X and Y
accelerometer pickups in the instrument
unit, the pitch, yaw, and longitudinal
accelerometers, and the pitch, yaw, and roll
rate gyros. At 62.78 seconds, the roll rate
gyro sensed a sudden clockwise roll rate re-
sulting in a peak amplitude of 3.0 degrees
per second clockwise 62.94 seconds. A sensor
at the instrument unit upper mounting
showed a maximum peak-to-peak shock of
17.2 g's at 63.17 seconds. In addition, the S-II
engine actuators experienced pressure fluc-
tuations caused by vehicle movement
against the inertia of the non-thrusting
engine nozzles.
The data indicate that the most probable
sequence of meteoroid shield failure was
initialstructural failure of the meteoroid
shieldbetween the SAS-2 wing and the main
tunnel (between positions I and II).The
initialfailure propagation from this area
appears likely since the wardroom window
thermocouple indication (C7013) remained
normal at 62.94 seconds after SAS-2 indicat-
ed unlatched at 62.90 seconds and after the
K7010 and K7011 tension strap measure-
ments failed.
593-SECOND ANOMALY
As a consequence of the meteoroid shield
failure at approximately 63 seconds, the
SAS-2 wing was unlatched and partially de-
ployed as evidenced by minor variations in
the main solar array system electrical volt-
ages and SAS-2 temperatures. Full deploy-
ment was prevented due to the aerodynamic
forces and accelerations during the remain-
der of powered flight.
At the completion of the S-II phase of
flight, the four 35,000-pound thrust retro-
rockets fired for approximately two seconds
commencing at R+591.10 seconds followed
by spacecraft separation at 591.2 seconds.
The effect of retro-rocket plume impinge-
ment was observed almost immediately on
the SAS-2 temperature and on vehicle body
rates.
At 593.4 seconds the wing imparted mo-
mentum to the vehicle, probably by hitting
and breaking the 90 degree fully deployed
stops, and at 593.9 imparted a final kick as it
tore completely free at the hinge link. In-
orbit photographs show clearly the hinge
separation plane and the various wires
which were torn loose at the interface.
INTERSTAGE SECOND PLANE
SEPARATION ANOMALY
Post-flight analysis revealed unexpectedly
high temperatures and pressures in the S-II
engine compartment following ignition and
continued high after interstage separation
command. The unusually high temperatures
from S-II ignition and until the S-II inter-
stage separation signal are considered by
Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) to be
caused by a change in the engine heat shield
skirts introduced on this flight, and there-
fore do not indicate a problem. However, the
increasing temperatures after the time of
normal S-II interstage separation are indica-
tive of an abnormal condition. More detailed
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investigation based on performance evalua-
tion and axial acceleration time history re-
vealed that the interstage had not been
jettisoned; however, due to the vehicle per-
formance characteristics and performance
margin, the desired orbit was achieved.
Data analysis confirms that the primary
ordnance command was properly issued at
R + 189.9 seconds. The backup command was
issued 100 milliseconds later but the explod-
ing bridge wire circuit discharge was charac-
teristic of an open circuit consistent with
separation of the interstage disconnect by a
minimum of 0.25 inch.
The linear shaped charge is mounted cir-
cumferentially around the S-II interstage.
When fired by the primary command, the
charge cuts the tension straps (in the direc-
tion of position II to position I) allowing the
skirt to drop away. Normal propagation time
of the linear shaped charge is approximately
four milliseconds. Assuming a failure to
propagate completely around the structure,
analyses were made by appropriate contrac-
tor and government personnel to determine
what area must remain intact in order to re-
tain the skirt and what area must have been
cut to allow rotation of the skirt sufficient to
disconnect the connector panel. The various
analyses isolate the region of failure to an
arc extending from approximately _ = 100
degrees to as much as O = 200 degrees.
This ordnance installation was different
from prior Saturn flights. Previously, a sin-
gle fire command from the instrumentation
unit was issued which simultaneously deto-
nated the linear shaped charge from both
ends allowing the charge to propagate from
both directions. On this flight, in an attempt
to provide redundant firing commands, the
detonators at each end of the linear shaped
charge were separately connected to two
command channels spaced 100 milliseconds
apart due to the characteristics of the air-
borne equipment. As a result of the partial
cutting of the interstage, it rotated suffi-
ciently to separate the electrical connector
prior to issuing the backup command.
A review of the history of manufacturing,
acceptance, checkout, qualification and
flight environment revealed no basic cause
for failure. The most probable cause is secon-
dary damage as a result of the meteoroid
shield failure, attributed to falling debris as
evidenced by the various shock and acoustic
disturbances occurring in the 63-second time
period.
The redundant mode of ordnance opera-
tion of all prior Saturn flights in which both
ends of the linear shaped charge are fired at
once from a single command would probably
have prevented the failure, depending on the
extent of damage experienced by the linear
shaped charge.
FORWARD INTERSTAGE INTERNAL
PRESSURE ANOMALY
Flight data indicated a deviation of the S-II
forward interstage pressure from analytical
values commencing at approximately 63 sec-
onds. Inasmuch as the deviation from the
analytical curve of the internal pressure ver-
sus time appeared to be coincident with the
meteoroid shield failure, it was postulated
that a portion of the shield had punctured
the forward interstage. On this basis, it was
possible to correlate the flight data with ei-
ther an assumed 2.0 square foot hole in the
conical section or an assumed 0.75 square
foot hole in the cylindrical section.
RANGE SAFETY RECEIVER ANOMALY
During the S-II portion of the flight, the sig-
nal strength indications from both range
safety receivers showed drops in level. From
liftoff through R+259 seconds, both receiv-
ers maintained relatively stable values
above range requirements. At R+259.57
seconds, receiver 2 signal strength began to
drop and between this time and 522.1 sec-
onds, both receivers indicated various de-
grees of signal strength shift. These signal
strength shifts dropped below the 12 db safe-
ty margins required by Air Force Eastern
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Test Range Manual 127-1. At R÷327.81 sec-
onds the receiver 2 signal strength dropped
briefly below its threshold sensitivity. At
this instant this receiver probably would not
have responded to any range safety com-
mands. Receiver 1 was, however, capable of
receiving commands. At R + 521.16, receiv-
er 2 strength again dropped briefly to its
threshold sensitivity. None of these drops
could be correlated to ground system perfor-
mance.
Analysis indicates that the most probable
cause of the S-II receiver signal strength
dropout was a variable phase shift within
the vehicle's hybrid coupler due to the chang-
ing aspect angle produced by the moving
vehicle and the fixed transmitting site. Be-
cause the decrease in receiver signal
strength occurred with only one receiver at a
time, range safety commands could have
been received continuously throughout pow-
er flight. During two of these drops, however,
the planned redundancy of range safety re-
ceivers was not available.
During this investigation, it was revealed
that the Wallops Island and Bermuda
ground stations did not continuously record
ground transmitter power levels. The Board
considers that such continuous recordings
would be of value.
THE METEOROID SHIELD DESIGN
Although fairly simple in concept, the mete-
oroid shield had to provide such a variety of
functions that it was, in fact, a quite compli-
cated device. It was, foremost, a very lightly
built cylindrical structure 270 inches in di-
ameter (in the deployed condition) by 265
inches long.
In brief, the meteoroid shield is formed of
a set of sixteen curved sheets of 2014 T6 alu-
minum panels, 0.025 inches thick, assem-
bled at flanges and other fittings to form the
cylinder shown. The forward and aft ends
were reinforced with curved 7075 T6 angles.
Various special details were included in
the assembly in order to hold it in place,
deploy it in orbit, and provide access to the
orbital workshop interior during prelaunch
activities. The principal means of holding
the shield in place in orbit (and to a lesser
extent during powered flight) was a set of
tension straps under the main tunnel. These
straps were bonded to the orbital workshop
wall and fitted with a hinge on each end to
take the butterfly hinge that attaches to the
adjacent meteoroid shield panel. These
butterfly hinges were designed to rotate so
as to lie against the sides of the main tunnel
which enclosed the tension straps and var-
ious cable runs on the orbital workshop.
Clockwise from the tension straps and
butterfly hinge, the next special feature is
the auxiliary tunnel. This tunnel extends in
an arch between panels of the thin meteoroid
shield. The 28 titanium frames of this tunnel
provide a very springy section in the rela-
tively rigid hoop provided by the rest of the
shield. The auxiliary tunnel also encloses a
smaller tunnel covering the wiring for the
thruster attitude control system. Farther
around, in position I, there are two curved
rectangular smaller panels, included to pro-
vide access to the orbital workshop.
Between positions I and IV, the two
halves of the meteoroid shield overlap and
are joined by a series of 14 trunnion bolts and
straps. These trunnion bolts were used to ad-
just the tension with which the shield was
held against the orbital workshop. Adjusting
the bolts in the trunnion assemblies was a
major aspect in positioning and tightening
the meteoroid shield against the orbital
workshop (rigging).
In order to provide the extra 30 inches of
perimeter required when the meteoroid
shield was deployed, a foldout panel assem-
bly is included in the panel adjacent to the
trunnions. The only remaining distinctive
features of the meteoroid shield are the
panels located over the scientific airlock and
wardroom window at position HI. The mete-
oroid shield is completed at the butterfly
hinges and tension straps at position I.
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Deployment Provisions
The deployment of the 265-inch-long meteor-
oid shield was accomplished by providing
two folding panel sections on each side of a
contained explosive pyrotechnic chain which
extended axially for the full length of the
shield except for short end reinforcements.
When the ordnance strip is fired and sepa-
rates the fold-over panel, the segments are
released and the shield is deployed. After re-
lease of this folded panel, a number of swing
arms are used to displace the shield away
from the orbital workshop wall and hold it
there. A rotational force is applied to these
swing arms by a total of sixteen torsion rods
suitably spaced around the ends of the mete-
oroid shield. When the meteoroid shield is
stowed for launch, there is a larger twist in
the torsion rods than after deployment. The
links on one side of the ordnance chain swing
in a direction opposite to those on the other
side. The butterfly hinges on each side of the
main tunnel permit the radial displacement
of the shield at the location of the tension
straps.
The meteoroid shield should therefore be
regarded as a very limp system, which de-
pends on being stretched tight around the
orbital workshop to withstand the aerody-
namic, vibratory, flutter and thrust loads at
launch. After deployment, it needs very little
strength to serve its primary objective as a
meteoroid shield.
The Auxiliary Tunnel
The auxiliary tunnel extends from the for-
ward skirt, down the full length of the mete-
oroid shield shield, and below the meteoroid
shield by about 57 inches. Venting of this
tunnel was provided through an outlet of 10
square inches under the corrugations of the
tunnel cover at the aft end of the forward
fairing. The tunnel was intended to be sealed
at the aft end by a rubber boot assembly in
both the stowed and deployed position. Note
that the tunnel is displaced some 5 or 6
inches circumferentially upon deployment of
the shield.
The main structural members of the aux-
iliary tunnel are titanium, arch-shaped,
frame springs. These frames provide the
structural tie between two meteoroid shield
panels and provide both regulation of the
pre-loading of the meteoroid shield to the
orbital workshop and act as a flexible relief
for diametrical changes resulting from ther-
mal and pressure changes of the orbital
workshop.
The tunnel also serves to protect the
thrust attitude control system cables located
in a small channel-shaped cover permanent-
ly attached to the orbital workshop. A seg-
mented and corrugated outer skin form an
aerodynamic fairing for the complete system
and seals between forward and aft fairings.
Thermal Control
Although the primary purpose of the meteor-
oid shield is that of providing protection of
the orbital workshop from meteoroids, it also
plays a significant role in the thermal con-
trol system. Much of the overall thermal de-
sign was accomplished passively by painting
the outer surfaces of the meteoroid shield
black except for a large white cross-shaped
pattern on the Earth side during flight. The
entire surface of the orbital workshop wall
was covered with gold foil. The overall choice
of finishes biased the thermal design toward
the cold side, it being easier to vernier con-
trol by heating rather than cooling.
Friction between the Meteoroid Shield
and Orbital Workshop Wall
To provide a uniform tension throughout the
meteoroid shield upon assembly and rigging
for flight, and to permit transfer of the trun-
nion bolt tension into the frames of the auxil-
iary tunnel, it was necessary to minimize
friction between the shield and the external
surface of the orbital workshop. This was
accomplished by applying a Teflon coating to
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the entire inner surface of the meteoroid
shield assembly. Special care was also taken
to assure that all fastening rivets be either
flush with or below the Teflon surface of the
shield. In addition to considerations of
friction, the elimination of rivet head
protrusions was important in not damaging
the rather delicate gold surface used to pro-
vide the proper emissivity of the outer orbit-
al workshop wall surfaces as mentioned
above. This was a vapor-deposited gold sur-
face applied to a Kapton backing and bonded
to the outer workshop wall with an adhesive.
Panel Details
The sixteen panels comprising the meteoroid
shield were formed of 0.025 inch thick alumi-
num stock fitted with doublers and angles to
permit their assembly. In each of these panel
joints, 96 holes of 1/8-inch diameter were
drilled to vent any air trapped under the me-
teoroid shield skin. The special panel joint is
required next to the SAS-1 wing because of
the unavailability of sufficiently wide panel
stock for the panel under SAS-1. It was a
strap of metal of this special joint that be-
came embedded in the SAS-1 cover and pre-
vented automatic deployment of SAS-1 in or-
bit. It is, perhaps, of passing interest to note
the longer length of exposed bolts in this par-
ticular joint.
Around the top of the panels is located an
angle and a neoprene rubber rain or weather
seal. This seal was not intended to be an
aerodynamic seal and could not be expected
Forward
Fairing
_ Shocks fromForward
Fairing
Auxiliary
Tunnel
Meteoroid
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Figure 3 Compressibility waves from the forward auxiliary tunnel fairing
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to accommodate significant relative deflec-
tions between the orbital workshop and me-
teoroid shield surfaces. To provide meteoroid
protection at the two ends of the meteoroid
shield, small strips of thin stainless steel
"fingers" were squeezed down between the
orbital workshop and the meteoroid shield
when stowed. The thrust load of the shield,
which weighs some 1200 pounds, is trans-
ferred to the forward flange of the aft skirt
through a group of twelve thrust blocks.
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The preceding analysis and discussion of pos-
sible failure modes of the meteoroid shield
have identified at least two ways that it
could fail in flight. Although the most prob-
able cause of the present failure was the lift-
ing of the shield from the orbital workshop
tank by excessive pressures in the auxiliary
tunnel, other failure modes could have oc-
curred in other regions of flight or under
more severe flight environments that were
encountered by Skylab 1.
Among these other modes of potential
failure, which could combine in various ways
under varying conditions of flight, are exces-
sive pressures under the forward edge of the
shield, or inadequate venting of the folded
ordnance panel. The inherently light spring
force of the auxiliary tunnel frames, the
crushing loads on these frames in flight, the
inherent longitudinal flexibility of the shield
assembly, the forces applied by the swing
links to deploy the shield, the possible
breathing of the shield panels as cavities are
vented, the noncylindrical nature of the un-
derlying pressurized tank, and the uncertain
tension loads applied to the shield in rigging
for flight all contribute to a lack of rigidity of
the shield and a weakness of its structural
integrity with the underlying tank struc-
ture.
A simple and straightforward solution to
these inherent problems of the present shield
design is therefore not likely. A fundamen-
tally different design concept seems in order.
One solution is, of course, to simply omit the
meteoroid shield, suitably coat the orbital
workshop for thermal control and accept the
meteoroid protection afforded by the orbital
workshop tank walls. Although the Board
has not conducted an analysis, meteoroid
flux levels are now known to be considerably
lower than those used in the original calcula-
tions. A new analysis, based on these flux
levels, may show acceptable protection.
Should some additional meteoroid protec-
tion be required, the Board is attracted to the
concept of a fixed, nondeployable shield.
Although the inherent weight advantages of
a separable bumper are not available in this
approach, the mission of Skylab could prob-
ably be satisfied in this manner. One concept
would be to bond an additional layer of metal
skin to the surface of the tank with a layer of
nonventing foam between the orbital work-
shop tank and the external skin. The prob-
lem being statistical in nature, the entire
shell of the orbital workshop would not have
to be covered.
POSTULATED SEQUENCE OF THE MOST
PROBABLE FAILURE MODE
The availability of flight data from the in-
strumentation on the meteoroid shield and
the vehicle disturbances, the design features
of the meteoroid shield, the solar array sys-
tem photographs taken in orbit, descriptions
by the astronauts, and other information
permit the following postulation of the prob-
able sequence of events associated with the
meteoroid shield failure.
In Figure 4, sketches and details of sa-
lient events are correlated to the roll rate
data around the 63 second anomaly period.
The events are designated on the figures by
times which are consistent with the avail-
able data.
60.12 Seconds - Meteoroid shield liftoff
and local inflation in the vicinity of the aux-
iliary tunnel was indicated by a small shift
191
READINGS IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
in position of the torsion rod on the forward
edge just to the left of the tunnel.
61.78 Seconds - Air entered the forward
fairing opening, raised the pressure under
the shield and high mass flows escaped
through the adjacent holes in the butterfly
hinge. This flow produced reactive force
causing a gradual decrease in roll rate be-
tween 61.78 seconds and 62.74 seconds.
62. 74 to 62. 79 Seconds - Burst pressure
under the auxiliary tunnel and adjacent me-
teoroid shield caused a large tangential load
on the forward section of the butterfly hinge,
causing the whole hinge to unzip. Fly around
inspection indicated that the failure of the
butterfly hinge occurred at the hinge line ad-
jacent to the main tunnel.
The butterfly hinge was now completely
broken. Aerodynamic drag on the meteoroid
shield including the bulky auxiliary tunnel
produced tension in the shield and pulled on
the vehicle so as to roll it in the direction
shown, that is, opposite to that noted earlier.
The large area and mass of this metal flag
induced a more rapid change in roll rate than
the earlier jetting through the butterfly
hinge. This process terminated as the mete-
oroid shield started to wrap around and lift
the SAS-2 wing.
62.79 to 62.90 Seconds - During this in-
terval the shield was wrapping around the
SAS-2 wing producing a negative roll torque
in the vehicle. At about 62.85 seconds the
SAS-2 tie-downs were broken.
62.90 Seconds - Upon release of the
SAS-2, the tension in the shield was trans-
ferred to the trunnions, causing failure of the
trunnion straps. Upon separation of this sec-
tion of the shield, the negative roll torque
ended.
62.90 to 62.95 Seconds - In this interval,
the remaining section of the meteoroid shield
began unwinding, introducing a large posi-
tive roll torque.
63.17 Seconds - A large shock was detect-
ed by the instrument unit upper mounting
ring vibration sensor due to the impact of the
separated section of the meteoroid shield
upon the conical adapter between the orbital
workshop and the SAS-1 stage.
63. 7 Seconds - The meteoroid shield con-
tinued to unwind and whip until 63.7 sec-
onds when it reached SAS-1 wing. As the me-
teoroid shield began to wrap around the
SAS-1 wing, a negative roll torque resulted.
The meteoroid shield then ripped apart from
top to bottom at the longitudinal joint adja-
cent to SAS-1, pulling a portion of the joint
assembly over the SAS-1 wing as the meteor-
oid shield section departed. From this point
on the vehicle showed normal response to its
roll control system.
POSSIBLE IMPACT OF COSTS AND
SCHEDULES ON THE METEOROID SHIELD
The origin of Skylab in late 1966--as an ex-
tension of the use of Apollo hardware for ex-
periments in Earth orbit---imposed an initial
environment of limited funding and strong
schedule pressures on the program. Skylab,
then designated the Apollo Applications Pro-
gram (AAP), was to fit in among the Apollo
flights under schedules imposed by the main-
line Apollo program. Funding was provided
out of the Apollo program and thus the needs
of Skylab competed with those of the higher
priority Apollo program.
The situation changed in mid-1969 when
Skylab became a major line item in its own
right and was to use a Saturn-V launch vehi-
cle with a dedicated, dry, orbital workshop.
From that point on, increased funding and
new flight schedules were established for
Skylab. Nonetheless, the original concept of
the meteoroid shield was retained when the
orbital workshop changed from Saturn-IB
propulsion stage to a dry workshop launched
by a Saturn-V. The Board was therefore
interested in determining the extent, if any,
that either the initial limitation of funds and
time, or any subsequent limitations, deter-
mined the design or thoroughness of develop-
ment of the meteoroid shield. This inquiry
was limited to the possible effect of funding
and schedule of the meteoroid shield as
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designed and flown on Skylab 1 and did not
consider whether meteoroid protection could
have or should have been provided in some
other way had the program not evolved as it
did.
In the Board's review of the evolution of
the meteoroid shield from initial design con-
cept, through testing and development, to fi-
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na] assembly for flight,particular attention
was devoted to any impacts arising from
limitation offunds or time. Extensive discus-
sions were also held with management per-
sonnel of MDAC-W, MSFC, JSC, and NASA
Headquarters on this matter. In no instance
could the Board find any evidence that the
design or testing of the meteoroid shield was
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Figure 4 -- Postulated Sequence Failure Mode
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compromised by lack of funds or time. Pro-
gram personnel, both government and
contractor, had full confidence in the basic
concept of the meteoroid shield and thus saw
no need to alter the design when the change
to a dry, Saturn-V launched orbital work-
shop occurred. Given the concept that the
shield was to be maintained tight to the or-
bital workshop tank, and thus structurally
integrated with the well-established S-IVB
structure, the emphasis of testing given to
ordnance reliability and shield deployment
was considered proper. Neither the records of
Skylab nor the memories of key personnel
revealed any tests or analyses of the meteor-
oid shield that were considered desirable at
the time and which were precluded by lack of
funds or time.
THE SKYLAB MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The management system utilized for the
Skylab program was derived directly from
that which had been developed and used in
the Apollo program. As such, it included a
series of formal reviews and certifications at
progressive points in the program life cycle
that are intended to provide visibility to con-
tractor and NASA management on program
status, problems and their resolution. The
selected review points and their primary
purpose are set forth in Skylab Program
Directive No. l lA, which is summarized as
follows:
Preliminary Requirements Review (PRR).
"To verify by formal review the suitability of
the conceptual configuration and to establish
the requirements and action necessary to
achieve a design baseline."
Preliminary Design Review (PDR). "To
verify by formal review the suitability of the
baseline design of the Contract End Item."
Critical Design Review (CDR). "To verify
by formal review the suitability of the design
of a Contract End Item when the design is es-
sentially complete."
Configuration Inspection (CI). "To certify
that the configuration for the Contract End
Item as being offered for delivery is in confor-
mance with the baseline established at the
CDR."
Certification of Flight Worthiness
(COFW). "To certify that each flight stage
module and experiment is a complete and
qualified item of hardware prior to ship-
ment."
Design Certification Review (DCR). "To
examine the design of the total mission com-
plex for proof of design and development ma-
turity."
Flight Readiness Review (FRR). "A con-
solidated review of the hardware, operation-
al and support elements to assess their
readiness to begin the mission."
The primary thrust of these key program
milestones is thus a formal review and certi-
fication of equipment design or program sta-
tus; the primary purpose being served is to
provide visibility into these matters to senior
NASA and contractor program manage-
ment. As noted in the Skylab Program Direc-
tive, the organization and conduct of the
review is a major responsibility of a senior
program or management official. For each
review, specific objectives are to be satisfied,
in conformance with preestablished criteria
and supported by specified documentation.
The reviews are thus highly structured and
formal in nature, with a major emphasis on
design details, status of various items and
thoroughness of documentation. Several
hundred specialists, subsystem engineers
and schedule managers are generally in at-
tendance.
The material presented in these reviews
is, of course, developed over a period of time
in many lower-level reviews and in monthly
progress reports dealing with various sys-
tems and subsystems. In addition, several
other major reviews peculiar to Skylab were
conducted, including the following:
Cluster System Review of December 1967
Mathew's Subsystem Review Team of
August 1970-July 1971
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• Critical MechanismsReview of March
1971
• Systems Operations Compatibility
AssessmentReview of October 1971-June
1972
• Structural/Mechanical Subsystem
Reviewsof July 1971-May 1972
• Hardware Integrity Reviewof March
1973
• MSFC Center Director's Program
Reviews
There was thus no shortage of reviews. In
order to determine the consideration given to
the meteoroid shield throughout the pro-
gram, the Board examined the minutes, pre-
sentation material, action items, and
closeout of data of each of these reviews and
progress reports. In every case, complete
records and documentation were available
for inspection. In no casedid the Board un-
cover any conflict or inconsistency in the
record. All reviews appeared to be in com-
plete conformance to Program Directive llA
and were attended by personnel appropriate
to th_ subject matter under consideration.
The system was fully operational.
And yet, a major omission occurred
throughout this process--consideration of
aerodynamic loads on the meteoroid shield
during the launch phase of the mission.
Throughout this six year period of progres-
sive reviews and certifications the principal
attention devoted to the meteoroid shield
was that of achieving a satisfactory deploy-
ment in orbit and containment of the ord-
nance used to initiate the deployment. As
noted in the preceding section on possible
failure modes,design attention was also giv-
en to the strength of the hinges, trunnion
straps and bolts, to the crushing pressureson
the frames of the auxiliary tunnel, to flutter
and to the venting of both the auxiliary
tunnel and the several panels of the shield.
But never did the matter of aerodynamic
loadson the shield or aeroelastic interactions
between the shield and its external pressure
environment during launch receive the at-
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tention and understanding during the design
and review process which in retrospect it de-
served.
This omission, serious as it was, is not
surprising. From the beginning, a basic de-
sign concept and requirement was that the
shield be tight to the tank. As clearly stated
in much of the early documentation, the me-
teoroid shield was to be structurally integral
with the S-IVB tank--a piece of structure
that was well proven in many previous
flights. The auxiliary tunnel frames, the con-
trolled torque on the trunnion bolts and the
rigging procedure itself were all specifically
intended to keep the shield tight against the
tank. The question of whether the shield
would stay there under the dynamics of
flight through the atmosphere was simply
not considered in any coordinated manner--
at least insofar as the Board could determine
by this concentrated investigation.
Possibly contributing to this oversight
was the basic view of the meteoroid shield as
a piece of structure. Organizationally, re-
sponsibility for the meteoroid shield at
MDAC-W was established to develop it as
one of the several structural subsystems,
along with such items as spacecraft struc-
ture and penetrations, pressure vessels, sci-
entific airlocks, protective covers and fin-
ishes. Neither the government, (MSFC), or
the contractor, (MDAC-W), had a full-time
subsystem engineer assigned to the meteor-
oid shield. While it is recognized that one
cannot have a full-time engineer on every
piece of equipment, it is nonetheless possible
that the complex interactions and integra-
tion of aerodynamics, structure, rigging
procedures, ordnance, deployment mecha-
nisms, and thermal requirements of the me-
teoroid shield would have been enhanced by
such an arrangement. Clearly, a serious fail-
ure of communications among aerodynamics,
structures, manufacturing and assembly
personnel, and a breakdown of a systems
engineering approach to the shield, existed
over a considerable period of time. Further,
the extensive management review and
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certification process itself, in its primary
purpose of providing visibility of program
status to management, did not identify these
faults.
Further insight into this treatment of the
meteoroid shield as one of several structural
subsystems is obtained by a comparison of a
listing of the design reviews conducted on
both the meteoroid shield and the solar array
system. At MDAC-W, the solar array system
was considered a major subsystem and was
placed under the direction of a full-time pro-
ject engineer.
The Board is impressed with the thor-
oughness, rigor and formalism of the man-
agement review system developed by Apollo
and used by Skylab. Great discipline is im-
posed upon everyone by this system and it
has served very well. In a large program as
geographically dispersed and intrinsically
complex as Skylab, such visibility of pro-
gram status and problems is a management
necessity. We therefore have no wish to alter
this management system in any basic man-
ner. But all systems created by humans have
their potential flaws and inherent hazards.
Such inherent flaws and weaknesses must be
understood by those who operate the system
if it is not to become their master. We there-
fore wish to identify some of those potential
flaws as they have occurred to us in this in-
vestigation, not to find fault or to identify a
specific cause of this particular flight failure
but to use this experience to further
strengthen the management processes of
large and complex endeavors.
As previously noted, the management
system developed by NASA for manned
space flight places large emphasis on rigor,
detail and thoroughness. In hand with this
emphasis comes formalism, extensive docu-
mentation, and visibility in detail to senior
management. While nearly perfect, such a
system can submerge the concerned individ-
ual and depress the role of the intuitive engi-
neer or analyst. It may not allow full play for
the intuitive judgment or past experience of
the individual. An emphasis on a manage-
ment system, can, in itself, serve to separate
the people engaged in the program from the
real world of hardware. To counteract these
potential hazards and flaws, we offer the fol-
lowing suggestions.
Deployable systems or structures that
have to move, or that involve other
mechanisms, devices, or components in
their operation, should not be considered
as a piece of structure or be the basic re-
sponsibility of a structures organization.
A complex, multi-disciplinary system
such as the meteoroid shield should possi-
bly have a designated project engineer
who is responsible for overseeing all as-
pects of analysis, design, fabrication, test
and assembly.
Management must always strive to coun-
teract the natural tendency of engineers
to believe that a drawing is the real
world. First-hand experience with how
hardware behaves and can fail is of the
essence to design engineers. Possibly,
some design engineers should be required
to spend time in testing, operations, or
failure analysis. Such experience may not
contribute to cleverness or sophistication
of analysis, but something equally
valuable--actual experiencemmay be ad-
ded to the design group. An unfamiliarity
with hardware, first hand, makes it diffi-
cult to conceptualize a living, breathing,
piece of hardware from an analysis or a
drawing.
The. extensive use of the computer for
complex analyses can serve to remove the
analyst from the real world. One should,
therefore, require a simplified or support-
ing analysis that provides an understand-
able rationale for the phenomena under
consideration before accepting the results
of a computer analysis.
The emphasis on "visibility to manage-
ment" in the review process should not be
extended to the point that one can be led
to believe the job is completed, or the de-
sign is satisfactory, when such visibility
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is provided. A major emphasis on status,
on design details, or on documentation
can detract from a productive examina-
tion of "how does it work" or "what do you
think."
Today's organizations seldom include the
old-fashioned chief engineer who, rela-
tively devoid of administrative or man-
agerial duties, brings total experience
and spends most of the time in the subtle
integration of all elements of the system
under purview. Perhaps we should more
actively seek and utilize these talented
individuals in an engineering organiza-
tion.
SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS
1) The launch anomaly that occurred at ap-
proximately 63 seconds after lift-off was
a failure of the meteoroid shield of the
orbital workshop.
2) The SAS-2 wing tie downs were broken
by the action of the meteoroid shield at
63 seconds. Subsequent loss of the SAS-2
wing was caused by retro-rocket plume
impingement on the partially deployed
wing at 593 seconds.
3) The failure of the S-IIinterstage adapter
to separate in flight was probably due to
damage to the ordnance separation de-
vice by falling debris from the meteoroid
shield.
4) The most probable cause of the failure of
the meteoroid shield was internal pres-
surization of its auxiliary tunnel. This
internal pressurization acted to force the
forward end of the tunnel and meteoroid
shield away from the orbital workshop
and into the supersonic air stream. The
resulting forces tore the meteoroid
shield from the orbital workshop.
5) The pressurization of the auxiliary tun-
nel resulted from the admission of high
pressure air into the tunnel through
several openings in the aft end. These
openings were: (1) an imperfect fit of the
tunnel with the aft fairing; (2) an open
boot seal between the tunnel and tank
surface; and (3) open stringers on the aft
skirt under the tunnel.
6) The venting analysis for the tunnel was
predicated on a completely sealed aft
end. The openings in the aft end of the
tunnel thus resulted from a failure to
communicate this critical design feature
among aerodynamics, structural design,
and manufacturing personnel.
7) Other marginal aspects of the design of
the meteoroid shield which, when taken
together, could also result in failure dur-
ing launch are:
a) The proximity of the meteoroid
shield forward reinforcing angle to
the air stream
b) The existence of gaps between the or-
bital workshop and the forward ends
of the meteoroid shield
c) The light spring force of the auxil-
iary tunnel frames
d) The aerodynamic crushing loads on
the auxiliary tunnel frames in flight
e) The action of the torsion-bar actu-
ated swing links applying an out-
ward radial force to the meteoroid
shield
f) The inherent longitudinal flexibility
of the shield assembly
g) The nonuniform expansion of the
orbital workshop tank when pressur-
ized
h) The inherent difficulty in rigging for
flight and associated uncertain ten-
sion loads in the shield.
8) The failure to recognize many of these
marginal design features through six
years of analysis, design and test was
due, in part, to a presumption that the
meteoroid shield would be "tight to the
tank" and "structurally integral with
the S-IVB tank" as set forth in the
design criteria.
9) Organizationally, the meteoroid shield
was treated as a structural subsystem.
The absence of a designated project engi-
neer for the shield contributed to the
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lack of effective integration of the
various structural, aerodynamic, aeroe-
lastic, test fabrication, and assembly
aspects of the meteoroid shield system.
10) The overall management system used
for Skylab was essentially the same as
that developed in the Apollo program.
This system was fully operational for
Skylab; no conflicts or inconsistencies
were found in the records of the manage-
ment reviews. Nonetheless, the signifi-
carce of the aerodynamic loads on the
meteoroid shield during launch was not
revealed by the extensive review pro-
cess.
11) No evidence was found to indicate that
the design, development and testing of
the meteoroid shield were compromised
by limitations of funds or time. The
quality of workmanship applied to the
meteoroid shield was adequate for its
intended purpose.
12) Given the basic view that the meteoroid
shield was to be completely in contact
with and perform as structurally inte-
gral with the S-IVB tank, the testing
emphasis on ordnance performance and
shield deployment was appropriate.
13) Engineering and management person-
nel on Skylab, on the part of both con-
tractor and government, were available
from the prior Saturn development and
were highly experienced and adequate
in number.
14) The failure to recognize these design
deficiencies of the meteoroid shield, as
well as to communicate within the pro-
ject the critical nature of its proper vent-
ing, must therefore be attributed to an
absence of sound engineering judgment
and alert engineering leadership con-
cerning this particular system over a
considerable period of time.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
1) If the backup orbital workshop or a simi-
lar spacecraft is to be flown in the
future, a possible course of action is to
omit the meteoroid shield, suitably coat
the orbital workshop for thermal con-
trol, and accept the meteoroid protection
afforded by the orbital workshop tank
walls. If, on the other hand, additional
protection should be necessary, the
Board is attracted to the concept of a
fixed, nondeployable shield.
2) To reduce the probability of separation
failures such as occurred at the S-II in-
terstage Second Separation Plane, both
linear shaped charges should be detonat-
ed simultaneously from both ends. In
addition, all other similar ordnance
applications should be reviewed for a
similar failure mode.
3) "Structural" systems that have to move
or deploy, or that involve other mecha-
nisms, equipment or components for
their operation, should not be the exclu-
sive responsibility of a structures orga-
nization.
4) Complex, multi-disciplinary systems
such as the meteoroid shield should have
a designated project engineer who is
responsible for all aspects of analysis,
design, fabrication, test and assembly.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
The Board found no evidence that the design
deficiencies of the meteoroid shield were the
result of, or were masked by, the content and
processes of the management system that
were used for Skylab. On the contrary, the
rigor, detail, and thoroughness of the system
are doubtless necessary for a program of this
magnitude. At the same time, as a caution-
ary note for the future, it is emphasized that
management must always be alert to the po-
tential hazards of its systems and take care
that an attention to rigor, detail and thor-
oughness does not inject an undue emphasis
on formalism, documentation, and visibility
in detail. Such an emphasis can submerge
the concerned individual and depress the
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role of the intuitive engineer or analyst. It
will always be of importance to achieve a
cross-fertilization and broadened experience
of engineers in analysis, design, test or oper-
ations. Positive steps must always be taken
to assure that engineers become familiar
with actual hardware, develop an intuitive
understanding of computer-developed re-
sults, and make productive use of flight data
in this learning process. The experienced
chief engineer, whose time can be spent in
the subtle integration of all elements of the
system under review, free of administrative
and managerial duties, can also be a major
asset to an engineering organization.
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THE SEASAT FAILURE
N9 3-
REPORT OF THE SEASAT FAILURE REVIEW BOARD
by the NASA Investigation Board
The Seasat spacecraft failed on October 9,
1978, after satisfactory operation in orbit for
105 days, as a result of a loss of electrical
power in the Agena bus that was used as a
part of the spacecraft. The loss of power was
caused by a massive and progressive short in
one of the slip ring assemblies that was used
to connect the rotating solar arrays into the
power subsystem. The most likely cause of
this short was the initiation of an arc be-
tween adjacent slip ring brush assemblies.
The triggering mechanism of this arc could
have been either a wire-to-brush assembly
contact, a brush-to-brush contact, or a mo-
mentary short caused by a contaminant that
bridged internal components of opposite elec-
trical polarity.
The slip ring assembly, as used in the
Seasat spacecraft, was connected into the
power subsystem in such a way that most of
the adjacent brush assemblies were of oppo-
site electrical polarity. This wiring arrange-
ment, together with the congested nature of
the design itself, made the Seasat slip ring
assembly a unique, first-of-a-kind component
that was particularly prone to shorting.
The possibility of slip ring failures result-
ing from placing opposite electrical polarities
on adjacent brush assemblies was known at
least as early as the summer of 1977 to other
projects within the contractor's organization.
Furthermore, failures of slip ring assemblies
due to shorting between brushes had been
experienced by the prime contractor on the
slip ring assemblies used by other programsl
That the Seasat organization was not fully
aware of these potential failure modes was
due to a breakdown in communication within
the contractor's organization.
In addition to this small, though fatal,
breakdown in communications, the failure to
give the slip ring assembly the attention it
deserved was due, in large part, to an under-
_.
lying program policy and a pervasive view
that Seasat's Agena bus was a standard,
well-proven piece of equipment that had
been used on other programs. In actuality,
however, three major subsystems--the elec-
trical power subsystem, the attitude control
subsystem, and the data subsystem--were
substantially modified for use on Seasat's
Agena bus. So firmly rooted was this princi-
ple of using a "standard Agena bus" that,
even after the engineering staffs of both the
government and the contractor were well
aware of the final uniqueness of their bus,
the words, and the associated way of doing
business, persisted to the end.
The point of view that the Seasat bus was
flight proven, standard equipment proved to
have far-reaching consequences. It became
program policy to minimize testing and docu-
mentation, to qualify components by similar-
ity wherever possible, and to minimize the
penetration into the Agena bus by the gov-
ernment. It led to a concentration by project
management of the sensors, sensor integra-
tion, and the data management system to the
near exclusion of the bus subsystems. Impor-
tant component failures were not reported to
project management, a test was waived with-
out proper approval, and compliance with
specifications was weak. The component that
failed--the slip ring assembly--was never
mentioned in the briefing charts for either
the Consent to Ship meeting or the Critical
Design Review.
The Failure Modes, Effects and Critical-
ity Analysis that was conducted for the elec-
trical power subsystem did not consider
shorts as a failure mode and thus did not re-
veal the presence of single point failure
modes in the system or provide a basis for the
development of a full complement of sating
command sequences that could be used by
the flight controllers in responding to
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anomalies in the power subsystem. A lack of
clarity and rigor in the operating require-
ments and constraints documents for the
power subsystem of the bus, together with
this lack of sating command sequences, pre-
vented the flight controllers from having all
the tools they needed to do their job. The
flight controller for the power subsystem was
also new to his job at the time of the failure
and thus was not sufficiently knowledgeable
of the system he was controlling. While no
action of the flight controllers contributed to
the failure, they did fail to follow the pre-
scribed procedures in response to the infor-
mation available to them at the time of the
failure.
The advantages of using standard, well
proven equipment in terms of both cost and
mission success are well recognized. But the
experience of Seasat illustrates the risks that
are associated with the use of equipment that
is classified as "standard" or "flight proven."
The uncritical acceptance of such classifica-
tions by the Seasat engineering staff sub-
merged important differences in both design
and application from previously used equip-
ment. It is therefore important that thorough
planning be conducted at the start of a
project to fully evaluate the heritage of pre-
viously used equipment and to establish
project plans and procedures that enable the
system to be selectively penetrated.
THE SEASAT MISSION AND ITS
SPACECRAFT
The Seasat Project was a proof-of-concept
mission whose objectives included demon-
stration of techniques for global monitoring
of oceanographic and surface meteorological
phenomena and features, provision of
oceanographic data for both application and
scientific areas, and the determination of key
features of an operational ocean dynamics
monitoring system.
To fulfill these objectives, the Seasat sen-
sor complement comprised a radar altimeter
(ALT), a synthetic aperture radar (SAR), a
Seasat-A scatterometer system (SASS), a
scanning multichannel microwave radiome-
ter (SMMR), and a visual and infrared radi-
ometer (VIRR). All of these sensors except
the SAR operated continuously; telemetry
from them, as well as from all engineering
subsystems, was sent in real-time when over
a ground station and recorded on a tape re-
corder for later transmission to provide data
for a full orbit. SAR data had to be transmit-
ted in real-time, without the use of the on-
board recorder, to specially equipped stations
because of its high data rate. The normal
duty cycle for the SAR was four percent.
The five sensors were integrated into a
sensor module that provided mounting, ther-
mal control, power conditioning, telemetry,
and command support to the instruments.
The second major element of the spacecraft
was an Agena bus which provided attitude
control, electrical power, telemetry and com-
mand functions to the sensor module. In ad-
dition to these on-orbit functions, the Agena
bus also provided injection stage propulsion
and guidance to orbit. The spacecraft was
three-axis stabilized with all sensors Earth
pointing and is shown in its on-orbit configu-
ration in Figure 1. To provide near global
coverage, the spacecraft was injected into a
790 kilometer, near circular orbit with an
inclination of 108 degrees and a period of ap-
proximately 101 minutes. Design lifetime
was one year on orbit, with expendables pro-
vided for a three-year life.
The sensors were provided by various
NASA Centers. The sensor module, the Age-
na bus and the integration of the sensors,
sensor module and Agena bus into a space-
craft was provided by the Lockheed Missles
and Space Company under contract to the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory (JPL).
Responsibility for Seasat project manage-
ment, mission planning and direction, mis-
sion operations and experiment data process-
ing resided at JPL. The Goddard Space
Flight Center (GSFC) provided network
support and spacecraft orbit and attitude de-
terminations; use was therefore made of the
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existing Spaceflight Tracking and Data
Network, the NASA Communications (NAS-
COM) network, and the Project Operations
Control Center that are operated by GSFC.
To place this failure review in a proper
perspective, it is noted that the Seasat space-
craft operated in orbit in a generally satisfac-
tory maneuver for over three months and
provided a large amount of scientific data.
The sensors represented a significant ad-
vance in technology and their integration
into the sensor module, a large engineering
challenge. In addition, Seasat also required
the creation of significantly enlarged capa-
bilities in the acquisition and processing of
flight data. That the important and signifi-
cant technical and engineering advance-
ments were achieved is a tribute to the skill
and dedication of all who were associated
with this program.
The Seasat spacecraft was successfully
launched on June 26, 1978, and thus operat-
ed for 105 days until the failure occurred on
October 9, 1978. During this time in orbit,
the spacecraft operation was generally satis-
factory with considerable data being ob-
tained from all of the sensors. Three signifi-
cant anomalies were experienced during the
life of Seasat in orbit, one involving sun in-
terference in the attitude control system scan
wheels, one caused by a sticking thermostat
in a sensor heater circuit, and one in which
the spacecraft suffered an abnormally low
bus voltage for several orbits. Because of a
possible relationship of these latter two
anomalies with the failure of October 9,
1978, they were specifically investigated by
the Board.
PROGRAM HISTORY AND MANAGEMENT
The Seasat program was conceived and
initiated in a period of transition in the
philosophy of management of NASA pro-
grams following the Apollo program. Apollo,
and to varying degrees other NASA flight
programs, were characterized by extensive
test programs, large formal documentation
systems, and comprehensive and frequent
technical and management reviews. A large
in-house staffwas required in order to imple-
ment this approach. The high cost of conduct-
ing space programs in this mode severely
constrained the future uses of space. During
the final phases of the Apollo program,
NASA management accordingly instituted a
policy aimed at reducing the cost space mis-
sions. This policy was aggressively pursued
by the highest levels of management.
A Low Cost Systems Office was estab-
lished in Headquarters to oversee a stan-
dardization program and to encourage the
use of existing hardware. This program in-
cluded the development of standard compo-
nents as well as a multimission spacecraft.
A major emphasis was placed on shifting
work from in-house to out-of-house in consid-
eration of reducing the NASA manpower
base. Design-to-cost techniques and cost
benefits of heritage through the use of hard-
ware and software developed for other pro-
grams were subjects to be addressed at each
step in the approval cycle.
The basic philosophy of the Seasat pro-
gram was thus established in an environ-
ment in which management emphasis was
shifting from one of demonstrating a nation-
al capability to operate reliably in space to
one of reducing the cost of utilizing space.
Design-to-cost was a fundamental tenet of
the Seasat project definition. A cost estimate
of $58.2 million was established as a target
cost at the end of the feasibility study phase
in mid-1973 and was imposed as a design-to-
cost ceiling in December 1973 by NASA
management. Any overruns were to be offset
by descoping the mission content.
In attempting to define a program which
would both satisfy the user community and
live within the ceiling cost, the concept of
making maximum use of proven existing
hardware and software was adopted early in
the program planning phase. This in turn
provided for a reduction in design and devel-
opment effort and in the size of the in-house
staff needed to monitor the activity.
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Figure i On-Orbit Configuration of the Seasat Spacecraft
These were key elements of the manage-
ment philosophy which influenced the struc-
ture and conduct of the program.
PROGRAM PLANNING
Feasibility Studies (Phase A) - Feasi-
bility for the Seasat mission was established
in '73 through three studies conducted by the
JPL, GSFC, and the Applied Physics Labora-
tory of the Johns Hopkins University. These
studies were aimed at meeting the set of user
requirements generated at a series of meet-
ings held in the first half of 1973 among
NASA and representatives of the govern-
mental, commercial, and institutional com-
munities of users of ocean dynamics data.
With the user requirements as a basis, the
feasibility studies examined the Seasat mis-
sion from an overall systems viewpoint, in-
cluding a review of instrumentation and pos-
sible spacecraft (bus) approaches to accom-
modate the instrumentation.
Subsequent to the submission of the
Phase A studies in July 1973, a joint
NASA/User Study Task Team was formed to
review the Phase A studies, integrate the
results, and provide technical and program-
matic guidance for more in-depth Definition
Phase studies.
As a result of this review, the Task Team
recommended a Baseline Mission which in-
cluded a complement of the five sensor types
that actually ended up flying on Seasat.
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Based upon cost estimates prepared by
the Phase A study participants, the Task
Team recommended a target cost of $58.2
million for the Baseline Mission. This includ-
ed the cost of the spacecraft bus and instru-
ments, the launch vehicles, and tracking and
data acquisition. An Alternate Payload Mis-
sion of reduced capability, excluding the syn-
thetic aperture radar, was also recommended
for further study with a target cost of $43.2
million.
There was some discussion in the Seasat
Study Study Task Team Report (October
1973) of the use of an existing bus to mini-
mize cost. The idea, however, was addressed
with some skepticism. While it was believed
that the use of subsystems with a high de-
gree of inheritance from existing programs
was desirable and possible, it was not clear at
that time that an existing bus could be
adapted economically.
Definition Studies and Preliminary
Design (Phase B) - Definition Phase Studies
of the Baseline and Alternate Payload Mis-
sions recommended by the Seasat Study
Task Team were conducted from November
1973 to the summer of 1974. The Wallops
Flight Center managed the Definition Phase
Study of the Baseline Mission which was con-
ducted by the Applied Physics Laboratory.
The JPL, assisted by various aerospace com-
panies familiar with Earth satellite design,
conducted the Definition Phase Study of the
Alternate Mission.
In December 1973, NASA management
adopted the $58.2 million figure recommend-
ed by the Task Team as a not to exceed ceiling
for the Seasat Baseline Mission. The efforts
of the Definition Phase Study participants
were accordingly intensified to develop the
most economical satellite system possible
that would best suit the user requirements
within the cost ceiling.
GSFC declined to participate in the Defi-
nition Phase activity as they had serious
doubts as to their ability to structure a full
Baseline Mission within the design-to-cost
ceiling.
With the stimulus of the design-to-cost
ceiling, and management emphasis on the
maximum use of existing subsystem hard-
ware, the JPL Definition Phase Group pro-
posed the of idea building a spacecraft sys-
tem comprising two major elements: a sensor
module designed specifically for Seasat, and
a spacecraft bus based on an existing, flight
proven bus devloped for other Air Force or
NASA programs. The JPL viewed the results
of the Phase A studies as indicating that the
requirements of the sensors could be satisfied
by standard support subsystems for attitude
control, power, structures, thermal control,
etc. On the other hand, the area of greatest
uncertainty was seen to be the definition of
the sensor's operating capabilities, data re-
quirements and sensor system integration. It
was therefore proposed that if a suitable
spacecraft bus were available, the design and
development effort could be concentrated on
the sensors and their integration with a sen-
sor module that could then be mated to the
bus via a mechanical/electrical interface.
The JPL entered into four $I5,000 study
contracts with aerospace companies (Boeing,
General Electric, Lockheed, and TRW) that
had existing spacecraft designs with capabil-
ities in the range of Seasat requirements to
evaluate the concepts that: (1) there are ex-
isting buses that could be used, without
modification, to supply the necessary support
functions for the sensor payload, and (2) new
design functions could be incorporated in a
separate module along with the sensors and
thereby reduce the systems development
task to a sensor system development task.
The studies were conducted from November
15, 1973 to March 30, 1974. The sensors were
described to the study contractors as they
were developed on December 15, 1973, with
updates as appropriate until the end of these
studies.
It was concluded as a result of these stud-
ies that basic sensor support requirements
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could be satisfied by the existing spacecraft
bus designs studied with "no major changes,"
although "minor modifications" were ac-
knowledged to be required. It was contem-
plated, for example, that minor modifications
would be required of the attitude control,
power, and temperature control subsystems.
Telemetry, tracking and command subsys-
tems were reported to be off-the-shelf de-
signs, but required significant modification.
It should be noted that the contractor bus
studies were concerned almost solely with
mission performance requirements. The re-
ports did not sufficiently define the sub-
system design or component selections to
provide a basis for an adequate penetration
of heritage. The JPL Definition Phase Final
Report nevertheless concluded that the exist-
ing bus approach had significant cost, sched-
ule and risk advantages, and permitted a
concentration of development efforts on the
sensor system.
Midterm reports in May 1974 of the JPL
and the Wallops Flight Center and Applied
Physics Laboratory Definition Phase study
groups demonstrated that neither the Base-
line nor Alternate Payload Mission was
achievable within the $58.2 million ceiling.
The Wallops Flight Center and Applied
Physics Laboratory's estimate for the Base-
line Mission, which included an in-house de-
signed spacecraft, was $85.2 million. At this
point in time the Wallops Flight Center and
the Applied Physics Laboratory adopted the
sensor module/existing bus concept that JPL
was pursuing. JPL's midterm estimate for
the Alternate Payload Mission using the ex-
isting bus concept was $65.9 million.
The JPL and the Wallops Flight Center
and Applied Physics Laboratory searched for
ways to descope the project in order to stay
within the cost ceiling. Each group per-
formed a number of iterations wherein sen-
sor performance and sensor combinations
were varied in order to decrease the cost and
yet meet the basic user requirements.
A final presentation of the JPL and
Wallops Flight Center and Applied Physics
Laboratory's Definition Phase studies to
NASA Headquarters management in August
1974 resulted in a reduced baseline payload
at the $58.2 million ceiling which eliminated
the microwave radiometer and combined the
altimeter and scatterometer into a single in-
strument, but which retained the synthetic
aperture radar, as well as the visual and in-
frared radiometer.
SPACECRAFT REQUIREMENTS AND
DOCUMENTATION
The two primary contractual documents on
Seasat were the Satellite Vehicle Specifica-
tion (Part I and Part H) and the Satellite Ve-
hicle System Test Plan. There were 13 other
documents which required JPL approval, but
these were primarily implementation and
operations type plans; i.e., Data Manage-
ment Plan, Quality Assurance Plan, etc. One
of these plans, the Reliability Assurance
Plan, is relevant to this chapter and will be
discussed herein.
Part I of the Satellite Vehicle Specifica-
tion established the performance, design, de-
velopment, and qualification requirements
for the Seasat mission. Part II of the specifi-
cation established the product configuration
and system test acceptance requirements.
This specification is similar to a typical Part
I, Part II Contract End Item specification
used for most NASA programs.
The Satellite Vehicle Systems Test Plan
established the test program for assembling,
testing, monitoring and operating the Seasat
spacecraft from manufacturing through
launch. The Satellite Vehicle Systems in-
cluded all Lockheed and government fur-
nished hardware installed in the Agena bus
assembly and the sensor module. The test
plan was the controlling test document and
subordinate only to the Satellite Vehicle
Specification. An evaluation was made re-
garding this flow of requirements and the in-
terrelationships of Lockheed and JPL rela-
tive to control and the visibility of require-
ments.
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Compliance with Requirements - Dur-
ing the Board's review, it was determined
that a significant test required by the JPL
approved test plan was not conducted. The
Satellite Vehicle Test Plan required elec-
tronic assemblies to be subjected to eight
cycles in thermal environment of which, as a
minimum, two cycles should be in a vacuum
chamber (acceptance test). The Slip Ring
Assembly Component Specification, howev-
er, did not require a thermal vacuum test.
This noncompliance was not recognized by
JPL or Lockheed systems engineering until
the present failure investigation was begun.
Discussions with Lockheed and JPL person-
nel revealed that there was not a closed loop
system to assure compliance with contractu-
al requirements identified in the test plan.
The fact that a component specification
that violated a contractual requirement
could be issued is indicative of a lack of
checks and balances in the system. Another
indication of this lack surfaced in reviewing
the qualification requirements. In at least
two cases, to be discussed below, qualifica-
tion requirements noncompliance was not
documented. In fact, in the areas where the
Board performed an in-depth evaluation, in-
consistencies in requirements were noted in
many cases. Most inconsistencies were mi-
nor; however, the impression left was that
both compliance with requirements by Lock-
heed and the check and balance system at
Lockheed and JPL were deficient.
Engineering Memoranda - Environ-
mental derivations, test criteria and detailed
test requirements were documented in engi-
neering memoranda (EMs). Lockheed stated
that EMs were used to allow early genera-
tion of requirements while the spacecraft de-
sign was being finalized. A considerable
number of EMs were developed during the
course of the Seasat program, and it accord-
ingly became very difficult to establish a
documentation trail as to how test require-
ments were established, modified, and satis-
fied. In fact, two particular incidents were
uncovered during detailed evaluation into
the qualification status of the electrical pow-
er subsystem components that point out the
weakness of the EM system.
In one case, the Seasat environmental
requirements specified a five minute per axis
random vibration level but several compo-
nents were qualified by similarity to a pro-
gram that required only a three minute per
axis vibration. This five minute per axis
requirement was also specified in Part I of
the Satellite Vehicle Specification. There
was no documented evidence that this non-
compliance was acceptable. In the second in-
cident, pyro shock levels for Seasat were not
enveloped by the program to which the Sea-
sat slip ring assemblies were "qualified by
similarity." While an EM stated that the slip
ring assemblies are "not highly sensitive to
pyro shock," there was no documentation or
analysis to support the stated conclusion.
Because Seasat was a one-of-a-kind vehi-
cle, Lockheed did not summarize the require-
ments contained in the various EMs into a
single baseline document. A baseline docu-
ment, with change control, would have been
a systematic approach to assuring require-
ments were satisfied and would have pro-
vided a feedback mechanism to all parties.
The large number of EMs produced in the
Seasat program made it very difficult for
Lockheed to use the EMs to manage the
program and to assure continuity in require-
ments, as exemplified above, and equally
difficult for JPL to effectively penetrate the
system.
The Failure Modes, Effects and
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) - The
FMECA prepared for Seasat utilized the
Fault Tree Analysis Technique. In effect,
this was a method for studying the factors
that could cause an undesired event to occur
and inputting these factors into a computer
model to which probability data could be
applied to determine the most critical and
probable sequence of events that could pro-
duce the undesirable event.
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The Reliability Assurance Program Plan
required that a FMECA be performed at the
system level. Further evaluation revealed
that "critical/new equipment" would also be
subjected to an FMECA. Out of the 74 criti-
cal items identified on Seasat, only three
were judged to require component level
FMECAs. These were the command timing
unit (CTU), the telemetry sensor unit (TSU)
and the synthetic aperture radar (SAR) an-
tenna (supplier performed).
The FMECA for the electrical power sub-
system stated that there were "no single
point failures" and listed a number of redun-
dancies, including main bus power supply
channels, batteries, charge controllers, and
others. Electrical shorts were, however, not
included as possible failure modes; almost all
of the effort was directed toward consider-
ation of failure modes that would result in
loss of solar array power, and the only slip
ring assembly failure mode considered was
"slip ring contact failure." The lack of consid-
eration of electrical shorts in effect prevented
the FMECA from serving as a tool for direct-
ing attention to those portions of the system
where electrical shorts could occur and led to
the erroneous conclusions that there were no
single point failure modes in the electrical
power subsystem.
Component Specifications - Compo-
nent specifications were used on Seasat to de-
fine the design, performance, acceptance,
and qualification requirements of the major
hardware items and subassemblies. Because
the program intent was to utilize as much
off-the-shelf hardware as possible, many ex-
isting specifications were redlined and up-
dated for the Seasat Agena bus. These red-
lined specifications were then converted into
component specifications by the responsible
equipment engineers. After April 1976, a
program directive established that all com-
ponent specifications on Seasat required the
signature approval of reliability engineer-
ing, of space technology, and of the chief sys-
tems engineer in addition to the responsible
equipment engineer and the program engi-
neer. Two specifications were released prior
to April 1976 and never received the full
complement of signature approvals. These
two specifications were for the Slip Ring As-
semblies and the Solar Array Drive Motors.
Had the other three engineering organiza-
tions reviewed the specifications, quite possi-
bly the Slip Ring Assembly thermal vacuum
test deletion may have been prevented and
inconsistencies in the qualification require-
ments may have been avoided. The compo-
nent specifications were not reviewed and
approved by JPL.
Qualification for Flight - The Seasat
program used the classical methods of quali-
fying hardware for flight. These were:
a) Qualification by test to demonstrate the
capability of an item to meet specification
requirements.
b) Qualification by design similarity where-
by an unqualified item is compared with
an item qualified by test to determine
whether the requirements for both items
and their configurations are sufficiently
similar to justify not testing the unquali-
fied item.
c) Qualification by engineering analysis, in-
dependently or in conjunction with test
and/or similarity, to meet a specific quali-
fication in the specifications. The use of
engineering analysis alone could not be
used to satisfy all qualification require-
ments.
In September 1976, the Lockheed Seasat pro-
ject issued a directive creating an Equipment
Qualification Review Board for the purpose
of reviewing and approving all qualification
and design similarity certificates. The pri-
mary membership of the board included the
program engineering managers, the chief
systems engineer, the program reliability en-
gineer, the quality assurance manager, and
the applicable space technology manager.
This Board met every two weeks to review
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the status of the qualification program and to
determine what additional tasks were re-
quired to qualify a given item. Status reports
were issued by program reliability engineer-
ing which tracked the qualification progress
and documented open items.
The qualification cycle concluded with a
meeting to review all test data, design simi-
larity statements, engineering analyses, and
individual component pedigree packages. In-
dividual Certificates of Qualification were is-
sued stating that the specific component had
been qualified to the intended environment
and was acceptable for flight. A JPL engi-
neering representative attended these quali-
fication review meetings but was not re-
quired to approve the qualification certif-
icate. A JPL reliability representative at-
tended approximately 25 percent of the re-
view meetings.
Review of Build Paper - An evaluation
of the Seasat "build" paper was made with
primary attention focused on the electrical
power subsystem. The review encompassed
the electrical harness fabrication and instal-
lation, the "pedigree packages" on electrical
components and assemblies, nonconformance
reports on anomalies encountered in assem-
bly and test, vehicle log books, and the vehi-
cle acceptance summary.
Because the Board's failure analysis
eventually identified the slip ring assembly
as the component responsible for the Seasat
failure, the detailed build paper associated
with only this component will be discussed in
the next section. However, some brief obser-
vations are presented below that deal with
other findings made during the course of the
investigation.
The nonconformance reports are used by
Lockheed to document nonconforming condi-
tions and resultant dispositions and correc-
tion actions. In general, the nonconformance
report system at Lockheed was found to be
acceptable. At the Board's request, Lockheed
reviewed, cataloged, and summarized all
electrical power subsystem nonconformance
reports and made a conscious decision as to
the possible effect of the anomaly in contri-
buting to the Seasat failure. None of the non-
conformances were judged to be contributory
to the failure.
Evaluation of the spacecraft build paper
of the electrical power subsystem indicated
that the Air Force Plant Representative Of-
fice involvement, operating under delegation
from JPL, was shallow. Inspection coverage
was concentrated at the system level with
few in-process mandatory inspection points.
Early negotiations surfaced the fact that
the Air Force Plant Representative Office
could provide neither the number of person-
nel nor the required skill levels to perform
electronic inspections. As a result of these
negotiations, JPL elected to send three JPL
inspectors on extended temporary duty to
perform 100 percent of the solder joint in-
spections and electronic component accep-
tance testing. While it cannot be stated that
a more in-depth involvement by the govern-
ment would have prevented the failure, it is
the opinion of the Board that the depth of
penetration was inappropriate and a more
selective penetration would have been in or-
der rather than a nearly total reliance on
system level audits and shakedown inspec-
tions for the bus assembly operations.
SLIP RING HERITAGE
Consistent with the basic philosophy of the
Seasat program to use, to the maximum ex-
tent possible, standard flight-proven equip-
ment, the solar array drive motors and slip
ring assemblies for Seasat were adapted from
another Lockheed program. At the time of
initial contract negotiations, this other Lock-
heed program had just developed a slip ring
assembly and was in the process of perform-
ing qualification testing. This slip ring was
also being considered for still other Lockheed
programs and it was anticipated that the as-
sembly would be a qualified and flight-
proven design by the time Seasat was flown.
As it turns out, however, the program for
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which the design was originally developed
was canceled after completion of slip ring
qualification but prior to flight; however, one
other Lockheed program did fly a slip ring
assembly of this design shortly before Seasat
was launched. While the designs of the slip
ring assembly for Seasat and this "previously
flown" program were identical, the wiring se-
quence of the individual rings and brushes
was different in the two programs. As noted
earlier, the Seasat slip rings were wired such
that most of the adjacent power brushes were
of opposite DC polarity while the other Lock-
heed program was wired such that the adja-
cent power brushes had the same polarity.
This difference in how the slip ring assem-
blies were connected into the electrical power
subsystem thus became crucial to the heri-
tage of the Seasat slip ring assembly; when
the Seasat slip ring assembly became, in its
application, connected in a manner that was
different from its sole predecessor it became
a unique, first of a kind component.
Two significant problems were noted as a
result of random vibration testing of the slip
ring assemblies used for the other Lockheed
flight program. An isolation failure was
found after vibration testing in two adjacent
brush/ring circuits. The corrective action was
to separate the brushes. Also, when the as-
sembly was opened for this operation, a crack
was noted in the brush mounting block at a
mounting hole. This block was replaced on
the failed unit and a "T" strengthener was
added to all identical slip ring assemblies, in-
cluding the Seasat units, to distribute the
mounting loads away from the mounting
point.
Failure History - Slip ring assemblies of
the design flown by Seasat experienced two
nonconformances that provide evidence of
two separate failure mode possibilities. One
of these was the isolation failure noted above
on the other Lockheed flight program that
was indicative of a possible failure mode due
to contact between adjacent brushes of oppo-
site polarity. Another failure mode identified
on one of the Seasat assemblies was caused
by shorting of a wire to ground due to cold
flow of the Teflon insulation in the region
where high stresses were imposed on the
wire. This incident will be described later.
Considerable evidence exists in published
reports that the sliding friction between
brushes and rings will generate debris parti-
cles that can accumulate and produce electri-
cal noise or, in some cases, short circuits be-
tween adjacent rings and brushes. Lockheed
experienced a shorting failure in a slip as-
sembly used in ground tests of a control mo-
ment gyro prior to June 1977, which was at-
tributed to accumulation of brush-generated
debris and subsequent arcing between adja-
cent power brushes. Discussion with engi-
neering personnel from TRW, Ball Corpora-
tion, and Sperry Flight Systems have indi-
cated that other aerospace contractors have
experienced similar slip ring shorts in
ground tests. As a result of their experience
with slip rings, Sperry initiated an experi-
mental study of the possible effects of debris.
While the Board recognizes that there are
significant differences between the design
and application of the Seasat slip ring assem-
bly and these other units, experience illus-
trates a third possible failure mode due to
shorting caused by contaminants or debris
within the assembly.
Seasat Slip Ring History - A portion of
the build history of components is assembled
by Lockheed into pedigree packages. These
packages contain component drawings, a
component specification including accep-
tance and qualification test requirements,
nonconformance reports, and some vendor
documentation including specified testing
and plans test records. Component selection
for pedigree packages was determined by the
Seasat Program Office and the quality assur-
ance organization at Lockheed. The Seasat
slip ring assemblies are documented by such
pedigree packages. Relevant component his-
tory not contained in the slip ring pedigree
packages include vendor assembly and test
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nonconformance reports (including failure
reports), assembly test procedures and
records (including brush alignments and
pressure checks and brush "run-in" proce-
dures), and relevant vendor and customer
correspondence.
The timing of the Seasat contract was
such that Lockheed was able to acquire two
partially assembled slip ring assemblies
when another Lockheed program referred to
herein as Program A, was canceled. Program
A had initially contracted for 10 assemblies
and, at the time of termination, had accepted
delivery of one qualification unit, one devel-
opment unit, and two production units leav-
ing six partially assembled units at the ven-
dor. The Seasat program picked up two of
these units and Lockheed Program B picked
up the additional units. Reference will be
made to Program B in other portions of this
report relative to test experience and use of
Program B qualification testing as a basis for
qualifying the Seasat slip rings by similar-
ity.
Program A personnel were informed by
Poly-Scientific in late 1973 that the con-
straints placed upon the length of the assem-
bly were found to be restrictive and that re-
lief of the specifications would enhance reli-
ability. Program A, however, could not relax
the specification. Although the Seasat appli-
cation was not constrained by length, the
program desire to use available off-the-shelf
hardware precluded the development of a
new unit having increased dimensional tol-
erances between the rings and brush assem-
blies with possibly enhanced inherent reli-
ability.
Seasat personnel initiated discussions
with Poly-Scientific in late 1975 using the
Lockheed Program A specification as a base-
line. On February 3, 1976, Poly-Scientific
submitted its first written quote for two as-
semblies to be fabricated and tested per the
Program A specification. This initial quote
was not acceptable to Lockheed, and the re-
sponsible equipment engineer and buyer re-
sponded on March 5, 1976, with a Seasat red-
lined version of the Program A specification.
It was in this March 5, 1976, specification
that the Program A requirement for 10 cy-
cles of thermal vacuum acceptance testing
was deleted. This deletion occurred even
though: (1) the majority of the Seasat elec-
tronic assemblies and electromechanical as-
semblies were subjected to a thermal vacuum
acceptance test; (2) Seasat reliability and
systems engineering personnel, and JPL per-
sonnel were unaware of this deletion until
the present failure investigation; and (3) the
thermal vacuum test was contractually re-
quired and a waiver of the requirement was
never issued.
Upon pursuing the thermal vacuum dele-
tion further, it was determined from inter-
views with involved personnel that the test
was deleted during verbal negotiations be-
tween both the responsible equipment engi-
neer and the buyer at Lockheed, and the ven-
dor in order to reduce unit cost of the slip
ring assemblies. The responsible Lockheed
program engineer approved the deletion but,
at that time, there was no requirement to co-
ordinate specifications with the Seasat pro-
gram reliability engineer or the chief sys-
tems engineer. The fact that a waiver was
not issued on this and other contract noncom-
pliances is indicative of a weak compliance
system between Lockheed and JPL.
On March 25, 1976, Lockheed issued a
formal Request for Quote to Poly-Scientific
for two Seasat slip ring assemblies built to
the March 5, 1976 specification with a re-
quested delivery date of one year. On May
26, 1976, Lockheed authorized contract go
ahead for two slip ring assemblies at a unit
price of $8,953.50.
Researching the manufacturing history
and fabrication and test anomalies at Poly-
Scientific resulted in the following:
a) There were four anomalies noted on slip
ring unit 1001. Three were minor and ap-
pear to have had no real impact on assem-
bly reliability. The fourth anomaly was a
Teflon wire short to an adjacent ground
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c)
lug. The repair action, approved by Lock-
heed engineering, was to insulate the
ground terminal and repot with ES 222-2
cement. The damaged insulation on the
wire was not repaired. This discrepancy
report was not included in the vendor's
data package and consequently this fail-
ure was not contained in the Lockheed
pedigree package.
b) Slip Ring Unit 1002 (-Y solar array) had
the more significant anomalies noted dur-
ing fabrication and test. These anomalies
are summarized as follows:
1) 9/20/76 - 80 minute run-in of brushes
to rings at 100_ 10 rpm. Run-in time
should have been for 100 to 115 min-
utes. This discrepancy was missed and
not documented.
2) 9/23/76 - discrepancy No. 146522 - dis-
colored rings noted after above run-in
test. Unit had to be completely disas-
sembled, brushes and rings recleaned,
unit reassembled and another run-in
performed. The exact run-in time was
not recorded nor entered into the log
book.
3) 11/12/76 - discrepancy No. 151887 - ex-
cessive noise noted caused by moisture
pick-up in the brush material. Correc-
tive action was to run the unit in vacu-
um at 14.4 rpm for 1½ hours. No vacu-
um cleanup was performed after this
14.4 rpm run-in test. This run time
was not entered into the log book.
Review of vendor documentation and sub-
sequent teleconferences with Poly-
Scientific personnel revealed the follow-
ing assembly technique and procedures:
1) The assembly planning documenta-
tion specified that the brushes were to
be aligned "in center of the rings."
This requirement was verified visual-
ly by the inspector, but no dimensional
checks were made. Proper alignment
of the brushes is dependent, therefore,
on the inspector's judgment.
2) Poly-Scientific stated that the toler-
ances within the slip ring assembly
could allow adjacent brushes to touch.
It is noted here that an identical slip
ring assembly experienced an isola-
tion failure during acceptance testing
which was probably caused by adja-
cent brushes touching. (Program B
hardware).
Both Seasat slip ring assemblies were
shipped from Poly-Scientific on February 22,
1977. These units were received and accepted
at Lockheed on March 11, 1977, where they
remained in storage until required for instal-
lation on their respective solar array mod-
ules.
In approximately July 1977, Lockheed
Program B, which utilized identical slip ring
assemblies, made a wiring change external
to the slip rings that separated the polarity
arrangement of adjacent slip rings. By
changing connector pin functions, the power
applied to individual rings was changed from
a configuration in which adjacent rings were
of opposite polarity to one having positive
contacts on one end of the slip ring assembly
and negative contacts on the opposite end.
This wiring change significantly reduced the
possibility of internal shorts within the slip
ring assembly.
The Seasat chief system engineer was
contacted by a system engineer from Pro-
gram B about this change in wiring in Au-
gust 1977. The explanation given for the wir-
ing change was a concern that the ascent vi-
bration environment could cause adjacent
brushes to make contact and thus produce an
electrical short because Program B slip rings
had power applied during launch. The chief
system engineer discussed this change with
the Seasat program engineer and they decid-
ed not to make a similar wiring change be-
cause Seasat did not see the same launch vi-
bration levels and because Seasat slip rings
were not planned to be powered during
launch. It is noted that in April 1978, a
change in launch relay configuration was
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made which did apply power to the slip ring
assemblies. In retrospect, the decision not to
change the wiring sequence for Seasat was a
crucial one. When the other program
changed its wiring and Seasat did not, Seasat
became the first program to fly a 52-brush
slip ring assembly with adjacent brushes of
opposite polarity. Had there been better visi-
bility to the problems experienced with slip
rings by both the vendor and by other organi-
zations within Lockheed, the Seasat engi-
neering managers may have been more sen-
sitive to the failure prone nature of this com-
plicated device and to the importance of the
electrical polarity of adjacent brushes. Un-
fortunately, such visibility, which may only
have needed to have been slight to have been
effective, was lacking.
Slip Ring Assembly serial number 1002
was installed on the -Y solar array module on
August 17, 1977. On August 30, 1977, a non-
conformance report was written because the
mechanic "lost" an undetermined number of
shim washers.
Review of the installation drawing re-
vealed that four number 10 washers were re-
quired between the solar array mounting
structure and the slip ring assembly. The
cover of the assembly is made of thin sheet
metal and is prone to bow up during installa-
tion operations. Because the mounting bolts
go through the cover plate into the threaded
holes in the slip ring body, the mechanic had
to place the round washers over the bolts be-
tween the structure and the cover plate. It
was during this operation that the mechanic
lost the washers. The S/N 1002 slip ring as-
sembly was removed from the solar array
module, the cover plate removed and three
washers were found. Because some areas
were still obscured, an x-ray of the slip ring
was taken. No additional washers were locat-
ed. A nonconformance report was then writ-
ten against Slip Ring Assembly 1001 and no
washers were found by either visual or x-ray
inspection. It is interesting to note two
things: (1) there were no downstream electri-
cal functional checks after installation of the
slip ring assembly which could have detected
missing washers in the slip rings, and (2) it
was never conclusively determined if all lost
washers were found.
The solar array modules, including the
slip ring assemblies, were shipped to the
launch site in April 1978. The last reported
anomaly on the slip rings was high contact
resistance on unit 1002 during interface tests
performed when the solar array modules
were mated to the vehicle. The resistance
reading recorded was 2.38 ohms; the specifi-
cation value was 2.00 ohms maximum. The
engineering disposition in the nonconfor-
mance report was "use-as-is" because in-
flight operation would decrease the contact
resistance.
SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS
1) The spacecraft failure that occurred on
October 9, 1978, was due to a loss of elec-
trical power in the Agena bus as a result
of a massive and progressive electrical
short within the slip ring assembly of the
-Y solar array.
2) The electrical short was most probably
initiated by an arc between adjacent com-
ponents in the slip ring assembly. Possi-
ble triggering mechanisms for this arc are
momentary shorts caused by wire-to-
brush assembly contact, brush-to-brush
contact, or by a contaminant.
3) The congested nature of the slip ring de-
sign, coupled with a wiring arrangement
for connecting the slip rings into the pow-
er subsystem that resulted in most of the
adjacent brush assemblies being of oppo-
site polarity, made the Seasat slip ring as-
sembly particularly prone to shorting.
4) The combination of design and wiring se-
quence used for the Seasat slip ring as-
semblies made these unique, first-of-a-
kind components.
5) The possibility of slip ring failures result-
ing from placing opposite electrical po-
larities on adjacent brush assemblies was
known at least as early as the summer
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1977 to other projects within the prime
contractor's organization. That the Seasat
organization was not fully aware of these
potential failure modes was due to a
breakdown in communications within the
contractor's organization.
6) The failure to recognize the potential fail-
ure modes of the slip ring assembly and to
give this critical component the attention
it deserved was due, in part, to the under-
lying program policy and pervasive view
that it was an existing component of a
well-proven and extensively used stan-
dard Agena bus. This program policy fur-
ther led to a concentration by project
management on the sensors and sensor
module of the spacecraft to the near ex-
clusion of the bus subsystems. In actual-
ity, many of these subsystems, including
the power subsystem, contained compo-
nents that were neither flight proven nor
truly qualified by similarity.
7) Lack of proper attention by both Lock-
heed and JPL Seasat program engineer-
ing to the new and unproven components
on the Agena bus resulted in several in-
stances of both noncompliance with con-
tractual, qualification and acceptance re-
quirements and failure to document such
noncompliances.
8) The Failure Modes, Effects, and Critical-
ity Analysis that was conducted for the
electrical power subsystem did not consid-
er shorts as a failure mode and thus did
not reveal the presence of single point
failure modes in the subsystem nor pro-
vide a basis for the development of a full
complement of safing command se-
quences that could be used by the flight
controllers in responding to anomalies.
9) The strong desire on the part of all con-
cerned to initiate the project as soon as
possible resulted in inadequate time for
an effective Phase B study. As a result,
the project office did not have the opportu-
nity to plan the activity thoughtfully and
establish the preliminary designs, compo-
nent evaluations, test plans, and other
Phase B project plans before becoming en-
gaged in the actual spacecraft develop-
ment.
Although unrelated to the failure of the Sea-
sat, certain deficiencies in flight control pro-
cedures were present that are worthy of note
as a lesson for the future. The flight control-
lers were not provided with an adequate set
of safing command sequences to use in re-
sponse to anomalies, were not sufficiently fa-
miliar with the system they were controlling,
received insufficient anomaly training and,
during the failure event itself, failed to fol-
low the prescribed procedures in response to
the flight data available to them. Compound-
ing these difficulties were the frequent
breakdowns of the ground data acquisition
and processing system throughout the mis-
sion.
It is ironic, and yet typical, of spacecraft
failures that the termination of the Seasat
flight was caused not by a malfunction of a
new or sophisticated device, but by a failure
in a very common component of a type that
has flown in many spacecraft for many years.
It is also ironic, and instructive, that the
smallest of events or the slightest of commu-
nications could have prevented the failure.
Better clarity in an oral communication, a
brief memorandum of the right kind at the
right time, a failure report coming to the
right person, or an alert engineer could have
made all the difference.
Basic to the Seasat mission was the con-
cept of using an existing, flight-proven space-
craft bus for the services and housekeeping
functions required by the sensors in order to
minimize program costs and to permit a con-
centration of effort on the sensors and their
integration into the spacecraft. Thus the use
of a "standard Agena bus" as part of the Sea-
sat spacecraft became an enduring tenet of
the program. So firmly rooted was this prin-
ciple in program philosophy that, even after
the engineering staffs of both the govern-
ment and the contractor were well aware of
the final uniqueness of their Agena bus, the
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words, and the associated way of doing busi-
ness, persisted. They became deceived by
their own words.
Consistent with the concept of the "stan-
dard Agena bus" was the policy decision to
minimize testing and documentation, to
qualify components by similarity wherever
possible and to minimize the penetration into
the Agena bus by the government. As a re-
sult, a test was waived without proper ap-
proval, important component failures were
not reported to project management, compli-
ance with specifications was weak, and flight
controllers were inadequately prepared for
their task. Significantly, the Seasat slip ring
assembly had no applicable flight history at
the time of its launch and, in its application
to the spacecraft, was a new device.
There can, of course, be no quarrel with
the policy of using existing and well proven
equipment. The use of such equipment has
certainly reduced the costs and contributed
to the success of many space missions. But
the world of space flight is an unforgiving
one and words like "standard," "existing,"
and "similar to" can be traps for the unwary.
The technical risks of using standard equip-
ment can be as high as those present in a new
or untried piece of equipment, but the ap-
proach, both technical and managerial, must
be different. For new equipment, one designs
carefully, reviews thoroughly, and tests com-
pletely -- and that we know how to do. For
standard equipment, one should diligently
and thoroughly probe the heritage that justi-
fies the classification and identify, compo-
nent by component and piece by piece, those
that are truly standard and those that are
not. One should assume that each space vehi-
cle is unique until proven otherwise. Then,
for those parts that are standard or well
proven, and that are applied in the same
way, one can forego design, reviews, testing
and extensive documentation. Conversely,
components that are different should be
treated as new. The policy of limited pene-
tration into Seasat's Agena bus by the gov-
ernment was appropriate, but a limited pene-
tration must be a selective penetration and
not a reduced effort everywhere.
This identification of the heritage of pre-
viously used equipment, in both design and
application, need not require a large staff or
a lot of money. But it does take time, both at
the start of the project and at the time of the
Critical Design Review. And here, respond-
ing to strong desires by all concerned to get
the project on contract and underway, the
Seasat project was denied the advantage of
an effective Phase B study. Had there been
an effective Phase B study period, prelimi-
nary designs would have been completed,
component selections better understood, test
plans and qualification requirements better
established, and possibly, the critical role
and inherent complexities of the slip ring as-
sembly might have been more apparent to
the Seasat engineering staffs. Whether such
a Phase B study period would have precluded
the Seasat failure is, of course, uncertain for
history does not reveal its alternatives. But
such a carefully conducted planning and
study period would have minimized the
chances for the type of failure that did occur.
The policy of using existing, flight-proven
equipment can be both valid and cost effec-
tive. But it is the main lesson of Seasat that
an uncritical acceptance of such classifica-
tions as "standard" can submerge important
differences from previously used equipment
in both design and in application. It is impor-
tant, therefore, that thorough planning be
conducted at the start of a project to fully
evaluate the heritage of such equipment, to
identify those that are standard and those
that are not, and to establish project plans
and procedures that enable the system to be
penetrated in a selective manner.
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DEFINING SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
by George S. Trimble
Editors' Note
Back on September 27, 1968, a NASA engi-
neer by the name of George S. Trimble wrote
to the Chief of the Management Analysis and
University Programs Office after the Chief
issued a letter to find a universally suitable
definition for "systems engineer." The engi-
neer told the manager that the term had no
particular meaning at all. "In fact," Trimble
claimed, "I may know the guy who thought it
up or resurrected it, as the case may be, for
modern usage." His seemingly authoritative
account follows:
During the war, new management prac-
tices were introduced at a great rate, and one
of the functions that came to the fore was the
business of writing job descriptions and eval-
uating them. Certain industrial relations
experts fell heir to this function, and there
was a tendency for them to write very clear
job descriptions for all jobs except their own.
It soon became obvious that the value of a
job, or, more importantly, the money it paid
(or even more importantly, its draft-dodging
power), was inversely proportional to the
ease with which one could describe it. Indus-
trial relations people were able to describe
any engineering job in 25 words or less,
whereas an industrial relations function
might take two or three pages. Miserable to
begin with, engineering salaries were futher
threatened and so was draft status.
Of course, everyone knows that engineers
are very creative. They could see that the
industrial relations boys had a good thing
going, so they borrowed the approach and
improved on it (typical engineering method).
Soon it took five pages to describe the
most menial engineering task, and the engi-
neers were saved. It was a simple matter to
spend three hours explaining to a job analyst
from industrial relations why a 'systems
engineering' blueprint file was much more
complicated to run than a simple old 'engi-
neering' blueprint file, which was, of course,
familiar. The guy from industrial relations
never did understand it because the guy who
explained it, didn't. It takes a lot of words to
explain something you don't understand or
that isn't there. Try explaining 'zero' some-
time.
A parallel effort with the objective of em-
phasizing *!!ENGINEERING!!* was carried
out with great dispatch by the 'scientists,' all
of whom became famous at the close of WWII
because a couple of them invented and built
the A-bomb, all by themselves, with great se-
crecy. What they were really doing all that
time, of course, wasn't science--it was engi-
neering. When this was discovered, a mixed
wave of nausea and terror ran through the
brotherhood. It was worse than being caught
reading a dirty book in church. Most learned
scientists knew that engineers were people
who ran around with special hats and oil
cans and made steam locomotives go, and
who, incidentally, made too much money. Be-
ing identified as part of the same crowd was
too much for the intellectuals to bear. Scien-
tists had to be working on something more
important than 'engineering,' which is super-
vised by a Ph.D and is therefore high-class
and also obvious to those schooled properly,
but difficult if not impossible for anybody
else to understand.
Since, as we all know, very few, if any,
Ph.Ds understand the meaning of plain, ordi-
nary 'engineering,' it follows that 'systems
engineering' has given engineering a bad
name, and should be avoided for that reason
alone.
A third group who helped the cause for
systems engineering were the pre-war 'hand-
book' engineers who discovered creative
engineering when they joined up with a war-
time industrial engineering group to avoid
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being drafted. They had always thought that
engineering was the choosing from a catalog
of the proper washer for a quarter-inch bolt.
It was difficult for them to use the same
name for their new discovery, creative
engineering (designing a washer for a
quarter-inch bolt). The term 'systems engi-
neering' suited well, and groups of people
were noising it around by then. It sounded
nice and, after all, a quarter-inch bolt is a
fastening system of high complexity. It
consists of a bolt with threads (helical in-
clined plane), a nut of the proper size, hand
and thread configuration (bolt interface
problem), external shape (wrench interface
problem), one or more washers (structures
interface problem), and sometimes even a
cotter pin (reliability).
Moreover, one could dream of performing
systems engineering at increased hierar-
chical levels by considering at one and the
same time not only the quarter-inch bolt, but
also the half-inch bolt. Advanced systems
engineering.
So much for the history and meaning of
systems engineering. You can demonstrate
the validity of my story to yourself in several
ways. Your letter, for instance, can be clari-
fied by eliminating the word 'systems.' I
believe it appears 10 times. Check the uni-
versities for courses in systems engineering
and find out what they are really teaching.
Note also that the term 'systems engineer-
ing' does not yet appear in an accredited
dictionary. This is because Webster cannot
figure it out either. Good luck!
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